Day: December 20, 2023

By Rose P. Keravuori, Peter G. Bailey, Eric A. Swett, and William P. Duval

The Spartan Warrior, immortalized by the story of the 300 at Thermopylae, dominated the ancient Hellenistic world. While many know of the legendary Spartan training regimen, few know they were defeated through the power of Defense Diplomacy. Spartan dominance ended permanently when Epaminondas, a Theban general, used a “grand strategy of indirect approach” to establish capable partners, foster alliances, strengthen non-allied states’ defensive abilities, and decimate the “economic roots of [Sparta’s] military supremacy.”

Epaminondas’ use of officer exchanges—Philip II of Macedon, Alexander the Great’s father, spent his youth in Thebes during Epaminondas’ time and later used his tactics—high level governmental engagements, combined training, security building—the fortified city of Messene, for example—and regional security forums such as the Arcadia Alliance to advance Thebes’ interest in ending Spartan dominance—match the activities we currently call Defense Diplomacy.¹

Defense Diplomacy in Action

In April 2023, war broke out in Khartoum, Sudan. Suddenly, tens of thousands of Sudanese and foreign citizens became trapped between two generals vying for control of the country. Buildings were destroyed, and the streets became death zones as fighters shot at anything moving. Amid this chaos, foreign governments in Sudan, including the United States, scrambled to remove their citizens from Khartoum and the rest of the country.

U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM)’s proactive Defense Diplomacy was put to the test, ultimately helping to enable a successful operation for military-assisted departure of designated U.S. personnel and citizens from Khartoum. In support of the Department of State’s efforts, the command’s highest echelon of leadership began to engage, including the commander of USAFRICOM, General E. Michael Langley, USMC; the deputy commanding general and director of Strategy, Engagements, and Programs (J5), Major General Kenneth P. Eckman, USAF; as well as the director of Intelligence (J2), Brigadier General Jerry Carter, USMC. These three leaders established communications and personally engaged with the opposing Sudanese generals. Their direct efforts helped establish safe corridors and secure permission for the use of an airfield outside Khartoum. They also arranged safe passage corridors through checkpoints and contested territory for numerous multinational convoys from Khartoum to Port Sudan.

Even after most evacuees were safely out of Sudan, Defense Diplomacy continued to enable and support crucial humanitarian and evacuation efforts in coordination with the Department of State. Major General Eckman traveled to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, to support negotiations with Sudanese delegates from both sides of the conflict to establish safety guarantees for humanitarian efforts and evacuation of noncombatant personnel.

A Core Joint Force Task

Defense Diplomacy has long been a core mission of the Department of Defense (DOD) carried out by senior military officers. Its strategic importance is repeatedly exhibited throughout history, from General George Washington’s deft diplomatic management of the colonies’ alliance with France to General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s expert management of the strong personalities of British Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery, French General Charles de Gaulle, and General George S. Patton to create an effective, combined force in World War II.

Congress uses a set of criteria for determining a general or flag officer position, including “official relations with other U.S. and foreign governmental positions.”2 The Joint Force Universal Joint Task List identifies engagement and building partnerships with other U.S. Government departments and agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), state and local governments, foreign partners, and humanitarian organizations as a core task at all levels of leadership.3

DOD identified the need for enhanced Defense Diplomacy professional development, and in 2010 and 2011, Congress directed the study of the “current state of interagency national security knowledge and skills” among the workforce in the National Defense Authorization Act, citing their importance for effective national security efforts.4 Shortly thereafter, the United Kingdom (UK) published its 2013 International Defence Engagement Strategy, citing engagement by UK defense leaders as critical to achieving foreign policy objectives as a central part of an integrated approach to employ “all the levers of power across government.”5

Civilian and uniformed defense leaders have long understood the interrelationship among diplomacy, development, and defense—what USAFRICOM refers to as the 3Ds—to conflict prevention and resolution. In 2017, a joint letter signed by 121 three- and four-star generals and flag officers supported the fiscal year 2018 International Affairs Budget, which resourced diplomatic and development efforts as “critical to preventing conflict.”6 When serving as the commander of U.S. Central Command, General James Mattis, USMC, reportedly stated, “if you don’t fully fund the State Department, please buy a little more ammunition for me because I’m going to need it” to emphasize the importance of an integrated whole-of-government approach to achieve security outcomes.7

The joint force increasingly operates in joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environments in which Defense Diplomacy knowledge, skills, and behaviors—derived from education and experience—provide a marked advantage.8 DOD understands the value of diplomatic and interagency experience for midcareer officers assigned to niche interagency and diplomatic specialties such as defense attachés and military advisors, but such training and experience is exceptionally rare across the joint force and among general/flag officers outside of these specialties, creating a learning curve for the vast majority who receive only familiarization-level training.9 Preparing military leadership for Defense Diplomacy with rudimentary familiarization and on-the-job training invites increased risk and decreased effectiveness of integrated deterrence and global campaigning while progressing through the learning curve of interagency coordination.

Defense Diplomacy in Africa

Defense Diplomacy is particularly beneficial in Africa due to the range of challenges, dispersed U.S. presence, and historical ties that make military-to-military engagements more salient. On official visits, general/flag officers and senior enlisted leaders from USAFRICOM often meet with African counterparts and military, diplomatic, and civil leadership above parity, elevating the level of strategic engagement with the partner country to the ministerial and occasionally presidential levels, reflective of partners’ desires for strategic engagement with the United States. As USAFRICOM leaders often play a vital role in state and nonstate negotiations, having training in or familiarity with the nuanced nature of diplomatic and development discussions becomes a necessity.

Defense Diplomacy is also a cost-effective shaping operation in “phase zero,” enhancing partner capacity, capabilities, and interoperability while promoting stability through assistance using a 3D approach.10 To better support this at USAFRICOM, foreign policy and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) advisors, embedded interagency representatives, and foreign liaison officers were deliberately built into the core staff to synchronize efforts among agencies and governments at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.11

Increased partner engagement is the focus of the U.S. coastal West Africa and sub-Saharan strategies, and understanding African security concerns helps the United States identify how it can better support its African partners.12 With ongoing military engagements and presence in these regions—and across the continent—it becomes more important to ensure USAFRICOM and component leadership who meet with partners have the tools and training to navigate Defense Diplomacy opportunities in support of U.S. policy.

While Embassy Country Teams are responsible for coordinating whole-of-government efforts for a particular country, USAFRICOM hosts the annual Africa Strategic Dialogue, which convenes senior leaders from USAID, State, and DOD to develop a holistic 3D approach for African security challenges.13 In the following months after the Africa Strategic Dialogue, command staff, Country Teams, as well as State and USAID representatives convene for the Africa Strategic Integration Conference to coordinate layered 3D effects for specific regions, subregions, and countries.14

Unfortunately, even the best force structure can only marginally buy down the experiential learning curve for any complex task, such as Defense Diplomacy. As a foreign element investing in the development and security of a nation and culture speak the native language. Even the most qualified representatives bring cultural biases, preconceptions, and misunderstandings of effects to the development of the strategic approach for U.S. engagement. More diplomatically experienced senior military officers can quickly leverage State and interagency expertise and effectively engage partner-nation leaders to bridge the perception gap and provide relevant guidance for a more effective and culturally nuanced strategic approach.

Furthering U.S. Security Objectives: Insights From BG Bailey

West Africa is a growing focus for USAFRICOM and a strategic challenge that leaders in Washington, DC, must pay more attention to. From democratic backsliding to increasing expansion of violent extremist organizations (VEOs) southward from the Sahel to general instability caused by the repercussions of climate change—particularly in the Gulf of Guinea—the West Africa security environment is degrading at a dangerous pace.

USAFRICOM shares its regional partners’ concerns regarding these security threats and pursues avenues that it can work toward to ensure mutual objectives in a synchronized and complementary manner are met. In my service as the deputy director for Strategy, Engagements, and Programs, I have been particularly struck by how much these aims can be furthered simply by listening and communicating with our partners in an open and frank manner that conveys our respect for the relationship. Open communication lays the foundation for future collaboration, while establishing trust between partners that can lead to unexpected yet welcomed outcomes. It is within this context that I relay my experience working with a partner in the Gulf of Guinea. I hope that in recounting it, readers can internalize the use of transparent dialogue in conjunction with the art of active listening to assist in furthering U.S. strategic security objectives.

I traveled to Guinea in October 2021 to meet with Guinean leaders to discuss growing the longer term security relationship between our two nations, especially looking at what USAFRICOM could do to support Guinean partners. During this visit, I had the honor of meeting with Guinea’s minister of defense. The original intent of the meeting was to share our respective views on the security situation within Guinea and the surrounding region—a dialogue that would help inform future security cooperation efforts. It was immediately apparent that the minister took my concerns seriously; at the same time, he waited patiently to steer the conversation in the direction of his choosing once I had made my points. The minister then touched on the historical root causes of regional instability in the Gulf of Guinea, ongoing contributing factors, and what he saw as possible solutions. By the end of the minister’s statement, I had received an in-depth analysis of regional instability that was more nuanced and sophisticated than I had ever received. The minister elucidated aspects of the security environment that had their roots in generational grievances that could not be mitigated with a single security cooperation initiative or even a strictly defense approach. An issue we viewed as strictly a security issue was suddenly framed in the broader context it warranted, and it became clear that to truly tackle the problem set, the command’s framing and approach to the issue would need a significant recalibration.

The minister and I ended the engagement conveying the importance we both placed on the relationship between the Guinean armed forces and USAFRICOM and promised to engage in the future on a deeper and more regular level. I returned to Stuttgart, Germany, with a deeper appreciation for the historical context of the security situation in contemporary Guinea and a message for our command’s leadership that our strategic approach to the country would need to change.

This dialogue led to a deeper understanding and appreciation for the Guinean perspective and fundamentally strengthened and changed the nature of the partner relationship—and furthermore helped to refine the priorities and approaches we are taking toward Guinea. USAFRICOM has begun engaging with the country in a more nuanced and, quite frankly, effective manner because of the lessons gleaned from an open and honest dialogue. While this single conversation will not be a panacea for the relationship, it could establish a better foundation to continue to strengthen the relationship as we work toward our mutual security objectives.

It was chance that the minister and I were able to have such an important and rich exchange, and with other individuals in our positions, it may have been different. However, by incorporating a baseline standard of Defense Diplomacy training into the career paths of our senior leaders—and specifically giving them the tools to engage in open communication and active listening when interacting with peers and senior leaders on the continent—we can work toward building stronger relationships and trust with our African partners.

Practicing Intelligence-Driven Defense Diplomacy: Insights From BG Keravuori

The degrading security situation in West Africa has been of significant concern for USAFRICOM and the broader U.S. Government due to the expansion of VEOs from the fragile states in the western Sahel recently affected by political instability and subsequent withdrawal of Western military forces.15 Political instability and economic decline exacerbated by environmental factors in the Sahel have enabled a gradual southward expansion of VEO activity over the last 2 years, threatening the Gulf of Guinea littoral countries of Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Togo.16 President Joe Biden’s 10-year implementation plan to prevent conflict and promote stability under the Global Fragility Act specifically “seek[s] to break the costly cycle of instability” in these countries, through an “integrated, whole-of-government approach” leveraging “new and existing diplomatic, defense, and development programs.”17

USAFRICOM prioritized strategic engagement with coastal West African partners and multinational organizations to understand growing security concerns and VEO threats through the unique lens of each country. By doing so, it became abundantly clear that the most effective approach to regional security is to support our African partner states in developing a coordinated strategy toward clearly defined and shared U.S. and African goals using the entire toolkit of statecraft and not solely defense.18

To achieve long-term regional security outcomes with this holistic approach, the U.S. military must suppress its inclination to quickly “solutionize” a problem with a purely defense approach.19 Alternatively, a simultaneous 3D interagency effort coordinated with European partners to layer effects could facilitate sustainable “clear and hold” efforts of African partners to reduce the threat and root causes of VEOs over time.20

Throughout the past few years, USAFRICOM and its interagency partners identified shared security priorities in Africa and formed the Combined Joint Interagency Coordination Group–West Africa (CJIACG-WA) in late 2022. The group’s focus is to coordinate the use of DOD intelligence-sharing and training capabilities with unique diplomatic and development investments of other U.S. Government agencies to support partner-led efforts to implement a holistic counter-VEO approach. The group effort, among many others, has come to fruition after years of building a common understanding, trust, and relationships among U.S. agencies.

Applying the 3D approach in Africa starts with building a unity of effort with State Department Country Teams and then bringing in DOD to synergize efforts and reduce friction caused by stovepiped communication and divergent priorities. Working in tandem with diplomatic missions with embedded defense attachés and USAID regional offices, senior-level engagements initiated discussions to address regional security challenges around worrisome trends, the effectiveness of the United Nations (UN) missions such as the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, or African-led organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States and the Accra Initiative. The unilateral and multilateral relationships built from consistent senior-level engagements are key to understanding how the United States can support African-led efforts and regional security initiatives with intelligence-sharing, security assistance, and operational support.

Conversations about security concerns and the metastasizing VEO issue with military and civilian leadership in coastal West Africa consistently become a broader examination of root causes of instability. Contributing factors such as governance, services, resources, desertification, corruption, human rights violations, porous borders, land-use governance, and a rapidly changing environment collectively contribute to instability and support VEO recruitment.21 As a starting point, a sustainable solution needs to address social, economic, diplomatic, and military challenges while encouraging collaboration among the military, government agencies, NGOs, and neighboring states.

Strategic engagements led by senior USAFRICOM leaders and staff to partner countries have spurred greater collaboration between their national civic and military leadership. The interagency representation of visiting U.S. delegations often encouraged attendance by counterparts representing internal security, foreign affairs, humanitarian aid, law enforcement, and legislative affairs. African partner militaries capitalized on the opportunity to coordinate interagency lines of effort with U.S. support, such as increasing investment in education, providing basic services to underserved areas, and mitigating secondary and tertiary effects of land-use legislation potentially causing conflict and displacement. Intelligence directorate–led engagements specifically reinforced the need for information-sharing agreements among agencies and neighboring states and the establishment of systems and processes for efficient information-sharing.

Consistent bilateral engagements with coastal West African partners shaped a crucial subsequent multilateral engagement at the command-hosted African chiefs of defense conference. This unique forum built consensus among regional partners on shared security challenges and the transnational problem of VEO activity. USAFRICOM was trusted as a helpful partner to facilitate a multilateral discussion between coastal West African partners, which was particularly challenging due to the lack of a common language, cross-communication platform, or shared security framework involving the United States. Ultimately, these bilateral and multilateral engagements with coastal West African partners informed the purpose and establishment of CJIACG-WA by a trusted partner to address enduring security challenges in West Africa. Additionally, it contributed to encouraging African partners to “embrace joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational mindsets,” something that is happening across combatant commands.22

Professionalizing the Purple to Gold Pipeline: Insights from BG Keravuori

My assignment as USAFRICOM’s deputy director of intelligence was an example of successful joint force talent management considering the confluence of language proficiency, education, and interagency experience that allowed me to engage with senior African and European civil and military leaders on shared security interests. Serving in command and directing a commander’s action group hit my major key development milestones as an Army officer, but it was the broadening and interagency assignments that best prepared me to conduct Defense Diplomacy in Africa.

As French is the lingua franca in West Africa, my fluency in the language enabled more direct and candid discussions with senior African civil and military leaders and the French Armed Forces. The close partnership with France in Africa is made more striking through personal relationships and shared interests. Recently serving as a U.S. liaison to a French Army division and institutional exposure to the French military academy in Saint-Cyr provided me with a practical understanding of French defense strategy, foreign policy, and security efforts in the Sahel. The French military’s long history of security efforts in West Africa provides crucial context and insight, and its continued 3D efforts often align with USAFRICOM priorities. Such experiences and relationships prove indispensable to deepening our close partnership with the French Armed Forces in West Africa.

Defense Diplomacy in practice was particularly well-served by my formative experiences as a foreign area officer (FAO), during which I was exposed to the nuances of diplomatic language and culture and the bureaucratic challenges of security assistance. Continued involvement with the FAO community also enables an advantageous link to the defense attaché offices and Country Teams at U.S. Embassies across the continent. An interagency broadening assignment as a FAO at the Department of State provided familiarity with subdepartment level stakeholders and processes that now enable flat communications between USAFRICOM and State for a cohesive U.S. response promoting unity of effort with African partners.

Going Beyond Familiarization

Members of the U.S. joint force often assume significant responsibility for promoting U.S. foreign policy abroad from junior to senior officer levels through partner engagements, security forums, combined exercises, and multinational operations. Preparing military leaders with a foundational understanding of the interagency community is fundamental to integrating efforts across the 3Ds and promotes more immediate integration with partner efforts on common interests to achieve sustained results at a modest, shared cost.

Based on the reflections of Defense Diplomacy practitioners, the joint force is best prepared through formal education and interagency experience. Having institutionalized the concept, training, and experiences to achieve joint integration, it is time for the joint force to likewise institutionalize the same for interagency integration. As famously stated by Carl von Clausewitz in On War, “war is not merely a political act but a real political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, a carrying out of the same by other means.”23 Military officers, through campaigning in peacetime or conflict during wartime, participate in political dialogue. The military has long known the value of training and experience to achieving success, investing hundreds of thousands of dollars into training each Servicemember, building training and experience at each rank.

The same cannot be said for interagency training, where only a small subset in specialty fields receive any experience and training beyond a PowerPoint overview. Professionalizing interagency training and experience to build a bench of 3D officers at field grade ranks and above level can potentially magnify the effects of national security investments in the same way the joint force integration created an advantage over Service-centric militaries.

Gold Gilding the Purple Joint Force

Military leadership during the reforms of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was adamantly against the proposed changes, and joint opportunities were seen as career-ending assignments.24 With nearly 40 years of hindsight, the jointness enabled by Goldwater-Nichols is now one of the core strengths of the U.S. military.25 Services will inevitably be reluctant to weigh interagency experience in career advancement due to institutional pressure, but DOD can shift institutional Service culture to value interagency experience just as it has for joint experience through policy change and evaluation. The U.S. military enjoys an advantage over its adversaries by being able to effectively execute joint operations, and interoperability is the next phase of preparation for military leadership to overcome complex modern security challenges.26

The joint force prioritizes joint experience as a requirement for senior military leaders through joint qualification accreditation but currently has no formal requirement or incentive for interagency experience, the importance of which has been repeatedly discussed and advocated for in professional journals over the last two decades. The introduction of an interagency qualification requirement for career advancement would expand acculturation across development, diplomacy, and defense agencies. Elevating the importance of interagency assignments with drivers of U.S. domestic and foreign policy through military broadening assignments at USAID and the Departments of State, Commerce, Treasury, and Energy would reduce the seams in U.S. whole-of-government strategy, policy, and efforts.

Expanding interagency assignments and introducing competitive interagency credit would require refocusing existing resources and add costs for permanent change-of-station moves. To bring costs down, joint credit could be reduced to 2 years to facilitate 1 year of interagency credit, an approach that could allow personnel assigned to joint billets—especially within the National Capital Region—to rotate through 1-year interagency assignments with minimal resource requirements, avoiding the costs and turbulence of a permanent move.

While not everyone serving in joint assignments would be able to achieve interagency credit using this model, the joint force overall would have a significantly expanded bench of midgrade and senior officers with interagency acculturation and experiences enabling greater 3D integration and more effective Defense Diplomacy efforts in the future.

As Norman Schwarzkopf told a group of Naval Academy graduates in 1991, “the more you sweat in peace, the less you bleed in war.” Nowhere is there a lower cost opportunity to increase training to achieve strategic-level effects than advancing from a joint to an interagency force. 

About the authors: Brigadier General Rose P. Keravuori, USA, is Director of Intelligence, J2, at U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM). Brigadier General Peter G. Bailey, USAF, is Deputy Director, Strategy, Engagement, and Programs, J5, at USAFRICOM. Lieutenant Colonel Eric A. Swett, USA, is Chief, USAFRICOM J25 Plans West. Captain William P. Duval, USA, is a Reserve Officer supporting the Intelligence Directorate at USAFRICOM.

Source: This article was published in Joint Force Quarterly 111, which is published by the National Defense University.

Notes

1 B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1954).

2 Lawrence Kapp, General and Flag Officers in the U.S. Armed Forces: Background and Considerations for Congress, R44389 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 1, 2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44389/7.

3 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3500.02C, Universal Joint Task List Program (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, December 19, 2022), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/training/cjcsi_3500_02c.pdf?ver=DcbU-aEXlhWsm-03av9h4A%3d%3d.

4 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. 111–84, 111th Cong., 1st sess., October 28, 2009, https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ84/PLAW-111publ84.pdf.

5 International Defence Engagement Strategy (London: Ministry of Defence, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/international-defence-engagement-strategy.

6 Dan Lamothe, “Retired Generals Cite Past Comments from Mattis While Opposing Trump’s Proposed Foreign Aid Cuts,” Washington Post, February 27, 2017.

7 James Mattis and Stephen Hadley, “Secretary Mattis Remarks on the National Defense Strategy in Conversation with the United States Institute [of] Peace,” Department of Defense, October 30, 2018, https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1678512/secretary-mattis-remarks-on-the-national-defense-strategy-in-conversation-with/.

8 M. Wade Markel et al., Developing U.S. Army Officers’ Capabilities for Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Environments (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2011), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9631.html.

9 Kyle J. Wolfley, “Military Power Reimagined: The Rise and Future of Shaping,” Joint Force Quarterly 102 (3rd Quarter 2021), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2679810/military-power-reimagined-the-rise-and-future-of-shaping/.

10 Hans Binnendijk et al., Affordable Defense Capabilities for Future NATO Missions (Washington, DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, February 23, 2010), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/occasional/CTNSP/NATO_Affordable-Defense-Capabilities.pdf?ver=2017-06-16-142145-460.

11 “About the Command,” United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM), https://www.africom.mil/about-the-command.

12 The U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability: 10-Year Strategic Plan for Coastal West Africa, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Togo (Washington, DC: Department of State, March 24, 2023), https://www.state.gov/the-u-s-strategy-to-prevent-conflict-and-promote-stability-10-year-strategic-plan-for-coastal-west-africa/; U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington, DC: The White House, August 2022), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/U.S.-Strategy-Toward-Sub-Saharan-Africa-FINAL.pdf.

13 United States Africa Command: The First Ten Years (Stuttgart: USAFRICOM, 2018), https://www.africom.mil/document/31457/united-states-africa-command-the-first-ten-years.

14 Ryan McCannell, “At The Nexus of Diplomacy, Development, and Defense—AFRICOM at 10 Years (Part 3),” War Room, September 29, 2017, https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/special-series/anniversaries/forming-africom-part-3/.

15 Center for Preventative Action, “Violent Extremism in the Sahel,” Council on Foreign Relations, Global Conflict Tracker, August 1, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violent-extremism-sahel.

16 Leif Brottem, “The Growing Threat of Violent Extremism in Coastal West Africa,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, March 15, 2022, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/the-growing-threat-of-violent-extremism-in-coastal-west-africa.

17 President Biden Submits to Congress 10-Year Plans to Implement the U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability (Washington, DC: The White House, March 24, 2023), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/03/24/fact-sheet-president-biden-submits-to-congress-10-year-plans-to-implement-the-u-s-strategy-to-prevent-conflict-and-promote-stability.

18 William J. Burns, Michèle Flournoy, and Nancy Lindborg, U.S. Leadership and the Challenge of State Fragility, Fragility Study Group Report (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, September 2016), https://www.usip.org/publications/2016/09/us-leadership-and-challenge-state-fragility.

19 Brian Dodwell, “A View From the CT Foxhole: Brigadier General Rose Keravuori, Deputy Director of Intelligence, United States Africa Command,” CTC Sentinel 16, no. 1 (January 2023), https://ctc.westpoint.edu/a-view-from-the-ct-foxhole-brigadier-general-rose-keravuori-deputy-director-of-intelligence-united-states-africa-command/.

20 Aneliese Bernard, “Jihadism Is Spreading to the Gulf of Guinea Littoral States, and a New Approach to Countering It Is Needed,” Modern War Institute, September 9, 2021, https://mwi.usma.edu/jihadism-is-spreading-to-the-gulf-of-guinea-littoral-states-and-a-new-approach-to-countering-it-is-needed.

21 “Violent Extremism in the Sahel.”

22 Kurt W. Tidd and Tyler W. Morton, “U.S. Southern Command: Evolving to Meet 21st-Century Challenges,” Joint Force Quarterly 86 (3rd Quarter 2017), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/1219106/us-southern-command-evolving-to-meet-21st-century-challenges/.

23 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. J.J. Graham (Ware, UK: Wordsworth Editions, 1997).

24 James R. Locher III, “Has It Worked? The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act,” Naval War College Review 54, no. 4 (Autumn 2001), 104, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2537&context=nwc-review.

25 Charles Davis and Kristian E. Smith, “The Psychology of Jointness,” Joint Force Quarterly 98 (3rd Quarter 2020), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/2340620/the-psychology-of-jointness.

26 Dan Sukman and Charles Davis, “Divided We Fall: How the U.S. Force Is Losing Its Joint Advantage Over China and Russia,” Military Review, March–April 2020, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/March-April-2020/Sukman-Divided.

By Jim Zanotti

Hamas (or the Islamic Resistance Movement) is a Palestinian Sunni Islamist military and sociopolitical movement, and a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization (FTO). Hamas’s primary base of action and support is in the Gaza Strip, which it has controlled since 2007. It also operates in the West Bank and Lebanon, and some Hamas leaders and personnel live and/or work in various Arab countries and Turkey.

Hamas reportedly receives material assistance and training from Iran and some of its allies, including the Lebanese Shia group Hezbollah (another FTO). From its inception, Hamas has overseen a social welfare network that appears to have aided its popularity among Palestinians while serving as a conduit for some funding for Hamas military operations.

On October 7, 2023, Hamas led a surprise assault against Israel that killed some 1,200 Israelis and foreign nationals (including 35 Americans) and took around 240 persons hostage (including some Americans)—more than 100 of whom were released in November. The attack’s scope and lethality was unprecedented for Hamas. The ensuing conflict, which has reportedly killed more than 18,000 Palestinians in Gaza, has reshaped Middle Eastern dynamics, with implications for U.S. policy and Congress. A Hamas spokesperson has said the group is committed to repeating October 7-style attacks against Israel.

Origins, Ideology, and Leadership

An outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas emerged in 1987 in Gaza during the first Palestinian intifada (uprising). After the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) entered into a peace process with Israel that created the Palestinian Authority (PA) to exercise limited rule in the West Bank and Gaza, Hamas established itself as an alternative to the secular Fatah movement, which leads the PLO, by violently attacking Israeli civilian and military targets. Hamas’s ideology combines Palestinian nationalism with Islamic fundamentalism. Hamas’s 1988 charter committed the group to the destruction of Israel and the establishment of an Islamic state in all of historic Palestine (comprising present-day Israel, the West Bank and Gaza), and included anti-Semitic (anti-Jewish) rhetoric.

Observers differ on the extent of Hamas’s pragmatism. The group publicly released a 2017 document stating that Hamas’s conflict is with the “Zionist project” rather than with Jews in general. It also expressed willingness to accept a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza if it results from “national consensus,” but said Hamas would not recognize Israel’s legitimacy.

Hamas’s formal leadership structure consists of a 15- member politburo as the group’s primary decision-making entity and a Shura Council that elects the politburo—with similar structures for the West Bank, Gaza, prisoners in Israel, and the diaspora. Ismail Haniyeh, a former PA prime minister based in Qatar, is chairman of the politburo. Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’s leader in Gaza since 2017, reportedly masterminded the October 7 assault in Israel. He returned to Gaza from Israel in 2011 as part of a hostage- prisoner swap, after 22 years in prison for the abduction and murder of two Israeli soldiers and the killing of four Palestinians. Muhammad Deif and Marwan Issa apparently lead Hamas’s military wing, the Izz al Din al Qassam Brigades, with a reported 25,000-40,000 fighters as of October 7. Israel claims it has since killed about 7,000 fighters, and that Sinwar, Deif, and Issa are priority targets.

Military Capabilities and External Support

Hamas’s military capabilities and tactics have steadily advanced in sophistication from the rudimentary guerrilla and suicide attacks it initially employed. The group uses a range of domestically produced and smuggled weaponry: rockets and mortars, drones, anti-tank guided missiles, man- portable air defense systems, and a variety of small arms. Most of its rockets—the main impetus for Israel’s Iron Dome anti-rocket system—are only capable of targeting southern Israel, but some can strike Israel’s main population centers farther north. Hamas has constructed an extensive system of tunnels within Gaza that it uses to protect and transport personnel and weapons—significantly increasing targeting difficulties for Israeli forces.

According to the State Department, “Hamas has received funding, weapons, and training from Iran and raises funds in Persian Gulf countries,” and Iran provides up to $100 million annually in combined support to Palestinian militants. U.S. officials have said they have not found evidence that Iran helped directly plan the October 7 attacks, but argue that Iran’s longtime support for Hamas makes it “broadly complicit.” An Economist article hasestimated Hamas’s annual revenue to be more than $1 billion, with around $360 million in “taxes” on goods brought into Gaza, and about $750 million from foreign sources. According to the Treasury Department and a U.S.- based expert, these sources include Iran’s government andcryptocurrency exchanges, plus financiers, companies, and charities in other regional countries, including Algeria, Sudan, Qatar, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates.

Political Ambition, Control of Gaza, and Popularity

Hamas apparently seeks to play a leading role in the Palestinian national movement. In 2006, it won a surprise victory over Fatah in PA legislative elections, giving it nominal control over several key PA government ministries as it vied with PA President Mahmoud Abbas (who also heads Fatah) for power. A Middle East “Quartet” (the United States, European Union, Russia, and U.N. Secretary- General) urged Hamas to recognize Israel, renounce violence, and accept previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements. Hamas refused.

After a Saudi-brokered PA unity government collapsed in 2007, Hamas forcibly seized Gaza, and has since presided over worsening economic and humanitarian conditions there as the de facto authoritarian ruler. Since taking power, Hamas and other groups like Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) have used Gaza to launch attacks on Israel, prompting tightened access restrictions from Israel and Egypt. The PA has countered Hamas’s presence in the West Bank with Israeli and U.S. support. Media reports since 2022 suggest that Hamas and PIJ, with Iranian backing, have aided increased militant action in the West Bank to target Israelis and undermine the PA.

The extent of Hamas’s domestic popularity is uncertain. Hamas portrays itself as defending Palestinian national aspirations and Jerusalem’s Muslim holy sites, and is the preferred faction of at least 20% of Palestinians (in the West Bank and Gaza, or WBG) in most polls. However, in an Arab Barometer survey just prior to October 7, a majority of Gazans expressed little or no trust in the Hamas-led government, and Palestinians (in WBG) voiced more overall support for Fatah than for Hamas. WBG polls from late 2023 suggested that the conflict had boosted Palestinian approval for Hamas, but one analyst said such views could change when conflict subsides. In the wake of past conflicts, Hamas’s domestic popularity has spiked, before falling again to pre-conflict levels soon thereafter.

Armed Conflict with Israel

Hamas has pointed to purported Israeli military and political provocations to justify escalations of violence. During the four rounds of major conflict before October 2023, Hamas and other militants launched rockets indiscriminately toward Israel, and Israeli military strikes largely decimated Gaza’s infrastructure. After each round, economic recovery and reconstruction was minimal— perhaps partly because some international actors were unsure about the durability of any rebuilding efforts and/or how those efforts could proceed without bolstering Hamas.

President Biden has surmised that one objective of Hamas’s October 7 assault may have been to disrupt Israel’s improvement of relations with Saudi Arabia. Hamas might have sought to reemphasize the importance of Arab popular support for the Palestinian cause to Arab states engaging in or considering closer relations with Israel. Hamas leaders and various observers have suggested other possible objectives for the attack, such as bolstering Hamas’s domestic popularity amid active speculation over who might succeed PA President Abbas, securing prisoner releases, and capitalizing on Israeli domestic discord.

It is unclear how the October assault and Israel’s reaction to it may affect Hamas’s future in Gaza or elsewhere, and whether it can realize its basic goals. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has declared Israel’s intent to “destroy the military and governmental capabilities of Hamas.”Domestic and international pressures could influence the nature and extent of Israel’s military operations and post- conflict security plans in Gaza, and efforts to stifle support for Hamas or the ideas and practices it represents.

U.S. Policy and Options for Congress

Major questions for U.S. policymakers include: How can U.S. efforts to counter Hamas and the Iran-led “axis of resistance” bolster Israel, the PA, and other U.S. regional partners while minimizing suffering for Palestinian civilians? How should the United States engage with allies or partners—such as Qatar and Turkey—that may host or support Hamas and seek to mediate its conflicts? How can various actors assist Palestinians in Gaza and reestablish post-conflict governance there without empowering Hamas or its ideology and tactics? Since 2006, Congress and the executive branch appear to have structured certain types of U.S. economic and security assistance partly to help the PA counter Hamas. Congress also has placed conditions and restrictions on U.S. funding to any PA government that Hamas controls, joins, or “unduly influences” (for example, in P.L. 109-446 and Section 7040(f) of P.L. 117-328).

The Biden Administration publicly supports Israel’s efforts to end Hamas rule in Gaza, while seeking greater protection and humanitarian assistance for civilians. U.S. and Israeli officials also seek the release of hostages. Debate continues about how to achieve these goals. The Treasury Department has designated many actors for sanctions as Hamas supporters, but may have difficulty limiting fundraising activities abroad that bypass the U.S. financial system.

In November 2023, the House passed the Hamas International Financing Prevention Act (H.R. 340), which would require the executive branch to impose sanctions on foreign actors that provide certain types of support to Hamas, PIJ, or affiliates, subject to a presidential waiver for national security reasons. Some other bills (including S. 489 and H.R. 5996) would condition funding to Gaza on certifications that Hamas and other FTOs would not benefit.

• About the author: Jim Zanotti, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
• Source: This article was published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS)

By Haizam Amirah Fernández

The Middle East and the entire world need an alternative to the cyclical violence between Israelis and Palestinians. The risks of using the recurring formula –tested so many times with increasingly monstrous results– of occupation, terrorism, collective punishment, devastation and hatred are too high. The alternative to violence can only come through politics.

The scale of human and physical destruction after the unprecedented outbreak of war, following the Hamas attack against Israel on 7 October and the subsequent massive Israeli assault against the Gaza Strip, is confirmation of the failure of the old formula that avoids the two-state solution. Four realities have become clear: (1) the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was not settled after the normalisation between Israel and certain Arab countries; (2) this conflict retains a high capacity to destabilise the entire Middle East and its neighbourhoods; (3) trying to manage it through declarations of intentions disconnected from reality only contributes to the aggravation of its consequences; and (4) the West uses double standards when it comes to war crimes, depending on where they are committed and by whom.

A profound change is needed in the way the conflict is approached if the goal is to find a solution that brings hope and security to both Israelis and Palestinians. This involves getting both parties back to the negotiating table in less unbalanced conditions than until now. A step that would modify the perverse vicious circle of recent decades would be the recognition of Palestine as a state by the Western countries that have not yet done so, as well as by the UN, with the support or abstention of the US at the UN Security Council. Such a recognition would weaken Hamas and its supporters, especially if a Palestinian Authority with democratic legitimacy were to be renewed and strengthened.

Israel is not a normal state. It lacks defined borders according to international law. It is recognised by only 163 of the 193 UN member states. Of the 15% of countries that do not recognise Israel, many are among its Arab and Muslim neighbours who thereby show their rejection of the occupation of the Palestinian territories.

Palestine is an even less normal state. Only 139 UN members (72%) recognise it, including two permanent members of the Security Council (China and Russia). Among those who do not recognise the State of Palestine, the majority are in Western Europe, North America and the small islands of the Pacific. It is important to note that Palestine has recognised the State of Israel since the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, but recognition is not reciprocal.

It is paradoxical that the Western countries that so often repeat that peace between Israelis and Palestinians must be based on the ‘two-state solution’ are those that only recognise one of them (Israel) but not the other (Palestine). This is mainly due to the pressure that several of these countries receive from Israel and the US. On the other hand, the EU and its member states have contributed billions of euros to the Palestinians since the peace process began at the Madrid Conference in 1991, in theory to favour the two-state solution under the formula of ‘land for peace’. It is surprising that, after such a disbursement, only nine of the 27 EU countries recognise the Palestinian state (only Sweden did so while being a member of the EU, in 2014, while the other eight did so before joining).

Following an escalation of violence in Gaza during the summer of 2014, much smaller than that taking place in 2023, several European parliaments, including those of France, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, Luxembourg, Ireland and the UK, approved motions asking their governments to recognise Palestine as a state. The European Parliament also voted by a large majority in favour of a non-binding resolution calling for the recognition of the Palestinian state as a way of reviving the moribund peace process.

In the case of Spain, Parliament voted in November 2014, almost unanimously and with the support of all parliamentary groups, a non-law proposal urging the Spanish government to recognise Palestine as a state. Also, some autonomous parliaments, with regional governments of different political parties, issued institutional statements supporting recognition. It should be borne in mind that it was a left-wing Spanish government that recognised the State of Israel in 1986, while a right-wing one voted in favour of recognising Palestine as a non-member observer state of the UN in November 2012.

Although the conditions for the proclamation of an independent and viable Palestinian state do not exist today, its recognition by more Western countries would be a decisive step to break the current vicious circle of destruction and hatred, undermining the position of the most radical on both sides. There are many Israeli voices calling for the main EU countries to make such a decision, as they see an independent and democratic Palestinian state as the best guarantee for Israel’s security. Furthermore, mutual recognition between Israel and Palestine would normalise the situation of the Israeli state with the 57 Arab and Muslim countries that form the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (the second-largest intergovernmental organisation after the UN), whose population accounts for almost 25% of the entire world population. That incentive for Israeli society is the basis of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, which is summarised in three points: (1) security for Israelis; (2) statehood for Palestinians; and (3) prosperity for both peoples and their neighbours.

The world must recognise the difference between the Palestinians and Hamas. There is an unexplored formula to end this fundamentalist movement. It consists of applying international law, offering international security guarantees to Israelis and Palestinians, normalising Israel’s situation in its neighbourhood, giving hope to the Palestinians and recognising their humanity. It must be understood that Hamas is the result of the failure of politics and the intentional weakening of the Palestinian Authority by the successive Israeli governments led by Benjamin Netanyahu.

As the EU High Representative for Foreign Policy, Josep Borrell, expressed at the recent Regional Forum of the Union for the Mediterranean: ‘Hamas is an idea. You cannot kill an idea unless you can prove you have a better one’. Hamas –or any other extremist organisation that might emerge in the future– feeds on hopelessness, injustice, hatred and double standards. In the absence of hope for peace and dignity for the Palestinians, Israelis will have no security and their country will adopt increasingly extremist policies, further deepening its internal fractures and putting international peace and security at risk.

• About the author: Haizam Amirah-Fernández is Senior Analyst at the Elcano Royal Institute and Associate Professor at the Instituto de Empresa (IE). BA from the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid and an MA in Arab Studies on a Fulbright scholarship from Georgetown University’s Center for Contemporary Arab Studies. He completed his studies at the Université Libre de Bruxelles (Belgium) and at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA).
• Source: This article was published by Elcano Royal Institute and originally published in the daily El Mundo on 6/XII/2023.

By Leo von Breithen Thurn

Two days ago on 17 December, general and local elections took place in Serbia, a Western Balkans country often linked with conflicts. The outcomes of the elections are already being challenged by the majority of opposition leaders, particularly within the ‘Serbia Against Violence’ coalition. The results of these elections in Serbia are expected to further complicate issues related to stability, security, reconciliation, European integration, and press freedom in the Western Balkans.

On 18 December, the electoral commission officially announced the triumph of the Serbian Progressive Party in the recent parliamentary elections, securing 46.71% of the vote (1,721,572), whereas the opposition pro-European coalition “Serbia Against Violence” garnered 23.58%. Out of 6,500,666 registered voters, 58.84% participated in the elections, with approximately 2.7% of the ballots deemed invalid.

The performance of the “Serbia Against Violence” (Srbija Protiv Nasilja) party has demonstrated that there is space for opposition to the current regime. However, the state apparatus has actively taken measures to diminish their capacity to influence the public. The key question lies in the future development of this party, which, if approached with wisdom, could evolve into a formidable force posing a genuine threat to Vučić in the coming years. Achieving this would require securing more media visibility and engaging in conflicts with Vučić, particularly on the issue of Kosovo, while presenting alternative solutions that the public would be willing to accept. This scenario is highly questionable.

President Aleksandar Vučić of Serbia has requested extraordinary elections as part of a strategic move to demonstrate his authority and reinforce the absolute dominance of the Serbian Progressive Party (Srpska Napredna Stranka – SNS) over the country. Especially through personalizing the campaign for the SNS to secure votes.

In the week before the elections, as an analyst and commentator on politics and foreign affairs in Europe and the Western Balkans, I appeared as a guest on N1 Croatia’s Newsroom. During that discussion, I predicted that President Vučić ‘s party would secure victory through non-ethical elections. The Serbian Progressive Party’s governance can be somewhat compared to Lukashenko’s corrupted rule in Belarus. Concerns are around issues such as media freedom, political corruption, treatment of minorities, and diplomatic relations with Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Albania, and Bosnia & Herzegovina.

Since the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the establishment of the Republic of Serbia, a trend has emerged where politicians and leaders associated with the previous regime of the war criminal President Slobodan Milosevic dominate the Serbian government, judiciary, military, and public services, including crucial institutions. This infiltration of politics and the ruling party into the state constitutes a “deep state,” capable of influencing and controlling the electoral process.

According to the opposition and its leader, Miroslav Aleksić, the recent elections in Serbia were manipulated, with numerous rule violations reported. Miroslav Aleksić, the opposition leader, claimed that individuals residing outside Belgrade were transported in buses, vans, and cars to vote as if they were local citizens. He further alleged that 40,000 identity documents were issued for individuals not residing in the Serbian capital. Expressing strong disapproval, Aleksić stated, “we will employ all available democratic means to address the vote rigging in Belgrade and Serbia. What happened today is not something we can acknowledge as the result of a democratic and fair election.”

In this context, it is intriguing to observe certain regional leaders standing alongside President Vučić and Prime Minister Brnabic. Noteworthy figures include Milorad Dodik, the President of Republika Srpska, Nenad Nesic, the Minister of Security of Bosnia & Herzegovina, whose ministry effectively functions as the state intelligence agency, and Andrija Mandic, the President of the Parliament of Montenegro. The presence of President Dodik and Minister Nesic may also be associated with allegations that they are assisting President Vučić and the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) by mobilizing people from Republika Srpska to participate in voting in Serbia.

Minorities, including Croats in Serbia, experienced limited representation in Sunday’s elections, with no representatives successfully elected to the Serbian Parliament. It also highlights the need for Serbia to enhance efforts toward safeguarding minority rights and protection. For example, Croatia by law guarantee representation of minorities in the Parliament of which 3 seats are reserved for Serbs minority representatives in Croatia. Serbia should in same way protect minorities and guarantee their representation in the Parliament and government. Croatia should address this concern within the EU framework, particularly in the context of Serbia’s negotiations process for the EU integrations.

The complicated relations between Croats and Serbs in Bosnia & Herzegovina contribute to this issue, acting as a platform for conflicts between the two countries. Factors such as destabilization efforts by President Milorad Dodik in Republika Srpska, challenges with the Electoral Law, non-compliance with the Constitution, and disregarding decisions of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina are among the significant issues in this highly divided country.

The largest employer in Serbia is undeniably the state itself, under the control of President Vučić’s associates, strategically utilized to shape the narrative of state politics, foreign policy, and the economy. In such a system, achieving a genuinely free market or facilitating foreign investments becomes exceedingly challenging, given the bureaucratic hurdles and the dominance of businessmen affiliated with the ruling party. The primary objective behind this structure is evidently to exert control over the day-to-day affairs in Serbia and financial resources. These funds were instrumental in influencing the elections on Sunday, December 17, with advertisements, media presence, and various means of “buying votes” deemed crucial for President Vučić and his party to consolidate their ultimate authority over Serbia.

The upcoming year holds great significance in global affairs and geopolitics, prompting President Vučić to proactively initiate extraordinary elections in Serbia. The move is aimed at positioning himself and Serbia strategically ahead of major elections in Europe, Russia, and the United States. Vladimir Putin continues to regard Vučić as a significant ally within the Russian sphere.

Despite the relatively muted response from the United States regarding the illegal invasion of Kosovo and the near outbreak of war in the Western Balkans this year, there is an acknowledgment that Vučić is willing to withdraw when instructed. The US also expects increased involvement from the EU in addressing these matters. While the EU remains Serbia’s primary trade partner and financier, there is an unspoken understanding on both sides that Serbia’s European path is effectively delaying tactics for the predictable future.

President Vučić, while affirming Serbia’s dedication to the European path in the current period, notably underscores the phrase “for now.” This emphasis is crucial to understanding his approach of upholding relations with the EU for economic advantages while concurrently fostering ties with Russia. Vučić ‘s strategy involves navigating both sides to attain benefits from two prosperous sources, with the aim of securing financial gains for his friends and colleagues. Another aspect of this diplomatic balancing act is his anticipation of the resolution of the conflict in Ukraine and the future direction of the EU. Vučić intends to position himself favorably based on the more prosperous outcomes in these geopolitical developments.

China expresses satisfaction with its relationship with Serbia, particularly highlighted by the strengthened friendship between President Xi and President Vučić through the recently established Free Trade Agreement of two months ago. The agreement further solidifies Serbia’s position as a significant European outpost within China’s geopolitical initiative, the Belt and Road project. The mutual interests on both sides are expected to yield benefits for individuals associated with President Vučić and Chinese businesses, positioning Serbia as a gateway to the EU.

Considering the inherent corruption in Serbia, there is anticipation of a transitional import/export arrangement for Chinese goods, clearing the way for the Western Balkans market and potentially even the EU. Additionally, this presents an opportunity for China to extend its geopolitical influence and interests into the Western Balkans, like its expansion in Africa. Croatia is expected to play a crucial role in defending the EU’s external borders and the Schengen Zone within this context.

A significant portion of the Serbian population appears to be swayed by nationalist rhetoric, directing attention towards issues that do not fully focus on the challenges facing the country’s development. President Vučić and his party keeps warning the nation that they have enemies and that they are victims of foreign powers. In such a way they are creating an atmosphere where people think that the authorities are the only ones to protect them and Serbia’s national interests. Consequently, there is less enthusiasm for EU integration and engaging in negotiations, especially considering the rivalry and stronger economic position of Croatia, a target of the ‘Greater Serbia’ aspirations. This way nationalist rhetoric is influencing the public and using relations with Croatia to create “savior” and “protector” role of President Vučić, which generates favorable opinions in most of the elder and rural Serbian population.

The opposition and students in Serbia organized a protest yesterday outside the headquarters of the Republic’s Electoral Commission. During the demonstration, they presented evidence of electoral rule violations and called for the annulment of the election results. The German Ministry of Foreign Affairs has expressed concerns about the breach of electoral rules and the use of unethical methods to secure votes. This adds to the growing doubts regarding the fairness of the elections and supports my earlier predictions about the electoral process in Serbia. Russia supports the victory of President Vučić’s party and the US is taking a diplomatic position, stating that it looks forward to cooperation with the new government. The EU observer mission member for the elections in Serbia and MEP Andreas Schieder of Austria has criticized elections and stated that there is no place for stealing of votes and corruption in democratic world.

The political stance of “Serbia above everybody” is unlikely to pave the way for a positive future for the nation. While democracy in Serbia faces threats, the current focus of European leaders, the United States, and the United Kingdom lies on urgent internal and foreign policy matters. On the other side, Aleksandar Vučić, as the leader, may be seen as acceptable because he is already familiar to both Western and Eastern powers, allowing for a level of control through various deals, agreements, threats, and corruption. Therefore, after Sunday’s elections in Serbia we have Milosevic after Milosevic with predictable next political moves.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.

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