Thousands of citizens wave European flags in Tbilisi, demanding free and fair elections and protesting the Georgian Dream’s pivot away from the European Union. As hundreds brave police violence and arbitrary arrests, what can the EU do, and what is it actually doing to meet the aspirations of Georgians? In frames of our collaboration with the Trans-European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA) in Poland, Mariam Bichoshvili spoke with Dr. Giselle Bosse, who researches EU policies to respond to impediments to democratisation in the neighborhood.
Dr. Giselle Bosse is an Associate Professor and Jean Monnet Chair in EU Foreign Policy and International Relations at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Maastricht University, and a Fellow at the European Democracy Hub in Brussels. She also leads work packages for EU Horizon projects EMBRACE (2022-2025) and INVIGORATEU (2024-2027), which address barriers to democratization in the EU neighborhood.
Mariam Bichoshvili: In light of the dramatic developments we are witnessing, how would you say the EU is positioning itself towards Georgia and its ongoing severe democratic backsliding?
I’m afraid the EU’s response has been very limited, which has understandably been a disappointment. This is particularly striking given the EU’s decision to offer Georgia candidate status last year. That decision came with clear obligations for the Georgian government: to implement democratic reforms and, at the very least, protect and further develop democracy.
What’s notable here is how the EU framed its decision on candidate status at the time. It explicitly stated that the decision reflected “the genuine aspiration of the overwhelming majority of Georgia’s citizens to eventually join the European Union.” The candidacy was, in fact, explicitly for the Georgian citizens.
Now, however, we see the EU falling short in its response – first to elections that were judged by the OSCE’s [preliminary] findings as compromised, with issues such as vote secrecy violations, vote-buying, and other irregularities. The OSCE’s verdict was clear, yet the EU’s reaction to these elections was already very limited.
There seems to be a lack of traction among EU Member States as a whole to persuade the Hungarians and Slovakians to change their stance.
Today, in light of the disproportionate and brutal violence used by police forces against protesters, the EU’s response remains disappointing in many ways. This, in my opinion, is not solely due to the vetoes by Hungary and Slovakia against additional sanctions on Georgian leadership and officials involved in the crackdown. More broadly, there seems to be a lack of traction among EU Member States as a whole to persuade the Hungarians and Slovakians to change their stance, as we saw in the context of Ukraine when similar divisions needed to be overcome.
How did we get here? Essentially, there’s nothing new about what is happening in Georgia. We’ve seen similar developments earlier in Russia, Belarus, attempts to do the same in Ukraine. Why do you think it still takes an explicit declaration from the GD officials about a U-turn in foreign policy for the EU to act decisively?
I still wouldn’t describe the EU’s reaction – particularly after yesterday’s Foreign Affairs Council – as decisive. What we see is a continuation of the EU’s selective approach to addressing democratic backsliding, depending on the context. The EU has tools at its disposal, yet it has not used them effectively in response to developments in Georgia, for example, when the so-called ‘foreign agents’ law’ was introduced by the Georgian Dream government earlier. Apart from declarations urging the government to reverse course, the EU’s reaction has been limited.
What we see is a continuation of the EU’s selective approach to addressing democratic backsliding, depending on the context.
At the same time, the EU has continued to support Georgian Dream’s government through significant projects. For instance, the European Investment Bank recently made a €1 billion investment in the East-West Highway – a prestigious project. Surely, if they had not done this, there would have been interest from other investors, such as China or Turkey. So, there was always a tension between supporting or working with the GD government while also using the EU’s leverage to apply sufficient pressure, also through the trade agreement on the Georgian government, but [the EU] has chosen not to do so.
Moreover, we cannot overlook the Southern Gas Corridor’s role. The EU’s strategy to diversify energy supplies away from Russia has made this pipeline increasingly significant, especially in recent years. The South Caucasus Pipeline, which runs through Georgia and delivers Azerbaijani gas to the EU via Turkey, is critical for southern EU Member States. This reliance creates a cautious approach among some Member States, particularly in the south, to avoid jeopardizing stability and good relations with the Georgian government – currently led by Georgian Dream.
This cautious and selective approach also underlines a key weakness in EU foreign policy: the requirement for unanimity. Sanctions or asset freezes require agreement from all 27 Member States. Hungary and Slovakia made it clear they would not support sanctions against Georgian officials, effectively blocking the decision yesterday [on December 16 – eds.].
That said, there are Member States—like Germany and the Baltic States—that have pushed for stronger measures and even proposed a coalition of the willing. The Baltic States, for instance, have already imposed unilateral sanctions on Georgian Dream officials, including Bidzina Ivanishvili and others. However, these actions are not unified.
The EU is strongest when it speaks with one voice. When it fails to do so, it undermines its credibility and leverage.
The EU is strongest when it speaks with one voice. When it fails to do so, it undermines its credibility and leverage. The Georgian government knows this and is exploiting divisions within the EU to its advantage. For example, meeting separately with leaders like Viktor Orbán sends a poor signal to Georgia and the region as a whole. It weakens the EU’s position and emboldens governments that engage in democratic backsliding.
HR/VP Kaja Kallas highlighted that based on the developments in Georgia, the EU is ready to take additional steps. As for now, she explained, “the [suspension] of the visa-free regime to the holders of diplomatic and service passports is the first step and is also symbolic.” My question is, what is the main message that the EU is aiming to convey, and what is your take on its symbolic aspect?
The High Representative, Kaja Kallas, is a strong supporter of human rights and democracy, particularly in the Eastern Partnership countries, and has, of course, been highly critical of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As we say, she is a ‘hawk’ in EU politics. However, the High Representative’s role is always limited by the requirement for unanimity among Member States, which restricts what she can effectively achieve.
The High Representative’s role is always limited by the requirement for unanimity among Member States.
At the same time, Kallas tries to convey a clear and unified message on behalf of the Union. This suspension of visa-free travel that will potentially be applied to Georgian officials holding diplomatic and service passports can be decided through qualified majority voting, as it is based on a different legal mechanism from sanctions. And it is now the European Commission that can start this visa suspension procedure. Interestingly, this procedure was initially introduced to address concerns from Member States critical of migration, allowing them to signal when too many migrants were arriving from a visa-free country and trigger a suspension mechanism. However, it is now being used as a form of sanction mechanism against government officials, so it looks like this is really going to happen.
It is symbolic in the sense that, yes, it restricts visa-free travel for diplomatic passport holders, but it falls far short of measures like asset freezes, which would have a real and tangible effect, particularly on oligarchs. For example, figures like Ivanishvili, who are rumored to own luxury real estate in Paris, would be significantly affected by such sanctions. However, such steps require unanimity, which remains a major challenge. This is likely why Kaja Kallas described it as symbolic – it is a step forward, but it will lack teeth.
Has there ever been a precedent within the EU where citizens retained visa-free travel while diplomats did not?
This is not entirely unprecedented. While Georgia currently has a visa-free regime with the EU, Belarus previously had a visa facilitation agreement, which is a step below full visa liberalization. In 2020, the EU decided to partially suspend this agreement, specifically targeting individuals involved in police violence and brutality against protesters.
A similar partial suspension can be applied to visa-free regimes under qualified majority voting. However, while the mechanism exists, it has not yet been used in this exact context. So, while this would not be a complete precedent, it would be the first time it is used in the context of a visa-free regime.
Would you assess the possibility of the EU imposing sanctions through unanimity as even remotely plausible in the future? And if such sanctions remain off the table, what might the next steps be that Kallas referred to?
On the feasibility of sanctions, we have seen – particularly in the context of Ukraine and sanctions against the Russian Federation – that if the Member States truly put their mind to it and genuinely want sanctions, they will find ways to make it happen. This has included rather transactional approaches to dealing with governments like Hungary and Slovakia, as was the case multiple times with Russian sanctions. These two governments, particularly Hungary, are very transactional and can often be ‘bought off,’ whether through concessions focusing on domestic issues, democracy, human rights, or other means.
If the Member States truly put their mind to it and genuinely want sanctions, they will find ways to make it happen.
That said, there is a larger issue at play here. I have the impression that some Member States, especially those in southern Europe, are heavily reliant on energy supplies transiting through Georgia. So, the EU is trying to balance carefully. On the one hand, there is the declared focus on human rights, democracy, and keeping the promises tied to Georgia’s candidate status. On the other hand, there is an interest in maintaining relations with the Georgian government for energy security and regional stability. I think this tension plays much more heavily in the case of Georgia, precisely because of the geopolitical interests. And that’s why it will be very difficult for the Union to find unanimity on this.
At the same time, the EU tends to react more decisively when violence escalates to a very severe level. Comparing the early days of protests in Belarus and Georgia illustrates this point. In Belarus, during the first two days alone, around 7,000 people were detained, and the police violence was extremely brutal. While the violence in Georgia has been serious and deeply concerning, it has not yet reached the same level. Unfortunately – and I emphasize this is not my opinion – it sometimes takes those extreme images of police brutality, mass detentions, and violence for the EU to find the consensus needed to act. Another complicating factor is that energy interests were not as significant in Belarus as in Georgia. This cannot be ignored when considering the EU’s hesitancy in imposing harsher measures. That’s why I remain slightly less optimistic about the EU’s willingness to take tougher measures in the short term.
Looking ahead, with the upcoming Polish Presidency of the Council, there is some hope that cooperation with the Baltic States, known for their hawkish foreign policy stance, and the involvement of the new Polish government could push for more decisive action regarding developments in Georgia.
Based on your expertise, what further immediate actions would you recommend for the EU to take in addressing the current crisis that you would consider the most effective?
I think that, as mentioned, freezing the assets would be a very useful tool, particularly for those in the Georgian government who have vested interests and assets in the EU. While they likely have stronger business interests in Russia, which limits the EU’s leverage to some extent, there are still opportunities to apply pressure. For example, the EU can use its trade agreements and funding for infrastructure projects. The latter often benefit specific oligarchs and their businesses or industries, and withdrawing this kind of support would be a targeted and effective measure. I would recommend explicitly targeting individuals or entities that benefit under the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), particularly the technical assistance that comes with it.
Freezing the assets would be a very useful tool, particularly for those in the Georgian government who have vested interests and assets in the EU.
Another possibility is imposing sanctions not only on individuals but also on companies. Many oligarchs likely have assets in the EU – perhaps not essential, but certainly lucrative and ‘nice to have.’ Targeting these assets could have some impact, although whether it would change the Georgian Dream government’s overall course is uncertain. Their direction appears clearly focused on deepening relations with Russia while attempting to carve out a role similar to Azerbaijan. However, this is overly optimistic on the government’s part because Georgia does not possess the energy resources Azerbaijan has. Georgia’s main asset is its pipeline infrastructure, but it is unclear how much leverage this gives vis-à-vis Russia.
Beyond economic tools, the EU could also increase high-level political support, including more visits from senior officials. While largely symbolic, such visits send an important message to the Georgian people.
At the same time, the EU could develop and publicly communicate a clear escalation plan outlining the steps it will take if democratic backsliding continues. This could include consequences for further police violence against protesters, the lack of independent investigations into such violence, and other demands the European Parliament has made. Such a plan could specify additional sanctions, the withdrawal of funding, and even the suspension of the DCFTA if necessary.
So, there definitely are possibilities for what the EU can do, but ultimately, the issue is not just unanimity but also political will among Member States. Poland, the Baltic States, and a handful of others cannot be the only ones pushing for stronger measures—broader support is needed.
In response to these developments, we often hear from the GD that these processes are just temporary and that attitudes, including from the EU, will change the moment the new Trump administration takes over on 20 January. Where do these narratives come from, and how would you assess the new administration’s impact on the EU’s approach to Georgia?
The question is whether the U.S. government’s stance toward Georgia will necessarily change. The U.S. has been much more active than the EU when it comes to imposing sanctions on Georgian government officials. However, I’m not fully convinced that this would necessarily shift under a Trump administration.
How many strategic interests the U.S. actually has in the region remains unclear. If Trump pursues a more pro-Russian course, it could potentially have implications for Georgia, but this remains to be seen. At the moment, I don’t foresee Trump having as much influence on the so-called ‘peace process’ as he hoped to have, so I think this will be his immediate concern.
Regarding sanctions, I would expect the Trump administration to prioritize pressuring the European Union on its relations with China, as well as on any potential peace agreements with Russia. I don’t see Georgia being a priority for the Trump administration.
I don’t see Georgia being a priority for the Trump administration in the context of his relations with the European Union.
Will this affect the EU? I also don’t think so. If anything, a Trump administration could drive Europeans closer together on security and defense policy, as we already see a trend of reduced reliance on the U.S. as Europe’s security guarantor. This could eventually have implications for EU foreign policy, particularly in decision-making on sanctions, as it might accelerate discussions about transitioning away from unanimity toward more qualified majority voting. This would be a more immediate implication.
More broadly, there is a question about the West’s security guarantees – not just for Georgia but also for Armenia, Moldova, and, of course, Ukraine. Discussions about potential NATO membership for Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia remain crucial, not only for the context of EU enlargement but also as a way to increase the West’s leverage, including over GD.
People who have been voting for the Georgian Dream are also people who fell for these scaremongering arguments that the EU was about to open another front in Georgia, leading to another intervention from the Russian Federation. These fears may seem real, especially to those living near the border with Russia or in regions close to Abkhazia or South Ossetia. So, this issue of security guarantees from Europe and the U.S. still looms large in this context.
NATO’s current hesitancy to offer firmer security guarantees may make the Georgian Dream stronger in its argumentation that they need to balance foreign policy with Russia. If NATO membership for Ukraine and Moldova were more firmly on the table, it would likely have significant repercussions for Georgia and could be a potential ‘carrot’ for the Georgian Dream government to change course. But then again, I’m not sure they would be willing to do that.
Finally, on the question of Trump: his impact on NATO membership for these countries could be significant, potentially making it more difficult. Then again, Trump is not known for his predictability, so it’s very hard to say for certain.
Thank you!
