The Israel Defense Forces has announced another four-hour pause in hostilities in the north of the Gaza Strip
Day: November 15, 2023
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NPR News: 11-15-2023 5AM EST
By Dhesigen Naidoo
Since the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October, the world has seen the unfolding of possibly the worst humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip. This runs parallel to the Ukraine war and several African conflicts – all markers of a world at war. Three of the 10 Economist Intelligence Unit critical global risk scenarios for 2024 are military conflict-related.
The African Union Peace and Security Council has highlighted the climate-development-security nexus as a strategic analysis tool. Globally, there’s growing acceptance of climate as a threat multiplier, with extreme weather events and higher levels of global heating catalysing potential conflict. The United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on Climate Change emphasises how climate change can exacerbate conflict.
What do war and conflict mean for climate risk? An obvious answer is that they generally divert political attention and investment focus. This has been the case with the Ukraine war and will almost certainly be so with Gaza’s war. This has a huge impact on commodity access and affordability.
On 30 October, the World Bank said the current Middle East conflict could bring a ‘dual shock’ to global commodity prices. Looking at oil prices, it says a regional expansion of events in Gaza could produce a ‘medium disruption scenario’ akin to the Iraq war that started in 2003.
War and conflict generally divert political attention and investment focus
That would see an oil production deficit of three to five million barrels per day, pushing up the price by 21% (initially 35%). A ‘large disruption scenario’ with an impact on the scale of the 1970s Arab oil embargo would see a six to eight million barrels per day supply curtailment with a 56% price increase, after a 75% initial shock.
Although climate change responses mean we must rapidly move away from fossil fuels, the global economy’s current addiction to oil and coal will increase oil prices, particularly food price inflation. These chains and dependencies are well described. The effect on the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals will be intense, especially on poverty and hunger.
The move towards national security-first policy around the world, but particularly in the global north, will intensify. That will see energy security returning to the old mainstays of oil, gas and coal. There has already been a visible rise in fossil fuel demand and a significant change in the strategy of the oil majors, with either a reversal of net zero pledges or alterations in the decarbonisation timetable.
In addition, as a direct contributor to climate change, the global military carbon footprint currently accounts for 5.5% of global emissions. This exceeds Africa’s entire carbon footprint at less than 4% of global emissions. This is troubling, especially as the rate, frequency and intensity of climate-related extreme weather events increase worldwide.
The global military carbon footprint of 5.5% of global emissions is more than Africa’s entire footprint
Another factor is the forced movement of people. In June 2022, the UN Refugee Agency said war and violence were responsible for the forced displacement of 110 million people. The main theatres are Ukraine, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Myanmar, Somalia and Afghanistan. Depending on its duration and intensity, this could increase due to the Gaza war. For recipient regions and countries, refugees further strain resources that could have helped with climate change responses.
Many developed northern countries are expected to fulfil their pledges of US$100 billion a year to help the south with climate adaptation and mitigation, and then contribute to a Loss and Damage Fund.
But the financial costs of war and war support will leave fewer resources available for climate actions. Science and innovation efforts will also be redirected towards the war enterprise, again with an opportunity cost for our ability to deal with climate change innovatively. By destroying lives, human capacity and infrastructure, war drastically diminishes climate resilience capacity.
War and conflict inevitably see an economic reprioritisation and diminished resources for development. This compounds the already disruptive impact on the social tapestry, with the additional factor of increased refugees.
By destroying lives, capacity and infrastructure, war drastically diminishes climate resilience capacity
The exacerbation of climate risk has many facets. Vital infrastructure (such as dams, roads and bridges) is destroyed either directly or through diminished maintenance and the capacity to operate. There is also damage to environmental assets that serve as a bulwark against climate disasters, including resilience to extreme weather and a reduction in critical decarbonisation investments. The result is increased climate risk at local, national and regional levels, which increases the potential for existing conflicts to escalate.
Climate change threatens security at all levels. War and conflict return the favour multifold by limiting our ability to respond adequately to climate-related disasters and build climate resilience.
About the author: Dhesigen Naidoo, Senior Research Associate, ISS Pretoria
Source: This article was published by ISS Today
By Harsh V. Pant
The much-anticipated meeting between United States (US) President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping will happen this week in the San Francisco Bay Area on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit.
Ties between Washington and Beijing have been on a downward trajectory in recent years. A growing consensus about China as the most serious challenger has become the hallmark of American foreign policy thinking. Biden continued with the Trump administration’s approach vis-a-vis China and, in fact, has doubled down in challenging Beijing across a whole range of issues. It is precisely this downward spiral that the two leaders will be hoping to contain as they sit down for face-to-face talks.
The Biden Administration’s diplomatic mettle is being tested by multiple global crises from the Ukraine war to the Israel-Hamas conflict in West Asia. There is neither any bandwidth nor any appetite for the opening of another front though the volatility in the Indo-Pacific is pointing to a potential crisis brewing there. Amidst this growing global disorder, an overstretched Washington is seemingly keen to bring some stability to its ties with China, which has been challenging the US in every theatre – be it siding with Russia in its war against Ukraine or lending its full weight to the Palestinian cause. From the climate crisis to trade talks, there are multiple issues where the US has struggled to get China on board with its global objectives.
Beijing, meanwhile, has been upping the ante on the Taiwan issue and the South China Sea, challenging the US and its close allies. The restrictions imposed by the Biden Administration on the export of advanced technology to China are viewed by Beijing as explicit measures being taken to contain China’s rise, especially when the Chinese economy is under stress. So, Beijing too seems to have an incentive to seek some stabilisation in its ties with the US. As Chinese vice president Han Zheng recently underlined as a message to American interlocutors: “We (China) are ready to strengthen the communication and dialogue with the United States at all levels, promote mutually beneficial cooperation, properly manage differences, and jointly address global challenges.”
The concrete deliverables from the meeting are likely to be fairly limited. It might lead to a resumption of high-level military-to-military dialogue, which was cut off by China after the then House Speaker, Nancy Pelosi, visited Taiwan in August 2022. Biden would also seek Xi’s help in restricting the flow of Chinese-made fentanyl to the US as well as to exert influence on Iran to prevent the conflict in West Asia from escalating. For Xi, Taiwan will be at the top of the agenda as it would be seeking reassurances from Biden that American policy toward Taiwan would remain unchanged.
The distrust between the two nations is a function of the underlying structural change in the global balance of power and there is a reason, therefore, why the US has been viewing the relationship through the lens of “competition”. America’s partners and allies will also be watching this meeting closely and some have already been trying to stabilise their ties with Beijing. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese visited China earlier this month, the first Australian leader to visit China in seven years, arguing that it is in the interest of both Australia and China “to have a relationship where there is dialogue”. Japan and South Korea have also agreed to revive three-way talks with China after a four-year hiatus. Clearly, these nations are trying to find a new balance in their ties with China as the regional and global order undergoes a systemic transformation.
For New Delhi too, the stakes are high in this re-ordering of the regional matrix. The India-US 2+2 dialogue last week has underlined the organic strength of this engagement, which aims towards “building a forward-looking partnership while we (India and the US) construct a shared global agenda”. Given the criticality of this partnership for ensuring a free, open and rules-based Indo-Pacific region, India will be keenly watching the Biden-Xi meeting.
About the author: Professor Harsh V. Pant is Vice President – Studies and Foreign Policy at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. He is a Professor of International Relations with King’s India Institute at King’s College London. He is also Director (Honorary) of Delhi School of Transnational Affairs at Delhi University.
Source: This commentary was published by the Observer Research Foundation and originally appeared in Hindustan Times.
By Alejandro Turino
Around a third of all murders around the world occur in Latin America each year, most of them accredited to organized crime. Finding effective policies to combat crime continues to be a headache for the region’s governments, regardless of where they stand in the political spectrum.
Traditionally associated with right-wing political parties, “mano dura” (Spanish for “hard hand”) zero-tolerance policies have often been an electorally popular position. For example, a 2013 paper by Alisha Holland, a professor at Harvard University, examined how the Nationalist Republican Alliance, a conservative political party in El Salvador, leveraged the popularity of mano dura initiatives to secure electoral majorities. El Salvador’s current President, Nayib Bukele, continues to campaign on similar policies and a commitment to lower the country’s homicide rate. After doubling the number of army soldiers at the beginning of his tenure, Bukele was then granted emergency powers by the legislature in March of 2022. This allowed him to arrest more than 40,000 people, or about one percent of the population between the ages of 15 and 64, for suspected gang activities or affiliations.
Despite countless violations of human rights and rule of law, the mano dura approach is making Bukele not only popular among his constituents, but also with his peers throughout the region. This is driven by mano dura policies’ tendency to temporarily lower crime rates and create a public perception that security has improved. After Bukele took office in June 2019, homicide rates decreased from 6.6 murders per day to 1.4 per day by 2022. However, it is also known that the homicide reduction was actually a result of a peace pact between Bukele and El Salvador’s main gangs. Furthermore, the long-term sustainability and success of mano dura has a mixed record at best. Crackdowns by previous administrations suggest that these security measures will do nothing to solve the causes of violence, which are rooted in poverty and social insecurity.
For incumbent leftist parties in the region, this popularity creates a challenge to offer voters an alternative to combat crime effectively while respecting human rights and the rule of law. The question of how to do so is an important one, given that this year, crime will be a central issue in elections across the region.
If you can’t beat them, join them
Leftist governments have tried to stay away from mano dura policies, but most have simply reverted to iron-fisted public security tactics. Chile, Mexico, and Honduras, among others, have chosen to adopt elements of mano dura policies instead of developing their own alternatives.
Chilean President Gabriel Boric’s 2023 budget mandated a 4.4% increase in security spending, while investing heavily in new police equipment. The move sparked criticisms from his base and had a distinct mano dura taste, especially given the Chilean police brutality of the last few years. Boric, whose government has been left wing since its creation, also authorized and deployed the Chilean military to play a bigger role in stemming the flow of migrants at Chile’s border with Peru and Bolivia.
Early in his mandate, Mexican President Andres Manuel López Obrador (commonly referred to as AMLO) attempted to take a structural approach to combating crime through a set of vague policies he called “abrazos no balazos” (“hugs not bullets”). Initiatives included poverty alleviation programs to provide alternatives to organized crime, the possible legalization of marijuana, and changes in sentencing guidelines for drug trafficking. After a short stint with limited success, kidnappings and killings remain prevalent today. Consequently, AMLO simply reversed course to the mano dura policies of his predecessors by putting the military back on the streets and in command of the civilian police.
Similarly, Honduran President Xiomara Castro came to power promising to reverse the mano dura security policiesof her predecessors. After a very slow start that saw the homicide rate remain the second-highest in Latin America, Castro returned to a more militarized security strategy. By the end of 2022, Castro even emulated El Salvador’s Bukele, who declared a state of emergency earlier in the year which suspended basic individual rights ranging from freedom of assembly to the right to state-sponsored legal defense upon detention. Castro declared Honduras’ own state of emergency and increased the police’s power of arrest.
The reversion to mano dura security approaches seems to be a trend across the region and a worrisome one. As Holland’s work shows, there is a clear connection between being “tough on crime” and electoral success. As alternative approaches to zero-tolerance policy do not deliver immediate reductions in crime, or at least a perception of such, the temptation to turn to more popular mano dura strategies inevitably grows. For many incumbent leftist parties throughout the region, this creates a dilemma of how to combat crime in an effective way that is both respectful of human rights and leads to electoral victories.
Policies to Move Forward
Despite this dilemma, a new way forward is possible. Crime is a complex issue with many societal causes and effects, most of them interlinked. For incumbent leftist governments throughout Latin America, steps should be taken to address the issue effectively.
Firstly, Boric, AMLO, Castro, and many others need to rethink the image of what it means to be “tough on crime” and communicate this to their constituents. They should resist efforts to frame alternatives to mano dura as inherently weak and emphasize that their governments will not sit idly by as criminal organizations go on a rampage.
The initial structural changes (poverty alleviation, legalization of drugs, etc.) of López Obrador and Castro do not mean that the role of law enforcement goes away altogether. These institutions, particularly civil police forces, should continue to be trained and funded but with a mandate to protect and serve local communities as opposed to punishing them.
Honduras, for example, has the lowest per capita police force in Central America, and the Honduran National Police’s lack of resources have left it vulnerable to corruption. There have been multiple efforts to address this, but these have come under the mandates of very corrupt past administrations. The Castro government should double down on these reforms and invest adequately in funding and training the civil police force to protect communities from crime. The same applies for Mexico, where previous corrupt governments also attempted security reformswhich failed to decrease violent crimes and eliminate corruption in law enforcement. Both governments must remove the military from public security efforts and make sure civil police forces are adequately trained and funded.
One of the most logical ways to reduce the violence is to stem the flow of weapons used to commit crimes, a task that will require the help of the United States. It is no secret that most of the weapons used by criminal organizations flow in illegally and legally from the US. In August of 2021, the Mexican government actually sued US gunmakers for contributing to the high homicide rate in Mexico. The issue is not much better in Central America. In 2022, US companies exported more semi-automatic firearms to El Salvador than in any other month since 2018. Guatemala remains saturated with weapons: In a country of 17 million people (five million boys and men between ages 15-64), more than 500,000 guns are registered, though there are likely many more unregistered weapons.
Although there have been attempts by the U.S. government, particularly the Department of Commerce, to stem the flow of guns to these countries, they have all been inadequate. Recent US intelligence documents show that Mexican drug cartels have smuggled vast amounts of military-grade weapons into Mexico with the help of American citizens. The reports also show that American officials have known this for years but have done little to stop these weapons trafficking networks inside America. Leftist governments in the region need to collectively lobby and pressure the US government to do more in ensuring that firearm exports are better regulated and not excessive. Nothing is “tougher on crime” than making sure the guns used by criminals to inflict violence on Latin American populations do not reach their hands in the first place.
Preventative Alternatives
There are a number of structural ways that leftist governments can effectively be “tough on crime” in their own way, respecting human rights and rule of law. Many of these are centered on education, democratic processes, and fighting corruption. All of these efforts should focus on building trust between communities and the state, which will be key to incumbent leftist governments’ electoral success.
The unfortunate large rates of incarceration provide an opportunity for governments to improve the “employability” of inmates to allow them to actually enter the workforce. A major RAND Corporation study found that every dollar spent on prison education programs saved $4-$5 by reducing recidivism rates. This is money that can then be invested in additional social programs. RAND researchers also found that increasing inmates’ education level is the best way to boost their chances for positive reentry into society.
Organizations such as the Instinct for Life Campaign (IFLC) have identified data-driven measures that have successfully prevented killings. When it comes to value for money, the most effective strategies to reduce lethal violence are investing resources in stabilizing unstable households and promoting positive parenting. Interventions that keep children in school, provide vocational training, generate meaningful jobs, and teach life skills to at-risk youth are also effective. IFLC has already seen up to 10% and 15% annual reductions in violence. Governments should support and scale these types of programs, especially through regional multilateral organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank (which is a member of IFLC).
Reducing corruption is another key step in combating crime. Corruption redirects funds that should go towards helping vulnerable populations, and reducing it could help build trust among citizens. Governments in the region should reinstate anti-corruption regimes such as the Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), the Mission to Support Fighting against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH), and the International Commission against Impunity in El Salvador (CICIES). These commissions have been key in targeting corrupt police officers and other public officials, including lawmakers and judges, and are essential tools in the fight against crime.
A New Mano Dura
Between prevention (education programs, vocational training, etc.) and policy (professionalizing civil police, decreasing weapons smuggling, fighting corruption, etc.) options, Latin American leftist governments have ways to craft their own version of mano dura. A version which is evidence-based, effective, and most importantly, protects citizens and their human rights. Collectively, these policies should yield results that lower crime and violence, build trust between civilians and politicians, and in-turn lead to electoral success for incumbent leftist governments. However, governments need to act now. Reverting to and continuing mano dura policies using the excuse that there are no alternatives is not only untrue; it will also keep the region in a state of endless violence.
The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.
If the United States is a declining power and China’s rise inevitable in the Indo-Pacific; if Russia regards itself as a global power and is determined to bury the US-dominated rules-based order; if the defeat of the US and NATO in the Ukraine war has become a fait accompli; if Canada was encouraged by the US to fret and fume over alleged Indian involvement in Nijjar’s killing; if Israel’s bloodbath in Gaza is actually genocide — well, India’s policymakers haven’t heard any of this. That is the message coming out of the US-Indian 2+2 foreign and defence ministers meeting in New Delhi on November 10.
The big picture is that after audaciously claiming the mantle of leadership of the Global South as recently as in September, in a span of over two months, India is gliding over to the American camp as the US’ indispensable ally, even aspiring to be a “global defence hub” with Pentagon’s help.
The following were some of the takeaways at the 2+2 meeting:
- Sharing technology relating to “maritime challenges, including in the undersea domain”;
- co-development and co-production of ground mobility systems;
- India to undertake US aircraft maintenance and mid-voyage repair of US naval vessels;
- US investment in India’s maintenance, repair, and overhaul of US aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles;
- finalisation of a Security of Supply Arrangement, which will deepen the integration of defence industrial ecosystems and strengthening of supply chain resilience;
- creation of new liaison positions between the two armed forces further to India’s full membership of the multinational Combined Maritime Forces, headquartered in Bahrain;
- Maximisation of the scope of the Logistics and Exchange Memorandum Agreement, and identify steps to enhance the reach of the US naval vessels to Indian bases.
No doubt, the above is only the tip of the iceberg, while this extraordinary transition in Indian policies will largely remain behind closed-doors. The US seems supremely confident that India is ready to enter into an exclusive alliance, something that New Delhi never sought with any big power. What is the offer that the Biden Administration has made to India that the latter cannot refuse?
Clearly, such a massive shift in India’s military policies needs to be co-related with the fundamental postulates of foreign policy. That said, curiously, call it “bipartisan consensus” or whatever, India’s main opposition party apparently couldn’t care less about the shift. This is not surprising. The shift is actually about a nascent India-US alliance to counter China — and that is a policy front where it is difficult to choose between Tweedledum and Tweedledee.
To be sure, both Russia and China understand that Indian foreign policy is transitioning. But they pretend not to notice and would hope it is an aberration. At any rate, neither Russia nor China can stop India on its tracks. Their capacity to leverage Indian policies has dramatically shrunk — Moscow’s in particular — in the contemporary security environment.
The heart of the matter is that India is not ecstatic about the growing multipolarity in the world order. India is a beneficiary of the “rules-based order” and feels far more comfortable with a bipolar world order where multipolarity, if at all, remains a fringe phenomenon while the US’ pre-eminence will continue to prevail for decades to come. Such a paradigm is perceived as advantageous for India to navigate its pathway toward checking China’s hegemonic instincts while also optimally developing its own comprehensive national power. It is an ambitious agenda which is risky too, as policies change in Washington as presidents come and go and American interests get redefined and priorities change.
Today, however, the Indian willingness to align with the US is more evident than ever before. The animus against China’s rise was palpable at the 2+2 meeting. India has cast away any residual pretensions and is shifting toward an openly adversarial relationship with China. The QUAD has become an important locomotive. To be sure, a Chinese response can be expected — when or in what form, time will tell.
This is only possible because Delhi feels reasonably assured that Washington’s Indo-Pacific focus remains intact under the Biden Administration despite growing engagement with China. Of course, an inflection point is arising as Chinese President Xi Jinping will make his first trip to the US in five years and a summit meeting with President Biden has been meticulously prepared, which both sides hope will be productive and make the Sino-American relationship more predictable.
The three regional issues that figured prominently at the 2+2 were Afghanistan, Ukraine and the Palestine-Israel conflict. The Joint Statement devoted a separate paragraph with the sub-title Afghanistan, which implicitly accused the Taliban rulers of not adhering to their “commitment to prevent any group or individual from using the territory of Afghanistan to threaten the security of any country.”
The joint statement goes on to pointedly recall UNSC Resolution 2593 (2021), which specifically “demands that Afghan territory not be used to threaten or attack any country or to shelter or train terrorists, or to plan or finance terrorist attacks.”
Delhi is making a radical departure from its attempts to constructively engage with the Taliban rulers. One reason could be intelligence inputs to the effect that Afghanistan is once again becoming a revolving door for international terrorist groups.
A second possibility could be that the US and India share a sense of exasperation over the Taliban’s growing proximity with China and the spectre of Afghanistan turning into a hub of the Belt and Road Initiative. Beijing’s plan to build a road connecting Afghanistan via Wakhan Corridor is a game changer in geo-strategy which is profoundly consequential. Anything that relates to the security of Xinjiang cannot but be a matter of incessant interest to Delhi.
The 2+2 joint statement signals a renewed US-Indian convergence on Afghanistan. How far this would translate as proactive moves is a moot point. Notably, the US and its allies are also exploiting Russia’s preoccupations with the conflict in Ukraine to double down on their post-cold war strategy to roll back Russian influence in Afghanistan. Moscow senses that it is losing ground in its backyard.
When it comes to Ukraine and the Palestine-Israel conflict, what emerges is that the US and Indian sides have succeeded in harmonising their respective positions on these crucial regional conflicts. In reality, Delhi is shedding its strategic ambivalence and moving towards the US position. This comes out in the strokes in the joint statement by what it says and what it doesn’t. Thus, on Ukraine, Russia’s attritional war has “consequences predominantly affecting the global South.” This apart, Moscow can learn to live with the 2+2 formulation on the Ukraine war.
As regards the West Asian situation, the joint statement voices vehement support for Israel’s fight against “terrorism”. But here, again, India refuses to call out Hamas. Nor is India endorsing Israel’s war on Hamas, leave alone pre-judge its chances of success. Most important, the joint statement omits any reference to Israel’s so-called “right to self-defence”, a mantra that is constantly on Biden’s lips.
India cannot possibly call the Gaza war an act of “self defence” when Israel has unleashed such a brutal military operation against hapless civilians and razed Gaza City to the ground — reminiscent of the joint British-American aerial bombing attack on the city of Dresden, the capital of Saxony, during World War II on the horrific night of 9-10 March 1945 killing over 25000 German people.
Perhaps, all these diplomatic peregrinations through the valley of death could be better understood against the backdrop of the intense back channel dealings involving Hamas leadership in regional capitals in which Biden administration would have high stakes and is a participant.
This article was published by Indian Punchline