Month: June 2024

By C Raja Mohan

The summit meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping in mid-May 2024 in Beijing underlines the growing convergence of strategic interests between two of the world’s most consequential nations in countering the West. The sweeping agenda of bilateral cooperation, from financial to technological and collaboration on regional security-from Ukraine to North Korea outlined by the two leaders demands that Delhi carefully recalibrate its own great power relations and compensate where ever necessary to blunt the negative consequences of the Sino-Russian entente.

Since he took charge of Russia in 2000, Putin has made a sustained effort to expand ties with China even as he explored a modus vivendi with the West. At the turn of the 2000s, a rising China was intensifying interdependence with the United States (US) and Europe, but Beijing found it useful to develop strong ties with Moscow to stabilise its frontiers and strengthen global multipolarity. Since his ascent to the top in 2012, Xi Jinping has sought to reduce dependence on the US, chip away at American US primacy in Asia and double down on a strong partnership with Russia.

As their contradictions with the US began to deepen over the last decade, both Putin and Xi have elevated their bilateral collaboration into a ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Coordination for a New Era’ in 2019 and professed a high degree of mutual trust. On the eve of his invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Putin travelled to Beijing to proclaim an “alliance without limits”. Since then, Putin and Xi have surprised Western observers who had been arguing that Russia and China cannot get too close to each other, given the range of their competing regional geopolitical interests and the intensity of their stakes in economic engagement with the West.

It is not that Putin and Xi do not have any differences. As two major powers in a shared neighbourhood with a record of intense bilateral conflict, the interests of Moscow and Beijing are not in absolute alignment. Yet, Putin and Xi have shown that they can put their divergences aside in building a new alliance to resist Western dominance over world affairs.

The latest summit has highlighted their efforts at political coordination and mutual support on their respective national priorities – Ukraine for Russia and Taiwan for China. Putin and Xi also denounced the US’ interventions in Europe and its effort to build new coalitions like the Quadrilateral Security Forum (in which India is a member, including Australia, Japan and the US). They also underlined their commitment to build a ‘multipolar world’ and weaken American global hegemony over international institutions, especially in the domain of finance. If the US has been pressing China to limit his cooperation with Russia, the usually wooden Xi seemed to thumb his nose against Washington with a rare hug for Putin.

New Delhi, like many Western chancelleries, had been betting on the thesis that Moscow and Beijing could not collaborate beyond a point. In a corollary to this thesis, Delhi has been hoping that Putin will not ignore India’s concerns in drawing too close to China that has emerged as India’s principal external challenge. The time has come for Delhi to reexamine its Russia thesis and its corollary as the Sino-Russian partnership goes from strength to strength.

India’s former Army Chief, General M M Naravane, put India’s concerns succinctly, “The closer alignment between Moscow and Beijing could potentially embolden the latter in its assertive actions in the region – including territorial disputes with India along the Himalayan border. Russia’s tacit support or neutrality in such conflicts could complicate India’s strategic calculus and necessitate a reassessment of its foreign policy priorities. Given a no-limits partnership and the premise that China is undoubtedly supporting the Russian war effort, India can no longer assume Russia’s support in reining-in China in the event of a clash.”

Beyond the question of border security, Delhi has reasons to worry that Putin’s support for China’s positions in the Indo-Pacific would undermine India’s effort to build a balanced regional order in Asia. In the aftermath of the Cold War in the 1990s, India had joined hands with Russia and China in promoting a ‘multipolar world’. However, as India’s conflict with China deepened in recent years, Delhi has underlined the importance of a preventing Chinese dominance over Asia. Moscow’s growing regional security cooperation with Beijing would make India’s quest for a multipolar Asia that much more challenging.

The Sino-Russian partnership might also reduce the Indian compulsions to avoid too tight a strategic embrace with the US. During the Cold War, India turned to Russia to balance China and blunt the Sino-US entente in Asia. Delhi may no longer hope to get that kind of strategic depth from the Russian partnership. Although Moscow understands India’s difficulties with China and would want to sustain the traditional bonds with Delhi, Russia is likely to be constrained by the logic of its confrontation with the West.

Moscow believes that the “collective West” poses an extraordinary threat to Russian interests and the alignment with China is critical in addressing it. For India, the principal contradiction is with China; the US and its allies are seen as part of the solution in Delhi. This structural contradiction between the Russian and Indian security imperatives will not be easy to finesse, as the conflict between the West and Sino-Russian entente escalates.

• About the author: Professor C Raja Mohan is a Visiting Research Professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore
• Source: This article was published by Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS)

Canada is a major energy producer, consumer, and exporter with a diverse and dynamic energy sector. Historically, hydroelectric power dominated Canada’s energy mix, but oil and natural gas production have grown. The majority of Canada’s oil and natural gas output is in Alberta; in contrast, hydroelectric and renewable energy make up a larger share of energy output in Quebec and British Columbia. 

Primary energy production in Canada grew at an average annual rate of 2.6% between 2012 and 2022; Canada’s share increased from 3.2% to 3.6% of total global energy production.¹ Crude oil production followed by natural gas production mainly drove this growth. By 2022, oil production accounted for 51.7% of Canada’s total energy production, followed by natural gas at 32.4% (Table 1). As of 2022, Canada was the world’s sixth-largest energy producer.

Canada’s energy consumption has remained stable despite inflation-adjusted GDP per capita growth, mainly because of improvements in energy efficiency. Between 2012 and 2022, natural gas use increased at an annual growth rate of 2.6%, making it the primary source of energy with the largest growth contribution.

According to the Canadian Centre for Energy Information (CCEI), the energy sector contributes significantly to government revenues. Between 2017 and 2021, the energy sector accounted for 4.6% of total industry tax revenue. The oil and natural gas extraction industry accounts for about 83% of government petroleum-related revenues. In 2022, the combination of rising oil and natural gas prices and higher production volumes contributed to the overall increase in revenue for the oil and natural gas extraction industry.^2,3 According to CCEI, Canada’s energy sector accounted for approximately 11.8% of the nominal gross domestic product (GDP) and approximately 3.5% of total employment in 2022.⁴

Canada’s distribution bottlenecks hinder crude oil flow outside the domestic refining market, including to refiners on the U.S. Gulf Coast. The Trans Mountain Expansion (TMX) Project on the Trans Mountain Pipeline aims to increase Canada’s crude oil exports to the worldwide market through Pacific coast ports. The expansion will more or less triple the pipeline’s present capacity of 300,000 barrels per day (b/d) for transporting crude oil from Alberta’s oil sands to Canada’s Pacific coast, where it will be exported to markets in Asia or the United States. The TMX pipeline began operations in May 2024.^5,6,7

Canada has many policy measures to support the transition to lower carbon fuels, including carbon pricing, clean fuel regulations, coal phaseout, nuclear power plant expansion, methane regulations, energy-efficiency programs, and the decarbonization of the transportation sector.⁸ Canada’s energy-related carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions from oil and coal consumption have declined, while natural gas has increased between 2012 and 2022.⁹ However, as of 2022, oil remains the largest source of energy-related CO₂ emissions with 51% of the total. In December 2023, Canada’s government proposed a cap-and-trade system to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the oil and natural gas sector to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050. If signed into law, the cap-and-trade system would be implemented in 2030, limiting emissions to between 131 metric tons (mt) of CO₂ equivalent per year and 137 mt of CO₂ equivalent per year, down from 171 mt of CO₂ equivalent per year in 2019.¹⁰

Petroleum and Other Liquids

Canada had proved oil reserves of 163 billion barrels as of January 2024, ranking fourth in the world behind Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, and Iran.¹¹ Oil sands account for 97% of the country’s total oil reserves.¹² These large deposits are spread across three regions in Alberta and Saskatchewan: Athabasca, Peace River, and Cold Lake.

In 2023, Canada was the world’s fourth-largest petroleum and other liquids producer and was a liquid fuels net exporter. Nearly all of Canada’s energy exports are destined for the United States. Many U.S. refineries are configured to process heavy oils like those produced in Canada’s oil sands.

In 2023, 5.8 million b/d of petroleum and other liquid fuels were produced in Canada, growing at an average annual rate of 3.8% between 2013 and 2023. Crude oil (including condensate) contributed 2.9% to the growth, and the remaining 0.9% growth was from natural gas liquids (NGLs). Liquid fuels production in Canada has increased because of increasing production from Alberta’s oil sands and upgraded synthetic crude oil.¹³ Approximately 83% of crude oil production in Canada in 2022 originated in Alberta. In 2022, oil sands production accounted for 65% of total crude oil production, and conventional, offshore, and tight oil accounted for the remaining 35%.¹⁴

Offshore production in Canada is concentrated in the eastern provinces and accounts for less than 5% of total production. Severe weather and difficult deep-water conditions have hampered the progress of three projects in Newfoundland, Labrador, and Nova Scotia. These challenges exacerbate both technical difficulties and exploration and production costs.

Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin (WCSB) producers have traditionally focused on natural gas production, but because of a lack of midstream infrastructure and export capacity, the focus has shifted to producing liquid fuels for use as domestic diluents in nearby oil sands projects. Alberta’s extra-heavy crude oil must be mixed with lighter liquids, such as plant condensate or pentanes before it can flow through pipelines and reach downstream facilities.

Canada’s petroleum and other liquids consumption was 2.5 million b/d in 2023, of which 32% was motor gasoline, 24% was distillate fuel oil, and 7% was liquefied petroleum gases. The main petroleum and other liquids consuming sectors were transportation (60%), non-energy use(24%), and industry (7%).

Pipelines account for 88% of the crude oil transportation modes. The Canadian Energy Regulator (CER) regulates Canada’s pipelines. Canada’s oil operating capacity is 4.3 million b/d as of 2021. Canada’s pipelines transport crude oil from the western provinces to refineries in the United States and Quebec and Ontario and to export terminals. Four primary crude oil export pipelines are in Western Canada: Enbridge Canada Main Pipeline, Keystone Pipeline, Trans Mountain Pipeline, and Express Pipeline. Together, these pipelines can ship 96% of all withdrawals from the WCSB. Enbridge Canadian Mainline, which is owned by Enbridge Pipelines Inc., accounts for approximately 58% of all Canada’s oil exports.^15,16,17

As of 2023, Canada had 14 refineries and a nameplate crude oil processing capacity of 1.7 million b/d (Table 2). These refineries process crude oil into various products, such as gasoline, diesel, and home heating oil, that are essential for transportation and heating. The refineries are in six provinces, and the largest concentrations are in Alberta and Ontario, which account for 49% of the total capacity. Most of the crude oil is refined into motor gasoline and diesel fuel.^18,19

Canada’s refineries supply petroleum to domestic and export markets, and the United States is the main destination for Canada’s refined products. In Canada, more crude oil is produced than refined domestically, but it imported an average 57% of its total crude oil trade between 2019 and 2023 because eastern refineries are not connected to domestic crude oil production supplies.²⁰ The nine refineries in Western Canada have a combined capacity of 653,000 b/d, or 38% of Canada’s total nameplate refining capacity.

Oil sands are a mixture of sand, water, and bitumen. Bitumen is a crude oil extracted from the ground that is too thick to transport via pipelines. Bitumen can be either upgraded into a lighter synthetic crude oil or diluted with light hydrocarbon condensate, which is referred to as diluted bitumen or dilbit.²¹

Upgraders are partial refiners that convert the residue of the bitumen and remove all the sulfur, making the synthetic crude oil easier to process. This process makes it ideal for less sophisticated refineries, like those in Canada. About half of the synthetic crude oil produced in Alberta is sold domestically, and the rest is exported to the United States.²²

Dilbit contains around 60% bitumen, which produces a lot of residue during distillation. Dilbit refineries require a lot of residue conversion capacity, which Canada’s refineries do not have. As a result, nearly 95% of Alberta’s dilbit is exported to the United States, leaving very little dilbit to be used in Canada.²³

Refinery	Operator	Nameplate crude oil distillation capacity  (thousand barrels per day)	Location
Data source: Oil & Gas Journal, 2023 Worldwide Refining Survey
Saint John Refinery	Irving Oil Ltd.	320,000	Saint John, New Brunswick
The Jean Gaulin Refinery	Valero Energy Corp.	218,500	Levis, Quebec
Strathcona Refinery	Imperial Oil Ltd.	186,200	Strathcona, Alberta
Edmonton Refinery	Suncor Energy Inc.	146,000	Edmonton, Alberta
Montreal Refinery	Suncor Energy Inc.	137,000	Montreal, Quebec
Co-op Refinery Complex	Federated Co-operatives Limited	130,000	Regina, Saskatchewan
Sarnia Refinery	Imperial Oil Ltd.	113,050	Sarnia, Ontario
Nanticoke Refinery	Imperial Oil Ltd.	107,350	Nanticoke, Ontario
Scotford Refinery	Shell Canada Ltd.	95,000	Scotford, Alberta
Sarnia Refinery	Suncor Energy Inc.	85,000	Sarnia, Ontario
Corunna Refinery	Shell Canada Ltd.	80,750	Sarnia, Ontario
Burnaby Refinery	Parkland Fuel Corp.	55,000	Burnaby, British Columbia
The Cenovus Lloydminster Refinery	Husky Energy Inc.	29,000	Lloydminster, Alberta
Prince George Refinery	Tidewater Midstream & Infrastructure Ltd.	12,000	Prince George, British Columbia
Total		1,714,850

Name	Operator	Capacity (thousand barrels per day)
Data source: Canada Energy Regulator—REGDOCS
Enbridge Canadian Mainline	Enbridge Inc	2,890
Keystone Pipeline	TC Energy	591
Express Pipeline	Express Pipeline LLC	310
Trans Mountain Pipeline	Trans Mountain Corporation (TMC)	300
Milk River Pipeline	Inter Pipeline Ltd. (IPL)	98
Aurora Pipeline	Aurora. Pipeline Company Ltd	45
Wascana Pipeline	Plains Midstream Canada ULC (PMC)	40
Total		4,274

Natural Gas and LNG

Canada’s proved natural gas reserves are estimated to be 87 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) as of January 2024.²⁴ Most of these reserves are found in the Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin (WCSB). Natural gas reserves are also present in other regions of Canada, such as offshore fields off the eastern coast of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, the Arctic region, and the Pacific coast. In March 2016, the Canadian Energy Regulator published a study on the Liard Basin located in northwest Canada that spans the borders of British Columbia, Yukon, and the Northwest Territories. The study found that it contains 219 Tcf of marketable unconventional natural gas, making it the world’s ninth-largest shale gas resource.

Canada is the world’s fifth-largest natural gas producer, following the United States, Russia, Iran, China, and Qatar, and produced 6.6 Tcf of dry natural gas in 2022.²⁵ Most natural gas production in Canada takes place in the WCSB, mainly concentrated in British Columbia and Alberta, which accounted for 98.7% of the total output in 2022.

Natural gas production in Canada increased from 5.8 Tcf in 2012 to 6.6 Tcf in 2022, despite a decline in the number of wells drilled. The productivity of individual wells increased because of technological advancements in horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing.²⁶

Natural gas consumption in Canada has increased by an average of 2% per year between 2012 and 2022. Natural gas consumption was 4.6 Tcf in 2022; 32% was used by industry, 27% by residential customers, and 26% by commercial and public services. Natural gas consumption is highest in Alberta (44%), followed by Ontario (30%), and British Columbia (BC) (9%).²⁷

Canada currently has eight LNG export projects in different stages of development. Together, these projects have a potential production capacity of 2.5 Tcf of LNG. Although most export projects are in British Columbia, one export project has been proposed that includes Newfoundland and Labrador. Canada also has four LNG liquefaction plants and two LNG import plants that serve the domestic market, although most of them operate at low volumes. LNG Canada in Kitimat (BC) is set to become Canada’s first large-scale LNG export facility, and it has a target to start exporting by 2025. Most of the other projects will begin operations between 2027 and 2030.²⁸

The NOVA Inventory Transfer (NIT) is a pricing point for natural gas produced in the WCSB. It’s a trading hub in Alberta linked to several export markets and storage facilities. Other reference points include Dawn, Ontario, and Station 2 on the Enbridge BC Pipeline. The Canada Energy Regulator (CER) has approved many natural gas pipeline projects in the last five years, including Nova Gas Transmission Ltd. System’s projects to add capacity in key areas. Westcoast Energy has also proposed upgrades to its Enbridge BC Pipeline because of growing BC production. In late October 2023, TC Energy announced that it had completed construction of the Coastal GasLink earlier that month.^29,30

New natural gas-fired power plants in Canada are replacing coal-fired plants. The Canadian government has pledged to phase out coal use for power generation by 2030. In its place, 18 natural gas-fired facilities are in the planning and approval stages, and four are currently under construction. These facilities include the Suncor Oilsands Cogeneration Base Plant with a power generation capacity of 800 megawatts (MW), ATCO Strathcona Cogeneration Plant in Alberta (116 MW), and the Great Plains Power Station in Saskatchewan (360 MW).

Name	Capacity utilization (percentage)	Capacity (billion cubic feet per day)
Data source: Canada Energy Regulator—Pipeline Profiles
NGTL System—Upstream of James River—Intra-Canada	88%	11.2
TC Canadian Mainline—Prairies—Intra-Canada	47%	6.2
Foothills System—Kingsgate—Export	78%	2.9
NGTL System—West Gate—Intra-Canada	89%	2.8
Foothills System—Monchy—Export	26%	2.2
Alliance Pipeline—Border—Export	82%	1.6
Enbridge BC Pipeline—Huntingdon—Export	53%	1.6
TC Canadian Mainline—Iroquois—Export	29%	1.2
TC Canadian Mainline—Niagara—Import	95%	0.7
M&NP Pipeline—St. Stephen—Import	34%	0.5
Total		30.9

Coal

Canada’s large coal reserves totaled 7.3 billion short tons in 2021.³¹ The majority of the reserves consist of anthracite and bituminous coal. The rest of the reserves are subbituminous and lignite. More than 90% of Canada’s coal reserves are in the western provinces, which provides a strategic advantage because of its proximity to West Coast ports for export.³²

Because the national electricity grid has reduced its coal use, Canada’s overall coal production has also declined, reaching 45.4 million short tons in 2021, compared with a peak of 86.7 million short tons in 1997. Metallurgical coal, used for steel manufacturing, accounted for 61% of Canada’s coal production in 2022.³³ British Columbia produces 57% of the coal in Canada, followed by Alberta (25%) and Saskatchewan (17%).³⁴

As of 2022, Canada’s coal accounts for 4% of the country’s total energy supply and 2% of total consumption, making Canada a net exporter of coal (Table 1). Canada’s exports are primarily metallurgical coal. Lignite coal, used to generate electricity, accounted for 45% of Canada’s coal consumption in 2022, mostly for electricity generation in Alberta and Saskatchewan.³⁵

In 2022, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Saskatchewan, and Alberta were still using thermal coal plants to generate electricity. Ontario stopped using coal-fired power plants in 2014, and Manitoba followed suit in 2019. Alberta has announced that it will phase out coal-fired power plants by 2024, and Nova Scotia and New Brunswick have confirmed plans to phase out coal by 2030.³⁶

In 2018, Canada’s government committed to phasing out coal use for electricity generation by 2030, except for power plants that can meet certain emissions standards through carbon capture and storage technology. The federal government has established strict emissions requirements that require coal-fired power plants to either close at the end of their lifecycle or to install carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology.

The lignite-fired Boundary Dam Power Station in Saskatchewan is currently the only power plant in Canada using CCS technology. The site began carbon capture and storage in 2014, making it the first of its kind in the world.³⁷

Biofuels

In Canada, biofuels are primarily produced from corn and wheat for ethanol and from canola and soybean for biodiesel. Canada produced 31,000 b/d of fuel ethanol and 6,000 b/d of biomass-based diesel in 2022, meeting 51% and 47% of the domestic demand, respectively.^38,39

Biofuel production in Canada increased by an annual average of 1.6% between 2012 and 2022, with biomass-based diesel contributing 1.2% and fuel ethanol contributing 0.4% of the increase. Ethanol is the top biofuel in Canada, accounting for 83% of biofuel production and 82% of biofuel consumption in 2022.

The demand for biofuels, particularly ethanol and renewable diesel, is rising because of regulations; biofuel consumption grew at an average annual rate of 7.6% between 2012 and 2022. As of 2022, Canada was the world’s seventh-largest biofuel consumer. Industry accounted for 58% of total biofuel consumption, followed by transportation (22%) and residential use (20%).⁴⁰

Renewable diesel, a biomass-based fuel that can be blended with or used as a replacement fuel for petroleum diesel, is becoming increasingly popular. In June 2023, Tidewater Midstream’s stand-alone renewable diesel facility, the first of its kind in Canada, began operating. Covenant Energy in Saskatchewan has announced plans to move forward with a renewable diesel facility on the edge of Lloydminster, and Imperial Oil has committed to constructing a renewable diesel facility near Edmonton.⁴¹

Several provinces, such as British Columbia and Ontario, have implemented biofuel requirements. These policies require a certain percentage of biofuels, typically ethanol in gasoline and biodiesel in diesel, to be blended into conventional fuels. Starting January 2023, Quebec required gasoline to contain 10% renewable content and diesel to contain 15%.⁴²

Canada’s biofuels market is driven by federal and provincial regulations, such as the Renewable Fuels Regulations, the Clean Fuel Standard, and the low-carbon fuel standards in British Columbia and Quebec. 

The Clean Fuel Regulation (CFR), implemented in 2022, requires the carbon intensity of transportation fuels to be reduced and promotes biofuels. In June 2021, the Net Zero Canada Act became law, committing the government to achieving net zero emissions by 2050.⁴³

Electricity 

Canada is the world’s seventh-largest electricity generator, at an average 638 billion kilowatthours (kWh) in 2022, and renewables accounted for 70% of electricity generation. Canada’s electric power sector contributed about 1.7% to the country’s 2022 gross domestic product (at current prices) and accounted for 0.5% of Canada’s total employment.⁴⁴ Hydropower contributed 62% of Canada’s electricity generation in 2022 and has been Canada’s primary source of electricity generation for over a century. China and Brazil are the only countries that produce more hydropower than Canada on a kilowatthour basis. Apart from hydropower, nuclear and natural gas plants are the primary sources of electricity in Canada (Table 1). 

Canada is the world’s seventh-largest electricity consumer on a per capita basis, at 14,500 kilowatthours (kWh) per person in 2022. Canada’s ranking is mainly because of the presence of energy-intensive industries, cold climate, and affordable electricity prices. In 2021, the largest electricity-consuming sector in Canada was industry (35%), followed by residential (34%), and commercial and public services (28%).⁴⁵Most electricity is used in Quebec (37%), Ontario (26%), British Columbia (12%), and Alberta (11%).⁴⁶

Canada’s electricity market is divided into provincial markets; each province has its regulatory authority overseeing generation, distribution, and pricing. Provinces with surplus electricity can sell it to neighboring provinces through a network of transmission lines. This connectivity enhances reliability and efficiency.

Canada has three electricity grids: Western Grid, Eastern Grid, and Quebec Grid. The border between Alberta and Saskatchewan is where the Eastern and Western grids meet. Canada’s electricity grids are connected to the U.S. grids by 37 major transmission lines spanning from New England to the Pacific Northwest. The Canada Energy Regulatory Commission (CER) characterizes Canada’s electricity grid as “fragmented,“ with few interconnections between different locations. Major grid connections mostly link the provinces to the United States, and electricity flows from north to south. Nunavut is the only region in Canada without an electricity grid; it relies on local diesel generation.

All of Canada’s provinces and territories except Nunavut and Prince Edward Island generate hydropower. Quebec, Manitoba, British Columbia, Ontario, and Newfoundland and Labrador use the most hydropower to meet their electricity needs, combined accounting for 97% of Canada’s total hydropower capacity. A large 1,100-MW hydropower project, Site-C in British Columbia, is underway and is expected to be completed in 2025. Provinces like Alberta have a mix of energy sources, including natural gas and coal, while others, such as Ontario, have a significant nuclear power presence.

Nuclear energy contributes in powering Canada’s electricity supply. As of 2022, nuclear power plants accounted for 13% of the country’s total electricity generation. The 19 commercial reactors in the country provide a net capacity of 14,629 MW. Ontario holds 95% of Canada’s nuclear power capacity, and the remaining 5% is in New Brunswick. In recent years, Canada has focused on updating and improving its existing reactors, as well as developing small modular reactors (SMRs), in part to address climate change, meet regional energy demand, and promote economic development.^47,48

Federal and provincial commitments to reduce carbon emissions from the electric power sector by 2030 and increase renewable energy have driven the development of non-hydro renewable energy in Canada. Between 2012 and 2022, non-hydroelectric renewable electricity generation significantly increased. On average, it grew by 9.8% per year. Wind energy contributed 8.1% to this growth, solar power contributed 1.4%, and biomass and waste contributed 0.2%. Canada has favorable market conditions for wind energy and has abundant high-quality wind resources, especially offshore and along coastlines, making it an ideal location for wind electricity.⁴⁹ Most solar power is in Ontario, but provinces such as British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Alberta are also developing solar capacity.

Between 2000 and 2021, emissions from power generation decreased by 43% because of Ontario’s and Québec’s successful phaseout of coal-fired generation.^50,51 Renewable and natural gas power plants will replace coal-fired power generation by 2030.⁵² SaskPower, Saskatchewan’s main utility company, plans to increase the share of renewables in its portfolio from 25% to 50% by 2030, investing in wind, solar, geothermal, hydropower, and biomass.

Name	Owner	Start year	Capacity (megawatts)	Type	Location
Data source: Global Energy Monitor, Global Hydropower Tracker, May 2023
Pine Falls hydroelectric plant	Manitoba Hydro	1952	9,084	Conventional storage	Manitoba
Robert-Bourassa hydroelectric plant	Hydro Québec	1979	5,616	Conventional storage	Quebec
Churchill Falls hydroelectric plant	Nalcor Energy and Hydro-Quebec	1971	5,428	Conventional storage	Newfoundland and Labrador
La Grande 4 hydroelectric plant	Hydro Québec	1984	2,779	Conventional storage	Quebec
Mica hydroelectric plant	BC Hydro	1973	2,746	Conventional storage	British Columbia
Gordon M Shrum hydroelectric plant	BC Hydro	1968	2,730	Conventional storage	British Columbia
Revelstoke hydroelectric plant	BC Hydro	1984	2,480	Conventional storage	British Columbia
La Grande 3 hydroelectric plant	Hydro Québec	1982	2,417	Conventional storage	Quebec
La Grande 2A hydroelectric plant	Hydro Québec	1991	2,106	Conventional storage	Quebec
Beauharnois hydroelectric plant	Hydro Québec	1932	1,912	Run-of-river	Quebec
Manic 5 hydroelectric plant	Hydro Québec	1970	1,596	Conventional storage	Quebec
Sir Adam Beck 2 hydroelectric plant	Ontario Power Generation	1954	1,499	Conventional storage	Ontario
La Grande 1 hydroelectric plant	Hydro Québec	1994	1,436	Run-of-river	Quebec
Limestone hydroelectric plant	Manitoba Hydro	1990	1,350	Run-of-river	Manitoba
Manic 3 hydroelectric plant	Hydro Québec	1975	1,326	Run-of-river	Quebec
Kettle hydroelectric plant	Manitoba Hydro	1970	1,253	Run-of-river	Manitoba
Manic 2 hydroelectric plant	Hydro Québec	1965	1,229	Run-of-river	Quebec
Bersimis 1 hydroelectric plant	Hydro Québec	1956	1,178	Conventional storage	Quebec
Shipshaw hydroelectric plant	Rio Tinto Group	1943	1,145	Conventional storage	Quebec
Manic 5PA hydroelectric plant	Hydro Québec	1989	1,064	Conventional storage	Quebec
Other conventional storage	Other conventional storage	1968 (average)	21,209	64 conventional storage	17 Quebec; 15 British Columbia; 32other
Other run-of-river	Other run-of-river	1964 (average)	12,318	42 run-of-river	26 Quebec; 7 Ontario; 9 other
Other unknown	Other unknown	1943 (average)	1,052	5 unknown	2 Quebec; 3 other
Other pumped storage	Other pumped storage	1957 (average)	174	1 pumped storage	1 Ontario
Total			85,127

Energy Trade 

Canada exports more energy than it imports (net exporter), and its largest and most important trading partner is the United States. Canada’s 2022 energy exports amounted to $240.5 billion, equivalent to 33% of the country’s total goods exports, and 90% of those energy exports were destined for the United States. The energy goods exported include crude oil, natural gas, refined petroleum products, electricity, and coal. Among these, oil and natural gas made up 90% of the total energy exports.⁵³ Canada’s energy imports were $65.3 billion in 2022, amounting to 9% of Canada’s total goods imports. 

In 2023, 92% of Canada’s crude oil exports went to the United States. Inland regions of the United States, particularly the Midwest (PADD 2) and Rocky Mountain (PADD 4) regions, are highly integrated with Canada’s oil markets, and Canada’s crude oil makes up a significant portion of U.S. refinery inputs in these regions. For this reason, Canada is the top crude oil supplier to the United States, providing 60% of U.S. crude oil imports in 2023. U.S. imports of refined products from Canada accounted for 18% of total U.S. petroleum product imports. 

Canada’s crude oil producers face complex market and logistical challenges. The transportation capacity of pipelines serving foreign markets is less than Western Canada’s crude oil supply. Canadian oil producers rely on rail for transportation as export pipelines are operating at full capacity. Since 2022, the Marathon Capline pipeline has allowed producers to increase oil sands volume from Alberta through the Gulf Coast to Asia. The Trans Mountain Expansion Project (TMX) has been in operation since May 2024 and has significantly increased the pipeline capacity to Canada’s Pacific Coast, enabling export to foreign markets. The pipeline runs parallel to the existing 715-mile pipeline route between Strathcona County (near Edmonton) and Burnaby, British Columbia, which is Canada’s only crude oil pipeline to its West Coast. The expansion project aims to enhance the capacity of the Trans Mountain pipeline system, facilitating the delivery of more crude oil to global markets.

Canada’s natural gas exports were 3.1 Tcf Bcf in 2023, and 100% of those exports went to the United States. Canada is the top natural gas supplier to the United States, providing 99.9% of U.S. imports in 2023. Most of Canada’s natural gas exports to the United States come from Western Canada and are transported to U.S. markets in the West and Midwest regions.

Canada is the world’s top electricity exporter; it exported 52 terawatthours (TWh) to the United States in 2023.⁵⁴ Hydropower is the main source of Canada’s electricity, and the United States was the primary import recipient. Provinces with abundant hydroelectric resources, such as Quebec and British Columbia, export electricity to neighboring regions and the United States, particularly the U.S. Northeast and Midwest. Canada imported 17 TWh of electricity from the United States; almost all of it came from the Pacific Northwest.⁵⁵

Canada is the eighth-largest coal exporter in the world, as of 2022, and Asia was its primary market. In 2023, Canada exported 44.7 million short tons (MMst) of coal, which includes lignite and peat. Japan (31%), China (22%), and Korea (20%) were the top destinations. On the other hand, Canada imported 6,526 MMst of coal in 2023, which mainly came from the United States (77%) and Colombia (22%). For over a decade, coal imports have been decreasing, but exports have remained mostly stable. Canada is planning to phase out traditional coal-fired electricity by 2030 domestically. However, because coal is utilized for metallurgical processes, Canada continues to export coal, which constitutes almost two-thirds of its production as of 2022.⁵⁶

Source: This article was published by EIA

Endnotes

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President Ilham Aliyev receives credentials of incoming Italian ambassador to Azerbaijan [PHOTOS/VIDEO]  AzerNews.Az

Azerbaijani gymnasts win medals at World Cup and international tournament in Poland (PHOTO)  Trend News Agency

A Progressive Perspective: Some Political Observations — Robert Menendez Jr., Larry Hamm, and the South Ward  The Trentonian

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Chinese Minister of National Defense Dong Jun launched an acerbic attack on what he called the “hegemonic powers” behind tension in the Asia-Pacific, a clear swipe at the United States and its allies.

In an address to the annual Shangri-La Dialogue security forum in Singapore, Adm. Dong said that people in the Asia-Pacific are “independent and self-reliant,” and were “against any attempt to turn our countries into vassal states or draw us into bloc confrontations.”

“Our people have firmly rejected infiltration, sabotage and coercion by outside forces,” the minister said, adding that regional countries “despise those who attempt to bolster themselves by taking orders from hegemonic powers.”

Dong also said China had exercised great restraint in the face of what he called “infringements and provocations” but warned “there is a limit to our restraint.”

Beijing has repeatedly accused Washington of assisting Taipei and Manila to stand up to its assertive actions in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.

The Pentagon last month deployed an intermediate range missile system in the Philippines during the annual Balikatan military drills, which Beijing condemned as bringing “huge risks of war into the region.”

The U.S. House of Representatives has recently passed an $8-billion package to help Taiwan boost its defense capabilities against China.

Dong said  that “some external interfering forces keep hollowing out the One China principle with the salami slicing strategy.”

“They have cooked up Taiwan-related legislations and continued to sell arms to Taiwan and have illegal official contacts with it.”

The minister, who took office five months ago after his predecessor was removed over suspected corruption, went on a lengthy tirade against Taiwanese leaders who he called “Taiwan independence separatists.”

China considers the democratic island one of its provinces and Dong said that China “will take resolute actions to curb Taiwan independence and make sure such a plot never succeeds.”

He accused Taiwan’s leaders of “betrayal of the Chinese nation and their ancestors,” and said they would be “nailed to the pillar of shame in history.” 

“The Taiwan question is at the core of China’s core interests,” the minister said. “Anyone who supports Taiwan independence will only end in self-destruction.”

Defense analyst Malcolm Davis from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, or ASPI, said that Dong “made clear a willingness for China to use force to prevent independence and respond to any external forces involved in supporting Taiwan.”

“It was a fairly predictable speech and very much the ‘party line’ with little in the way of new comments. In effect this was a propaganda speech and not an accurate statement of Chinese policy,” Davis said.

‘Wolf warriors’

But Dong’s tone did seem more combative than that of his predecessor, Li Shangfu, he added.

“On the South China Sea, he issued a warning that China won’t rule out the use of force specifically in relation to the Philippines and the support of the United States,” the Canberra-based analyst said, “That suggests to me that China does intend to escalate the crisis, and has singled out the Philippines as their focus with the goal being to coerce Manila to capitulate to Chinese interests.”

Unlike Li and his predecessors, Dong is not a member of the Central Military Commission of the Chinese communist party – the highest national defense organization.

“That may be the reason behind Dong’s tough statements to show his clout and get a promotion,” said an Asian analyst who didn’t want to be identified because of the sensitivity of the issue.

A Chinese academic praised Dong’s speech and said his attendance at the conference helped bring “China’s real voice” to the world.

“The Shangri-La Dialogue as a major security forum bears a great relevance to China,” said Gao Zhikai, vice president of the Center for China and Globalization and chair professor at China’s Soochow University. “It is important that China’s voice, which is increasingly in sharp contrast to that of the U.S., be heard.”

Several other Chinese delegates also promoted Beijing’s views at the forum, in a forthright manner known as “wolf warrior” diplomacy.

The term, adopted from the title of a Chinese movie, describes an assertive, even aggressive, approach to international relations.

Maj. Gen. Xu Hui, president of the International College of Defense Studies at China’s National Defense University, confronted Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. after the latter’s keynote speech on Friday, saying that Manila was risking ruining the “long-earned, long-lasting peace” within ASEAN by responding to Chinese vessels’ activities in the disputed South China Sea.

On Saturday, another Chinese delegate, Senior Col. Cao Yanzhong, a researcher at China’s Institute of War Studies, questioned U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin about the U.S. alliance system in the region which Beijing compares to “an Asian version of NATO.”

During a session on ‘Maritime Law Enforcement and Confidence Building’ on Saturday, another Chinese delegate, Senior Col. Ge Hanwen, associate professor at the College of International Studies at China’s National University of Defense Technology, blamed the Philippines for “dramatically” raising tensions in the region and Japan for using water cannons first in a confrontation at sea.

Austin and Dong met for about an hour at the conference on Friday for talks aimed at improving their communications, a U.S. official said.

New regional order

A Western observer at the forum, speaking on the condition of anonymity, told Radio Free Asia that the Chinese delegates are “on a mission to spread Beijing’s messages and their statements are pre-scripted and pre-approved by the [communist] party.”

Beijing-based Gao denied that. 

“It is only normal that people from all walks of life, including military officers, talk about the topics of their interest,” Gao said.

“China attends a lot of international forums because we believe in having our voice heard by as many people as possible.”

Dong acknowledged that different countries had different security interests and goals but he implied that China had a leadership role, said the ASPI’s Davis.

“He kept pushing the implication that China speaks for the region in terms of shaping the future of Asia-Pacific security order,” Davis said. 

“China is clearly setting the basis for trying to assert its dominance over ASEAN, and if it can get [the] Philippines to submit to Chinese power through military coercion, then Beijing will expect other ASEAN states to also accept China’s interests,” said the Australian analyst.

“By default, China would then dominate the region.”

Over the past decade, the Chinese military has become more powerful, with its rapid growth bringing a new confidence, especially in relation with the United States.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies said in a recent report that China is the world’s largest shipbuilder with a capacity some 230 times larger than the U.S.

“One of China’s large shipyards, such as Jiangnan Shipyard, has more capacity than all U.S. shipyards combined,” the center said in its report.

“China is way ahead of the U.S. in many aspects and the Chinese economy is soon to be larger, too,” Gao, who served as a translator for Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping during the 1980s, told RFA.

“The Americans are worried about a rising China, that Beijing will impose its ideological and political system on the U.S.,” he said, while adding that in his opinion, that fear was unfounded.

“No one can really decouple from China and the best Washington can do is to deal with China on an equal footing.” 

Lyle Goldstein from the U.S. think tank Defense Priorities said that Beijing was “not reckless or aggressive,” and despite the threats, it had not used force since the 1980s.

Despite a downward spiral in U.S.-China relations, Goldstein suggested that the two countries and their militaries, “should meet halfway and resolve disputes through diplomatic compromise.”

By Dr. Amal Mudallali

Last month’s Memorial Day holiday set a record for travel by car in the US, with about 38 million Americans hitting the road for the holiday weekend. I was one of those 38 million Americans traveling and getting stuck in traffic for hours, which meant that, in addition to fraying the nerves, a lot of gas was used over that weekend.

With the perception in this country that high gas prices affect presidents and doom election campaigns, the stakes are high and the Biden administration is feeling the heat of gas prices as President Joe Biden seeks reelection. A February Moody’s Analytics study found that a surge in gas prices could cost President Biden the election in November. The report explained that “forecasting oil prices is especially difficult, and if prices move up much more than anticipated, the damage to Biden’s reelection bid will quickly mount.” The agency predicted that, “if prices surge close to $4 per gallon, former President (Donald) Trump will win the election.”

As the presidential election is still months away, the White House was prompted to act fast to lower the price of gas for Americans and avoid a potential backlash against the president that could doom his reelection chances. White House Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre announced two days before the holiday that, “with Memorial Day weekend and the start of the summer driving season around the corner, the Biden-Harris Administration is taking action to lower gas prices with the sale of 1 million barrels of gasoline from the Northeast Gasoline Supply Reserve.” She explained that this action was in addition to the “historic releases from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and the largest-ever investment in clean energy.”

Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm explained that, “by strategically releasing this reserve in between Memorial Day and July 4th, we are ensuring sufficient supply flows … at a time hardworking Americans need it the most.”

But the Republicans were not having it. While they were attacking the president for the high gas prices, they also attacked him for releasing the reserves to lower the prices. The Republicans believe that the president is doing this only for his reelection campaign. Rep. August Pfluger accused Biden of “pulling another political move out of his dirty hat.” He said that the president is “frantically trying to lower gas prices to increase his poll ratings.”

Gas prices inched up this spring, with a gallon of gas costing an average of $3.60, according to AAA, and it is higher in the Northeast and on the West Coast than in the rest of the country. Analysts also believe that, although the release of 1 million barrels of gasoline from the reserves will “move the needle,” it will not lower gas prices by enough.

The perception that oil prices determine the results of elections and doom presidents is supported by some research, but oil and gas experts caution that there are other factors to take into account. A 2016 study by Political Psychology found that, when gas prices go up, a president’s approval rating goes down. And ClearView Energy Partners said that its “models show a meaningful … inverse correlation over more than four decades between presidential approval ratings and real gasoline prices.”

Axios discussed the effect of the rise in the price of crude oil on the markets and gasoline prices because of the Middle East crisis. It referred to RBC Capital Markets’ note that “the run up in prices has sparked discussions about a revived White House energy diplomacy effort aimed at securing an easing of OPEC cuts this June.”

The Biden administration tried, after the start of the Ukraine war and before the 2022 midterm elections, to rein in gas prices to avoid voters’ wrath. It released more than 180 million barrels from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve in March 2022. Analysts say the reserve is now at its lowest level in about four decades. The US is trying to replenish its reserves amid complaints from Republicans that the Democrats are draining the supplies that are meant for emergencies only. Presidential adviser Amos Hochstein said in early May that the US has “sufficient supply of oil” in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve “to address any kind of concern in the economy if we need it.”

But despite the efforts of the administration, experts believe that the current inflation and the public’s negative perception of the economy, combined with the rise in gas prices, will definitely impact November’s elections. Randa Fahmy, a former associate deputy secretary of energy in the Bush administration, told Arab News that the “rise in gas prices will affect the election results and most certainly favor Trump.” She explained that “most Americans are viewing the American economy with a negative lens and part of that is the cost of consumer goods, including gas and groceries. The Americans are blaming the president for the sluggish economy and they are hoping that Trump will come back and fix it.”

Another analyst, Roger Diwan, vice president of commodity insights for S&P Global, believes that “gasoline prices are rarely a determinant of a presidential vote, despite the legend.” He added that the price of oil’s “supposed importance for Biden’s election prospects is more myth than reality.” However, he also pointed out that “the administration is very wary of inflation in general and the impact it is having on purchasing power, and more importantly on interest rates and Fed policy. This is a real concern, and gasoline prices play in that context.”

It is true that many factors will play a role in Biden’s reelection campaign and will affect the president’s chances, from his handling of the economy to how he is responding to the crisis in the Middle East and the Ukraine war, as well as his age. The Biden campaign is aware of all these factors, but it does not want the price of gas to add to his woes in November. Six months is a long time in politics and, as Diwan said, “of course any shock between now and the election, including the oil prices, would be detrimental for a sitting president.”

Last week’s guilty verdict by a New York court against Trump raised the hopes of Democrats and the president’s campaign that the election might now flip in favor of the president, regardless of how high gas prices soar. This might be a very optimistic outlook for the Democrats, but in volatile election campaigns like the one that is currently underway, anything can happen.

• Dr. Amal Mudallali is a consultant on global issues. She is a former Lebanese ambassador to the UN.

Over two years into the Ukraine conflict, the long-term outlook appears to be shifting towards Moscow’s favor. Despite Ukraine’s counteroffensive efforts, they have fallen short of their primary objectives. The Russian military, recovering from early setbacks, has made incremental advances along the front lines, bolstered by strategic recalibrations. Moscow’s capabilities in manpower and arms production seem to be on the rise, with no evident signs of political instability within Putin’s administration.

Moreover, the impact of international sanctions on Russia’s economic growth appears to be minimal. In contrast, Kyiv faces significant challenges, including shortages of personnel, munitions, and internal discord, compounded by a perceived reduction in Western support. Consequently, the narrative of a war mired in stalemate, as portrayed by many analysts, may overlook the evolving realities of the conflict. As the war transitions into a war of attrition, the scales seem to be tipping increasingly in Russia’s favor.

From a military standpoint, the flow of Western armaments to Ukraine has seen a downturn, attributed to a waning motivation for support and practicality, as well as inadvertent factors like limited production capabilities and dwindling stockpiles. Even with a robust commitment to aid, Western nations are struggling to meet Ukraine’s urgent demand for weaponry and ammunition at the current rates of production. Taking the United States as an example, which boasts the world’s most extensive military manufacturing infrastructure, it can only produce 28,000 units of 155 mm artillery shells per month when operating round-the-clock—a figure that falls short by 10% of Ukraine’s operational requirements on the front lines. The intensifying crisis in the Middle East, particularly the imperative to bolster Israel, a principal ally, exacerbates the predicament, potentially leading to even more acute challenges for Kyiv.

Beyond the challenges in the supply of arms and ammunition, there is an emerging concern over the potential waning of Western support for Ukraine. The Biden administration has encountered significant hurdles in securing Republican approval for financial assistance to Ukraine. There is a noticeable shift in the consensus regarding support for Ukraine, with diminishing enthusiasm observed among both the American public and political elites. Within the European Union, figures such as Hungary’s Orban and Slovakia’s Fico present formidable resistance to the continuation of aid to Ukraine. The anticipated rise of right-wing and far-right parties across Europe could lead to an increase in both the number and fervor of Ukraine’s detractors.

The escalating challenges on the battlefield have been paralleled by a surge in internal discord among Ukraine’s leadership. The removal of several high-ranking military officials by President Zelensky, including the well-regarded commander-in-chief, has laid bare the rifts within the military hierarchy over war strategy. This tension is further compounded by the defection of Zelensky’s one-time adviser to the ranks of his most vocal detractors. The roster of dissenters also includes prominent political figures such as the mayor of Kyiv and a former prime minister, both influential in the Orange Revolution, signaling a deepening of political fissures.

Conversely, Russia appears to be navigating the current geopolitical landscape with increasing adeptness. Since the onset of the conflict, there has been a marked escalation in the production of Russian armaments, with output in certain sectors surging to manyfold their prior levels. In defiance of imposed sanctions, Russia has adeptly forged new alliances, establishing robust supply chains with non-Western allies. These strategic partnerships have been instrumental in securing essential components for its defense sector. Notably, China has emerged as a pivotal ally, providing approximately 90% of the electronic components and semiconductors required. Additionally, Iran has contributed significantly with the provision of Shahid-136 drones and associated technological expertise. North Korea has also played a critical role, supplying a diverse array of armaments, with artillery shells being a key component of their contributions.

Despite the considerable losses sustained by Russian forces in Ukraine, the nation’s substantial population provides a buffer to absorb such impacts. With Russia’s population standing at 143 million, in stark contrast to Ukraine’s 28.5 million, the demographic advantage is clear. The Russian military has bolstered its ranks by an additional 400,000 personnel, augmenting the existing 300,000-strong combat forces, a portion of which remains uncommitted in Ukraine. Current recruitment rates are estimated at about 30,000 individuals monthly, a figure that is deemed sufficient to replenish forces and offset battlefield attrition.

Economically, Russia’s position remains robust despite the imposition of comprehensive sanctions, presenting a stark contrast to the challenges faced by Kyiv. The outbreak of hostilities precipitated a 30% contraction in Ukraine’s economy. Although there was a rebound in economic growth in 2023, Kyiv’s financial system continues to rely heavily on international support. This dependency extends across the board, from funding its military operations to sustaining basic state functions such as pensions, public services, and government wages. Conversely, Russia has demonstrated economic resilience with an approximate 4% growth in 2023, countering expectations of regime destabilization due to internal dissent from figures like Prigozhin and factions such as the Wagner Group. On the political front, President Putin’s standing appears stable, with the Levada Center reporting his approval ratings in the high 80s as the nation approaches electoral events. Moreover, public backing for the conflict hovers at a substantial 76%.

On the global stage, Moscow has adeptly framed the conflict in Ukraine as a challenge to Western hegemony, persuading many nations, particularly those in the Global South, to adopt a stance of neutrality or tacit support. Despite a majority of United Nations member states officially denouncing Russia’s actions in Ukraine, there has been a notable reluctance to fully engage with the Western-led sanctions. Recent assessments by the Economist Intelligence Unit indicate a shift in sentiment; the number of countries censuring Russia has diminished from 131 to 122, while those displaying a tendency towards Russian alignment have risen from 29 to 35.

The perception of a stalemate in Ukraine is gaining traction, driven by the apparent absence of significant strategic gains and the escalating financial toll on the nation and its Western allies. Yet, this perspective may be overly simplistic, hinging on the static nature of territorial control as depicted on military maps. Observers subscribing to this view may be overlooking the dynamic and multifaceted nature of the conflict, which cannot be fully captured by the movement of the front lines alone. The lack of substantial shifts in territory over the past year does not necessarily equate to a deadlock, as it fails to account for the underlying tactical, political, and economic factors at play.

When considering the broader aspects of the conflict, a divergent narrative emerges. A comprehensive analysis suggests that the trajectory of the conflict is not heading towards a stalemate but rather towards a deteriorating situation for Ukraine. The portrayal of the war as a deadlock or a frozen conflict marks a significant shift from the West’s initial optimistic outlook. However, this characterization does not accurately capture the evolving dynamics on the ground. Without meaningful diplomatic efforts and resolutions, the current momentum could potentially culminate in dire and regrettable consequences for Ukraine and its supporters.

If Hamas agrees to the Israeli proposed truce on Gaza, the United States expects that Israel will accept the plan, said White House national security spokesperson John Kirby on Sunday.

“This was an Israeli proposal. We have every expectation that if Hamas agrees to the proposal — as was transmitted to them, an Israeli proposal — then Israel would say yes,” Kirby said in an interview on ABC News’ “This Week” program.

Peace mediators from Egypt, Qatar and the U.S. have called on both sides to agree to a cease-fire and hostage release deal outlined by U.S. President Joe Biden Friday.

Israel’s defense minister, Yoav Gallant, said on Sunday that Israel would not accept Hamas continuing to rule Gaza at any stage during the peace process and that it was examining alternatives to the Islamist group.

“While we conduct our important military actions, the defense establishment is simultaneously assessing a governing alternative to Hamas,” Gallant said in a statement.

“We will isolate areas [in Gaza], remove Hamas operatives from these areas and introduce forces that will enable an alternative government to form — an alternative that threatens Hamas,” Gallant said.

Gallant did not elaborate on possible alternatives.

Israel’s war Cabinet, of which Gallant is a member, was expected to meet later in the day, Israeli media reported, after President Biden presented a framework deal for winding down the war in Gaza.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on Saturday that “Israel’s conditions for ending the war have not changed: the destruction of Hamas’s military and governing capabilities, the freeing of all hostages and ensuring that Gaza no longer poses a threat to Israel.”

Domestic divisions

Netanyahu faces a fractured right-wing coalition government and intense domestic pressure from opposing sides in his country on Israel’s plan for Gaza and Hamas.

Two right-wing members of his Cabinet, National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, threatened Saturday to bring down Netanyahu’s government if he agreed to Biden’s proposal.

Opposition leader Yair Lapid urged Netanyahu to take the deal and offered to support the prime minister if Ben Gvir and Smotrich bolted.

“I remind Netanyahu that he has our safety net for a hostage deal,” Lapid said on the X platform, the former Twitter.

The families of the hostages pressed Israel and Hamas to agree to the deal. Tens of thousands of protesters rallied again on Saturday in Tel Aviv for the return of the hostages.

Israeli President Isaac Herzog said on Sunday he had told Netanyahu, “… I will give him and the government my full support for a deal which will see the release of the hostages.”

“It is our inherent obligation to bring them home within the framework of a deal that preserves the security interests of the State of Israel,” Herzog said in an address at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Palestinian militant group Hamas, meanwhile, said it “views positively” what Biden on Friday described as the Israeli plan.

However, senior Hamas official Mahmoud Mardawi said Saturday in a Qatari television interview, “No agreement can be reached before the demand for the withdrawal of the occupation army and a cease-fire is met,” calling for an end to the war and Israel’s full troop withdrawal from Gaza.

‘Time for the war to end’

President Biden said Friday the peace deal would involve an initial six-week cease-fire with a partial Israeli military withdrawal, and the release of some hostages, while “a permanent end to hostilities” is negotiated through mediators.

“It’s time for this war to end, for the day after to begin,” he said.

Netanyahu has insisted that according to the “exact outline proposed by Israel,” the transition from one phase to the next was “conditional” and drafted to allow it to maintain its war aims.

Fierce fighting

Across Gaza, the military said Sunday it struck “30 terror targets, including military infrastructure, weapons storage facilities and armed terrorist cells that posed a threat to IDF [army] ground troops.”

In Gaza’s southern border city of Rafah, fierce fighting continues despite concerns for displaced civilians sheltering in the city.

Before the Rafah offensive began on May 7, the United Nations said up to 1.4 million people were sheltering there. Since then, one million have fled the area, according to the U.N. agency for Palestinian refugees, UNRWA.

Israeli Apache attack helicopters targeted areas of central Rafah Sunday; a jet fired a missile at a house in the western Tel al-Sultan district and artillery shelling targeted the southern Brazil neighborhood, witnesses said.

Elsewhere in Gaza, Israeli helicopters fired at targets in Gaza City’s Zeitun and Sabra areas, and an airstrike hit a house in the city’s east, AFP reporters said.

Three people were killed, including a woman and a child, when an airstrike hit a family apartment in Gaza City’s Daraj neighborhood, a hospital medic said.

Artillery shelling also targeted areas of Deir al-Balah and the Bureij and Nuseirat camps, witnesses said.

The Israeli seizure of the Rafah crossing has further slowed sporadic aid deliveries for Gaza’s 2.4 million people and effectively shuttered the territory’s main exit point.

Cairo hosted a meeting with Israeli and U.S. officials on Sunday to discuss reopening the Rafah crossing, according to Egypt’s Al Qahera TV. Israel seized the Rafah and Kerem Shalom crossings in early May. Both are along the Gaza-Egypt border. Kerem has been reopened, Israel says, but the U.N. says little to no humanitarian aid has gotten through. The two crossings are important ports of entry to food, fuel, medicine and other supplies.

Israel’s defense ministry body overseeing civilian affairs in the Palestinian territories, COGAT, also said that 764 Egyptian trucks had crossed into Gaza over the past week through the Kerem Shalom crossing.

Hamas launched a terror attack October 7 on Israel, killing about 1,200 people and taking roughly 250 hostages, 121 of whom remain in Gaza, including 37 the army says are dead.

Israel’s retaliatory bombardments and ground offensive have killed at least 36,379 people in Gaza, mostly civilians, according to the Hamas-run territory’s health ministry. The health ministry does not estimate how many of the dead were combatants.