The South Caucasus News - SouthCaucasusNews.comBut seriously, Putin has become a problem for everyone – both inside and outside Russia. He is a problem for Russia’s elites and for “allies,” including China. Putin is a problem for the United States and the European Union.
Putin has completely lost touch with reality. The only thing that interests him is endless war.
This situation cannot last forever.
Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry has congratulated the Republic of Maldives on the occasion of Independence Day, Report informs.
The ministry shared the message on its X account.
“Congratulations to the friendly people and government of the Republic of Maldives on the occasion of Independence Day. Happy Independence Day, Maldives!” reads the post.
The North Caucasus Federal District (NCFD) in Russia has registered a simultaneous rise in fuel prices and a drop in agricultural product costs.
While falling vegetable prices stem from standard seasonal harvest deflation rather than structural market shifts, this temporary consumer relief coincides with a severe supply-side fuel shock. Surging petrol and diesel prices, driven primarily by Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian refining infrastructure and domestic logistical bottlenecks, are creating a dual squeeze on regional agribusiness. Local agricultural producers face shrinking profit margins from low wholesale crop prices alongside rising operational transport costs.
As seasonal harvest deflation wanes, this persistent fuel pressure threatens to trigger broader transport-driven inflation across the NCFD, elevating socioeconomic friction in one of Russia’s most politically sensitive regions.
According to the Severo-Kavkazstat (the official statistics agency for the North Caucasus), recent price monitoring across highlights a sharp split in consumer costs, marked by an 11% surge in the price of AI-92 petrol in Ingushetia alongside rising diesel expenses. In North Ossetia, washing powder led non-food price increases with an 8.6% rise, while items such as televisions, boiled sausages, and sugar also grew more expensive. Conversely, seasonal agricultural produce provided some relief to household budgets, with staples including tomatoes, cucumbers, potatoes, cabbage, carrots, and beetroot seeing widespread price drops across all monitored territories.
Data shows that these falling vegetable costs are currently helping to offset wider inflation in fuel and grocery staples across Stavropol Krai, North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and Karachay-Cherkessia. However, official tracking across the region remains fragmented. Chechnya regularly publishes metrics restricted solely to food items, whereas Dagestan’s reporting suffers from significant delays, making a complete economic assessment of the entire North Caucasus difficult to maintain.
Despite local sources welcoming lower vegetable costs as consumer relief, the rise in fuel prices is likely linked to the ongoing Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian oil refineries, fuel depots, and energy storage infrastructure. By disrupting domestic refining capacity and creating logistical bottlenecks, these attacks have caused widespread fuel shortages throughout the Russian Federation.
Peripheral regions like the North Caucasus are particularly vulnerable to these supply chain pressures, forcing filling stations to raise prices rapidly and threatening broader transport-driven inflation once the seasonal drop in crop prices ends.
Because the North Caucasus serves as a strategic bridge between Russia and neighbouring regions, and as Moscow’s primary outposts in the Caucasus, rising economic friction poses political risks. Given the region’s significant contribution to Russian military manpower in Ukraine, economic strains such as surging fuel costs and reduced profits margins for agricultural produces might generate widespread local discontent.
Mitigating regional dissatisfaction towards local authorities and the Kremlin is critical for Russian leadership. While large-scale ethno-nationalist insurgency (resembling the Chechen Wars of the 1990s or the Caucasus Emirate in the 2000s) has been largely suppressed, modern security threats stem from anti-mobilisation grievances, North Caucasian Diaspora’s campaign activities against Moscow as well as Caucasian volunteers fighting alongside the Ukrainian forces, localised civil unrest, and digital recruitment by transnational violent extremist organizations (such as the Islamic State) targeting marginalised Muslim youth. Therefore, a deteriorating socioeconomic environment is likely to elevate regional geopolitical risks unless the Kremlin intervenes with targeted investments and fiscal relief measures
In the short term, ongoing Ukrainian drone attacks against Russian critical infrastructures and oil pipelines will likely continue to exert pressures on the domestic fuel system, with direct repercussions for the North Caucasus. Military recruiters will likely exploit deteriorating local economic conditions by leveraging high contract bonuses and state benefits to attract economically squeezed agricultural workers into the armed forces.
In the medium term, if Russia remains unable to counter Ukrainian drone strikes, accumulating socioeconomic strains in the North Caucasus will likely fuel domestic resentment against central authorities, creating vulnerabilities that external actors or violent extremist organisations might exploit against Moscow.