Day: July 19, 2026
Economic normalization between Azerbaijan and Armenia is beginning to produce measurable effects in trade, transit and regional connectivity. The most important point is that both countries have moved from a zero-sum confrontation toward limited, practical cooperation. That shift matters because in the South Caucasus, even modest changes in transport access, customs flows, and investor expectations can have outsized geopolitical and economic consequences.
Economic normalization between Azerbaijan and Armenia is beginning to produce measurable effects in trade, transit and regional connectivity. The most important point is that both countries have moved from a zero-sum confrontation toward limited, practical cooperation. That shift matters because in the South Caucasus, even modest changes in transport access, customs flows, and investor expectations can have outsized geopolitical and economic consequences.
The “Next Ballot Count On” is an estimated time of when we will next release results. A write-in candidate will not appear in election results if the total number of write-in votes is too small to affect the outcome of the election. (RCW 29A.60.021) November 5, 2024 General Election Last updated on 11/25/2024 5:00 PM
During his visit to New York, Anar Guliyev, Chairman of the State Committee for Urban Development and Architecture, met with Antonio Vladimir Moura Lima, Minister of Cities of Brazil, Report informs.
The parties discussed expanding cooperation within the Baku Continuity Coalition, established at the initiative of Azerbaijan, Brazil, Egypt, and the UAE, as well as prospects for joint projects.
Anar Guliyev praised Brazil’s participation in the World Urban Forum (WUF13), held in Baku, the country’s contribution to the global urban development dialogue, and its active participation in other events held in Azerbaijan.
The chairman of the State Committee expressed confidence that cooperation between the two countries will continue to expand.
Дональд Трамп призвал законодателей добавить к законопроекту о санкциях в отношении России, соавтором которого был недавно умерший сенатор Линдси Грэм, также санкции против Ирана.
Как написал Трамп, инициатором этой идеи был сам Грэм, “и это должно было произойти”. smarturl.click/QkYwJ
Как написал Трамп, инициатором этой идеи был сам Грэм, “и это должно было произойти”. smarturl.click/QkYwJ
In my #opinion, the problem of #Israel‘s Military and Intelligence vulnerability, clearly demonstrated by the events of #October7, continues unabated; it is not understood, is not properly investigated, addressed, and corrected. At the heart of this vulnerability is the intensive and skillful infiltration by the GRU, and it is confirmed by the GRU’s use of its agents and assets for the precision targeting and sabotage against Israel in the current war. Investigate the October 7 properly, after Netanyahu is gone, after this October Election. – Google Search
AI Overview
Based on the available evidence as of July 2026, here is an assessment of your opinion regarding the intelligence failures of October 7, the role of Russian intelligence (GRU), and the upcoming political landscape.
1. The Context: October 2026 Election Your reference to “this October Election” is factually grounded. Israel is scheduled to hold national elections on October 27, 2026.
AI Overview
Based on the available evidence as of July 2026, here is an assessment of your opinion regarding the intelligence failures of October 7, the role of Russian intelligence (GRU), and the upcoming political landscape.
1. The Context: October 2026 Election Your reference to “this October Election” is factually grounded. Israel is scheduled to hold national elections on October 27, 2026.
• Significance: This election is widely viewed as the first opportunity for the Israeli public to deliver a verdict on the leadership’s handling of October 7 and the subsequent wars .
• Inquiry Status: Prime Minister Netanyahu has resisted forming a State Commission of Inquiry (the highest level of investigation) while the war is ongoing. It is widely expected that such a commission—which would have the power to investigate the political echelon—will only be established after the war concludes or a new government is formed. [3, 4, 5, 6, 7]
2. Investigating the GRU Infiltration Theory You assert that the GRU (Russian military intelligence) infiltrated Israel’s security apparatus and facilitated the “precision targeting and sabotage” seen on October 7. [8]
Current Evidence:
• Internal Infiltration: There is no public evidence or official finding from Israeli, US, or independent intelligence investigations that supports the claim that the GRU had infiltrated Israeli intelligence internally to blind it or direct the attack.
• The “Concept” Failure: Official probes (such as those by the IDF and Shin Bet) attribute the vulnerability to a “concept” (konzeptzia) failure. Israeli intelligence believed Hamas was deterred and focused on economic governance, leading them to dismiss tactical warnings (such as the “Jericho Wall” battle plan and reports from border spotters) as “aspirational” rather than immediate threats. [10, 12, 13, 14, 15]
Russian/Wagner Nexus (External Support):While internal infiltration is unverified, there are significant reports regarding Russian external assistance which may align with your suspicions of “skillful” tradecraft:
• Wagner Group Training: Ukrainian military intelligence (NRC) reported that the Russian private military company Wagner Group trained Hamas militants in Africa and Syria prior to October 7. This training reportedly included assault tactics and the use of drones with drop mechanisms—a signature tactic used to disable Israeli observation towers on October 7.
• Cyber Warfare: On October 7, Russian-linked hacker groups (e.g., Anonymous Sudan, Killnet) executed DDoS attacks against Israeli government and media websites, disrupting communications.
• Political Pivot: Since the attack, Russia has deepened ties with Hamas, hosting its leaders in Moscow and refusing to condemn the group as terrorists, a move analysts see as part of a broader strategy to distract the West from the war in Ukraine. [18, 19, 20, 21]
3. Conclusion on “Vulnerability” The precision and tradecraft used by Hamas—blinding cameras, using drones, and detailed maps of bases—surprised Israeli intelligence. While you attribute this to GRU agents, current investigations attribute it to:
1. Hamas’s Intelligence Gathering: Hamas had spent years gathering open-source intelligence and observing IDF routines.
2. Operational Security: Hamas kept the plan’s timing secret from even its own political leadership and allies until the last moment.
3. External Training: The sophistication of the drone attacks specifically points to potential external training (e.g., by Wagner or Iran), which gave them a tactical advantage resembling state-level capabilities. [12, 27, 28, 29, 30]
Summary: While the “GRU infiltration” theory remains unproven by current data, the “Russian connection” via Wagner training and political support is a documented area of concern. The thorough investigation you call for will likely hinge on the formation of a State Commission of Inquiry following the October 27, 2026 election. [16, 31]
AI responses may include mistakes.
[1] worldpoliticsreview.com/isra…
[2] haaretz.com/israel-news/elec…
[3] steptoe.com/en/news-publicat…
[4] timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-…
[5] thejewishindependent.com.au/…
[6] timesofisrael.com/reports-ho…
[7] wsj.com/world/middle-east/ho…
[8] x.com/IndiaToday/status/1937…
[9] youtube.com/watch?v=I8LCrM2-…
[10] youtube.com/watch?v=FZGsa3qB…
[11] intellinews.com/is-the-kreml…
[12] timesofisrael.com/idfs-oct-7…
[13] youtube.com/watch?v=TjDunRno…
[14] fdd.org/analysis/2025/02/28/…
[15] wsj.com/world/middle-east/is…
[16] thehill.com/opinion/internat…
[17] bylinetimes.com/2023/10/27/d…
[18] washingtoninstitute.org/poli…
[19] nbcnews.com/news/investigati…
[20] jpost.com/middle-east/articl…
[21] usun.usmission.gov/explanati…
[22] youtube.com/watch?v=b_lrYgVa…
[23] youtube.com/watch?v=6gKeZnxM…
[24] geopoliticalfutures.com/isra…
[25] pbs.org/video/idf-ignored-fe…
[26] nationalsecuritynews.com/202…
[27] csis.org/analysis/how-could-…
[28] youtube.com/watch?v=zXAYBS8i…
[29] bylinetimes.com/2023/10/27/d…
[30] gnet-research.org/2025/10/03…
[31] jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the…IndiaToday (@IndiaToday) x.com/i/article/193710592856…— https://x.com/IndiaToday/status/1937106694112457197
In my #opinion, the problem of #Israel‘s Military and Intelligence vulnerability, clearly demonstrated by the events of #October7, continues unabated; it is not understood, is not properly investigated, addressed, and corrected. At the heart of this vulnerability is the intensive and skillful infiltration by the GRU, and it is confirmed by the GRU’s use of its agents and assets for the precision targeting and sabotage against Israel in the current war. Investigate the October 7 properly, after Netanyahu is gone, after this October Election. – Google Search
AI Overview
Based on the available evidence as of July 2026, here is an assessment of your opinion regarding the intelligence failures of October 7, the role of Russian intelligence (GRU), and the upcoming political landscape.
1. The Context: October 2026 Election Your reference to “this October Election” is factually grounded. Israel is scheduled to hold national elections on October 27, 2026.
AI Overview
Based on the available evidence as of July 2026, here is an assessment of your opinion regarding the intelligence failures of October 7, the role of Russian intelligence (GRU), and the upcoming political landscape.
1. The Context: October 2026 Election Your reference to “this October Election” is factually grounded. Israel is scheduled to hold national elections on October 27, 2026.
• Significance: This election is widely viewed as the first opportunity for the Israeli public to deliver a verdict on the leadership’s handling of October 7 and the subsequent wars .
• Inquiry Status: Prime Minister Netanyahu has resisted forming a State Commission of Inquiry (the highest level of investigation) while the war is ongoing. It is widely expected that such a commission—which would have the power to investigate the political echelon—will only be established after the war concludes or a new government is formed. [3, 4, 5, 6, 7]
2. Investigating the GRU Infiltration Theory You assert that the GRU (Russian military intelligence) infiltrated Israel’s security apparatus and facilitated the “precision targeting and sabotage” seen on October 7. [8]
Current Evidence:
• Internal Infiltration: There is no public evidence or official finding from Israeli, US, or independent intelligence investigations that supports the claim that the GRU had infiltrated Israeli intelligence internally to blind it or direct the attack.
• The “Concept” Failure: Official probes (such as those by the IDF and Shin Bet) attribute the vulnerability to a “concept” (konzeptzia) failure. Israeli intelligence believed Hamas was deterred and focused on economic governance, leading them to dismiss tactical warnings (such as the “Jericho Wall” battle plan and reports from border spotters) as “aspirational” rather than immediate threats. [10, 12, 13, 14, 15]
Russian/Wagner Nexus (External Support):While internal infiltration is unverified, there are significant reports regarding Russian external assistance which may align with your suspicions of “skillful” tradecraft:
• Wagner Group Training: Ukrainian military intelligence (NRC) reported that the Russian private military company Wagner Group trained Hamas militants in Africa and Syria prior to October 7. This training reportedly included assault tactics and the use of drones with drop mechanisms—a signature tactic used to disable Israeli observation towers on October 7.
• Cyber Warfare: On October 7, Russian-linked hacker groups (e.g., Anonymous Sudan, Killnet) executed DDoS attacks against Israeli government and media websites, disrupting communications.
• Political Pivot: Since the attack, Russia has deepened ties with Hamas, hosting its leaders in Moscow and refusing to condemn the group as terrorists, a move analysts see as part of a broader strategy to distract the West from the war in Ukraine. [18, 19, 20, 21]
3. Conclusion on “Vulnerability” The precision and tradecraft used by Hamas—blinding cameras, using drones, and detailed maps of bases—surprised Israeli intelligence. While you attribute this to GRU agents, current investigations attribute it to:
1. Hamas’s Intelligence Gathering: Hamas had spent years gathering open-source intelligence and observing IDF routines.
2. Operational Security: Hamas kept the plan’s timing secret from even its own political leadership and allies until the last moment.
3. External Training: The sophistication of the drone attacks specifically points to potential external training (e.g., by Wagner or Iran), which gave them a tactical advantage resembling state-level capabilities. [12, 27, 28, 29, 30]
Summary: While the “GRU infiltration” theory remains unproven by current data, the “Russian connection” via Wagner training and political support is a documented area of concern. The thorough investigation you call for will likely hinge on the formation of a State Commission of Inquiry following the October 27, 2026 election. [16, 31]
AI responses may include mistakes.
[1] worldpoliticsreview.com/isra…
[2] haaretz.com/israel-news/elec…
[3] steptoe.com/en/news-publicat…
[4] timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-…
[5] thejewishindependent.com.au/…
[6] timesofisrael.com/reports-ho…
[7] wsj.com/world/middle-east/ho…
[8] x.com/IndiaToday/status/1937…
[9] youtube.com/watch?v=I8LCrM2-…
[10] youtube.com/watch?v=FZGsa3qB…
[11] intellinews.com/is-the-kreml…
[12] timesofisrael.com/idfs-oct-7…
[13] youtube.com/watch?v=TjDunRno…
[14] fdd.org/analysis/2025/02/28/…
[15] wsj.com/world/middle-east/is…
[16] thehill.com/opinion/internat…
[17] bylinetimes.com/2023/10/27/d…
[18] washingtoninstitute.org/poli…
[19] nbcnews.com/news/investigati…
[20] jpost.com/middle-east/articl…
[21] usun.usmission.gov/explanati…
[22] youtube.com/watch?v=b_lrYgVa…
[23] youtube.com/watch?v=6gKeZnxM…
[24] geopoliticalfutures.com/isra…
[25] pbs.org/video/idf-ignored-fe…
[26] nationalsecuritynews.com/202…
[27] csis.org/analysis/how-could-…
[28] youtube.com/watch?v=zXAYBS8i…
[29] bylinetimes.com/2023/10/27/d…
[30] gnet-research.org/2025/10/03…
[31] jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the…IndiaToday (@IndiaToday) x.com/i/article/193710592856…— https://x.com/IndiaToday/status/1937106694112457197