Category: Selected Articles
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The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, Jeyhun Bayramov, met with the US State Department Senior Advisor for Caucasus Negotiations, Louis Bono, Report informs.

Azerbaijan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jeyhun Bayramov, met with the US State Department Senior Advisor for Caucasus Negotiations, Louis Bono, Report informs.
The meeting discussed the current situation in the region, the normalization and peace proces
Azerbaijani FM says US repeating Armenia’s claims is unacceptable
First they start on a positive note, then they start to reveal
their true hypocritical nature. However, for the time being, we are
not talking about France, or a group of pro-Armenian officials
represented at the UN. This time we are talking about the Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Hadja Lahbib, who first identified
himself as a diplomat and later revealed her true prejudice against
Azerbaijan.
A couple of days ago, when the information about her visit was
spread, the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs showed a more
positive position regarding the resolution of the ongoing
Armenian-Azerbaijani tension in the South Caucasus. However,
Lahbib, who started her first trip from Armenia, somehow damaged
the reputation of the European Union with her diplomatic
illiteracy. It is likely that Hadja Lahbib did not even look at the
agenda related to the region prior to her visit to the South
Caucasus. After all, why look? Because everyone believes that Hadja
Lahbib is successfully following the path of French diplomats.
A Belgian “diplomat” in Armenia meets with the soldiers of an
occupying state crushed under the iron fist and presents them with
flowers. Lahbib’s French-style action presented her purpose and
position to the public at the first moment.
Perhaps she has never asked herself the question on whose
territory that soldier whom she hugged before fought and received
the deserved punishment. Lahbib completely devoted herself to
Armenia, stepping on the diplomatic behavior of Charles Michel, the
President of the Council of Europe, in Brussels. Whatever the
reason that made her to this request, it was not received
unambiguously for Azerbaijan.
The Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who participated in the
briefing in Yerevan, demonstrated her insidious behavior and even
attepted to send a note against the Azerbaijani Foreign Minister
Jeyhun Bayramov: “The rights and security of the population of
“Nagorno-Karabakh” must be respected, let me remind my Azerbaijani
colleague about this .”
The next corrupt pro-Armenian example of Europe has astrayed so
much that she did not even respect the opinion of the President of
the Council of Europe Michel about recognizing the territorial
integrity of Azerbaijan.
You probably won’t take my criticism wrong. Indeed, Azerbaijan
has no prejudice against Lahbib. We have never seen her
contribution to conflict resolution before. But what we have seen
is that Lahbib is indeed biased towards conflicts.

It would not be wrong to say that the issue of Georgia in the
South Caucasus is at the same level as Garabagh. It is good that
Hadja Lahbib one in her lifetime could express an honest and
objective position on this issue. Following the European Union
mission team, the so-called diplomat, who was watching the
territories with binoculars in her hand, allegedly demanded the
recognition of Georgia’s territorial integrity within the framework
of international laws. The question is, what is the problem with
Azerbaijan, Mrs. Hadja? Why don’t your binoculars show Garabagh
correctly? We have no doubt that Abkhazia and South Ossetia are
occupied territories, and so is it, according to your opinion; then
why is Garabagh strange to your statement?
You say that there is no question of self-determination of
peoples in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But when it comes to
Garabagh, your opinions change 180 degrees, and you are not ashamed
to even express biased opinions. But we were ashamed for you. We
are ashamed that you, as a diplomat, destroyed the image of the
Council of Europe and the Parliament of the European Union and
masterfully demonstrated your diplomatic illiteracy. At least you
should be abashed to refuse to come to Azerbaijan after your rascal
behavior. You deserve to bow only to the invading soldier. I am
afraid to say that even though Azerbaijan remains true to its
diplomatic culture while coming here, the spirits of our Martyrs
over these lands will not leave you alone. So we strongly advise
you not to come at all. Maybe this will calm your “honor” and
“conscience” sold for some pennies…
—
Elnur Enveroglu is AzerNews’ deputy editor-in-chief, follow him
on @ElnurMammadli1
Follow us on Twitter @AzerNewsAz
With Friends Like These

Turkey’s brinksmanship in the South Caucasus puts a spotlight on tensions within NATO.
On Friday, the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan flew to Moscow for ceasefire talks. A “humanitarian ceasefire” was announced earlier this week, but at the time of writing appears to have broken down. “Let those holding talks in Moscow know that it’s our territory and we won’t be making any concessions,” Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham Aliyev remarked of the prospects for peace on Friday, foreshadowing this week’s renewed violence. Currently at an advantage, Azerbaijan has little incentive to return to the negotiating table.
In the past, when tensions around Nagorno-Karabakh flared up, neither side gained sufficient advantage to force the other side into concessions. By default or design, Moscow has ended up as an arbiter. This time, however, Turkey seems to be tipping the scales in Azerbaijan’s favor, with the other two regional powers, Russia and Iran, pleading for peace. In an unlikely turn, Western leaders today find themselves in the unlikely position of being more aligned with governments in Moscow and Tehran than their own NATO ally.
Aggressively backing Azerbaijan is in line with Turkey’s increasingly assertive, interventionist foreign policy developed under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Turkey has pursued unilateral military interventions in Syria and Libya, pressured Greece and Cyprus over expanding maritime borders, and is now backing Azerbaijan’s territorial cause in the South Caucasus. Its military interventions in Syria and Libya have been condemned by many European countries, and with French leadership, the EU has threatened Turkey with sanctions over the Mediterranean maritime border dispute.
The security guarantees afforded by its NATO membership may be emboldening Turkey to use military force when it knows that deterrence keeps adversaries at bay. Especially in the South Caucasus, it’s conceivable that Turkey’s strategists are calculating they can escalate conflicts without fear of Russia directly retaliating on Turkish soil. Early last week, Turkey’s foreign minister was downright dismissive of Russian calls for an immediate ceasefire on his visit to Baku.
Russia has every reason to want to do something about Turkish behavior. As Samuel Ramani, a DPhil candidate in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford, pointed out, “[Russia] views Turkey’s seamless integration of Syrian proxy militias alongside the Azerbaijani military as worrisome, as that show that Ankara could mobilize Syrians for its own purposes effectively in more places that just Libya.” Unanswered provocations send signals of their own.
That said, Turkey does not have a completely free hand in the region either. Earlier in the conflict, Armenia accused Turkey of shooting down one of its military jets, which Turkey vehemently denied. Armenia is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russian-led alliance modeled on its North Atlantic adversary. The CSTO is often dismissed as a paper tiger, but its existence complicates the calculus of all the players. Russia’s prestige in the region, as well as its credibility as a security provider, is on the line, and we do not know to what extent Turkey is willing to test these commitments. For now, the CSTO’s involvement is mostly a question of escalation—whether there is a credible threat on Armenian soil. The CSTO’s treaty obligations do not extend to Nagorno-Karabakh (which is not part of Armenia and which even Armenia has not recognized as independent), so there is ample gray area for Turkey to act. Known tensions between Putin’s regime and the government of Nikol Pashinyan could also prompt Turkish brinksmanship.
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Neighboring Iran is the other uneasy and interested spectator in the region. The country has enjoyed a close relationship with Armenia, but it has a sizeable Azeri minority living within its borders (representing 16% of Iran’s total population, more than the total number living in Azerbaijan proper). The leadership in Tehran cannot afford to alienate either side. At the same time, it also wants to avoid spillover of regional violence and is eyeing Turkey’s presence at its borders. So despite attempts to signal a neutral stance, Iran has allowed Russia to transport military supplies through to Armenia.
Nicole Grajewski, an international security fellow at Harvard’s Belfer Center, noted Iran’s seriousness in taking on a mediator role in alleviating the conflict, but highlighted the geostrategic difficulties facing any settlement. While Russia and Iran would prefer a return to the pre-July status quo and may want to re-freeze the conflict as quickly as possible, Turkey has incentives to push on for longer. Part of the motivation is domestic; saber-rattling nationalists upset with Turkey’s humiliation in the current Greece talks need to be deflected. But, Ramani says, Turkey does not want to risk pushing Russia and Iran away simultaneously, thereby both further intensifying its international isolation and straining peace negotiations in Syria.
Thus far, the West has gone missing in the conflict. This is attributable to a lack of on-the-ground presence on the one hand, as well as to uncertainty at getting involved in a complicated fight where Turkey, Russia, and Iran already dominate. Still, allowing a NATO member to court conflict so openly hardly seems like optimal policy. CEPA’s Lauren Speranza thinks NATO needs to find a way to help de-escalate the situation at a higher level, as the United States tried to do with Russia in Syria. For better or for worse, Erdoğan’s Turkey is an ally, and the Alliance will have to stand by it. The goal has to be to avoid an unintended escalation spiral should either Russia or Turkey somehow miscalculate.
Letting Russia, Turkey and Iran take the lead on brokering peace—or another ceasefire—may be the best available option, even if prospects for a lasting agreement are dim under such leadership. Western leaders, however, can’t afford to be complacent. Even the best-case outcome in Nagorno-Karabakh should lead to serious soul-searching in the Alliance. Having an erratic and increasingly authoritarian regime as a partner poses risks all its own.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.
Europe’s Edge
CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, Jeyhun Bayramov, met with the US State Department Senior Advisor for Caucasus Negotiations, Louis Bono, Report informs.

Azerbaijan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jeyhun Bayramov, met with the US State Department Senior Advisor for Caucasus Negotiations, Louis Bono, Report informs.
The meeting discussed the current situation in the region, the normalization and peace proces
Azerbaijani FM says US repeating Armenia’s claims is unacceptable

Ilham Aliyev, President of Azerbaijan for nearly eighteen years, sits atop a mirage. Azerbaijan’s capital Baku exudes wealth. Luxury boutiques like Bulgari, Christian Dior, Gucci, and Trussardi line Neftchiler Avenue across Primorsky Park from the Bay of Baku. Luxury hotels like the Four Seasons, Marriott Absheron, and the Hilton Baku overlook the cornice. Car dealerships showcase the latest Rolls Royces, Lamborghinis, and Ferraris. Azerbaijan is hardly the only country to sport such an ostentatious display—Persian Gulf emirates do as well—but the wealth extremes among Azeri citizens are greater, as anyone who has bypassed the official tours to see the mudbrick houses and shantytowns outside the capital can attest. While those associated with the Aliyev family and his inner circle might afford Baku’s luxury goods, most city residents, including the educated and professional class, barely scrape by. Travel an hour or two outside the capital, and the situation is even worse.
Azerbaijan is among the world’s most corrupt countries; Transparency International ranks Azerbaijan with Russia, Mali, and Malawi. In contrast, neighboring Armenia sits alongside Greece and Slovakia in the rankings, while Georgia scores even better. The recent Pandora Papers exposé showed that family members of senior Azeri officials had bought or sold tens of millions of dollars of luxury real estate.
Politically, Azerbaijan remains an authoritarian dictatorship. Freedom House assesses that Azeris living under Aliyev’s dictatorship enjoy less freedom than Palestinians struggling under Hamas rule in the Gaza Strip and Houthi repression in Yemen; Azeris enjoy fewer civil liberties than the Chinese under President Xi Jinping’s repressive rule.
Why the West Ignores Azerbaijan’s Reality
Western states have ignored Aliyev’s corruption and repression for a variety of reasons:
The United Kingdom shields Azerbaijan at international forums because of British Petroleum’s interest in the country’s energy market. While China’s trade with Azerbaijan has historically been only a fraction of Great Britain’s, Beijing’s ambitions in Azerbaijan are quickly growing, which ironically makes China and the United Kingdom allies in the United Nations Security Council offering blind support to Azerbaijan, when the United Nations considers issues involving the South Caucasus.
Israel, meanwhile, has long-standing ties with Azerbaijan that are rooted in the arms-for-energy trade. During last year’s Nagorno-Karabakh war, Azerbaijan used Israeli drones against both civilian and military targets to turn the tide of the war after ethnic Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh rebuffed the initial Azerbaijani invasion.
Traditionally, both Israel and the United States also value Azerbaijan for its strategic location and willingness to allow espionage, if not full-fledged operations, against the Islamic Republic of Iran. While the mostly Shi’ite Azerbaijan once sought to distinguish itself from theocratic Iran to its south, in recent years, Aliyev has played the issue both ways: coasting on Azerbaijan’s past reputation while increasing his ties with Iran (and Russia), recent disputes with Tehran notwithstanding.
Azerbaijan’s reputation for religious tolerance and secularism also attracts many Western supporters. Certainly, Azerbaijan deserves praise in this regard, though the myth does not live up to reality. While Azerbaijan has generally protected its Jewish community, Aliyev’s government has long targeted Azerbaijan’s Christians, in some cases by erasing centuries-old cultural property like the graveyard in Julfa that Azerbaijani troops systematically destroyed. More recently, Aliyev’s cooperation with and tolerance for Syrian jihadi mercenaries, whom he used in his fight against Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenians, raise questions about his outlook. In many ways, Aliyev appears to be taking a page from Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s playbook: Distract the West with paeans to the secular past while quietly co-opting, if not promoting, religious extremists to act as policy proxies. When countries have embraced such tactics, the result has been blowback that harmed the standing of religious minorities. Azerbaijan’s subordination of its foreign policy to Erdoğan’s—even allowing Turkish diplomats veto power over Azerbaijani engagements—should raise questions about Baku’s tolerance and the ability of Israel and the United States to leverage Azerbaijani territory for other strategic pursuits in the near future.
Beyond the strategic reasons for ignoring Azerbaijan’s reality, there is also the reality of caviar diplomacy and golden parachutes. Azerbaijan pays well. The regime spends lavishly on gifts, luxury hotel suites, and dinners and provides access to those who parrot official positions and, more importantly, refuse to research or consider counterarguments. Some Israeli officials openly talk about how they hope to enter the Azerbaijani business scene after retirement. Former American officials might be more discreet in what they say, but their actions do not substantively differ.
Aliyev’s Dangerous Revanchism
Aliyev’s orientation should raise questions for any honest analyst, but, what really makes Azerbaijan a strategic liability, is Aliyev’s increasing unwillingness to live within Azerbaijan’s borders. This problem goes beyond disputes with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, the contested territory recognized by most countries as Azerbaijani territory, and extends to Aliyev’s territorial claims over Armenia proper, which the Azerbaijani dictator has increasingly voiced over the past decade.
For example, on November 20, 2012, Aliyev said, “Armenia as a country is of no value. It is actually a colony, an outpost run from abroad, a territory artificially created on ancient Azerbaijani lands.” The following year, Aliyev gave a speech in which he promised not only to retake Nagorno-Karabakh but also all of Armenia. “Azerbaijanis will live on their historical lands in the future. Our historical lands are Irevan [Yerevan] and Zangezur regions,” he said. He returned to this theme on January 22, 2014, during a visit to Ganja, Azerbaijan’s second-largest city, when he described Armenia as “historical Azerbaijani lands” that his countrymen will eventually regain. While Minsk Group diplomats pushed a land-for-peace and security deal, Aliyev promised Azeris that an Armenian withdrawal from Nagorno-Karabakh and the adjacent districts would only be the first phase of a final solution.
At Nowruz celebrations the following year, Aliyev tripled down on the theme. “The Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict must be settled only within the framework of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized territorial integrity,” he said, then added, “after that, we will return to our ancient lands—to Yerevan, Geicha, and Zangezur.”
While successive secretaries of state took Aliyev at his word when he promised to settle his disputes with Armenia diplomatically, Aliyev did not try to deceive his home audience. Speaking in the central Azerbaijani district of Terter in December 2016, he explained, “Today, we are not claiming any in the modern Republic of Armenia. We do not intend to reclaim Yerevan, Meghri, Goris through military force but I’m sure that time will come, and we, Azerbaijanis, will return to all our historic lands,” He then promised, “The main factor [for success] is strength. This is true. We live in the real world. So we have to become even stronger, to create a more powerful army.”
In recent years, especially as his economy has stagnated or declined against the backdrop of falling oil prices, Aliyev has increasingly turned toward revanchist claims to distract the public from his own mismanagement. During a speech to his New Azerbaijan Party, for example, Aliyev claimed that Yerevan, the territories of Lake Sevan, and the province of Syunik, also known as Zangezur, are historical Azerbaijani lands and that their return was a “strategic and political goal.” During a Baku military parade after the Azeri victory in the most recent Nagorno-Karabakh war, Aliyev called Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, as well as Armenia’s Syunik and Sevan regions “historical lands” of Azerbaijan. Such rhetoric dashes hopes for peace. Just last month, Aliyev threw cold water on Armenia’s request for talks about the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, warning Armenians that they should refrain from raising the subject since Azerbaijan has more historical grounds for claiming parts of Armenia like Zangezur and Lake Geicha.
It is one thing for Azerbaijan not to have diplomatic relations with Armenia—that can be rectified—but it is quite another to reject Armenia’s right to exist.
A Perfect Storm
Family fiefdoms seldom succeed in countries without formal, institutionalized monarchies. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak fell when he tried to promote his son to power. Likewise, Muammar Gaddafi fell as he tried to have his son Saif succeed him. Hafez al-Assad’s son Bashar did come into power, but Syria ultimately paid a far higher price as it descended into civil war.
For dictators, the problem with multi-decade rule is that political scapegoats are in short supply. For example, Erdoğan cannot blame his predecessors for the corruption and economic mismanagement that drained Turkey’s foreign reserves and crashed its currency. For all of Azerbaijan’s hydrocarbon wealth, the per capita income of Azerbaijanis is actually less than that of Georgians and Armenians, the latter of whom subsist under a Turkish-Azerbaijani economic blockade. While the citizens of Gulf emirates arguably accept a contract in which they sacrifice freedoms for wealth, the comparison between the Gulf states and Azerbaijan falters because ordinary Azeris receive little in exchange for political pliancy.
Azerbaijan now faces a perfect storm. As Aliyev seeks to promote his wife and son to succeed him, ordinary Azerbaijanis grow increasingly frustrated with their plight. They also see the cost of Aliyev’s Nagorno-Karabakh victory: infringement on Azerbaijani sovereignty by Russian and Turkish troops. Aliyev sponsors trips for foreign officials and some Azeris to recaptured areas of Nagorno-Karabakh, but few Azeris who originate from the territory are prepared to return permanently, given the region’s lack of jobs and their new roots in and around Baku. In effect, Aliyev wants to spend billions of dollars on infrastructure and Potemkin ghost towns that few Azeris want to reside in permanently during a shaky time for Azerbaijan’s economy, the rise in oil prices notwithstanding.
To #CIA, #ODNI, #POTUS, #Senate, #House, #SenatorMenendez: #Azerbaijan needs a #REGIMECHANGE! And the sooner the better. This appears to be the most efficient solution for its problems. The #PetroWealth of the #SouthCaucasus belongs to all its #people, and it has to be… pic.twitter.com/ugbRVyuMG2
— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) September 13, 2023
To #CIA, #ODNI, #POTUS, #Senate, #House, #SenatorMenendez: #Azerbaijan needs a #REGIMECHANGE! And the sooner the better. This appears to be the most efficient solution for its problems. The #PetroWealth of the #SouthCaucasus belongs to all its #people, and it has to be distributed #accordingly. The #SouthCaucasusFederation should be formed, #firmly #allied with the #New #Ukraine and the “#CollectiveWest“.

зачем полицейскому «лягушка» и что в народе прозвали «здравствуй и прощай»
В 2017 году в нашем городе открылся обновленный историко-демонстрационный зал УВД Витебского облисполкома, а в этом году его даже включили в программу «Феста экскурсоводов». Экспозиция находится в административном здании УВД Витебского облисполкома и в ней около 300 экспонатов. О самых интересных фактах из истории витебской милиции рассказывала старший хранитель фондов ЦКВР Инна Александровна Абрамова. И если вас интересует вопрос, почему полицейских называли «фараонами», зачем им «лягушка» и почему в 1920-ых годах первые милиционеры должны были проходить «кастинг» не только по характеру, но по внешности, – теперь мы готовы рассказать об этом.
1. История милиции началась еще в Витебской губернии, в 1802 году на территории Российской империи впервые сформировали «милиционные отряды», которые собирали из-за угрозы войны с Наполеоном. Обученные военному делу крестьяне должны были стать резервом регулярной армии. После окончания войны отряды были распущены.
2. Правопорядок в городах Российской империи охраняли полицейские. Город делился на околотоки, в каждом был свой надзиратель, стоявший на перекрестке или на главной улице. Народ прозвал полицейских «фараонами», потому что такой страж порядка, одетый в специальную форму, стоял с суровым выражением лица, подобно египетскому царю. На боку у него была шашка, правда, только для устрашения – главным рабочим «оружием» полицейского был свисток. В народе его называли «лягушка», потому что медь окислялась и становилась зеленой.
За такой внешний вид полицейских прозвали “фараонами”. Источник dz-online.ru
3. Перед началом Февральской революции полиция получила право входить в любое учреждение и даже в домовладение, если подозревалось, что там находятся революционеры. Так что потом вместо нее сформировали милицию. Вместо формы у нее были только с нарукавные повязки «НО» (народная охрана). В Витебске полицию заменили милицией в ночь с 5 на 6 марта (по старому стилю) 1917 года.
4. В 1920-е годы на работу в милицию годился не любой мужчина, например, смотрели, чтобы на лице у него не было шрамов, к тому же нужно было обладать определенными качествами характера и опрятным внешним видом. Милиционер должен был выглядеть красиво. Следили, чтобы он был правильно одет, если оторваны пуговицы, грязная обувь – значит такая и власть.
Служба милиционера длилась 8 часов. В любое время суток, в любую погоду нужно было нести службу. ГАИ в те времена не было, так что приходилось регулировать и движение транспорта. Для этого использовался жезл красного цвета. А для гужевого транспорта еще были таблички с надписью: «Ехать шагом». Когда в нашем городе был установлен первый светофор, читайте на нашем сайте.
Инсталляция рабочего места милиционера в 1920-ых годах. Фото Анастасии Вереск
5. С 1922 года милиция стала профессиональной, а не просто добровольной обязанностью каждого гражданина по охране порядка. В том же году в Витебске впервые отмечали первый профессиональный праздник, а Ратушу даже украсили большим портретом милиционера в форме. Старались отметить каждого, поэтому дарили часы, сапоги, отрезы на костюм и даже пивные кружки. В то время милиционер получал очень мало – 17 рублей. Впервые самых лучших и заслуженных милиционеров отметили государственной наградой – орденом Красного знамени, а также званием Герой труда милиции.
6. В 1931 году белорусская милицейская форма была заменена на общесоюзную. Введенные «каскетки» в народе прозвали «здравствуй и прощай», потому что у них был козырек впереди и сзади.
7. Последними из оккупированного в Отечественную войну Витебска уходили истребительный батальон милиции и сотрудники ОСОАВИАХИМ. Первый бой батальона под Суражем стал также и последним: потери были ужасны. Сейчас установлены 182 фамилии сотрудников витебской милиции, погибших при исполнении служебного долга в разные годы. Именами Бобкова и Синкевича названы улицы в Орше и Сенно.
Мемориальный комплекс в честь погибших солдат правопорядка возле здания УВД был установлен в 2005 году. Фото Анастасии Вереск
8. Легендой витебской милиции стал Ландыченко Виктор Федорович, полный кавалер Ордена Славы. Третья степень награды нашла его уже после войны, когда Виктор Федорович в уголовном розыске разведчиком. Его направляли в бандформирования для сбора информации.
9. Пять сводных отрядов из витебской милиции были отправлены после аварии в чернобыльскую зону, из 1300 человек на сегодняшний день в живых осталось только 700.
За организацию работы сводных отрядов полковник милиции Томашев А.М. награжден орденом Красного знамени. Такой же награды удостоен милиционер Сергей Малахов, умерший в от полученной лучевой болезни.
10. До того, как в 1980 году было построено здание для УВД на проспекте Фрунзе, милиция находилась на улице Калинина, теперь там работает поликлиника УВД. В экспозиции восстановлена дежурная часть, в которую звонили по номеру «02».
В коллекции есть и форма современной белорусской милиции, ОМОНа, ГАИ. Фото Анастасии Вереск
Знакомство с экспозицией предполагает групповое посещение с 9.00 до 18.00 (с понедельника по пятницу), для посещения необходима предварительная запись, так как выставочный зал находится в административном здании.
Подробнее об истории уголовного розыска в Витебске читайте на нашем сайте.

Ilham Aliyev, President of Azerbaijan for nearly eighteen years, sits atop a mirage. Azerbaijan’s capital Baku exudes wealth. Luxury boutiques like Bulgari, Christian Dior, Gucci, and Trussardi line Neftchiler Avenue across Primorsky Park from the Bay of Baku. Luxury hotels like the Four Seasons, Marriott Absheron, and the Hilton Baku overlook the cornice. Car dealerships showcase the latest Rolls Royces, Lamborghinis, and Ferraris. Azerbaijan is hardly the only country to sport such an ostentatious display—Persian Gulf emirates do as well—but the wealth extremes among Azeri citizens are greater, as anyone who has bypassed the official tours to see the mudbrick houses and shantytowns outside the capital can attest. While those associated with the Aliyev family and his inner circle might afford Baku’s luxury goods, most city residents, including the educated and professional class, barely scrape by. Travel an hour or two outside the capital, and the situation is even worse.
Azerbaijan is among the world’s most corrupt countries; Transparency International ranks Azerbaijan with Russia, Mali, and Malawi. In contrast, neighboring Armenia sits alongside Greece and Slovakia in the rankings, while Georgia scores even better. The recent Pandora Papers exposé showed that family members of senior Azeri officials had bought or sold tens of millions of dollars of luxury real estate.
Politically, Azerbaijan remains an authoritarian dictatorship. Freedom House assesses that Azeris living under Aliyev’s dictatorship enjoy less freedom than Palestinians struggling under Hamas rule in the Gaza Strip and Houthi repression in Yemen; Azeris enjoy fewer civil liberties than the Chinese under President Xi Jinping’s repressive rule.
Why the West Ignores Azerbaijan’s Reality
Western states have ignored Aliyev’s corruption and repression for a variety of reasons:
The United Kingdom shields Azerbaijan at international forums because of British Petroleum’s interest in the country’s energy market. While China’s trade with Azerbaijan has historically been only a fraction of Great Britain’s, Beijing’s ambitions in Azerbaijan are quickly growing, which ironically makes China and the United Kingdom allies in the United Nations Security Council offering blind support to Azerbaijan, when the United Nations considers issues involving the South Caucasus.
Israel, meanwhile, has long-standing ties with Azerbaijan that are rooted in the arms-for-energy trade. During last year’s Nagorno-Karabakh war, Azerbaijan used Israeli drones against both civilian and military targets to turn the tide of the war after ethnic Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh rebuffed the initial Azerbaijani invasion.
Traditionally, both Israel and the United States also value Azerbaijan for its strategic location and willingness to allow espionage, if not full-fledged operations, against the Islamic Republic of Iran. While the mostly Shi’ite Azerbaijan once sought to distinguish itself from theocratic Iran to its south, in recent years, Aliyev has played the issue both ways: coasting on Azerbaijan’s past reputation while increasing his ties with Iran (and Russia), recent disputes with Tehran notwithstanding.
Azerbaijan’s reputation for religious tolerance and secularism also attracts many Western supporters. Certainly, Azerbaijan deserves praise in this regard, though the myth does not live up to reality. While Azerbaijan has generally protected its Jewish community, Aliyev’s government has long targeted Azerbaijan’s Christians, in some cases by erasing centuries-old cultural property like the graveyard in Julfa that Azerbaijani troops systematically destroyed. More recently, Aliyev’s cooperation with and tolerance for Syrian jihadi mercenaries, whom he used in his fight against Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenians, raise questions about his outlook. In many ways, Aliyev appears to be taking a page from Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s playbook: Distract the West with paeans to the secular past while quietly co-opting, if not promoting, religious extremists to act as policy proxies. When countries have embraced such tactics, the result has been blowback that harmed the standing of religious minorities. Azerbaijan’s subordination of its foreign policy to Erdoğan’s—even allowing Turkish diplomats veto power over Azerbaijani engagements—should raise questions about Baku’s tolerance and the ability of Israel and the United States to leverage Azerbaijani territory for other strategic pursuits in the near future.
Beyond the strategic reasons for ignoring Azerbaijan’s reality, there is also the reality of caviar diplomacy and golden parachutes. Azerbaijan pays well. The regime spends lavishly on gifts, luxury hotel suites, and dinners and provides access to those who parrot official positions and, more importantly, refuse to research or consider counterarguments. Some Israeli officials openly talk about how they hope to enter the Azerbaijani business scene after retirement. Former American officials might be more discreet in what they say, but their actions do not substantively differ.
Aliyev’s Dangerous Revanchism
Aliyev’s orientation should raise questions for any honest analyst, but, what really makes Azerbaijan a strategic liability, is Aliyev’s increasing unwillingness to live within Azerbaijan’s borders. This problem goes beyond disputes with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, the contested territory recognized by most countries as Azerbaijani territory, and extends to Aliyev’s territorial claims over Armenia proper, which the Azerbaijani dictator has increasingly voiced over the past decade.
For example, on November 20, 2012, Aliyev said, “Armenia as a country is of no value. It is actually a colony, an outpost run from abroad, a territory artificially created on ancient Azerbaijani lands.” The following year, Aliyev gave a speech in which he promised not only to retake Nagorno-Karabakh but also all of Armenia. “Azerbaijanis will live on their historical lands in the future. Our historical lands are Irevan [Yerevan] and Zangezur regions,” he said. He returned to this theme on January 22, 2014, during a visit to Ganja, Azerbaijan’s second-largest city, when he described Armenia as “historical Azerbaijani lands” that his countrymen will eventually regain. While Minsk Group diplomats pushed a land-for-peace and security deal, Aliyev promised Azeris that an Armenian withdrawal from Nagorno-Karabakh and the adjacent districts would only be the first phase of a final solution.
At Nowruz celebrations the following year, Aliyev tripled down on the theme. “The Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict must be settled only within the framework of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized territorial integrity,” he said, then added, “after that, we will return to our ancient lands—to Yerevan, Geicha, and Zangezur.”
While successive secretaries of state took Aliyev at his word when he promised to settle his disputes with Armenia diplomatically, Aliyev did not try to deceive his home audience. Speaking in the central Azerbaijani district of Terter in December 2016, he explained, “Today, we are not claiming any in the modern Republic of Armenia. We do not intend to reclaim Yerevan, Meghri, Goris through military force but I’m sure that time will come, and we, Azerbaijanis, will return to all our historic lands,” He then promised, “The main factor [for success] is strength. This is true. We live in the real world. So we have to become even stronger, to create a more powerful army.”
In recent years, especially as his economy has stagnated or declined against the backdrop of falling oil prices, Aliyev has increasingly turned toward revanchist claims to distract the public from his own mismanagement. During a speech to his New Azerbaijan Party, for example, Aliyev claimed that Yerevan, the territories of Lake Sevan, and the province of Syunik, also known as Zangezur, are historical Azerbaijani lands and that their return was a “strategic and political goal.” During a Baku military parade after the Azeri victory in the most recent Nagorno-Karabakh war, Aliyev called Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, as well as Armenia’s Syunik and Sevan regions “historical lands” of Azerbaijan. Such rhetoric dashes hopes for peace. Just last month, Aliyev threw cold water on Armenia’s request for talks about the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, warning Armenians that they should refrain from raising the subject since Azerbaijan has more historical grounds for claiming parts of Armenia like Zangezur and Lake Geicha.
It is one thing for Azerbaijan not to have diplomatic relations with Armenia—that can be rectified—but it is quite another to reject Armenia’s right to exist.
A Perfect Storm
Family fiefdoms seldom succeed in countries without formal, institutionalized monarchies. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak fell when he tried to promote his son to power. Likewise, Muammar Gaddafi fell as he tried to have his son Saif succeed him. Hafez al-Assad’s son Bashar did come into power, but Syria ultimately paid a far higher price as it descended into civil war.
For dictators, the problem with multi-decade rule is that political scapegoats are in short supply. For example, Erdoğan cannot blame his predecessors for the corruption and economic mismanagement that drained Turkey’s foreign reserves and crashed its currency. For all of Azerbaijan’s hydrocarbon wealth, the per capita income of Azerbaijanis is actually less than that of Georgians and Armenians, the latter of whom subsist under a Turkish-Azerbaijani economic blockade. While the citizens of Gulf emirates arguably accept a contract in which they sacrifice freedoms for wealth, the comparison between the Gulf states and Azerbaijan falters because ordinary Azeris receive little in exchange for political pliancy.
Azerbaijan now faces a perfect storm. As Aliyev seeks to promote his wife and son to succeed him, ordinary Azerbaijanis grow increasingly frustrated with their plight. They also see the cost of Aliyev’s Nagorno-Karabakh victory: infringement on Azerbaijani sovereignty by Russian and Turkish troops. Aliyev sponsors trips for foreign officials and some Azeris to recaptured areas of Nagorno-Karabakh, but few Azeris who originate from the territory are prepared to return permanently, given the region’s lack of jobs and their new roots in and around Baku. In effect, Aliyev wants to spend billions of dollars on infrastructure and Potemkin ghost towns that few Azeris want to reside in permanently during a shaky time for Azerbaijan’s economy, the rise in oil prices notwithstanding.
To #CIA, #ODNI, #POTUS, #Senate, #House, #SenatorMenendez: #Azerbaijan needs a #REGIMECHANGE! And the sooner the better. This appears to be the most efficient solution for its problems. The #PetroWealth of the #SouthCaucasus belongs to all its #people, and it has to be… pic.twitter.com/ugbRVyuMG2
— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) September 13, 2023
To #CIA, #ODNI, #POTUS, #Senate, #House, #SenatorMenendez: #Azerbaijan needs a #REGIMECHANGE! And the sooner the better. This appears to be the most efficient solution for its problems. The #PetroWealth of the #SouthCaucasus belongs to all its #people, and it has to be distributed #accordingly. The #SouthCaucasusFederation should be formed, #firmly #allied with the #New #Ukraine and the “#CollectiveWest“.
To CIA, ODNI, POTUS, Senate, House, Senator Menendez:
Azerbaijan needs a REGIME CHANGE! And the sooner the better. This appears to be the most efficient solution for its problems.
The Petro Wealth of the South Caucasus belongs to all its people, and it has to be distributed… pic.twitter.com/brTxi1zZgQ— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) September 13, 2023
Israel and Netanyahu should support all the people of the South Caucasus, not just Azerbaijan and the corrupt Ilham Aliyev’s regime. The alliances of convenience are short lived. Jews have roots throughout all the South Caucasus. The relations with Armenia have to be reviewed and… pic.twitter.com/7RcKqGB60b
— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) September 14, 2023
To CIA, ODNI, POTUS, Senate, House, Senator Menendez:
Azerbaijan needs a REGIME CHANGE! And the sooner the better. This appears to be the most efficient solution for its problems.
The Petro Wealth of the South Caucasus belongs to all its people, and it has to be distributed… pic.twitter.com/brTxi1zZgQ— Michael Novakhov (@mikenov) September 13, 2023
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