Potential threats to Armenia from Azerbaijan
“Azerbaijan and Turkey are creating a virtual reality in which they present themselves as peace-loving states. President Aliyev says that Azerbaijan itself initiated negotiations on a peace treaty with Armenia and drafted the text. Turkey, too, declares its interest in peace in the Caucasus. However, Armenia should not fully immerse itself in this virtual reality because of its domestic political or other considerations,” political analyst Benjamin Poghosyan said on air on a local television channel.
He argued that Yerevan should act cautiously, periodically reminding its neighbours of ongoing processes and of agreements that have been reached but not yet implemented. As an example, he pointed to the agreement to open the Armenian-Turkish border to third-country nationals, which the sides reached back in 2022.
Against this backdrop, he said, Armenia should not support narratives claiming that “Turkey is a very peace-loving country, as is Azerbaijan, that relations with Armenia are excellent and that negotiations have made significant progress”. He explained that, in his view, the policies pursued by these countries have not in fact changed.
“Turkey’s policy in the South Caucasus has always been, is and will remain based on the concept of ‘Azerbaijan first’. In other words, whatever Turkey does or does not do in the South Caucasus, it will always proceed from its strategic alliance with Azerbaijan and coordinate its actions with Baku, including on issues concerning Armenia,” he said.
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Risk of escalation by Baku significantly lower this year
The political analyst recalls that at the beginning of last year the threat of military escalation by Azerbaijan was extremely high. There was open talk of a “forceful seizure of a road to Nakhchivan” through Armenian territory. According to Benjamin Poghosyan, the likelihood of escalation fell after the agreements reached in Washington on 8 August 2025 on the so-called “Trump Route”.
“But it is important to understand why,” he said. “Is it because Baku has abandoned the threat of military escalation and dropped its demands? Or does Azerbaijan believe that the Washington agreements fit exactly with what it had envisaged from the outset — a transition in which Azerbaijanis would not see a single Armenian?”
The Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) is a road intended to link Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhchivan through Armenian territory.
For several years, Yerevan and Baku failed to agree on the issue. Azerbaijan demanded a route it referred to as the “Zangezur corridor”, while the Armenian authorities said they were ready to unblock all roads but rejected the term “corridor”, arguing it would imply a loss of control — and therefore of sovereign rights — over the territory.
It was only on 8 August in Washington that the sides agreed the road would remain under Armenia’s sovereign control, with the United States joining the unblocking process as a business partner. The project was therefore dubbed the “Trump Route”, after the mediator.
According to the analyst, the real reasons will only become clear once the project is implemented. In particular, he said, the terms for establishing an Armenian-US company and the technical details would be crucial.
He warned that Yerevan and Washington may agree the details, but Baku could still refuse to use the road.
“Azerbaijan could argue that, because the necessary regulations are lacking, the August agreements did not in fact lead to the opening of the road,” Poghosyan said. “And at the very least, after Trump leaves the White House, we could return to the situation of January 2025, when — as the Armenian government maintains — the likelihood of a large-scale Azerbaijani attack was quite high.”
Positive steps do not neutralise threat from Baku
The political analyst says Armenian-Azerbaijani relations have seen some positive changes over the past two years. As examples, he cites the following:
- the first joint statement by Armenia and Azerbaijan, adopted in December 2023, which allowed 32 Armenian detainees to return home and enabled Baku to host COP29 thanks to Yerevan’s consent;
- the delimitation of a 12.6-kilometre section along the Tavush–Gazakh stretch of the border in 2024.
“It seemed that these developments should have led to a certain easing of relations and positive progress. However, at the beginning of 2025 there was a significant risk of military action and large-scale escalation on the part of Azerbaijan,” he said.
The expert says wheat imports into Armenia via Azerbaijan reflect the same pattern of limited positive steps. He adds that future trade would fall into the same category.
According to Benjamin Poghosyan, these positive gestures do not neutralise the risks emanating from Azerbaijan:
“The facts show that minor shifts do not lead to qualitative change and do not eliminate the main threat — the club that Azerbaijan constantly holds over our heads. It is as if it is saying: if you do not behave properly, the club will come down on your head.”
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