The Azerbaijan State Agency for Science and Higher Education, in partnership with the Uzbekistan Innovative Development Agency, has launched a joint scientific competition as part of their collaboration, Azernews reports.
Will Azerbaijan attack Iran?
An analytical article in The Washington Post, a newspaper often seen as close to the White House, argues that if Iran’s internal situation escalates into violent conflict, Azerbaijan could feel compelled to intervene to protect its ethnic kin.
At first glance, such a scenario appears radical. However, it rests on several underlying factors. One of them is demographic. The number of ethnic Azerbaijanis living in Iran exceeds the population of Azerbaijan itself. According to an official study by the Iranian government, Azerbaijanis make up about 23% of Iran’s population — roughly 20 million people.
This large community lives mainly in north-western Iran, in provinces bordering Azerbaijan and Turkey. For many years, Iranian Azerbaijanis were seen as more closely integrated into the state than other ethnic groups. Recently, however, signs of discontent have grown. Many now follow Turkish and Azerbaijani media more closely, show a stronger interest in their Turkic-Azerbaijani roots, and demand education in their native language in schools.
The terms and place names used in this JAMnews article, as well as the views and ideas expressed, reflect solely the position of the author or a specific community. They may not coincide with the views of JAMnews or its individual staff members.
Does Baku intend to intervene in Iran’s affairs?
President Ilham Aliyev, commenting on the situation around Iran during the tense year of 2022, stressed that Azerbaijan guarantees the right to education in native languages for ethnic minorities, including Russian and Georgian communities. He said that Azerbaijanis in Iran do not enjoy such opportunities and described this as unjust. He criticised the ban on Azerbaijani-language schools in Iran and said he regarded raising this issue as his sovereign right.
Iran, for its part, views such statements as interference in its internal affairs.
Aliyev rejected these accusations, saying that “Azerbaijan has never interfered and will never interfere in the internal affairs of other states”. As a result, while Baku officially expresses concern about the situation in Iran, it does not frame this stance in legal terms as an intention of military intervention.
At the same time, the Azerbaijani leadership does not hide the fact that it closely follows the fate of the Azerbaijani population in north-western Iran, a region that officials in Baku refer to as “South Azerbaijan”. Aliyev’s earlier remark that “we will do everything possible to protect the secular way of life of our compatriots” has gained traction in some government circles in Azerbaijan as a form of doctrine.
This doctrine suggests that, if necessary, support for “South Azerbaijani” Turkic communities could take the form of humanitarian involvement or political and diplomatic backing.
Although Azerbaijan’s constitution and legislation contain no explicit provision on protecting compatriots abroad, the country’s national ideology treats Iranian Azerbaijanis as a historical and cultural diaspora. This approach mirrors the concept of “one nation, two states” used in relations with Turkey.
Azerbaijani media coverage on the issue stresses that linguistic, religious and cultural ties with a population of 30–40 million people of Azerbaijani origin living in Iran — a figure cited by some sources — remain so strong that Azerbaijan cannot stay indifferent.
In Azerbaijan, commentators consistently condemn the policy pursued by the Iranian authorities towards this community over many years. They point to bans on education in the native language, arrests and executions of Azerbaijani activists. These developments cause serious concern in Baku.
The Azerbaijani government seeks to raise these issues through diplomatic channels. At the same time, it avoids the use of overt military rhetoric.
The position of pro-government experts
At present, Azerbaijan’s public space features almost no independent expert views on Iran. Political commentators who appear in the media largely take a pro-government stance. They analyse Tehran’s actions and offer forecasts about possible steps by Baku, but their assessments largely mirror the official line.
Political analyst Fikret Sadigov warns that tensions in the Middle East have intensified. He says that if the conflict expands, Azerbaijan must take preventive measures to ensure its own security. According to him, if the United States or Israel carry out military strikes against Iran and this leads to a prolonged conflict, refugees from Iran will inevitably flow into neighbouring countries, including Azerbaijan.
In such a scenario, Sadigov stresses that “if force majeure circumstances arise, official Baku will take appropriate steps”. He does not specify what he means by these “appropriate steps”. However, he says they could include both readiness to protect the borders and measures to manage a potential influx of compatriots migrating from the south. In other words, the Azerbaijani state must prepare for a possible military and political emergency along its border with Iran.
Russian analyst Sergey Markov, who is known for his close ties to the authorities, goes even further in his assessments. In an interview with the portal Modern.az, he effectively echoes the scenario outlined by The Washington Post. Markov argues that if the situation in Iran spirals out of control and the state begins to disintegrate, Azerbaijan would not be able to remain indifferent to the fate of millions of its ethnic kin in what he calls “South Azerbaijan”.
He says openly that if armed clashes break out or a process of internal fragmentation begins in Iran, Azerbaijan could face pressure to take a more active stance to protect the Azerbaijani population living along its southern borders. Markov outlines several possible scenarios:
- southern Azerbaijanis remaining within Iran;
- the proclamation of an independent state of South Azerbaijan;
- unification of the south with northern Azerbaijan (the Republic of Azerbaijan);
- the creation of a temporary confederative union between South Azerbaijan and Baku during a transitional period.
He says each of these options would prove extremely complex and sensitive. Such a transformation would alter borders in the region and could, in turn, trigger a chain geopolitical reaction.
Markov warns that events could unfold very rapidly. He says Baku should already prepare for a range of political, diplomatic and military scenarios.
Sergey Markov ranks among Kremlin ideologues, and his remarks may reflect the thinking of political circles in Russia. For that reason, the role of Moscow occupies a central place in his analysis.
Regional risks and potential consequences
An open armed conflict between Azerbaijan and Iran would not remain a purely bilateral issue. Such a war would inevitably draw in other regional and global actors.
The Washington Post notes that Azerbaijan has emerged as a rising regional power. It points to a strong army built to NATO standards, deep military cooperation with allied Turkey, and close security ties with Israel. This suggests that in the event of a serious crisis in Iran, Baku would not take steps against Tehran without open backing from Ankara and likely covert intelligence support from Israel.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has repeatedly said that Azerbaijan’s security and borders constitute a red line for Turkey. In this context, international observers have noted a clear pattern. Whenever tensions rise inside Iran or along the Armenia–Azerbaijan border, the Azerbaijani and Turkish armies hold joint military exercises. These displays of force aim to signal alliance solidarity and underline the seriousness of the Ankara–Baku partnership to Tehran.
At the same time, many actors oppose any potential military escalation involving Iran. Russia has openly signalled that it does not want Iran to fragment. The Kremlin has expressed diplomatic support for the authorities in Tehran and has spoken out against any external interference that could undermine Iran’s stability. Russian analyst Sergey Markov has also said that Moscow will do everything it can to preserve Iran’s territorial integrity and will not allow the country to break apart.
Russia’s position rests on several factors. Iran remains a key ally for Moscow in the Middle East. Russian strategists also fear a power vacuum if Iran were to weaken or collapse. They warn that such a scenario could lead to full Turkish and Western dominance in the South Caucasus, a development that would run counter to the Kremlin’s regional interests.
It is also important to consider that if a scenario of ethnic fragmentation were to unfold inside Iran, the chain reaction could spread to other multi-ethnic states.
Turkey, like Iran, is a multi-ethnic country. The Kurdish issue remains particularly sensitive, and in the event of a collapse of the authorities in Tehran, it would be difficult to predict how far a wave of ethnic separatism might go. The United States and Europe generally support democratic change in Iran. At the same time, they view the prospect of the country’s disintegration along a Yugoslav-style scenario with caution.
The Washington Post writes that for Washington, a sudden collapse of the Tehran regime would create large-scale uncertainty in the region. As a result, the United States is currently seeking to prepare for both possible engagement with Iran and a pressure-based approach, depending on how events unfold.
This suggests that the West would not openly encourage Azerbaijan to “start a war against Iran”. On the contrary, the US State Department has repeatedly said that while it expresses solidarity with Azerbaijan on issues related to the security of its border with Iran — including statements of support for Baku in the event of Iranian military action in the area of the so-called Zangezur corridor — it believes that the future of the Tehran regime should, above all, be decided by Iranians themselves.
In the end, the answer to the question “Will Azerbaijan attack Iran?” depends directly on processes inside Iran itself and on the balance of power among regional players. At present, neither Baku nor Tehran seeks an open war. Both capitals understand that such a confrontation would prove catastrophic and could spiral out of control, spreading across a wider region.
At the same time, relations between the two countries remain extremely tense, and mutual distrust has reached a peak. Tehran, acting in the interests of regime survival, will likely continue to portray Azerbaijan as an “accomplice of external enemies”. In response, Baku can be expected to mobilise its capabilities under the banner of protecting its security interests and amplifying the “voices of compatriots”.
Under current conditions, Azerbaijan does not intend to launch a war against Iran on its own. If a large-scale internal conflict were to erupt inside Iran, the most realistic scenario would involve Azerbaijan, with open support from Turkey, attempting to create a security zone along its border. Under the pretext of humanitarian intervention, it could seek to establish temporary control over the region known as South Azerbaijan.
Such a move would become possible only under specific conditions — namely, a de facto paralysis of Iran’s central authorities. Otherwise, in the short term, tensions between Azerbaijan and Iran will most likely continue to play out mainly through information warfare, intelligence confrontation and diplomatic pressure, rather than open military conflict.
Will Azerbaijan attack Iran?
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Ilia Ghudushauri, Georgia’s former deputy health minister, was arrested on allegations of abusing his official authority in connection with a state procurement tender in 2022, the Investigative Service of the Ministry of Finance reported on January 27.
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