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Day: June 23, 2026
On June 8, the judicial investigation in the Toplum TV case was concluded at the Baku Court for Grave Crimes.
At the hearing, chaired by Judge Azer Taghiyev, the state prosecutor addressed the court and requested prison terms of between 13 and 16 years for the defendants.
The prosecutor asked the court to sentence Akif Gurbanov, spokesperson for the Third Republic Platform, and Ruslan Izzatli, a member of the organization’s founding council, to 16 years’ imprisonment.
The prosecution requested 15-year prison sentences for Toplum TV co-founder Alasgar Mammadli and Ali Zeynalov, an employee of the Institute for Democratic Initiatives.
The prosecutor also asked the court to sentence Ramil Babayev, Ilkin Amrakhov, and Mushfig Jabbarov to 14 years’ imprisonment each, and Farid Ismayilov and Elmira Abbasova to 13 years each.
The state prosecutor also sought a ban on the defendants holding certain positions for a period of up to three years. In addition, he requested the confiscation of their vehicles and residential properties that had previously been seized by court order.
The prosecutor also asked the court to order the immediate arrest of journalist Elmir Abbasov in the courtroom. Abbasov is currently subject to a preventive measure placing him under police supervision.
The next court hearing has been scheduled for June 22.
Brief background on the Toplum TV case
The Toplum TV case began on March 6, 2024. On that day, law enforcement authorities conducted searches at the offices of the independent media outlet Toplum TV, the Institute for Democratic Initiatives, and the Third Republic Platform, as well as at the homes of several employees and activists.
Following the searches, criminal proceedings on smuggling charges were initiated against journalists and civil society activists Farid Ismayilov, Elmir Abbasov, Mushfig Jabbar, Akif Gurbanov, Ali Zeynal, Ramil Babayev, and Ilkin Amrakhov. Preventive detention was ordered for some of the defendants.
On March 8, Ruslan Izzatli, a member of the founding council of the Third Republic Platform, and Alasgar Mammadli, co-founder of Toplum TV, were placed under arrest on the same charges.
The defendants were initially charged under Article 206.3.2 of the Criminal Code of Azerbaijan, which concerns smuggling committed by a group of persons acting in concert by prior agreement. However, following the completion of the investigation, the charges were expanded and made more severe on January 17, 2025.
Additional charges were added to the original accusation, including employing workers without labor contracts, illegal entrepreneurship, money laundering, smuggling, and tax evasion.налогов.
On the same day, January 17, journalist Farid Ismayilov was taken into custody. Prior to that, he had been under police supervision.
On February 5, Toplum TV editor Shahnaz Beylargizi was detained. The following day, a court ordered her held in pretrial detention for three months and 15 days. On February 26, that preventive measure was replaced with house arrest.
The defendants reject the charges against them and maintain that the criminal prosecution is politically motivated. Toplum TV’s management and staff view the case as pressure on independent media and an attempt to restrict freedom of expression in Azerbaijan.
The Toplum TV case is unfolding against a broader wave of persecution of independent journalists. Since November 2023, around 30 media representatives have been arrested in Azerbaijan, many of whom are associated with Meydan TV, AbzasMedia, and Toplum TV.
Following the searches and arrests, Toplum TV’s operations inside Azerbaijan were effectively paralyzed. In February 2024, the media outlet’s team announced that it would continue its activities from abroad.
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This article was originally published on JAMnews.
At a time when Azerbaijan has suspended relations with the European Parliament and the dispute over the credentials of the Azerbaijani delegation to PACE remains unresolved, Baku and Brussels have stepped up negotiations on a new agreement. During meetings in Baku, the two sides reached a preliminary understanding on the draft Partnership Priorities for 2026–2030 and confirmed the resumption of talks on a comprehensive agreement between Azerbaijan and the European Union.
In early May, the Milli Majlis suspended all channels of cooperation with the European Parliament, ended its participation in the EU-Azerbaijan Parliamentary Cooperation Committee and launched the process of withdrawing from the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly.
The move followed the European Parliament’s adoption on 30 April 2026 of a resolution on “Supporting democratic resilience in Armenia”. Baku described the provisions concerning Azerbaijan as biased and as interference in the country’s internal affairs.
At the same time, the dispute over the Azerbaijani delegation’s credentials in PACE continues. In 2024, the Assembly declined to ratify the delegation’s mandate. In 2025, human rights organisations called for the restriction to remain in place. In May 2026, one of PACE’s committees again expressed concern over what it described as the “suppression of critical voices” in Azerbaijan.
Against this backdrop, negotiations between Azerbaijan and the EU in Baku may appear paradoxical at first glance. Sharp tensions at the parliamentary level coexist with positive momentum in intergovernmental relations.
However, this parallel dynamic illustrates the way relations between Baku and Brussels currently function. Disagreements over political values and parliamentary diplomacy coexist with pragmatic cooperation in energy, trade, transport connectivity and regional security.
What changed in relations between Baku and Brussels?
The legal basis for relations between Azerbaijan and the EU remains the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which entered into force in 1999. Negotiations on a new comprehensive agreement to replace it began in February 2017.
According to the European Commission’s trade portal, the process stalled in February 2022 after seven rounds of talks on the trade chapter. In April 2025, the EU’s top diplomat, Kaja Kallas, announced in Baku that negotiations on the new agreement would resume. A technical round took place in Brussels in April 2026, and the talks continued in Baku in June. On its official communications platform, the EU noted that the June negotiations coincided with the 30th anniversary of relations between the European Union and Azerbaijan.
The anniversary carries symbolic significance from a political communication perspective. Brussels and Baku are attempting to redefine the framework of their relationship amid both longstanding normative disagreements and new geoeconomic calculations. The dispute at the parliamentary level should be viewed in this context.
In its official decision of 1 May, the Milli Majlis stated that the European Parliament had become an instrument of “pressure, blackmail and blatant interference in Azerbaijan’s internal affairs”.
For their part, leading Members of the European Parliament said in a statement on 5 May that Baku’s decision was “unjustified”. They stressed that parliamentary cooperation remains a useful platform for discussing disagreements. As a result, both sides have effectively blamed each other for blocking institutional dialogue.
Relations with PACE
The dispute with PACE has deeper and longer-standing roots. In January 2024, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe declined to ratify the credentials of the Azerbaijani delegation. In explaining its decision, the Assembly cited “very serious concerns” regarding elections, the separation of powers, judicial independence, human rights and cooperation with the Assembly itself.
Baku views this approach as biased. Human rights organisations, by contrast, have called for the restrictions to remain in place. A further warning from a PACE committee, issued in May this year and referring to the “suppression of critical voices”, also suggested that there are currently no signs of a softening of the Assembly’s position.
At the same time, geopolitical considerations have not reduced Brussels’ interest in cooperation with Baku. The European Union remains Azerbaijan’s largest trading partner and the country’s leading source of foreign investment. In 2025, Azerbaijan exported 12.8 billion cubic metres of natural gas to Europe.
Earlier this year, the EU also formally committed itself to a gradual phase-out of Russian gas while maintaining diversification of energy supplies as a key strategic priority. As a result, Brussels views Azerbaijan not only as an energy supplier but also as an important partner in developing the Middle Corridor, strengthening digital and transport connectivity, and promoting stability in the South Caucasus.
What do experts say?
In recent weeks, one key theme has increasingly emerged in commentary by Azerbaijani analysts: Baku is pursuing a dual-track strategy in its relations with Europe.
Vasif Huseynov, Chief Adviser at the Center of Analysis of International Relations, argues that Europe spoke to Azerbaijan “with different voices” in the spring of 2026. On the one hand, the European Parliament adopted critical resolutions. On the other, the Council of Europe, the European Commission and intergovernmental institutions expanded cooperation in security, energy, transport and negotiations on a new agreement.
In a separate publication, Huseynov emphasises “measurable results”. He argues that Baku places greater value on investment, infrastructure and deeper economic integration than on political gestures.
Political commentator Fuad Kerimli told AnewZ that the EU no longer views the South Caucasus as a peripheral region. Instead, it sees the region as strategically important for energy security and trade routes.
According to Kerimli, this growing interest stems from natural gas supplies, the Middle Corridor and the prospects for investment in green energy. He sees this as one of the reasons why negotiations have gained momentum at this particular moment.
A more critical assessment comes from Azerbaijani researcher Murad Nasibov, who argues that EU-Azerbaijan relations have evolved “from normative divergence to strategic convergence”.
In other words, while human rights and democracy formally remain on Brussels’ agenda, energy, transport connectivity and regional stability are playing an increasingly important role in practical policymaking.
At a hearing in the European Parliament in May, Azerbaijani journalist Leyla Mustafayeva argued that further cooperation between the EU and Azerbaijan should be linked to the release of political prisoners.
European Commission materials on Azerbaijan also indicate that the EU continues to focus on human rights, support for civil society and media freedom.
As a result, although pragmatic considerations have become more prominent in EU-Azerbaijan relations, the normative agenda has not disappeared altogether.
Why is parliamentary crisis not stopping cooperation?
The progress achieved during the talks in Baku primarily demonstrates that Azerbaijan does not approach its relationship with the EU on an all-or-nothing basis. Instead, it follows a selective strategy. Baku responds sharply to political pressure from parliamentary institutions, yet it continues to cooperate with the European Commission, the Council of the European Union and the European External Action Service on energy, trade, transport connectivity and security. This reflects not so much a contradiction as a division of institutional roles. The EU itself follows a similar model. While the European Parliament and human rights institutions focus on democracy and human rights concerns, the bloc’s executive bodies continue working with Azerbaijan on a new framework agreement.
Brussels’ motivations are relatively straightforward. Statements by European Council President Antonio Costa and EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas have clearly identified the main priorities: energy security, transport and digital connectivity, regional stability and the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process. The EU’s plans to phase out Russian gas and its search for alternative supply routes have only strengthened that interest. Azerbaijan’s export of 12.8 billion cubic metres of gas to Europe in 2025, together with its role in developing the Middle Corridor, has further reinforced Brussels’ pragmatic approach.
Around 90% of the draft Azerbaijan-EU Partnership Priorities for 2026–2030 has already been agreed, while the main disagreements remain concentrated in the trade chapter. The European Commission’s trade portal likewise indicates that trade negotiations have remained frozen since 2022. Political risks also persist, including renewed tensions with the European Parliament and PACE, concerns over human rights and continuing disagreements surrounding the peace process.
By comparison, Azerbaijan’s relationship with Turkey may be deeper in terms of security cooperation and political coordination. However, the European track offers Baku advantages in access to markets, investment, regulatory frameworks and infrastructure opportunities. This is reflected in the EU’s position as Azerbaijan’s largest trading partner and investor, as well as in initiatives such as Global Gateway and regional connectivity projects. While relations with the United States focus more heavily on security and mediation, Brussels offers a broader and more long-term agenda. That helps explain why the June negotiations have attracted relatively little public attention while still carrying significant strategic importance.
Conclusions and outlook
The talks in Baku have demonstrated that the crisis in relations with the European Parliament and PACE does not amount to a freeze in Azerbaijan’s relations with the EU as a whole. On the contrary, engagement is increasingly shifting towards the executive level and taking on a more pragmatic character, centred on cooperation in energy, transport connectivity, trade and security. This approach aligns both with Azerbaijan’s multi-vector foreign policy and with the European Union’s evolving energy and geopolitical priorities.
In the near term, the key question is whether the two sides can resolve the remaining trade disagreements and normative disputes in order to finalise a new agreement.
For now, the signals appear positive. The parties have agreed to continue negotiations in an intensive format, both online and through in-person meetings. However, if new tensions emerge over parliamentary relations or human rights issues, relations between Baku and Brussels are likely to retain their current dual-track character, with political criticism and strategic cooperation continuing to exist side by side.
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Only a few days remain until the parliamentary elections in Armenia. The election campaign in the country resembles a geopolitical confrontation more than internal political competition.
On one side stands Nikol Pashinyan, who came to power after the 2018 revolution and has been gradually trying to distance the country from Russia in recent years.
On the other side are political forces, church circles, and Russia-linked business groups that believe maintaining close relations with Moscow is important for Armenia’s security and economy.
This confrontation is reflected less in the slogans used during the election campaign and more in the events that have taken place over the past two years.
After Karabakh came under Azerbaijan’s control in 2023, Pashinyan openly accused Russia of failing to fulfill its allied obligations toward Armenia. Following this, Yerevan froze its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), expanded the activities of the European Union monitoring mission, and increased cooperation with the United States. Moscow, in turn, viewed these moves as a blow to its position in the South Caucasus.
In recent months, tensions in the relationship have entered a more visible phase.
At the end of May, Russia recalled its ambassador to Armenia for consultations. The Russian Foreign Ministry explained the move by citing the Armenian leadership’s growing rapprochement with the European Union. At the same time, discussions began within the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union regarding Armenia’s future in the bloc. Union officials demanded that Yerevan choose between the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union, and even raised the possibility of suspending Armenia’s membership.
The Pashinyan government, however, stated that it does not accept such a choice.
A few years ago, debates over Armenia’s foreign policy direction were largely confined to expert circles; today, they are at the heart of the election campaign.
For Moscow, that is not enough.
At the beginning of June, Russia’s agricultural watchdog banned the import of Armenian apricots, peaches, nectarines, cherries, grapes, and other products. Prior to this, Armenian mineral water, alcoholic beverages, fish products, strawberries, tomatoes, and various other agricultural goods had also faced different restrictions. Russia is one of Armenia’s main export markets. For this reason, these measures are viewed in Yerevan less as technical inspections and more as a political signal.
Russia is also venturing into more sensitive territory.
Moscow has stated that if Armenia continues its integration with the European Union, preferential arrangements for the supply of discounted natural gas, oil, and diamonds could be withdrawn. Armenia imports more than 80 percent of its natural gas from Russia and obtains these energy resources at prices lower than those on European markets.
As a result, economic pressure has emerged as one of the main instruments Moscow is using during the election campaign.
However, Pashinyan’s challenges are not coming only from abroad.
Over the past year, two important political factors have come to the forefront within Armenia: the Apostolic Church and the Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan.
Karapetyan is a businessman operating in Russia and one of the wealthiest Armenians listed in Forbes. In the summer of 2025, he accused the government of conducting a campaign against the church and stated that if politicians did not resolve the issue, they would “intervene in their own way.” The Armenian authorities interpreted these statements as a call to seize power by force, and Karapetyan was arrested.
Interestingly, Karapetyan’s arrest drew more attention for Moscow’s reaction than for the response within Armenia itself.
The Kremlin stated that Karapetyan is a Russian citizen and that his case is being closely monitored. Members of the Russian parliament and politicians close to the Kremlin strongly criticized the arrest. The Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in turn, sent a note to Moscow, describing the statements by Russian politicians as interference in the country’s internal affairs.
Thus, the Karapetyan case ceased to be merely the arrest of an oligarch and became a new point of tension in Armenia–Russia relations.
A new opposition to Pashinyan: the church and the oligarchy
One of the most notable features of the election campaign in Armenia is that the opposition is emerging not from traditional political parties, but from the church and business circles.
In 2024, after the decision to return four villages as part of the border delimitation with Azerbaijan in the Tavush region, Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan, the head of the Tavush diocese, became the face of anti-government protests. Marches involving thousands of people extended all the way to Yerevan, and the “Holy Struggle” movement was formed.
Bagrat Galstanyan. Photo: news.am
Galstanyan’s main argument was that after Karabakh, Pashinyan is making new concessions under pressure from Azerbaijan and is weakening Armenia’s security.
A year later, the events moved into a more intense stage.
In June 2025, the Armenian Investigative Committee announced that the group led by Galstanyan was preparing to seize power by force. Law enforcement agencies conducted searches at more than 90 locations, and 14 people were arrested. According to the investigation, the searches uncovered weapons, communication devices, drones, smoke grenades, and lists of a post–regime-change government.
The opposition called it political persecution.
The authorities, however, stated that it was the prevention of a coup d’état.
This confrontation shows how polarized Armenia has become as it heads toward elections.
Billionaire Samvel Karapetyan entered the political scene at exactly that time. Although Karapetyan had long been known for his business activities in Russia, in the past two years he has begun to take an open political stance. He criticizes Pashinyan’s policies and describes the government’s confrontation with the church as a threat to Armenian statehood.
Photo: OC Media
The “Strong Armenia” bloc led by Karapetyan has become one of the main opposition centers in the election campaign. In recent polls conducted in recent months, this bloc appears in second place. According to an EVN Report poll in May, Pashinyan’s “Civil Contract” party has 56.4 percent support, while Karapetyan’s bloc has 17.5 percent. In February polls, Karapetyan’s figure was around 19 percent.
These figures reveal an important detail.
Although Pashinyan’s approval rating has weakened compared to previous years, the opposition has still not been able to unite around a single candidate or a single political center.
Who is standing against Pashinyan in this election?
Nineteen parties and two blocs are taking part in Armenia’s June 7 elections. However, the real political competition is taking place between a few main forces.
The first and main contender is, of course, the ruling “Civil Contract” party led by Nikol Pashinyan. In most polls, this party appears in first place and is considered the favorite to win the election.
However, there is no unified opposition against Pashinyan.
On the contrary, the opposition camp is divided into several centers.
One of the biggest rivals is the “Hayastan” (“Armenia”) bloc led by Armenia’s second president, Robert Kocharyan.
Robert Kocharyan. Photo: “NEWS.am”
Kocharyan served as President of Armenia from 1998 to 2008 and is one of the most prominent figures of the political elite that emerged from Karabakh. His bloc considers Armenia’s distancing from Russia dangerous and advocates restoring a strategic partnership with Moscow.
Another major center of the opposition is the “Strong Armenia” bloc formed around Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan. In many current polls, Karapetyan’s bloc is shown in second place and is considered Pashinyan’s main rival.
The third important player is the “Prosperous Armenia” party led by businessman Gagik Tsarukyan.
Tsarukyan has been one of the key figures in Armenian politics for many years. He is neither as openly pro-Western as Pashinyan nor as openly pro-Russian as Kocharyan. For this reason, his role could be significant in potential post-election coalitions.
In addition, forces such as “Wings of Unity” led by former ombudsman Arman Tatoyan, “Bright Armenia” led by former Foreign Minister Edmon Marukyan, and “New Power” led by former Yerevan mayor Hayk Marutyan are also participating in the election.
But one of the key questions concerns the fate of the former presidents.
Kocharyan is there, but Sargsyan is not
One of the most notable aspects of the election is that former President Robert Kocharyan is personally taking part in the race.
However, Armenia’s third president, Serzh Sargsyan, and the Republican Party he leads are not participating in the elections. Sargsyan announced in April 2026 that his party would not take part in the election.
Serzh Sargsyan, official photograph
There are several explanations behind this decision.
First, the Republican Party’s approval rating has sharply declined in recent years.
Second, there is concern about the fragmentation of votes within the opposition camp.
Third, a widely held view in Armenian media and expert circles is that part of Sargsyan’s camp is effectively leaning toward Karapetyan’s project. There is no clear evidence of this, but the fact that some members of Karapetyan’s team previously had ties to the Republican Party has intensified these discussions.
Thus, a paradoxical situation has emerged.
The “old system,” which was the main target of the 2018 revolution that brought Pashinyan to power, is returning in this election in two different forms: on one side, the traditional opposition led by Kocharyan; on the other, a new political project formed around Karapetyan that is financially stronger and has closer ties to Moscow.
And one of the main intrigues of the election is this: will Pashinyan’s main rival be former President Kocharyan, or Karapetyan’s political camp, which has risen rapidly over the past year?
What do the polls say: is Pashinyan really the leader?
One of the biggest paradoxes in Armenian politics is that Pashinyan remains both the most criticized and the most popular politician. The loss of Karabakh, economic problems, and security concerns have dealt a serious blow to his approval ratings. However, this blow has not been enough for the opposition to come to power.
According to recent data, the ruling “Civil Contract” party has around 30 percent support and is still in first place.
In some polls, this figure appears even higher.
In a Breavis poll conducted in February, Pashinyan’s party received 50 percent support, while Karapetyan was shown in second place with 19 percent.
A March survey by the International Republican Institute (IRI) revealed another point.
The poll showed that for a significant portion of Armenians, the main priority is no longer security, but the economy and stability. A large share of respondents supports integration with the European Union.
This also becomes Pashinyan’s main political advantage.
The opposition is running its campaign on the issues of Karabakh and national security.
Pashinyan, on the other hand, poses a different question to voters: Do you want to return to the past, or continue the new foreign policy course?
For this reason, the election is not just a contest between the government and the opposition, but a competition between two different models of Armenia.
Why doesn’t Moscow want Pashinyan to win?
One of the most important aspects of this election is Russia’s position.
Pashinyan and Putin, official photograph
Moscow’s problem with Pashinyan began after the loss of Karabakh. After 2023, Armenia suspended its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The functions of Russian border guards were reduced. Arms purchases began from countries such as France, India, and others. Relations with the United States and the European Union were rapidly expanded. In January 2025, Armenia and the United States signed a strategic partnership charter. This document elevated cooperation between Washington and Yerevan in the fields of security, economy, and institutional reforms to a new level. In 2026, the European Union allocated an additional €20 million aid package under the European Peace Facility to support the Armenian army. In Washington, a trilateral document was signed with the participation of U.S. President Donald Trump and President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev.
Moscow views all of this as a weakening of its positions in the South Caucasus.
According to experts, the Kremlin fears that if Pashinyan is re-elected, Armenia’s integration into the European Union will accelerate. For this reason, Russia has both activated economic pressure tools and is closely monitoring the rise of alternative figures such as Karapetyan.
Some media outlets, citing Western intelligence sources, even report that Moscow is attempting to influence the election by using disinformation campaigns and various political projects. The Kremlin denies this.
At this point, it is no longer just about Pashinyan.
It is about Russia’s fear of losing an ally in the South Caucasus.
Why does Azerbaijan appear interested in Pashinyan staying in power?
Official Baku has not so far publicly declared support for any candidate or party in Armenia’s elections. The Azerbaijani authorities traditionally state that they do not interfere in the internal politics of other countries.
However, events in recent years show that for Baku, the main issue is not which specific individual is in power in Armenia, but rather the existence of a government that will continue peace negotiations and will not reverse the agreements that have been reached.
It was precisely under Pashinyan that, starting in 2022, commissions on border delimitation were established.
In 2024, the first real border delimitation between Azerbaijan and Armenia was carried out in the Tavush direction, and Armenia returned four villages that had belonged to Azerbaijan.
It was also during Pashinyan’s tenure that Armenia, for the first time, openly recognized Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan’s territory.
In October 2023, in a document adopted in the city of Granada, Spain, Armenia confirmed that it recognizes Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity of 86,600 square kilometers.
This marked a significant departure from the political line that Armenia’s previous governments had defended for decades.
This is also what underlies the increasingly favorable perception of Pashinyan in Baku.
Aliyev, Trump and Pashinyan Photo: Azərtac
For the Azerbaijani authorities, Pashinyan is not a “friendly politician.”
In this context, one notable point is the shift in Azerbaijan’s rhetoric toward Armenia’s leadership. During the 2020 war and the months that followed, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev used extremely harsh and mocking language toward Nikol Pashinyan. In his speeches, expressions such as “What happened, Pashinyan?”, “Didn’t you say you wouldn’t give it up?”, “You were building a road from Jabrayil to Yerevan. What happened, Pashinyan?”, and “You were dancing in Shusha” were used. Terms like “heel-licker” and “dog chaser” were also employed, making Pashinyan one of the main targets of personal criticism and political ridicule.
This rhetoric was part of the open confrontation between Baku and Yerevan at that time as well as the narrative of military victory. However in the following years especially after Azerbaijan re-established full control over Karabakh and peace negotiations became the main focus of the agenda this tone has changed significantly. Today the Azerbaijani authorities view Pashinyan more as a party to the ongoing negotiation process and personal mockery in official rhetoric has decreased considerably compared to the previous period. He is seen as a leader who conducts talks with Baku makes compromises and most importantly is able to implement the decisions he makes.
The alternatives appear more uncertain.
Robert Kocharyan and the forces representing his political line have long taken a tougher stance on the Karabakh issue.
The opposition formed around the church is demanding the cancellation of the Tavush delimitation and a change in the policy toward Azerbaijan.
For this reason, the main risk for Baku is not Pashinyan’s departure.
The main risk is that the government that replaces him may question the agreements reached so far.
The Pashinyan phenomenon in Azerbaijani media
An interesting trend has emerged in Azerbaijani media over the past two years.
Whereas Armenian leaders, including Pashinyan, were previously mainly the subject of criticism and ridicule, some media outlets have now begun publishing more neutral and, at times, even positive coverage of Pashinyan.
This change has become particularly noticeable since Karabakh came under Azerbaijan’s control.
A number of Azerbaijani commentators portray Pashinyan as the first politician in Armenia’s history to accept reality.
Their argument is as follows:
If Armenia recognizes Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, agrees to border delimitation, and is willing to discuss a peace treaty, this creates a more favorable situation for Azerbaijan than under previous governments.
However, this approach also has a reverse effect within Armenia.
The opposition often portrays Pashinyan as “the politician Baku wants.”
During the election campaign, opponents of the government have repeatedly pointed to positive coverage of Pashinyan in Azerbaijani media as evidence that he has drifted away from Armenia’s national interests.
Thus, the growing positive tone toward Pashinyan in Azerbaijani media produces a paradoxical effect.
These reports may be seen in Baku as evidence of the success of Pashinyan’s political course.
However, within Armenia, they sometimes have the opposite effect, becoming an argument used by the opposition against the government.
For this reason, it is difficult to argue that the positive image of Pashinyan emerging in Azerbaijan’s information space brings him any real political benefit.
In some cases, the opposite effect may be even stronger.
Do the U.S. and Europe want Pashinyan to stay?
If Russia views these elections as a process that will determine Armenia’s geopolitical orientation, a similar perspective also exists in Western capitals.
The difference, however, is that Washington and Brussels have expanded their cooperation with Armenia to an unprecedented level over the past two years.
In April 2024, a high-level trilateral meeting between Armenia, the United States, and the European Union was held in Brussels. Following the meeting, economic and technical assistance packages worth hundreds of millions of euros were announced for Armenia. In 2025, the United States and Armenia signed a Strategic Partnership Charter. The European Union, meanwhile, expanded its support for Armenia’s border security, public administration, and defense sector. Taken together, these steps send a clear message: the West is interested in seeing the course pursued by Pashinyan continue.
The reason for this is not personal sympathy toward Pashinyan.
Pashinyan and Ursula von der Leyen, official photograph
The key issue is Armenia’s shift away from Russia’s sphere of influence toward closer integration with the West. If the government changes after the election and a new administration attempts to restore relations with Moscow, the cooperation model built over the past two years could suffer a serious setback. For this reason, the main question for Brussels and Washington is not Pashinyan’s fate. The central question is whether Armenia’s foreign policy course will change.
If Pashinyan loses, what happens to the peace process?
The outcome of this election could have the greatest impact on the ongoing peace process between Baku and Yerevan.
It is currently reported that a large part of the text of a peace agreement between the sides has already been agreed.
However, a number of fundamental issues still remain unresolved.
The issue raised by Baku regarding territorial claims in Armenia’s Constitution is one of these unresolved matters. In recent months, Pashinyan has repeatedly spoken about the need for a new constitution, which is seen as a positive signal in Baku.
However, a large part of the opposition is against such changes.
The Kocharyan camp, the church movement, and representatives of the radical opposition consider Pashinyan’s policy toward Azerbaijan to be contrary to national interests.
This means that if a change of government occurs, peace negotiations may not automatically stop, but their pace and direction could change.
At least some of the agreements reached over the past three years could become subject to renegotiation.
For this reason, the outcome of the election will not only determine Armenia’s internal political balance.
It will also affect security in the South Caucasus in the coming years.
The real question of the election
A few years ago, elections in Armenia were mainly framed as a struggle between the former and the new ruling elites.
This time, the situation is different.
This election is no longer just about Nikol Pashinyan’s political fate. It has the character of a referendum on the direction Armenia will take.
On one side stands a model of Armenia moving closer to the European Union, building a strategic partnership with the United States, and attempting to distance itself from Russia.
On the other side are forces advocating the preservation of traditional security and economic ties with Moscow.
For this reason, the main issue in the campaign is not economic programs or social promises.
The central debate is Armenia’s future geopolitical identity.
Russia’s economic pressure, the opposition formed around Karapetyan and the church, the West’s increasing support for Yerevan, and Azerbaijan’s close attention to the process are all different parts of the same picture.
In short, on election day Armenians will not only choose a new parliament. They will also decide the direction in which Armenia will move from here.
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