Green energy offers new opportunities to Azerbaijan and China global.chinadaily.com.cn
Day: April 4, 2024
In the wake of mounting environmental concerns and escalating energy demands, the world is witnessing a transformative transition towards embracing green energy solutions. Spearheaded by the visionary concept of a “Green Economy” introduced by British economist Michael Jacobs in 1991, the global shift towards green energy has emerged as a beacon of hope in combating climate change, reducing carbon emissions, and ensuring energy security.
By Ronojoy Sen
India’s general election, the world’s largest electoral exercise, will be held from 19 April to 1 June 2024. Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party have been successfully pushing the narrative that the election results are a foregone conclusion and it is only a matter of their party increasing its numbers. Earlier this year, Modi unusually made a prediction about the poll results in parliament, announcing that the BJP will win at least 370 of the 543 Lok Sabha (Lower House) seats and the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) will cross 400 seats.
Since then, this narrative has been bolstered by Modi and other senior BJP leaders who have repeatedly emphasised their intended target. Indeed, the BJP’s slogan for the coming election is “Abki baar, 400 paar” (This time, above 400). The BJP, on its own, has 303 seats in the outgoing Lok Sabha. A significant increase in the party’s seat share would be required to reach the intended target. Does the BJP’s target make sense and, if so, where will it win the additional seats?
There is not much scope for improvement for the BJP in the Hindi belt – north and central India – as well as in western India where it had an exceptional strike rate in the 2019 general election. In some states in this large region – Gujarat, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Haryana, Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand and Goa – the BJP, either on its own or with allies, had a strike rate of over 90 per cent in 2019. These are also states, with the exception of Bihar, Jharkhand, Delhi and now Haryana (with the split of the BJP with its ally, the Jannayak Janta Party), where the BJP’s primary opponent is the Congress against whom it has an exceptionally high success rate.
In some states, where the BJP has a lower strike rate, it has room to increase its footprint. Of these, the BJP, along with its allies, already has an 80 per cent strike rate in Uttar Pradesh (UP) and 85 per cent in Maharashtra which collectively have 128 seats. In UP, the BJP could add to its tally of 62 seats won in 2019, given the diminished state of the opposition Bahujan Samaj Party, which won 10 seats in 2019. However, in Maharashtra, where the BJP and the undivided Shiv Sena won 41 of 48 seats, the situation is more complex. The Sena has split with one faction, led by Chief Minister Eknath Shinde, allied with the BJP, and the other, led by Uddhav Thackeray, with the opposition, comprising the Congress and the Sharad Pawar faction of the Nationalist Congress Party. The changed ground reality could pose challenges to the BJP. In the northern state of Punjab and the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, the BJP also has had a poor strike rate and the chances of improvement are slim.
In eastern India, primarily West Bengal and Odisha, which have a combined 63 seats, the BJP has made inroads and sees scope for expansion. In 2019, the BJP won 18 of 42 seats in West Bengal and eight of 21 seats in Odisha. It is looking to make gains in these two states, particularly in West Bengal, where Modi has made several trips in the recent past, though it faces a strong regional party in Trinamool Congress. The situation is somewhat different in Odisha with the BJP and the Biju Janata Dal (BJD) cooperating in parliament, but efforts at an alliance falling through. The BJD has also been hit by internal discontent, which could work to the BJP’s advantage. In Assam, which has 14 seats, the BJP had a strike rate of 64 per cent in 2019 and could eke out a few more seats.
Apart from Karnataka, southern India has been most resistant to the BJP and Modi. The southern states send 130 MPs to the Lower House. In 2019, the BJP won 29 seats with 25 coming from Karnataka alone. The BJP is making a concerted southern push with Modi having already visited Tamil Nadu six times in 2024. The south, along with the east, will be crucial to the BJP’s goal of increasing its tally. In Karnataka, which sends 28 MPs, there is hardly any scope for improvement. Indeed, the BJP, which has tied up with Janata Dal (Secular), faces a rejuvenated Congress which is now in power in Karnataka as well as internal dissent. The BJP’s best prospects are in Telangana where it won four seats in 2019. However, there too, the BJP faces a reinvigorated Congress which came to power in 2023. In Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Kerala, the BJP drew a blank in 2019. It could open its account in these states, especially in Andhra Pradesh, where it has a tie-up with the Telugu Desam Party but might find it difficult to do more.
The BJP’s efforts to surpass its 2019 performance will depend on Modi’s popularity, particularly in areas where the party is weak. It will also be helped by its formidable electoral organisation funded by a huge war chest, filled largely by the electoral bonds scheme, which has recently been declared unconstitutional. In contrast, the opposition is fragmented, harried by central investigating agencies and seems unable to stitch a coherent narrative on issues like unemployment, electoral bonds and farmers’ discontent. However, despite the tailwind, the BJP could struggle to reach the target set by Modi.
- About the author: Dr Ronojoy Sen is Senior Research Fellow and Research Lead (Politics, Society and Governance) at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore (NUS). He can be contacted at isasrs@nus.edu.sg. The author bears full responsibility for the facts cited and opinions expressed in this paper.
- Source: This article was published by Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS)
By Julia Jose
The first-ever electoral win of Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands late last year, which saw it win 37 out of the 150 House of Representatives seats, highlights the growth of far-right extremism across Europe.
PVV is considered a far-right political party due to its extremist positions on issues such as border control, immigration, asylum and Islam. Wilders’ electoral success aligns with the region-wide ethno-nationalist and anti-globalist tilt and a retreating embrace of multi-culturalism, the rule of law, and liberalism, which formed the bedrock of the European political system since 1945. Similar scenarios have unfolded in other European countries like Sweden, Finland, Poland, France and Italy, where the far-right has established a prominent presence.
Key Drivers
Far-right extremist beliefs and conspiracy theories promote a hierarchical narrative wherein non-Whites are deemed inferior to the White race and disseminate a warning of the Islamisation of Europe. Europe’s restive immigrant population has contributed to exacerbating the far-right extremist threat across the continent. The influx of migrants over the decades has festered resentment within the local European population, who fear the undermining of ethno-national identities and access to adequate social and economic opportunities.
This has resulted in swelling support for exclusionary nationalist rhetoric,1 rising instances of Islamophobia, and dissemination of conspiracy theories such as eco-fascism and the Great Replacement, worsening the crisis. The Great Replacement Theory, endorsed by far-right political leaders such as Marine Le Pen, Viktor Orbán and Matteo Salvini, asserts that ‘replacist elites’ are purposely replacing White Christian communities with multi-ethnic and multi-religious groups through illegal immigration.2
Furthermore, conservative intellectuals and organisations have openly expressed xenophobic views. Douglas Murray, in his book The Strange Death of Europe, argued that rising immigration levels have resulted in the ‘streets in cold and rainy northern towns of Europe filled with people dressed with the foothills of Pakistan or the sandstorms of Arabia.’3 Many White supremacists and conspiracy theorists frequently highlight census data and express concerns that White European citizens will become a minority by 2044.4
Eco-fascists attribute environmental degradation to a surging immigration population. They advocate creating homogenous White Christian communities.5 This ideology has inspired incidents of far-right extremism, including the Christchurch shooting in March 2019. The Euro crisis, resulting in large-scale unemployment and the COVID-19 outbreak, which devastated economies and various industries, further deepened anxieties and the impact of continued immigration into their countries.
Additionally, self-radicalisation through technological advancements and social media has heightened the risks of lone-wolf extremist acts carried out by the far-right. Technological advancements have also facilitated the cultivation of online communities among the far-right on 8chan and Facebook, among other forums.
Right-Wing Extremist Incidents
One of the earliest physical manifestations of far-right extremism in Europe occurred when Anders Breivik, a neo-Nazi, killed 77 people in Norway in July 2011. His manifesto and actions, driven by his apprehension about the Islamisation of the predominantly Christian West, have been emulated by others years after his arrest.6 In June 2019, Walter Lübcke, a Christian Democratic Union leader, was fatally shot near the city of Kessel by Stephan Ernst, a neo-Nazi for his pro-immigration views.7
A few months leading up to this attack in Germany, Christchurch in New Zealand was devastated by mass shootings in March 2019, in which over 50 people were killed. These attacks were carried out on two mosques by another neo-Nazi, Brenton Tarrant, who was inspired by Breivik. Additionally, a boy based in Darlington was arrested in the United Kingdom as part of an investigation into far-right extremism. It was found that he was an active participant in racist online forums and possessed information useful for committing terrorist acts, such as manuals for making explosives.8
In December 2022, adherents of the far-right Reichsbürger movement attempted to violently seize power in Germany by overthrowing the democratically-elected government.9 However, their plan was thwarted by German officials following which mass arrests occurred. One of the detainees was Birgit Malsack-Winkemann, a former lawmaker associated with the far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party. Raids and seizures were also carried out throughout the country across multiple properties.
More recently, following a stabbing incident near a school in Dublin in December 2023, far-right extremists damaged public infrastructure and targeted police forces. Following the attack, police concluded that unrest was driven by a ‘lunatic, hooligan faction driven by a far-right ideology’ and warned against ‘misinformation’.10 About 34 people were arrested as part of the investigations into the rioting carried out by the far-right.11
Counter-Measures
Various European countries have been taking countermeasures to tackle the scourge of violent extremism. Finland, for instance, since 2012 has put forward National Action Plans after extensive collaboration between governmental and non-governmental organisations, along with researchers and religious communities. These plans contain measures to identify recruitment methods of different radical extremist groups, steps to prevent participation of young people in radical activity, help promote safety and security of premises of religious communities, among other provisions.12
The Swedish Center for Preventing Violent Extremism, established in 2018, is primarily tasked with developing knowledge-based and cross-sector work involved in preventing violent extremism at national, regional and local levels. The Center works to promote the development of preventive work at the national, regional and local levels; strive to attain a high degree of coordination and effectiveness concerning preventive measures; provide support to agencies in addressing issues relating to VE and collect and disseminate information about preventing violent extremism.13 Sweden also appointed a National Coordinator to safeguard democracy against violent extremism in 2015.14
The Netherlands’ National Counter-terrorism Strategy for 2022–26 calls for ‘extra attention’ towards the threat posed by potentially violent, extremist lone actors, flags the need to privilege innovative (technological) solutions to facilitate the detection and combating of the dissemination of violent extremist and terrorist content and calls for measures designed to ensure the safe re-integration of individuals after detention.15 The United Kingdom’s ‘Prevent’ strategy supports police and security agencies in identifying individuals and groups at risk of radicalisation.16
Germany passed the Federal Government’s Strategy to Prevent Extremism and Promote Democracy in 2016 which calls for coordinated efforts by federal, regional and local authorities in association with civil society. More than 700 civil society organisations are funded by the federal government on measures to prevent extremism. Germany has established federal agencies for civic education and anti-discrimination.17 Germany also has initiatives such as Exit Germany which counsels families impacted by right-wing extremism.18
Despite these significant measures, far-right extremism continues to be a sociological challenge that has significantly undermined multi-culturalism, liberal democracy and rules-based order in Europe. Continuing and enhanced cooperation between intelligence agencies, NGOs and community activists is necessary for addressing this critical threat.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.
About the author: Ms Julia Jose, Intern, Counter Terrorism Centre, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi.
Source: This article was published by Manohar Parrikar IDSA
- 1.Prerna Singh, “How Exclusionary Nationalism Has Made the World Socially Sicker from COVID-19”, Nationalities Papers, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2022, pp. 104–117.
- 2.“How France’s Great Replacement Theory Conquered the Global Far Right”, France 24, 8 November 2021.
- 3.Doughlas Murray, The Strange Death of Europe: Immigration, Identity, Islam, Bloomsbury, May 2017.
- 4.Cassie Miller, “There is No Political Solution: Accelerationism in the White Power Movement”, Southern Poverty Law Centre, 23 June 2020.
- 5.Alistair Walsh, “Eco-fascism: The Greenwashing of the Far Right”, DW, 19 May 2022.
- 6.“Norway Mass Killer Anders Breivik Ordered to Stay in Jail”, BBC, 1 February 2022.
- 7.“German Far Right Gunmen Gets Life for Murder of Politician Lübcke”, BBC, 28 January 2021.
- 8.Daniel De Simone, “Darlington Boy Youngest to be Convicted of Terror Offence”, BBC, 19 January 2022.
- 9.Ido Vock, “Reichsbürger: German Far-Right Extremists Charged with Planning Violent Coup”, BBC, 12 December 2023.
- 10.“Far-Right Riots Erupt in Dublin Following School Stabbing Attack”, Al-Jazeera, 24 November 2023.
- 11.“Calm Restored to Dublin Streets After 34 Arrested for Riots”, Reuters, 25 November 2023.
- 12.“National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism is Progressing”,Ministry of the Interior, Finland, 21 July 2022.
- 13.The Swedish Center for Preventing Violent Extremism.
- 14.“Actions to Make Society More Resilient to Violent Extremism”, Stockholm, 13 August 2015.
- 15.“The National Counterterrorism Strategy for 2022-2026: Summary”, National Coordinator for Counter-terrorism and Security, Ministry of Justice and Security, The Netherlands, May 2022.
- 16.“Prevent Strategy”, HM Government, June 2011.
- 17.“Federal Government’s Strategy to Prevent Extremism and Promote Democracy”, July 2016.
- 18.Exit: Germany — We Provide Ways out of Extremism.