Day: December 29, 2023

Egypt has put forward a framework proposal to end the war in Gaza including a three-stage plan for a ceasefire

By Rajneesh Singh

Hamas has developed a complex subterranean infrastructure consisting of tunnels, command and control centres, living accommodation, stores and contingency fighting positions. The tunnels also have designated spaces for rocket-assembly lines, explosive stores, and warhead fabrication workshops.1 This infrastructure is famously known as the ‘Gaza Metro’.  The Metro is reinforced by concrete and other building material and protected by blast doors, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and booby traps.

The tunnels have been in use since at least the early 1980s, and members of various Palestinian insurgent organisations have been known to use them since the first Intifada, beginning in 1987.2 In the aftermath of the 2021 Israel–Hamas conflict, Hamas leader, Yahya Sinwar claimed that Hamas has 500 kilometres of tunnel system and that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has damaged only 5 per cent of it.3 There is no way to verify Sinwar’s claim but is indicative of the magnitude of challenge the IDF faces in the ongoing war.

Tunnel warfare is not new and dates to the ancient times. Jews used them against Romans in Judea in the first century.4 In the more recent times, the tunnels have been used in the battles of the Vimy Ridge, Messines and Somme of World War I, by the Viet Congs in Vietnam and in Mariupol, Bakhmut, and Soledar during the ongoing war in Ukraine.5 

The Brief delves into the multifaced dimensions of the Gaza Metro and seeks to flag its origins, development, and the strategic implications on the ongoing war. It also focusses on the IDF’s concerted efforts in developing technologies and deploying specialised forces to detect and dismantle this clandestine infrastructure.

Gaza Metro is more than a just any military infrastructure. It is the centre of gravity (COG) of Hamas’s military wing.6 The Brief also attempts to analyse various aspects of operational significance of Gaza Metro using certain facets of the theoretical construct of COG advanced by Colonel John A. Warden of the US Air Force, Professor Joe Strange and Colonel Richard Iron, and Professor Antulio J. Echevarria II, retired US Army officer. 

History of Gaza Metro

The tunnels in Gaza predate Hamas. It is believed that they have been in use since the early 1980s7 after the city of Rafah was divided by the new border recognised in the 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.8 It was initially used by the divided families to communicate among themselves and by smugglers to transport goods. Hamas was raised in 1987 and soon it realised the military importance of the tunnels. It began digging tunnels in the mid-1990s, when Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was granted some degree of self-rule in Gaza by Israel. The group began tunnelling in earnest since 2005, when Israel withdrew from Gaza, and later when Hamas assumed power in 2006 election.9   

Among the early success of Hamas, using the tunnels, was abduction of IDF soldier Gilad Shalit and killing of soldiers Hanan Barak and Pavel Slutzker in a cross-border raid on 25 June 2006. Later Israel freed 1,027 Palestinian prisoners in return for Shalit’s release in October 2011.10

As per the reports, the tunnels in 1990s were approximately one meter wide and smugglers used winch motors to haul goods along the sandy tunnel floors in hollowed-out petrol barrels.11 Hamas has since gained considerable expertise in tunnelling and construction of underground infrastructure which has advanced security features, sewage disposal and air-conditioning systems, etc.   

Hamas and Gaza Metro

The Gaza Strip has an approximate area of 365 square kilometres. If Yahya Sinwar’s claim of 2021 of Hamas having built 500 kilometres of tunnel system is true, then it would be equivalent of having 10 parallel north to south tunnel systems and eight parallel interconnecting tunnels running east to west.12 The Gaza Metro is so designed that there may be dozens of shafts leading to a tunnel at depths of between 20 and 80 meters. As per some accounts, the density of tunnels is so high that some crisscross at different depths.13 To create a subterranean system of this magnitude requires a dedicated organisation, high level of technological expertise, and resources in terms of trained manpower, equipment and money.

Israeli officials have reported that Mohammad Sinwar, the brother of Yahya Sinwar, is heading the tunnel building project.14 Gaza has been under land, sea and air blockade by Israel and Egypt since 2007 and it was not expected to possess capability or resources to dig such an infrastructure. It was appreciated that Hamas has employed diggers using basic tools, used basic electrical fittings, and diverted concrete meant for civilian and humanitarian purposes towards tunnel building project. However, two of the tunnel systems discovered during the ongoing war, viz. near al Shifa Hospital and other close to the Erez crossing belies this assessment. The details of these tunnels have been discussed later in the Brief.  

During its operation in the house of Yahya Sinwar in Khan Yunis, the IDF collected significant amount of Hamas intelligence including Hamas’s report of financial transactions that gives details of more than a million dollars spent to construct tunnels in 2022.15   

Tunnel under al-Shifa Hospital

In the second week of November 2023, IDF’s 162nd Division was operating in Hamas’s “security quarter” of Gaza City, adjacent to al-Shifa Hospital. The troops of Givati Infantry Brigade reportedly found intelligence materials, weapons manufacturing plants, anti-tank missile launch positions and tunnels.16

On 17 November, the IDF located one of the shafts which led to the entrance of a bigger tunnel. This tunnel led to a blast door leading to a complex which had multiple rooms and one of them “was a spacious bedroom with two large beds and a large modern air conditioning unit, a kitchenette, a bathroom, and other facilities, as well as extensive plumbing and electrical wiring to enable all of the infrastructure”.17 The tunnel shaft leading to the main tunnel was approximately 2 metres high, lined with stones and concrete. The complex under the hospital was reportedly being used by Hamas as a command and control centre.18   

Tunnel near Erez Crossing 

The IDF reported on 17 December that it had discovered largest tunnel ever—four kilometre long and 50 metres deep—near the Erez crossing. The tunnel reinforced with concrete had electrical fitments and was wide enough to allow a vehicle to pass through. The IDF also released a video of Mohammad Sinwar driving a car through a tunnel. In another video released by the IDF, Hamas fighters were seen using a large drill. In the tunnel near the Erez crossing, the IDF reportedly found “unspecified digging machines” not reported earlier.19 One section of the tunnel was approximately 400 metres from the Israeli border.  

The IDF has informed that the Combat Engineering Corps’ elite Yahaom unit and Gaza Division’s Northern Brigade used “advanced intelligence and technological means” to uncover the tunnel network.20

Operational Employment of Subterranean Infrastructure

The infrastructure is the pivot of Hamas’s irregular warfare strategy and allows it to undertake both offensive and defensive operations. It offers Hamas asymmetric advantage, negating some of the technological advantages available to the IDF. The fact that Hamas has constructed the subterranean system under one of the world’s densest urban locations complicates the matter further for IDF.    

The system is designed to withstand IDF’s aerial and ground bombardment. The design and construction enable Hamas to locate its leadership, combat units, headquarters, command and control centres, weapons and supplies inside the complex. It also enables various military echelons to move freely between various prepared contingency positions. Hamas has located power generation and air-conditioning systems, plumbing and sewage disposal arrangements and food supplies within the infrastructure. This is helping its fighters to better withstand the siege laid by the IDF in the ongoing war. The tunnels also allow the fighters to escape the combat zone when they are decisively surrounded by the IDF, as was the case in battle near the al-Shifa Hospital.    

Hamas fighters are using tunnels to undertake offensive operations by infiltrating behind IDF positions and launching surprise attacks using snipers, rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and other weapon systems. It enables small teams to appear undetected behind IDF lines, strike and withdraw.   

It is also assessed that Hamas has booby trapped the tunnels and will initiate the devices causing the tunnels to collapse over the advancing IDF troops. 

Gaza Metro as Centre of Gravity 

Clausewitz originated the concept of attacking the enemy’s centre of grav­ity which he described as “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our ener­gies should be directed.”21 A fighting force can have multiple centres of gravity and each centre will have an effect of some kind on the others. Hamas too has multiple centres22 and some analysts have described Gaza Metro as one of them.23   

Warden’s Five-Ring Model

Warden has conceptualised “Five-Ring Model” related to COG, of which infrastructure is the third critical ring. The infrastructure relates to enemy’s transportation system—that moves civil and military goods and services in the combat zone. Gaza Metro is essential to move troops, warlike stores, command instructions and intelligence around the battlefield and if the IDF can disrupt the movement, Hamas will have lesser ability to resist it. Although Warden agrees with Clausewitz’s description of COG as “the hub of all power and movement”, he goes further to describe it as “that point where the enemy is most vulnerable and the point where an attack will have the best chance of being decisive”.24 Warden’s first ring and the “most critical” ring is the command ring, which refers to the leadership and communication resources.25 It is assessed that Hamas’s leadership,26 including Yahya Sinwar, leader of the Hamas movement within the Gaza Strip, Mohammed Deif, commander-in-chief of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, and Marwan Issa, the deputy commander are hiding in the subterranean complex.

Neutralisation of Hamas leadership is likely to have a decisive impact on the outcome of war. It is also expected that Hamas leadership would have constructed multiple safe hideouts inside the subterranean infrastructure, from where they can direct their subordinate commanders and units. It is also likely that only the most trusted Hamas members would be aware of these locations. It would require sustained intelligence operations by Israel to generate actionable intelligence. However, once the Hamas leadership is cordoned inside the tunnels, they would be extremely vulnerable to IDF operations.

For the moment, the IDF is unaware of the exact location of the leadership and is destroying as much of this subterranean complex, as is possible to cause “strategic paralysis—by destroying one or more of the outer strategic rings or centers of gravity”27 —the infrastructure ring—the Gaza Metro.      

Strange and Iron’s Theory

The Strange and Iron’s theory is helpful to identify the location of COG and the impact of operations against it.  The theory aligns with the J.J. Graham’s translation of On War, published in 1874 which postulates that: “As a centre of gravity is always situated where the greatest mass of matter is collected, and as a shock against the centre of gravity of a body always produces the greatest effect, and further, as the most effective blow is struck with the centre of gravity of the power used, so it is also in war.”28

Hamas is cognizant of the incredible capability and resources of Mossad and Shin Bet to generate actionable intelligence and doctrinal, technological, and material superiority of the IDF to undertake combat operations. To counter Israel’s operational superiority, Hamas relies on low-tech solution in the form of subterranean infrastructure. The nature of infrastructure provides Hamas inherent physical protection, ease of movement and concealment to command and control elements and, combat, and logistic units.

The Gaza Strip is one of the densest urban locations anywhere in the world. Tunnels in conjunction with urban infrastructure helps to create extremely potent defensive localities and killing grounds. The IDF hopes to find the leadership and fighters of the al-Qassam Brigades inside the Gaza Metro.

Hamas has claimed that Gaza Metro is spread over 500 kilometres. Hamas is expected to dissipate its forces all along the Metro to avoid presenting a concentrated target to the IDF. However, once located, and fixed, the IDF will be able to neutralise Hamas forces with relative ease inside the tunnel system. 

The Strange and Iron’s theory also introduces a model of COG analysis with three additional sub-concepts29 :

• Critical Capabilities (CC):  CC is the primary ability of the COG within a given context.
• Critical Requirements (CR): CR relate to conditions, resources and means essential for the COG to achieve its CC.
• Critical Vulnerabilities (CV): CV refers to those CRs or components that are vulnerable to neutralisation in a way that will contribute to a COG failing to achieve its CC. 

In the context of Gaza Metro, the subterranean nature of the infrastructure reinforced with concrete and other building material and further hardened using Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and booby traps are the CCs. The camouflage and concealment arrangement to prevent detection of tunnels are the CRs while entry and exit points, ventilation and sewage arrangements, and communication infrastructure to enable command of Hamas fighters are the CVs.    

Echevarria’s Theory

Echevarria postulates COG is identified to achieve total collapse of the enemy—which is considered both as an effect and an objective.30 He further elaborates on the construct to suggest that the COG helps in identifying “way”—course of action—within an “ends-ways-means” construct to achieve annihilation of the enemy.31

This aspect may not be true when fighting an ideologically motivated and radical organisation like Hamas. It is possible that the IDF may identify and destroy Hamas’s tunnel system and thereby achieve destruction of Hamas’s military leadership and fighting units, however, in all probability the organisation will survive and grow, perhaps even more radical. “Terrorist groups are known to survive the loss of their leaders and members. It is quite likely that even if Israel destroys Hamas’s military wing, the idea of Hamas may survive.”32

IDF’s Tunnel Warfare Capability

Development of Technological Capabilities

The IDF has been aware of Hamas’s underground infrastructure and has been working towards new technologies and doctrinal concepts. When the first tunnel was discovered, the IDF established a laboratory, manned by engineers, physicists, geologists and intelligence operatives under the Gaza Division. The laboratory employed innovative soil research techniques, including scanning and decoding signals, and developed new detection techniques.   In 2018, a review of then IDF’s underground combat capability was undertaken and a new training manual was published.33

The Israeli scientists and engineers have developed several new innovations, most of them are classified. The IDF’s specialised units have been equipped with special conical penetrators, drills, robotic systems that can inject special ‘emulsions’ either to seal or destroy the tunnels.34 IDF also makes innovative use of technologies such as ground and aerial sensors, ground penetrating radars, geophones, fibre optics, microphones, special drilling equipment and others.   

The Israeli scientists have developed radio and navigation equipment which can work underground, night vision devices that work in complete darkness and remote and wire-controlled robots that can see and map tunnels without risking the lives of the soldiers. The IDF has training simulators to train soldiers in near realistic situations. Israel has also developed variety of explosives and ground penetrating munitions, like the GBU-28 which can penetrate 20 feet of concrete or 100 feet of earth.35   

Israel, over the years, has used satellite imageries, aerostat cameras and radars to map the tunnel system. These assets cannot reveal the layout of the tunnels but have been used to monitor location where cement-mixture trucks have halted over the years. The general area around these locations are possible entrances of the tunnels and may be probed using low-frequency, earth-penetrating radars, or basic probes.36    

US and Israel have also been collaborating to develop newer technologies. Since 2016, Congress has appropriated US$ 320 million towards the project.37

IDF’s Special Units

Fighting enemy inside subterranean system requires specialised units. The Gazan tunnels were first discovered during the first Intifada and the IDF recognised the need to raise specialised units. It raised ‘Yahalom’, specialist commandos from Israel’s Combat Engineering Corps. Yahalom specialises in discovering, clearing, and destroying tunnels and has the “Yael” Company to undertake engineering reconnaissance, “Sayfan” to neutralise the threat of non-conventional weapons (weapons of mass destruction). In addition, there are two explosive ordinance disposal units, and “Samur”, which specialises in tunnel warfare.38

The IDF has a specialised canine unit, “Oketz”, whose dogs are trained in special tasks such as attack, search and rescue, explosive detection, and weapon location.39 In addition, police and intelligence services too have specialist units—“like Sayeret Matkal, the Yamam, and others—who share best practices for dealing with terrorists and combatants underground.”40

IDF’s Subterranean Operations 

The IDF’s doctrine of subterranean warfare has evolved with the development of newer technologies to counter Hamas’s underground infrastructure, which too has become increasingly sophisticated and more potent with the passage of time. 

Hamas fighters have advantage in narrow, dark, collapsible tunnels with which they are familiar. The IDF protocol demands that soldiers do not enter the underground structures unless it has been cleared of Hamas presence.41 It uses many of the newly developed technologies including tracker robots and explosives to map and clear the tunnels.   

During the ongoing war, Hamas prisoners have also provided intelligence about the tunnels. These prisoners do not have the complete picture of the Gaza Strip but have excellent knowledge of the underground system under their villages and localities.42

Namer Establishes Cordon      

Israel has one of the world’s best protected armoured vehicles, 70-ton Namer, to assist in tunnel demolition. It is armed with active defence system to intercept incoming rockets and missiles and machine guns to fight enemy on ground. The vehicle is equipped with cameras which allows the crew to operate in the safe environment from within the vehicle. The IDF employs Namer to provide protection by establishing a security cordon around the combat engineers who undertake the task of demolishing underground infrastructure.43       

Having secured the area of operation, the IDF maps the structure either by using ‘exploding gel’ or other technologies. Thereafter, it has an option of either demolish the underground infrastructure using explosives or flood it with sea water. 

IDF uses ‘Exploding Gel’ to Map Underground Infrastructure

The ‘exploding gel’ is used to map the underground structure. Having located the entrance to the tunnels, the army engineers fill the passage with ‘exploding gel’ and fire it using detonators. The smoke travels the passage way and is used to map the underground infrastructure and also cause casualties to anyone inside the tunnels. The composition of the gel is classified and is brought in trucks because the scale in which it is used is huge. Several tons of gel are required every few hundred metres.44 

The tunnel system runs for hundreds of kilometres. It is unclear how cost and resource effective this technology is.

IDF Deploys Pumps to Flood the Tunnels

The IDF maintains a tunnel flooding plan. In the middle of November 2023, it deployed five very large capacity pumps, approximately three kilometres north of Al-Shati refugee camp. Each of these pumps is reported to have capacity to draw thousands of cubic meters of water per hour from the Mediterranean Sea and flood the tunnels within weeks.45 On 12 December, The Wall Street Journal reported “Israel’s military has begun pumping seawater into Hamas’s vast complex of tunnels in Gaza.”46

It is still unclear how effective this tactic will be to achieve its intended objective of demolishing the underground infrastructure. The plan, however, has a downside since it is likely to contaminate Gaza’s fresh water supply.47

Conclusion

Hamas has expended a large percentage of its resources—money, material, and man-hours —to develop the subterranean infrastructure as a counter to technological and resource superiority of the IDF. It is the pivot around which Hamas’s defensive and offensive operations are planned and executed. The IDF, on the other hand, has been working to develop newer and more effective counters, however, there are yet to achieve the desired result. The ongoing Israel–Hamas war will bring out several new lessons of interest to Indian Army. 

The concept of COG originally advanced by Clausewitz applied to conventional wars fought by regular armies. The world today faces challenge from religious and ideologically motivated non-state actors and the concept does not provide adequate explanation when planning operations against such organisations. This aspect requires greater deliberation.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

• About the author: Rajneesh Singh is Research Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.
• Source: This article was published by Manohar Parrrikar IDSA

• 1.Edward Luttwak, “What Israel Will Face in Gaza”, UnHerd, 17 October 2023.
• 2.Jacob Knutson, “What to Know About Hamas’ Tunnel System Beneath Gaza”, Axios, 19 October 2023.
• 3.Tzvi Joffre, “Hamas’s Sinwar: We Have 500 km of Tunnels in Gaza, Only 5% Were Damaged”, The Jerusalem Post, 27 May 2021. 
• 4.Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Hamas’s Asymmetric Advantage: What Does It Mean to Defeat a Terrorist Group?”, Foreign Affairs, 22 November 2023.
• 5.John Spencer, “Underground Nightmare: Hamas Tunnels and the Wicked Problem Facing the IDF”, Modern War Institute, 17 October 2023.
• 6.“ “What’s the Endgame of an Israeli Ground Assault in Gaza?”, NPR, 17 October 2023.
• 7.Jeremy M. Sharp, “The Egypt-Gaza Border and its Effect on Israeli-Egyptian Relations”, CSR Report for Congress, 1 February 2008.
• 8.Jacob Knutson, “What to Know About Hamas’ Tunnel System Beneath Gaza”, no. 2.
• 9.“The Hamas Tunnel City Beneath Gaza – A Hidden Frontline for Israel”, The Jerusalem Post, 27 October 2023.
• 10.Raoul Wootliff and Stuart Wine, “Hamas Airs Video of Captive Gilad Shalit, Hours After Releasing Photo”, The Times of Israel, 30 December 2015.
• 11.“The Hamas Tunnel City Beneath Gaza – A Hidden Frontline for Israel”, no. 9.
• 12.Tzvi Joffre, “Hamas’s Sinwar: We Have 500 km of Tunnels in Gaza, Only 5% Were Damaged”, no. 3.
• 13.Marco Hernandez and Josh Holder, “The Tunnels of Gaza”, The New York Times, 10 November 2023.
• 14.Dov Lieber, “Israeli Military Reveals Tunnel It Says Hamas Built for Large-Scale Attack”, The Wall Street Journal, 17 December 2023.
• 15.Yonah Jeremy Bob, “IDF Turns Yahya Sinwar’s Home to Dust in Gaza’s Khan Yunis”, The Jerusalem Post, 22 December 2023.
• 16.Emanuel (Mannie) Fabian, “IDF says the 162nd Division is operating in Hamas’s “security quarter” of Gaza City…”, X (formerly Twitter), 9 November 2023.
• 17.Yonah Jeremy Bob, “‘Post’ Joins Israeli Forces in Hamas’s Gaza Tunnel Underworld”, The Jerusalem Post, 22 November 2023.
• 18.“Watch: Israeli Army Displays Hamas Tunnel Under Gaza Hospital”, NDTV, 23 November 2023.
• 19.Ashka Jhaveri, Andie Parry, Kathryn Tyson and Nicholas Carl, “Iran Update, December 17, 2023”, Backgrounder, Institute for the Study of War (ISW), 17 December 2023.
• 20.Emanuel (Mannie) Fabian, “IDF says the 162nd Division is operating in Hamas’s “security quarter” of Gaza City…”, no. 16.
• 21.Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited/translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1976, pp. 595–596.
• 22.U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin has described civilians in Gaza, the center of gravity. See Phil Stewart, “Civilians are ‘Center of Gravity’ in Gaza War: US Defense Secretary”, Reuters, 3 December 2023.
• 23.“What’s the Endgame of an Israeli Ground Assault in Gaza?”, NPR, no. 6.  
• 24.John A. Warden, The Air Campaign (revised edn), Excel Press, Lincoln, 2000.
• 25.John A. Warden, “The Enemy as a System”, Airpower Journal,Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 40–55, 1995.
• 26. Lina Alshawabkeh, “Hamas: Who are the Group’s Most Prominent Leaders?”, BBC News, 17 October 2023.
• 27.John A. Warden, “The Enemy as a System”, Airpower Journal, no. 25, p. 50.
• 28.Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated by J.J. Graham, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, London, 1908, Volume I, Book Six, p. 354.
• 29.Eystein L. Meyer, “The Centre of Gravity Concept: contemporary Theories, Comparison, and Implications”, Defence Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 332–333, 2022.
• 30.Antulio Echevarria II,Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine– again!, Carlisle, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002, pp. 12–13.
• 31.Ibid., p. 15.
• 32.Daniel R. DePetris, “Israel’s Gaza Problem”, RUSI, 1 November 2023.
• 33.Arie Egozi, “Israelis Test Classified Tunnel Tech To Stymie Terrorists; US Watches”, Breaking Defense, 13 August 2019.
• 34.Ibid.
• 35.John Spencer, “Underground Nightmare: Hamas Tunnels and the Wicked Problem Facing the IDF”, Modern War Institute, 17 October 2023.
• 36.Edward Luttwak, “What Israel Will Face in Gaza”, no. 1.
• 37.Michael Biesecker and Sarah El Deeb, “Hamas Practiced in Plain Sight, Posting Video of Mock Attack Weeks Before Border Breach”, AP, 14 October 2023.
• 38.“This is the IDF’s Plan to Combat Hamas Terror Tunnels”, The Israel Defence Forces, 27 November 2016.
• 39.Sneha Swaminathan, “Israeli Canine Unit ‘Oketz’ Helped Rescue 200 lives, Neutralise 10 Hamas Terrorists”, WION, 15 October 2023.
• 40.John Spencer, “Underground Nightmare: Hamas Tunnels and the Wicked Problem Facing the IDF”, no. 35.
• 41.“Ex-IDF Deputy Chief: Soldiers Won’t Enter the Tunnels, Will Turn them into Hamas Death Traps Without Going In”, The Times of Israel, 3 November 2023.
• 42.With Mapping Robots and Blast Gel, Israel Wages War on Hamas Tunnels”, The Jerusalem Post, 16 November 2023.
• 43.Edward Luttwak, “What Israel Will Face in Gaza”, no. 1.
• 44.“With Mapping Robots and Blast Gel, Israel Wages War on Hamas Tunnels”, no. 42.
• 45.Nancy A. Youssef, Warren P. Strobel and Gordon Lubold, “Israel Weighs Plan to Flood Gaza Tunnels With Seawater”, The Wall Street Journal, 4 December 2023.
• 46.Nancy A. Youssef, Carrie Keller-Lynn, Michael R. Gordon and Dov Lieber, “Israel Begins Pumping Seawater Into Hamas’s Gaza Tunnels”, The Wall Street Journal, 12 December 2023.
• 47.In 2015, Egypt had flooded 10 tunnels dug beneath the Gaza–Egypt border. See  “Steinitz: ‘Egypt Floods Hamas Tunnels, in part due to Israel’s Request’”, The Jerusalem Post, 6 February 2016.

By Sameer Patil 

The outbreak of Israel-Hamas hostilities, following the latter’s deadly raid on 7 October 2023, has sparked never-before-seen violence in the Gaza Strip. The involvement of external powers, coupled with the regional powers’ pursuit of geopolitical ambitions through proxies, threatens the fragile stability of West Asia. However, beyond the geopolitical implications lurks the threat of terrorist violence and radicalisation as a consequence of this conflict.

The Hamas’ shrewd use of graphic videos and imagery from its initial spectacular violence in southern Israel and then the death and destruction caused by Israel Defense Forces’ campaign in the Gaza Strip has generated a discernible pro-Hamas sentiment across many countries. This has acted as a stimulus for pan-Islamic terrorist groups like al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS), as well as other regional terrorist organisations. In South Asia, too, terrorist organisations and their sympathisers are using developments in West Asia to spur radicalisation and rally vulnerable, impressionable youth to fill their ranks.

Global scenario

Counter-terrorism experts around the world have noted that the Israel-Hamas conflict may cause a resurgence of the terrorist threat. The nature and scale of Israel’s retaliatory strikes in the Gaza Strip have expectedly generated anger and condemnation across the Muslim world. Terrorist organisations like AQ have exploited these sentiments to assert their relevance. Days into the Hamas attack on Israel, AQ’s franchisees in North and West Africa commended the attacks and called for more violence against the Jews. Likewise, AQ’s Somali affiliate, al-Shabaab, praised the Hamas fighters and termed it the “battle of the entire Muslim Ummah.”

In Europe, there has already been a spillover of the West Asian developments. Since 7 October, there have been two terrorist attacks in France – the beheading of a teacher in northern France (13 October), and the stabbing of a tourist in Paris (3 December), and one attack in Brussels, Belgium (16 October, though not explicitly linked by the authorities to the Israel-Hamas hostilities). These attacks have fuelled concerns among security agencies that the Israel-Hamas hostilities are potentially acting as a catalyst for terrorist radicalisation that can trigger a new wave of lone-wolf terrorist violence.

This radicalisation is also getting a boost from Hamas’ disinformation and propaganda tactics, seeking to generate sympathy for its actions by using explicit imagery and videos from the Israeli ground and air offensive in the Gaza Strip. To push its disinformation and propaganda, the group has used ‘X’ (formerly Twitter) social platform and Telegram encrypted messaging service. Recently, researchers unearthed a propaganda network of 67 accounts on ‘X’ platform that was coordinating and amplifying a campaign of posting false, inflammatory content related to the war. On Telegram, Hamas-linked channels regularly post violent graphics of its assault and highlight the aspect of civilian casualties in the Gaza Strip caused by Israeli raids. This has provided ample fodder for disinformation and impaired the international community’s understanding of the exact situation on the ground.

The Indian context

In India, too, the situation is not different. Since Hamas’ raid, the security establishment has kept a close watch on the mobilisation happening on the Israel-Palestine issue in the country, with Kerala and Maharashtra having emerged as states of particular concern. In Kerala, for instance, a pro-Palestine rally convened on 27 October in Malappuram by Solidarity Youth Movement (SYM), the youth wing of Jamaat-e-Islami, saw the virtual participation of Khaled Mashal, the former head of Hamas, based in Qatar. While the meeting did not figure any calls for violence and Hamas is not a banned organisation in India, the pro-Palestine campaign in the state is being held in a manner that glorifies Hamas and its leaders as warriors. This conflation of pro-Palestine sentiments with pro-Hamas sentiments is worrisome and establishes a justification for terrorist violence. Interestingly, SYM held this event as part of its ongoing campaign titled “uproot Hindutva and apartheid Zionism.” In Maharashtra, according to the security agencies’ statistics, between 7 October and 20 November, 27 pro-Palestine protests took place in various parts of the state, including Pune, Kolhapur, and Thane (Mumbra and Bhiwandi) districts. Some protest rallies were also held online.

These developments have also allowed organisation like the Popular Front of India, which, despite being banned in September 2022, continues its activities through its political front, the Social Democratic Party of India (SDPI). On 20 October, the SDPI held a pro-Palestine rally in Pune. In response, there were also some pro-Israel rallies.

This mobilisation is symbolic of the polarisation that the Indian society is witnessing over the Israel-Hamas conflict. However, it is also spawning antagonism between religious communities – something that terrorist organisations are eager to exploit. Moreover, they have also portrayed the police crackdown on some of the pro-Palestine rallies as a crackdown on “peaceful protests,” thereby fuelling the sense of injustice and victimhood.

In the pan-Islamic terrorist propaganda, India is generally clubbed with Israel. In April 2006, then AQ leader Osama bin Laden, in one of his audio messages had mentioned the “Zionist-Hindu war against Muslims.” Interrogation reports of previously apprehended Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorists from Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir had revealed that new recruits to the organisation were radicalised by showing footage of global events like the Israel-Palestine conflict and the Israeli crackdown on Palestinian protestors at the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. Notably, Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian Islamist, was one of LeT’s co-founders.

In the last decade, however, the threat of radicalisation to India further intensified with the IS making concerted efforts to target vulnerable youth in India. Even as the IS declined, the threat persisted, as was evident from the two back-to-back killings in June 2022 in Udaipur, Rajasthan and Amravati, Maharashtra, carried out by the radicalised lone wolves. This year alone, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) has arrested multiple suspects on charges of recruitment and radicalisation.

Against this backdrop, the Indian security establishment notes that the developments in West Asia have given a new lease of life to the terrorist organisations, with many of them being enthusiastic about their prospects – the kind of enthusiasm that they showed after the August 2021 takeover of Kabul by the Afghan Taliban. This will intensify terrorist propaganda and radicalisation. Already, the al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent has urged its supporters to attack American, British and French nationals and interests after Israel’s military campaign began.

In addition, a video messages from Pakistan-based fugitive terrorist Farhatullah Ghori, previously associated with the LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed, is also circulating on encrypted messaging platforms. Using video clips from the Gaza Strip, he castigates India for supporting Israel and urges Indian Muslims to unite with the Ummah in its fight against Israel. Ghori was part of the terrorist recruitment network in the Persian Gulf in the late 2000s. Therefore, his message aims to resonate with the vulnerable elements of the Indian diaspora in the region.

Clearly, with pan-Islamic and Pakistan-based terrorist organisations weaponising the deluge of footage from the Gaza Strip, their propaganda will have a far-reaching impact on terrorist radicalisation in India. The wide availability of encrypted messaging platforms and Pakistan’s attempts to revive terrorist violence exacerbate this threat. The Ministry of Home Affairs, particularly the NIA, has kept up the pressure on terrorist organisations and the supporting ecosystem. However, Indian agencies will have to step up their vigil in monitoring the renewed radicalisation drive by the terrorist masterminds and their well-resourced benefactors.

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• About the author: Sameer Patil is Senior Fellow with the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology and Deputy Director at Observer Research Foundation
• Source: This article was published by Observer Research Foundation

By Fiona Raval 

The Tatmadaw usurped power in Myanmar through a coup in February 2021. In the two and a half years since, India has been tolerant of the junta and hasn’t yet interacted with the pro-democracy National Unity Government (NUG). Further, in taking a “business as usual” approach in the interest of certain geostrategic calculations, India has effectively also offered support to the regime. The economic, political, and strategic benefits that New Delhi hoped to reap from this approach, however, have yet to be forthcoming. In fact, an assessment specifically of India’s trade and infrastructure investments in, and military cooperation with Myanmar recommend an urgent rethinking of its approach. 

Assessing Trade and Infrastructure Investments

India’s investments in Myanmar have not yielded desirable returns. 

For decades, India has been a prominent economic investor in, and trading partner to Myanmar. As of 2022, India’s development assistance to Myanmar, which includes infrastructure, amounted to over US$ 1.75 billion. This bilateral partnership includes highly publicised projects like the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project (KMMTP) and India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral (IMTT) Highway, which are crucial for India’s Act East Policy. India has also helmed development projects like schools, roads, and housing along the India-Myanmar border and in Rakhine State. Simultaneously, India is also one of the foremost buyers of Myanmar’s vegetables, gems, and timber. In addition to 13 Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs), several private Indian companies like Century Ply, Tata Motors, and Essar Energy have a notable presence in Myanmar.

Due to security concerns resulting from the civil war and specific areas being outside the Tatmadaw’s control, progress on these projects has been challenging. Projects to develop border areas and Rakhine State are unfinished. The KMMTP and the IMTT have missed multiple deadlines and aren’t yet operable. Following the coup, foreign companies have faced intense pressure from human rights groups to disinvest from Myanmar because such economic relations directly fund the military and its excesses. These companies have faced public ire, boycotts, and internal strikes. Such unviable conditions have steered several companies, including Chevron, Posco—even India’s Adani—into withdrawing from Myanmar. Furthermore, the NUG has declared that it won’t honour or recognise any investment deal or agreement made with the military since the coup. 

Reviewing Strategic Objectives

India’s military cooperation with the junta has proved counterproductive to New Delhi’s strategic interests. 

Myanmar’s cooperation is essential for India to maintain and monitor peace in its Northeastern region. Post-coup, India has supplied Myanmar with arms and defence technology amounting to US$ 51 million. These include radar technology, submarines, aviation fuel, explosives, ammunition, etc. This approach has been detrimental to India’s security interests. For example, the junta’s airstrikes along Myanmar’s northern border have caused physical damages on the Indian side. Additionally, there are reports of the junta facilitating the revival of Indian separatist outfits in order to combat the rebel alliance in northern Myanmar. Their mobilisation and deployment will have negative security repercussions for India. India-supplied military equipment and aviation fuel have also aided the junta in the “commission” of international crimes. This violence has forced tens of thousands of people to flee the country, compounding the pre-existing refugee crisis in the broader region, which, once again, has serious implications for India. 

Another roadblock is India’s single-focus diplomatic engagement with the junta. India doesn’t appear to be considering power ambiguities in Myanmar, or accounting for this in its approach. Despite assistance from India and other countries, the junta is struggling to retain singular authority. Centres of power in Myanmar are in a state of flux, with large-scale, public resistance to their authority. The NUG’s claims of being the legitimate government and various Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) joining the fight add complexity to the power conundrum. As per a June 2022 report, 40-50 per cent of Myanmar’s territory was already outside Tatmadaw’s control. This number is estimated to have increased given regular reports of the military losing control of areas, including important infrastructure and trade hubs. In such circumstances, India risks being left out of any meaningful engagement with Myanmar if it continues to only engage the junta.

China Challenge

India’s approach is predominantly attributed to balancing China’s presence in Myanmar. On this front, however, India is lagging behind quite significantly. 

China is Myanmar’s foremost trading partner and accounted for 26 per cent of all trade volume in 2022-23. Its post-coup defence supplies amount to US$ 267 million as opposed to India’s US$ 51 million. These include light attack aircraft and advanced trainer jets as well as aluminium, copper, rubber, etc. for domestic weapons manufacturing. Additionally, China’s Myanmar strategy is not junta-centric. By communicating with the EAOs and the NUG, China takes cognisance of the volatility of the power struggle in Myanmar. This helps secure their interests and prepares the conditions for future influence should there be a shift in authority. 

Such a multi-stakeholder lens is missing from India’s approach. While it is neither feasible nor desirable for India to cut the junta off entirely, it makes good strategic sense to diversify engagement. India must therefore simultaneously engage the NUG and other stakeholders, while retaining access to the junta.

Conclusion

The economic, political, and strategic returns on investment that India likely envisaged in exclusively engaging the junta have eluded it. Further, this positioning contradicts India’s avowed commitment to the principles of democracy, liberty, and justice. 

During Myanmar’s previous struggle for democracy, India was firmly aligned with the pro-democracy movement, with no interaction with the then military government. Over time, New Delhi acknowledged the strategic flaw in sidelining a central stakeholder, which led to the initiation of contact with the military. This is the learning curve we need to look to in reshaping our Myanmar strategy.

Fiona Raval is a Research Intern with IPCS’ South East Asia Research Programme (SEARP).

By Alexander Kostyuk

The most successful form of warfare is to strike at the enemy’s strategy. This is the main thesis of the famous treatise “The Art of War.” It should be added here that the most successful weapon in this case is wisdom.

History teaches us that the formula for ending a war almost always has one important component: promoting peace, as a method to deliver wisdom for the conflict resolution in a direct or indirect ways. History shows that promoting peace, even bordering on coercion, has been used successfully by large and experienced countries. Let us recall the Korean War with reference to Dr. Carter Malkasian and his book “The Korean War 1950-1953.” Already at the end of the negotiations, the United States felt resistance from the South Korean population to end the war, because the South Koreans did not want Korea to be divided into two parts – North and South, and were also against the deployment of the Chinese army in North Korea. There were protests in South Korea, but the United States and its partners resorted to peace enforcement by offering South Korea good postwar security guarantees, assistance in the development of the Korean army, and leaving their 8th Army, which had participated in the war, in South Korea. The coercion to peace worked – the war ended in two months and has never resumed.

What is happening now in the world and in Ukraine looks like coercion to peace. The postponement of aid because of the debate in the US Congress, the postponement of aid from the EU, the reduction of arms and ammunition supplies starting in late summer, the decision of the European Council to start negotiations on Ukraine’s accession to the EU, but subject to certain conditions until March of this year – all of this, to one degree or another, is evidence of coercion to peace in Ukraine by partner countries. It is likely that the delayed US and EU assistance is intended to fill in for post-war security guarantees for Ukraine, or the West’s first contribution to Ukraine’s post-war security, and the EU wants to start accession talks with Ukraine, where the war has already ended, because the negotiation process looks more predictable to Europeans, as does the result: Ukraine’s accession to the EU. NATO’s perspective is realistic, because without Ukraine in NATO, there will be no security in Europe, and Russia will be constantly swayed from the outside. Ukraine should probably receive an invitation to join NATO as an EU member.

For the West, Ukraine has already won, having defended the main objective – state sovereignty and independence, as Finland did in the days of Mannerheim, having defended its right to exist and define itself in the war against the huge USSR. The Finns have never considered this a defeat, nor has any Western partner. It was their victory, securely engraved in history.

In his press conference with President Zelensky on  December 12, 2023 President Biden made one statement that Ukraine has already won a great victory in the war by defeating the initial Russian plan to subjugate the whole of the country.

The experience of ending the war in Finland and Korea, as well as the German experience of managing the situation in the postwar period, with West Germany joining NATO and the final stage of peaceful reunification of Germany, should be useful to Western countries in ending the war in Ukraine.

A recent CNN article by Matthew Schmidt provides a meaningful analysis of the war’s developments, drawing on the wisdom of history. Here is one of the theses of what such a wise decision might look like:

“The second option — one less dependent on immediate deliveries of high-tech weapons, followed by a quick and drastic battlefield success — is for Zelensky to freeze the fighting and play a long-term strategy to get his territory back over time. This is a back-up plan if the first fails to happen or fails to work. One might call it the “Berlin option.”

Over the 32 years of independence, the Ukrainian government has made many mistakes. This includes the long-standing pursuit of the idea of “neutrality” in relations between Western countries and Russia, which left Ukraine as a buffer zone and tempted Russia to commit aggression. A superficial attitude to the development of the country’s defense capabilities, which led to the sale of a large number of conventional weapons during the first two decades of Ukraine’s independence. A very long and uncertain process of shaping public opinion on joining NATO, which changed dramatically in favor of joining NATO only as a result of Russia’s aggression in 2014. Ukraine has recognized all these mistakes. Russia’s aggression in 2022 is the latest tragic lesson that Ukraine has learned.

At the same time, Western countries should frankly recognize their mistakes as well. For example, the uncompromising process carried out by the United States in the 1990s, which left Ukraine without a deterrent – nuclear weapons.

Peter Hilpold in his recent paper gave an excellent description of one of this historical episode: “To read today Professor Mearsheimer’s analysis of ‘The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,’ published nearly 30 years ago, might leave a somewhat ghastly impression: How is it possible that a political analyst, shortly after Ukraine had become independent, developed such an accurate prediction of the events that would unfold, slowly but inevitably, in the following decades? A development that would end up in the disastrous Russian aggression against Ukraine? At the center of Professor Mearsheimer’s prophecy stood the prescience that abandoning her nuclear deterrent capacity would expose Ukraine, sooner or later, to an invasion by her ancient nemesis Russia.”

How can we not recall the infamous Budapest Memorandum of 1994. It is also worth recalling George Kennan’s warning against NATO’s eastward expansion, in which Western countries overlooked Ukraine’s buffer status and did not have an effective strategy in case of Russian aggression. Frank Castigliola has recently made a very meaningful attempt to revisit George Kennan’s warning in the context of the war in Ukraine.

If the United States were to take away Ukraine’s nuclear weapons, it would have to accept Ukraine into NATO along with Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. Taking away Ukraine’s nuclear deterrent in the 1990s, the West should have extended its nuclear deterrence to Ukraine through NATO membership.

It’s also worth mentioning an article by Steven Pifer written in 2011: “After the Trilateral Statement and Budapest Memorandum were signed, implementation proceeded relatively smoothly. By June 1, 1996, Ukraine had transferred the last of the nuclear warheads on its territory to Russia for elimination, and the last START I-accountable strategic nuclear delivery vehicle, an SS-24 missile silo, was eliminated in 2001. More broadly, Ukraine’s denuclearization opened the way to an expanded US-Ukrainian bilateral relationship. Among other things, by the end of the 1990s, Ukraine was among the top recipients in the world of US assistance. Denuclearization also removed what would have been a major impediment to Ukraine’s development of relations with Europe. In 1997, NATO and Ukraine agreed to a “distinctive partnership” and established the NATO-Ukraine Council.” Recently, we see that Ukraine’s denuclearization opened the way to the Russia invasion of Ukraine.

The issue of geopolitical status should have become a matter of constant dialogue between all countries interested in this issue as soon as the last nuclear warhead left Ukraine in June 1996. What security mechanism did Ukraine receive to replace nuclear deterrence? As events since 2014 have shown, Ukraine has not received any effective security mechanism from its Western partners and Russia.

What could such a dialog look like in terms of context and publicity? Here’s an example of such a dialogue, which began in July 2023, on the occasion of the NATO Summit in Vilnius.  In this series from the American Statecraft Program, James Goldgeier and Joshua Shifrinson discuss and debate the issues surrounding NATO enlargement in a twenty-first-century exchange of letters. A dialogue of this level of substance and intensity on Ukraine’s security status and the role of NATO should have been initiated by the leaders of the world’s leading countries back in 1996, and perhaps even earlier, when Ukraine became an independent state in 1991.

Part of what has happened since 2014 – Russia’s aggression in Ukraine – is the result of Western countries putting the issue of Ukraine’s geopolitical status on the back burner. Western countries must assume responsibility for Ukraine’s post-war security and the restoration of Ukraine. Coercion to peace, even in an indirect form, requires Western countries to answer the question honestly: What will happen after the war? Western countries have no right to repeat the mistakes of the past, because this is a matter of European and global security, i.e. their own security.

For coercion to peace to work as well in Ukraine today, as it did in 1953 during the Korean War, Western countries must provide Ukraine with a clear postwar perspective, taking out of the geopolitical desk the dusty-covered security issues that have been in need of resolution since the 1990s.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

By Mendee Jargalsaikhan and Enkhbayar Namjildorj

Mongolia is successfully navigating great power geopolitical rivalry, the dynamics of electoral democracy and the challenges that face small, resource-based economies. But current political and economic trends, if not managed cautiously, could trigger more challenges for Mongolia ahead of its 2024 parliamentary election.

Despite attempts by Beijing and Moscow to influence Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia continues to maintain an independent foreign policy. For example, Beijing’s authority was undermined when Mongolia’s religious leaders officially announced the reincarnation of the tenth Jebtsundamba Khutughtu, one of the key leaders of Tibetan Buddhism. Russian officials have similarly voiced discontent over the alleged rise of Western influence in Mongolia. These concerns may have formed the rationale behind Beijing and Moscow’s decision to invite the Secretary of Mongolia’s National Security Council to a trilateral meeting with Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in September 2023.

While maintaining balanced relations with China and Russia, Mongolia has also strengthened ties with France, the United States, Poland and South Korea — countries in direct geopolitical competition with Mongolia’s two neighbours. In 2023, the United States and South Korea strengthened their strategic partnerships with Mongolia and inaugurated a trilateral dialogue mechanism with an emphasis on critical minerals. French companies also began negotiations to develop a uranium mine in Mongolia, aiming to export to the Chinese market.

Mongolia’s leaders have prioritised multilateral diplomacy, strengthening its ties with countries operating in a similar geopolitical context. Mongolia hosted the Eighth ‘Ulaanbaatar Dialogue’ in June 2023, a regional security dialogue that provides a neutral platform for international diplomats and academics to strengthen regional understanding. In the same month, Mongolia launched the annual Khaan Quest peacekeeping exercise, along with Chinese, Indian, US, Japanese and South Korean counterparts.

Building on its socialist legacy, Mongolia has also conducted high-level talks with Vietnam, Laos, Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic, while deepening its trade and economic ties with Southeast and Central Asia. Mongolia also maintained its observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization despite Chinese and Russian pressure to join. Mongolia’s open, multi-pillared, neutral and peaceful diplomacy has increased the resilience of its independent foreign policy.

Compared to its authoritarian neighbours, Mongolia’s democracy remains durable, upholding human rights and pluralism. In 2023, Mongolia hosted Pope Francis, who attended an interfaith dialogue with shamans, Buddhists, Christians and Muslims. Mongolia’s civil society space remains open, allowing Western and local non-governmental organisations to engage in discussions about issues concerning political and civic rights. The failure of several attempts by populist interest groups and some government officials to change this legal environment demonstrates the strength of Mongolian civil society organisations.

Political leaders and parties have generally played by the rules of electoral democracy. In May 2023, the Parliament aimed to increase Mongolia’s democratic governance by introducing a mixed electoral system and approved a constitutional amendment to increase the number of parliamentary seats from 76 to 126, which will take effect in the 2024 parliamentary election

But Mongolia is still at the crossroads of becoming a crony democracy or a democracy with a strong rule of law. Corruption poses a major challenge to Mongolia’s democratic resilience. In response to public anti-corruption demonstrations, the ruling Mongolian People’s Party declared 2023 as the year of fighting against corruption. The cabinet announced a set of five measures towards this goal — to protect whistle-blowers, eliminate cronyism within the public service, extradite those accused of corruption, expropriate stolen funds and assets, and strengthen transparency.

But party leaders have struggled to implement these measures. For one, all disclosed corruption cases in 2023 — such as the Tavan Tolgoi coal case as well as scandals over the Educational Loan Fund and the Agricultural Support Fund — have involved members of the ruling party. Criminal investigation and judicial processes also remain slow. As the parliamentary election nears, these cases could threaten the nature of Mongolia’s electoral democracy.

Mongolia’s economy similarly underwent a resilience test in 2023. The ruling party-led parliament and cabinet have responded to rising inflation and costs of living by increasing salaries in August and September. A further ten per cent salary and pension increase has been approved for April 2024.

While the outgoing parliamentarians passed a very optimistic budget in hopes that coal exports to China would continue to increase, the economy is on a risky trajectory. Mongolia is struggling to pay off its debts and has extended its currency swap agreement with China until 2025. The remaining balance of this currency swap is 15 billion yuan (US$2 billion). The ongoing war in Ukraine might bring about a fuel supply crisis, which would present enormous challenges for the government and the public.

Mongolia’s economy also remains overly dependent on Chinese markets, investment and infrastructure. China holds a 91.5 per cent share of Mongolia’s total exports and 62.3 per cent of total export revenues came from coal exports alone. In the short-term, Mongolia will struggle to attract foreign investors due to its vulnerability to geopolitical shocks, high regulatory burdens and underdeveloped infrastructure.

Mongolia has shown resilience within its independent foreign policy, democracy and economy. But competitive domestic politics and inefficient populist economic policies will likely present the biggest challenges in 2024. If not carefully managed, Mongolia might struggle to cope with political instability while searching for ways to manage its debt-ridden economy.

About the authors:

• Mendee Jargalsaikhan is Dean of Research at the Institute for Strategic Studies of Mongolia.
• Enkhbayar Namjildorj is Senior Expert at the Institute for Strategic Studies of Mongolia and has served as an Economic Advisor to Mongolian Prime Ministers Jargaltulgyn Erdenebat, Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh and Luvsannamsrain Oyun-Erdene.

Source: This article was published by East Asia Forum

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