Day: October 24, 2023

According to the Joint Communique of the second meeting of the “3+3” Platform held in Tehran on October 23, the participating countries’ foreign ministers “reaffirmed the openness of this Platform for equal participation of Georgia.” The meeting, themed “Time for peace, cooperation, and progress in the South Caucasus” generally centered around Armenia-Azerbaijan peace talks and other developments in the region.

The format, which brings together three regional powers – Iran, Turkey and Russia – as well as two South Caucasus countries- Azerbaijan and Armenia, was established in 2021 and, despite its name, Georgia is not a member.

• 22/10/2023 – MFA: Tbilisi Won’t Attend “3+3 Platform” Meeting in Tehran

Following the ministerial, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov expressed “belief” that “full-fledged “3+3” format can work in the near future,” including Georgia, because “the current authorities in Tbilisi, as they have proven more than once, proceed primarily in all their actions according to fundamental national interests.”

The call for Georgia’s participation in the format was reportedly reiterated by Iran as well. “We hope to see Georgia, a friendly country, participate effectively and constructively in future meetings,” Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA) quoted Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, as saying in the opening remarks.

Ironically, the joint communique, adopted by the parties, including Russia, which continues to occupy 20% of Georgia’s territory, emphasized “the importance of peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, inviolability of internationally recognized borders, non-interference in internal affairs, prohibition on the threat or use of force and respect for human rights based on all the principles of the United Nations Charter.”

Georgia has refused to be part of the format, whose first meeting of the 3+3 platform was held in Moscow in 2021. The Georgian delegation stayed away, saying it could not attend a meeting hosted by the Russian Federation – the country that does not recognize Georgia’s territorial integrity. Nevertheless, Georgian flags appeared at the format’s 1st meeting in Moscow, prompting official condemnation from Tbilisi, which called it “unacceptable”. In January, Russia’s foreign policy chief, Sergey Lavrov, said that Russian authorities had asked Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan to “explain” to Georgia the “benefits of joining the format”.

Also Read:

• 14/01/2022 – Lavrov Hopes Baku, Ankara, Yerevan Can Convince Tbilisi on Joining 3+3
• 11/12/2021 – Tbilisi Skips 3+3 Platform Meeting in Moscow

Vadym Skibitsky, a spokesman for the Defense Intelligence Service of Ukraine, said that the Russian occupiers in Crimea plan to move their warships from the Bay of Sevastopol to Abkhazia, the occupied region of Georgia. According to him, this strategic move follows a series of strikes and special operations carried out by the Ukrainian Defense Forces in Crimea, which have escalated the military threat on the peninsula.

“There is active work going on in the town of Ochamchire in Abkhazia – the Russians have been dredging there, reconstructing the port infrastructure in some places to ensure that warships can be based there,” he noted.

Skibitsky further revealed that some of the Russian ships had been transferred to Novorossiysk, but the small port there could not accommodate the entire Russian Black Sea Fleet. Consequently, the Kremlin has decided to use the occupied territory of Georgia for this purpose.

During the opening ceremony of the Second Parliamentary Summit of the Crimean Platform, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky addressed Russia’s plans, stating: “Recently, the Russian leadership was forced to declare the establishment of a new base for the Black Sea Fleet in the occupied territory of Georgia – specifically in the southeastern part of the sea, distant from Ukrainian missiles and naval drones… The Russian military fleet is no longer capable of operating in the western part of the Black Sea and is gradually retreating from Crimea. This is a historic achievement”.

According to the press release of the Crimean Platform, the President of Ukraine assured that this development will not hinder the Defense Forces and expressed his firm belief that Ukraine will undoubtedly regain full control over Crimea and its adjacent waters.

Also Read:

• 29/09/2023 – Russian Missile Corvette ‘Tsyklon’ Moors in Sokhumi

A new report produced by the EU Strategic Communications Task Forces and Information Analysis sheds light on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), including disinformation with a particular focus on the LGBTIQ+ community, highlighting specific cases of FIMI. The report illustrates for foreign information manipulation and interference, including disinformation, feeds on vulnerabilities and sensitive issues, and then twists them to sow divisions and distrust to polarize societies.

The report aims to help the defender community better understand the nature of FIMI and the Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) used to target the LGBTIQ+ community. It identifies a common theme in many FIMI cases: undermining the LGBTIQ+ community.

Research findings point to significant gaps in tracking, preventing, and combating FIMI targeting the LGBTIQ+ community, primarily due to a lack of coordination, cooperation, and communication between different stakeholders, such as government, academia, non-government organizations, social media platforms, and the media. There is also insufficient utilization of existing networks, limited opportunities to bring experts together, and a lack of funding, causing initiatives to operate in isolation.

According to the report, in recent years, the growing visibility of LGBTIQ+ movements and changes in legislation have been exploited by threat actors aiming to undermine human rights and democratic freedoms. Disinformation, as a weapon, has placed LGBTIQ+ rights at the heart of political and geopolitical debates.

With regard to Georgia, the report mentions the omnipresence of disinformation narratives disseminated by Russian actors, “contributing to the growing antagonism between the EU and Russia regarding their “shared neighborhood” — in which Georgia occupies a strategic position.”

The report refers to one illustrative case of Russia-affiliated sources that have been spreading a misleading video on Georgian social media, combining fragments of Ukrainian army footage with a UK-produced video advocating gay marriage.

These narratives, also driven by local elites, help to crystallize “the idea of a value-based divide between the West/Europe and the East/Russia on LGBT+ issues” even leading to violent conflicts between LGBTIQ+ and conservative activists.

The report notes that the more general literature on disinformation “is replete with references to harmful and misleading narratives about the LGBTQ+ community”, which are a constant target of FIMI and disinformation campaigns.

In 2023, images showing a fabricated document misattributed to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, allegedly prohibiting gay people from having intimate relationships on the battlefield, were disseminated by unattributed websites and Telegram channels, which often amplify or mirror content from the Russian FIMI ecosystem. Additionally, deceptive materials, such as an altered page from an official German booklet addressed to Ukrainian refugee families about gender reassignment in German schools, were widely promoted in Russian, Ukrainian and Polish. Most of the documented incidents took place across platforms and websites.

FIMI campaigns leverage social media platforms effectively, employing tagging, mentioning, and replies to influential figures and institutions. These campaigns demonstrate a well-coordinated approach, from target selection to message crafting and content delivery, often generating organic user engagement and feedback loops.

Some FIMI incidents stand out due to unique tactics, including cyber-attacks against international entities, the development and promotion of a web-based online game, and calls for offline actions and protests.

In the context of the given analysis, 43% of documented incidents took place before, during or after a specific event. Most of these events were LGBTIQ+ related, such as Pride Month, Pride Marches and the International Day Against Homophobia, Biphobia and Transphobia (IDAHOBIT).

The evidence-based analysis provided by the EEAS sheds light on the persistence of discrimination against LGBTIQ+ people as a global problem that needs to be urgently addressed by governments and diplomatic organizations. From a societal point of view, report stresses that this seems to be the best way to ensure that citizens are less inclined to engage with biased information about the LGBTIQ+ community in the future.

Report presents a series of recommendations for policy makers, governments, international organizations, civil society, academia, the private sector and other stakeholders interested in countering or mitigating the impact and harm of FIMI on LGBTIQ+ communities:

General recommendation:

• To strengthen the fight against FIMI targeting LGBTIQ+ it is necessary to adopt a multi-stakeholder approach encompassing governments, international organizations, media, publishing houses and PR agencies, factchecking organizations and academic research, and always to involve the LGBTIQ+ civil society groups.

Recommendations for policy makers, including governments and international   organizations:

• Support the development of regulatory frameworks protecting the LGBTIQ+ community, in partnership with civil society, academia and the private sector.
• Train government officials, policy makers and media professionals on the complexity of issues facing the LGBTIQ+ community in the context of geopolitics, in order to equip them to identify and counter FIMI and disinformation, as well as to respond and communicate about it.
• Establish dedicated tasking within government departments to monitor FIMI and disinformation campaigns targeting LGBTIQ+ communities.
• Increase investment in media literacy, with a strong focus on digital media and human rights, including LGBTIQ+ rights and other identity-based rights.
• Involve LGBTIQ+ communities from the early stages of the planning phase of the awareness-raising campaigns, taking into account specific context and the risks that may result from further exposing LGBTIQ+ communities to attacks and sanctions.

Recommendations to the private sector:

• Develop a common framework for moderating harmful content, particularly content targeting the LGBTIQ+ community, considering international differences in legislation.
• Use algorithmic triggers to display educational popups when users encounter potential disinformation, providing quick tips on how to evaluate information.
• Remove harmful content, and block channels promoting online operations, as quickly as possible, by investing in content moderation and machine learning technologies.

Recommendations for civil society and academia:

• Develop clearer and harmonized definitions of FIMI, LGBTIQ+ FIMI, disinformation, gendered disinformation, misinformation and malinformation.
• Collaborate with social media platforms to develop frameworks and other solutions to improve content monitoring.