‘Church cannot be a state within a state’: issue included in Armenia’s ruling party programme JAMnews
Day: April 21, 2026
Catholicos removal in Pashinyan programme
For a second day in a row, Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has been reading out and commenting on individual points of his party’s election programme in a live broadcast. Among other issues, the Civil Contract party programme addresses the reform of the Church.
Under the ruling party’s plans, the “de facto head of the Church”, as Pashinyan’s team refers to the Catholicos, should step down.
“We are appealing to the people, because, yes, the Church is прежде всего the people, and elections are, in essence, a form of judicial process. The people, as the main source of legitimacy and rule of law, act as the judge. The people must deliver a fair verdict in the upcoming elections,” Pashinyan said, explaining why the issue of removing Garegin II was included in the programme.
He stressed that the Church in Armenia is separate from the state, but cannot operate outside it.
“Moreover, the Church cannot be a state within a state. This is absolutely unacceptable,” the prime minister said.
The Holy See has already condemned the party’s election programme. It said the ruling political force is making “unlawful campaign promises” to continue its actions against the Church.
Further details include what other provisions related to the Church appear in the programme, how Nikol Pashinyan comments on them, and how the Church responds.
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“The Church must be removed from politics”
The Civil Contract party’s election programme sets out key priorities for 2026–2031. It says that “renewing the Armenian Apostolic Church is a vital necessity”.
The party argues that the actions of the “de facto leadership of the Church” in recent years have distanced believers from the Church, and continue to do so. It describes this as “an issue of spiritual security”:
“This has allowed external forces to try to turn the Armenian Apostolic Church into a stronghold of hybrid warfare against Armenia’s independence and sovereignty.”
The programme outlines the following plan:
- removal of the de facto head of the Church;
- appointment of a locum tenens;
- adoption of a Church statute that preserves centuries-old traditions, while ensuring financial transparency and proper conduct of the clergy;
- election of a new Catholicos.
The document states that Armenia is a secular state and that religious organisations are separate from it. Party representatives say they respect freedom of religion and belief for all citizens. They argue that the proposed reforms “serve the full restoration of constitutional order in Armenia”. According to the ruling party, this requires removing the Church from politics.
Pashinyan: ‘The reform agenda is not against the Church‘
The prime minister says the ongoing process does not target the Church, but aims to support it.
“The Church is, first and foremost, the community of believers — the people, the congregation. Yes, the clergy are part of the Church, but the clergy are not the Church; the Church is the people,” he said.
Pashinyan also said that the parliamentary elections due in June would serve as a “judicial process” assessing the performance of the ruling majority and other political forces.
“Citizens must answer the question: to what extent is it acceptable to them that Ktrich Nersisyan [the Catholicos’s secular name] has for a long time turned the Church into a political party?”
The prime minister said the Church now formally engages in political activity. He said it delivers political messaging instead of spiritual sermons. He also argued that clergy have repeatedly crossed legal boundaries, and continue to do so, “with all the ensuing consequences.”
Response from the Mother See of Etchmiadzin: ‘This violates the Church’s right to self-governance‘
After the ruling party published its election programme, the Mother See issued a statement condemning what it described as “unacceptable provisions” concerning the Church.
It described the reform agenda, the revision of the Church statute, the removal of the Catholicos of All Armenians and plans for new elections as “coercion”. The clergy said the proposed reforms violate constitutional order, the Church’s right to self-governance, and fundamental international principles of freedom of conscience and religion.
Church representatives also said that “the mission of the Church, its sacred traditions and spiritual life” must not become a subject of political speculation:
“The election of the Catholicos and any reforms within the Church hierarchy fall exclusively within the spiritual and canonical sphere and are therefore outside the jurisdiction of political parties and state bodies.”
Context
Pashinyan has repeatedly raised the issue of removing the Catholicos over an extended period. He initially said that Garegin II could not lead the Church because he had allegedly broken his vow of celibacy and has a daughter. He later put forward another accusation, claiming links between the Patriarch and foreign intelligence services:
“I do not need a Catholicos who will be subordinate to me. I need a Catholicos who will not be subordinate to a senior lieutenant of a foreign intelligence service and will not report daily to officers of a foreign intelligence service.”
The prime minister made a similar allegation about Garegin II’s brother. Archbishop Ezras Nersisyan heads the Russian and New Nakhichevan Diocese. In December 2025, the pro-government website civic.am published a document. It said the document showed that the Patriarch’s brother had cooperated with the Soviet KGB. He allegedly used the codename “Karo”.
However, Armenia’s National Security Service declined to provide journalists with information.
The request concerned alleged links between Garegin II, Archbishop Ezras and foreign intelligence agencies. In response, the agency said the information is classified. It said operational and intelligence data counts as a state secret.
Catholicos removal in Pashinyan programme
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Reshuffle in Georgian government
Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze has announced a series of reshuffles, affecting key posts in the security and government system.
Interior Minister Geka Geladze will become head of the State Security Service.
He will be replaced by Sulkhаn Tamazashvili, the former head of the Adjara regional government, who is under sanctions from the United Kingdom, Lithuania and Estonia.
A new position is being created — State Minister for the Coordination of Law Enforcement Agencies. It will be taken by former SSSG head Mamuka Mdinaradze, who will also become deputy prime minister.
Foreign Minister Maka Bochorishvili has also been granted the status of deputy prime minister.
What Irakli Kobakhidze said:
● During his tenure at the Interior Ministry, Geka Geladze led systemic reforms and efforts to combat organised crime and drug-related offences.
● Sulkhаn Tamazashvili, while serving as head of the government of Adjara, implemented projects in governance and infrastructure and also has experience within the Interior Ministry system.
According to Irakli Kobakhidze, a new candidate for the post of head of the Adjara government will be named in the coming days following consultations with the president of Georgia and the Supreme Council of the autonomous republic.
● The decision to appoint Mamuka Mdinaradze to the new role of State Minister for the Coordination of Law Enforcement Agencies was explained by the need for him “to return to political activity after leading the State Security Service.”
Kobakhidze said that the relevant legislative amendment to establish the new structure would be submitted to parliament under an expedited procedure and is expected to be adopted at the next session.
● Irakli Kobakhidze also announced that the ruling Georgian Dream party is marking the 14th anniversary of its founding. He stressed that its founder, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, played a key role in shaping the modern Georgian state and advancing political processes.
He added that over these years democratic reforms have been implemented and state institutions strengthened, with the country moving from “confrontation to stability” and from “uncertainty to trust,” while safeguarding its sovereignty.
Drone lessons in Russian schools
Since the start of the full-scale war, Russian educational institutions—from universities and colleges to schools and kindergartens—have sharply increased their purchases of drones, drone assembly kits, and pilot training software. According to calculations by Novaya Gazeta Europe, nearly 16 billion rubles have been spent on this over the past four years. Before the war, such spending amounted to about 300–350 million rubles per year, with drones mainly purchased by technical colleges and specialized universities. However, after 2022, ordinary schools have increasingly begun to show interest in them.
The reason is that the war has made drones one of the main tools of the modern army. Russia needed a large reserve of future operators, engineers, and loyal personnel starting from school age—and sometimes even preschool age: formally, this is presented as technological and career-oriented education, but in essence it is about early training of personnel for a militarized system.
Amid a sharp increase in government procurement, drones have become a source of major contracts and guaranteed budget funding for companies close to the state; Putin’s daughter is also involved in this business.
Material from Novaya Gazeta Europe.
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Why drones have entered schools
Drones now play a key role in Russia’s war against Ukraine—from reconnaissance to strikes on targets at a distance. Both countries have already created separate branches for unmanned forces: Ukraine in 2024, and Russia in 2025. According to Latvian intelligence, drone strikes account for 70–80% of personnel losses on both sides. At the same time, armies need not only the devices themselves but also a large number of operators, and the success of missions largely depends on their training.
Since 2025, students in Russia have been actively encouraged to sign contracts with unmanned units. But the involvement of young people begins earlier. The Insider reported that minors are being drawn into developing technologies under the guise of educational clubs, which are then used at the front. Against this backdrop, the growth in procurement within the education system appears to be part of a broader militarization.
How procurement has grown
If in 2019–2021 universities, colleges, and schools spent 300–350 million rubles annually on such purposes, in 2022 spending rose to 600 million, in 2023 to 2.6 billion, and in 2024 to more than 9.7 billion. In 2025, the volume decreased to about 2.8 billion rubles, likely due to previously signed long-term contracts.
Before the war, drones were mainly purchased by technical colleges and specialized universities. After 2022, ordinary schools have increasingly shown interest in them. The two largest wartime contracts, totaling nearly 3.5 billion rubles, were signed by Moscow government bodies responsible for equipping schools and colleges. Among the major clients are also many regional ministries of education. Drones have even appeared at the Moscow State Academy of Choreography, where UAVs are included in the list of extracurricular developmental activities.
Who profits from this
One of the largest suppliers of drones to educational institutions is the St. Petersburg–based company “Geoscan.” Before 2022, it focused on aerial photography, mapping, and educational drones. After the start of the war and the launch of the national project “Unmanned Aerial Systems” in 2024, the company became a major government contractor. In 2023, the Innopraktika foundation—headed by Katerina Tikhonova, daughter of Vladimir Putin—acquired a stake in Geoscan. In 2024, the company’s revenue grew 3.6 times to 4.74 billion rubles, while its profit increased sixfold. Geoscan signed a contract with the Moscow government through 2030 worth 1.7 billion rubles, committing to invest at least 150 million in drone production in the capital. The company also received more than 400 million rubles through 52 contracts with state educational institutions.
How it was integrated into the school curriculum
In 2024, topics related to drones were included in the school subject “Labor (Technology).” In grades 7–9, 15 hours are allocated to drones.
Students are expected to learn how to assemble drones, program them, and operate them, including using FPV goggles. Formally, purchasing drones for schools is not mandatory: practical lessons can be replaced with simulators. In 2023, the Ministry of Education stated plans to equip nearly 5,000 schools and about 400 colleges with UAVs. By comparison, there are around 40,000 schools in Russia in total.
In school textbooks, military applications of UAVs are barely described. They focus instead on cargo delivery, aerial photography, agriculture, drone shows, and—briefly—use in law enforcement. But in practice, a military component has already been embedded into education.
Teachers who are meant to introduce students to drones are trained at the “Voin” military-sports training center. Its leadership has openly stated that a significant share of instructors are participants in the war against Ukraine.
Students are expected to learn about the military use of drones within a mandatory subject—OBZhR, which stands for “Fundamentals of Security and Homeland Defense.” In 10th grade, UAVs are given a separate lesson described as an “effective means of armed struggle.”
Defense policy expert Pavel Luzin believes that the practical impact of such programs will be limited despite their scale and cost. In his view, it is impossible in real school conditions to train sufficiently skilled operators in just a few hours, so much of this activity resembles bureaucratic imitation rather than a functioning system for training personnel.
What is happening in kindergartens
Kindergartens stand out as a separate case. Novaya Gazeta Europe identified drone-related purchases by preschool institutions in the Tyumen region, near Perm, and in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. It is not always clear what exactly these drones are used for there. One of such kindergartens, “Mosaic” in Perm Krai, reports on its social media about robotics clubs where children control drones in simulators and observe the flight of small devices.
At the same time, children are also introduced to a military logic: as part of a game called “Zarnichka,” they were given a task involving an “enemy drone,” which they had to knock down using sandbags. While in 2020 the kindergarten still posted content with the hashtag “PeaceOnEarth,” it now reposts calls from the Perm military recruitment office encouraging contract service enlistment.
This seems to reflect the broader underlying logic: drones in the Russian education system are becoming not only part of technical training, but also a tool for the early militarization of children and young people.
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