Russia and Ukraine freed hundreds of prisoners of war in their first exchange since Russia’s invasion in February 2022.
The swap, involving 230 Ukrainians and 248 Russians, was mediated by the UAE, which has close ties with Moscow.
Day: January 4, 2024
Parallel to its warmongering in the region, Iran’s regime continues to ratchet up human rights abuses in its prisons, especially against political prisoners. And the beginning of the new year has shown no respite in this trend of barbaric behavior.
On Tuesday, January 2, regime authorities in Ghezel Hesar prison in Karaj executed political prisoner Davood Abdollahi. Abdollahi, a Sunni Kurd hailing from Mahabad, had been in prison for 14 years and was executed while being on a hunger strike for six days.
Abdollahi was arrested in 2009 along with six other people in 2009. All seven were tortured to make incriminating confessions and were sentenced to death by the notorious judge Mohammad Moghiseh under trumped up charges of “undermining national security,” “propaganda against the regime,” and “corruption on Earth.”
In 2018, Abolghassem Salavati, another criminal judge with a terrible track record of human rights abuses, confirmed their death sentence and in 2019, the regime’s supreme court reaffirmed the sentence.
Ghassem Abesteh, another prisoner from the same group, was executed on November 5 and Ayoub Karimi was hanged on November 29. The four remaining prisoners are under the threat of being executed.
And the regime finished the year off with another wave of executions. Only in five days from December 27 to 31, the regime carried out at least 30 prisoners. The total number of declared executions for 2023 was at least 850, with an alarming uptick in death penalty since the outbreak of the war in Gaza.
At the same time, the regime is raising pressure on other political prisoners. The most recent case is the three-year extension of the prison sentence of political prisoner Maryam Akbari Monfared. She was slated to be released this year after completing her 15-year sentence, which she has endured without any furlough. But the regime’s Ministry of Intelligence fabricated two new dossiers against her to prevent her release. The MOIS began plotting these cases in August 2023 in order to prevent her release. These cases were heard in orchestrated courts in Semnan and Evin. She now faces a total of 18 years in prison.
Under the regime’s own laws, Maryam Akbari Monfared was supposed to be released in 2019 after serving 10 years of her sentence. Her main “crime” was seeking justice for her siblings, who were murdered by the regime.
Three of Akbari Monfared’s brothers and a sister were executed by the mullahs’ regime. Alireza Akbari, a PMOI member, was executed in 1981. Gholamreza Akbari, also a member of the PMOI, was murdered under torture in 1985. PMOI members Abdulreza and Roghiyeh Akbari were executed during the 1988 massacre of more than 30,000 political prisoners. The massacre was overseen by Ebrahim Raisi, the regime’s current president.
Akbari Monfared is one of several political prisoners who are being persecuted by the regime because they are relatives of supporters of the PMOI. In another recent case, the regime has denied 70-year-old political prisoner Ali Moezi access to much-needed medical care.
The regime continues to raise pressure on dissidents and political prisoners as it fears losing hold on power inside the country. Despite the regime’s wave of suppressive measures, protests continue across the country, and the ranks of PMOI Resistance Unitscontinue to expand.
By Piotr Buras and Engjellushe Morina
The Ukrainian counteroffensive has stalled. For the first time since the outbreak of the war, the feeling that Russia may actually be winning is taking root. The long-applauded Western resolve in support of Ukraine is waning. The Western Balkans are broiling. And next year’s presidential election in the United States does not bode well for Europe. In this context, the timing of the summit of EU leaders on 14-15 December could make it the most consequential in the bloc’s recent history.
For EU leaders, there is pressure to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova and agree a €50 billion package of financial help for Kyiv – and they would be well advised not to underestimate the gravity of these two decisions.
They need to send a strong signal to Russian president Vladimir Putin that his hopes to turn the tide of the war to his benefit are grossly premature. They must leave no doubt about the EU’s commitment to bringing Ukraine into the European bloc. And, more broadly, they must convey to European citizens why efforts to integrate Ukraine, and other countries, are the right investment for the future of the EU.
Such decisive action is needed more than ever. As a new opinion pollshows, large numbers of European citizens believe that Ukraine’s membership of the EU would undermine (45 per cent, on average) rather than strengthen (25 per cent) Europe’s security. Asked about the impact on their own country, only 15 per cent of the French and 20 per cent of the Germans expect any positives to manifest for their country’s security from such a move (and 39 per cent and 47 per cent, respectively, believe the outcome will be negative). Only in Poland do positive opinions clearly prevail (41 per cent versus 30 per cent).
For the Western Balkan countries, there are similarly gloomy views, with few Europeans seeing their possible accession as having any upswing in benefits for the EU’s security (23 per cent versus 33 per cent believing the opposite). The results of the survey – conducted in six EU member states (Germany, France, Denmark, Poland, Romania and Austria) by ECFR – are sobering, and a warning. European politicians continuously restate that EU enlargement is necessary for geopolitical reasons. But they have not yet managed to bring European societies on board to support this view. The worry that accepting new members could drag the EU into conflicts appears to be greater than the conviction that their membership would insulate Europe from Russian or Chinese influences.
Still, the conversation remains open. A plurality (37 per cent, on average) of the citizens in the six countries surveyed by the ECFR believe that Ukraine should be able to join the EU – and this often includes people who are aware of the negative consequences of such an event. It seems that the emotional support for Ukrainians is still strong and outweighs rational considerations.
There is less enthusiasm for the Western Balkans countries, though. Only 20-30 per cent of Europeans would like to see them as future members of the bloc. The differences in attitudes across the EU are significant. In Denmark and Poland, close to half of the populations (50 per cent and 47 per cent, respectively) support Ukraine’s accession. In Austria, only 28 per cent are in favour, while 52 per cent are against it. But in most countries, 20-40 per cent of respondents do not have an opinion or are indifferent to the prospect of Ukraine’s accession, as well as to enlargement in general. This suggests that there is a large constituency of Europeans who can still be convinced that their own future depends – like never before – on the EU’s resolve to make use of its main asset: integration of its European neighbours into the sphere of peace and economic prosperity.
The urgency to make meaningful steps towards this goal could not be more obvious. Should Ukraine lose not only a part of its territory, but also belief in the credibility of the EU’s offer, it will have dramatic consequences for Europe. In order to become a stable and predictable country, Ukraine needs to win the war. The key measure of its victory, however, will not be the restoration of full control of its territory, but winning control of its future as a European, prosperous and democratic country. The EU is Ukraine’s only chance. If this chance is lost, the EU will bear not only the responsibility but also the burden of dealing with the massive geopolitical impact of this failure. The same is true for the Western Balkans. It is perhaps the very last moment to stop those countries drifting away into the Russian or Chinese orbits.
Neither the European public nor many EU leaders seem to fully grasp the gravity of this situation. They appear to believe that maintaining the status quo is possible and the institutional reform debate constitutes an adequate response to the geopolitical challenges. This is wrong and dangerous. At this week’s summit, it is imperative that leaders do not shy away from alarmist language and tough decisions. They need to recognise that EU unity is not a goal in itself and overcome Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orban’s obstructionism by setting up the Ukraine facility – if needed, in a coalition of the willing, excluding Hungary.
They should open negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, commit to necessary military support in 2024 and declare that the EU will prepare the next budget for enlargement. They should also agree that bilateral disputes between EU member states and candidate countries will be dealt with outside the enlargement policy framework. This would help ensure that, by 2028, candidate countries that have fulfilled the EU’s requisite criteria and accepted a strong rule of law conditionality will, at the very least, enjoy the financial and economic benefits of integration.
There is no other way to underline the EU’s commitment to enlargement as a crucial geopolitical choice than to give clear commitments to Ukraine and other candidate countries. A clear message is also needed for citizens of the existing EU27, and the many who are still to be persuaded of the need for enlargement. They need to realise that their security and stability are at risk. Political elites will not win the battle for hearts and minds with sermons. They need to walk the walk.
About the authors:
- Piotr Buras, Head, ECFR Warsaw, Senior Policy Fellow
- Engjellushe Morina, Senior Policy Fellow
Source: This article was published by ECFR and first published in The Guardian on 12 December. It was also published in Publico, L’Obs, Tagesspiegel, El Espagnol, Berlingske, Huffingtonpost Italia, and Hospodarske noviny.
By Chester Cabalza, Amadeus Quiaoit, and Rhon Ethelbert Ducos
Early in 2024, Manila will take ownership of the Indian Brahmaputra and Russian Moskova or Brahmos missile system, worth $374.96 million. New Delhi’s assurance of timely delivery for the three batteries of the India-Russia made supersonic cruise weaponries and shore-based anti-ship missiles will fortify the Southeast Asian nation’s contested West Philippine Sea, known as one of the world’s longest coastlines.
In 2022, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) confirmed the acquisition of the BrahMos ballistic missiles, officially becoming the first foreign nation to acquire the potent supersonic anti-ship missile, strengthening its naval abilities to safeguard its sovereign claims in the South China Sea. Once delivered in Manila, the Philippines will join the ranks of Indonesia and Vietnam, states that possess sophisticated military hardware in the dynamic region of maritime Southeast Asia.
The archipelagic Philippines faces numerous security challenges in safeguarding its territorial integrity and maritime interests. In recent years, Manila has actively sought to bolster its external defense capabilities, considering the acquisition of BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles, a move that signifies a significant leap in its military capability and deterrence capacity toward Chinese aggression and frequent coast guard collisions at sea.
The BrahMos missile system is renowned for its speed, precision, and versatility. Its acquisition by the Philippines holds the promise of enhancing the country’s deterrence against potential threats, particularly in the contested South China Sea, where overlapping territorial claims have sparked strains among several nations.
However, while the efficacy of BrahMos missiles in bolstering defense is undisputed, the financial implications of acquiring and maintaining such a state-of-the-art defense system must be thoroughly examined. The cost associated with procuring and integrating these missiles into the Philippines’ defense infrastructure presents a considerable challenge.
Firstly, the procurement cost of BrahMos missiles is both new and substantial in the context of the country’s military modernization efforts. The intricacy and technology embedded within these missiles commands a high price tag. The Philippines, a developing nation with budgetary constraints, must allocate a significant portion of its defense budget to fund the purchase of these advanced weapons. Moreover, the ongoing maintenance, training, and infrastructure development required to support the BrahMos system add to the long-term financial commitment.
Secondly, the geopolitical implications of such a purchase warrant careful consideration. The acquisition of BrahMos missiles could potentially alter regional power dynamics, prompting reactions from neighboring countries and affecting diplomatic relations. By maneuvering through these diplomatic complexities while addressing national security concerns, a critical balancing act emerges for Manila with Beijing to lessen the tension in the South China Sea.
Lastly, as an emergent regional middle power, the impact of BrahMos missiles is potent enough to enhance Manila’s external defense capabilities. However, in fulfilling the second leg of the revitalized AFP modernization program, these expensive assets may or may not fit into the greater joint warfighting concept of the armed forces.
Nevertheless, despite the financial burden and diplomatic intricacies, investing in the BrahMos missile system is a credible risk in itself, though one that could offer tangible benefits for the Philippines’ defense strategy. The missiles’ unparalleled speed and accuracy could serve as a credible deterrent, frightening potential aggressors and bolstering the country’s thirst for defensive capabilities.
Moreover, the acquisition of BrahMos missiles as public investment might serve as a force multiplier, strengthening alliances with countries that possess or operate similar defense systems in the region. Collaborative training programs and interoperability with other nations could enhance the Philippines’ overall defense posture, contributing to regional stability.
Decision-makers must weigh the financial investment against the enhanced security and strategic advantages these missiles offer. Alternative defense strategies, including pooling resources to modify the Landpower Maneuver Concept to better address and consolidate resources for submarine and surface vessel acquisitions under the Archipelagic Naval Strategy, along with enhanced integrated air defense systems, should also be explored to complement the acquisition of the BrahMos system for territorial defense procurement. Hence the Philippines calls to re-think its national defense strategy to achieve effective national security strategy.
Ultimately, while the cost of BrahMos missiles poses a fiscal challenge, their potential in augmenting the Philippines’ defense capabilities cannot be overlooked. Striking a balance between strengthening national security and prudent financial management remains paramount as Manila navigates its external defense strategy in a region fraught with geopolitical complexities. As such, a holistic approach considering both the costs and benefits is essential in determining the optimal path forward for Manila’s defense modernization efforts.
This article was published by Geopolitical Monitor.com
By He Jun
On the last day of 2023, most cities in China did not hold official countdown events, and some places even canceled the celebrations. This reflects the current atmosphere of the country, that the economy is still in a downturn, while the market and public confidence remain insufficient. The government is both financially constrained and hesitant to take responsibility for many issues, fearing to overstep its bounds.
From 2020 to 2023, most people and businesses in the country have not had an easy time. Under the complex international and domestic environment, China is facing significant development and survival pressures. Facing 2024, some in China are not without worries, and some feel disheartened. Yet there is also a considerable number of individuals with hopes and aspirations, unwilling to resign to fate.
Regardless of their emotions, individuals and business entities in China still need to face the challenges of 2024.
“Our goal is both inspiring and simple. Ultimately, it is about delivering a better life for the people. Our children should be well taken care of and receive good education. Our young people should have the opportunities to pursue their careers and succeed. And our elderly people should have adequate access to medical services and elderly care. These issues matter to every family, and they are also a top priority of the government. We must work together to deliver on these issues”, said Chinese President Xi Jinping in his New year speech.
Compared to the grand narratives commonly seen in recent years, these straightforward statements might just garner more public approval. Researchers at ANBOUND posit that from a positive perspective, such statements reflect at least two points: first, the top leadership has an understanding of the grassroots situation. Second, Xi has actually pointed out many problems in past development, i.e., there are still significant gaps in improving people’s livelihood, education, employment, healthcare, and elderly care. In this regard, Researchers at ANBDOUND believe that objectively recognizing problems and straightforwardly acknowledging them is, in fact, the first step to solving problems.
From a macro perspective, ANBOUND’s researchers have some personal opinions on the economic situation in 2024:
Firstly, the emergence and development of China’s economic problems have their own logic and they will not be easily reversed. Even if changes are made, it will take time. To alleviate the current economic challenges, it requires more than technical macro policies, industrial policies, and financial policies. The various issues facing the Chinese economy are the result of past logic. The more complex, rigid, and fundamental the logic leading to current problems, the greater the difficulty in solving them, and the longer it will take.
Secondly, China has a large-scale economy with extremely complex aspects, including those that are industrial, urban-rural, regional, internal and external, virtual and real, as well as state-owned, private, and foreign-invested. Under the impact of internal and external factors, the pressure on various subsystems of the Chinese economy varies, with differences in performance during the post-pandemic economic recovery. For example, in 2023, China’s economic performance in the consumption sector differed significantly from that in the manufacturing sector, while the situation and operational performance of state-owned enterprises varied greatly from that of private enterprises and foreign-invested enterprises. In addition, there were also noticeable differences in the domestic and foreign economic environments and situations. While some economic sectors are recovering, many others are still declining along the inertia of the past, possibly dragging down this year’s economic performance for the country.
Thirdly, given the current situation facing China, both domestically and internationally, ANBOUND’s researchers personally tend to believe that as long as the economic situation in 2024 can stabilize and no systemic decline occurs, it can be considered favorable. Therefore, whether at the national or corporate level, the development goals set for 2024 should be rational, not overly ambitious, and economic and market laws should not be overlooked due to non-economic factors.
Finally, China’s economy faces issues in both international and domestic directions, but the latter issues are more significant and constitute the main contradiction. In recent years, the concepts of the “domestic circulation” and “dual circulation of domestic and international” have been emphasized, with a crucial background being China facing containment and pressure internationally. As a response, there is a focus on internal development, aiming to expand and deepen the domestic market, partly to offset the international setbacks and losses suffered by the Chinese economy. However, for Chinese enterprises and industries deeply involved in globalization, rushing into the domestic market not only intensifies the competition within the domestic market but also fails to effectively offset the losses suffered in the international one. In our view, while the international market losses are considerable, the fundamental solution lies domestically. Without effective reforms and breakthroughs capable of boosting overall market confidence, the relationship between the Chinese economy and the world economy may be difficult to improve.
Final analysis conclusion:
The year 2024 has just begun, and ordinary Chinese people, like everyone else, all hope that the new year will be better than the past and that the unfavorable past can truly become history. However, given the complexity of the Chinese economy, its development logic, and the strong inertia of the system, the economic issues will need to be treated with rationality and objectivity. For business entities, maintaining the status quo without further deterioration, and securing the fundamentals may be a practical strategy for weathering the economic winter.
He Jun is a researcher at ANBOUND