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Against the backdrop of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, combating authoritarian aggression has taken center stage in Washington’s foreign policy agenda. But given the West’s inaction in the face of yet another Azerbaijani assault on Nagorno-Karabakh this week—which resulted in the death of at least 32 people and the forced displacement of several thousand more—it is clear that not all crises are made equal.

During U.S. President Joe Biden’s remarks on Tuesday before the United Nations General Assembly, he asked “if we abandon the core principles of the United States to appease an aggressor, can any member state of this body feel confident that they will be protected?” Yet just hours prior, Azerbaijan launched an unprovoked assault on Nagorno-Karabakh following nine months of blockading the region’s 120,000 indigenous Armenians. The blockade was already causing critical shortages of food, medicine, fuel, and other basic necessities—forcing Karabakh’s Armenians into a position of dependence and subservience. Under these conditions, many Armenians will see no option but to leave their homes. But if Azerbaijan’s record of detaining civilians at its military checkpoint tells us anything, it’s that the ability for Armenians to flee persecution isn’t guaranteed.

A ceasefire announced on Wednesday appears to have largely brought the latest assault to a halt. Yet the latest fighting is a crisis the U.S. had every opportunity to prevent but spent months ignoring—prioritizing the preservation of energy ties with authoritarian Azerbaijan over the imminent threat to Armenian lives. The U.S. did not simply turn a blind eye to Azerbaijan’s longstanding attempts to impose its will on the Armenian people through starvation and force—it repeatedly emboldened and legitimized Azerbaijan’s coercive diplomacy by refusing to hold Azerbaijan accountable for its blockade. In standing by as Armenia was forced to engage in peace talks with a gun to its head, the U.S. appeared content with waiting until the Armenians of Karabakh were desperate enough to submit to Azerbaijan’s terms.

But the U.S. can learn from its past mistakes and make clear to Azerbaijan that its acts of aggression will not be rewarded. With negotiations between Azerbaijan and Karabakh’s Armenians on the horizon, the fate and status of the region’s Armenian population remains uncertain. What is certain, however, is that Azerbaijan cannot be trusted with their security.

Protesters clash with police as they call on Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to resign in central Yerevan on Sept. 19. Azerbaijan launched a military operation against the the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region, warning it would “continue until the end” in the territory.Karen Minasyan—AFP/Getty Images

Prior to Azerbaijan’s assault on Nagorno-Karabakh, international legal experts including former International Criminal Court Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo and former U.N. Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide Juan Méndez warned that Azerbaijan’s actions constituted a violation of the United Nations Genocide Convention. Those concerns remain no less pertinent today—and the risks of further tragedy remain extremely high should the international community fail to take action and hold Azerbaijan to account.

During a recent U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia Yuri Kim vowed that “the United States will not countenance any action or effort—short-term or long-term—to ethnically cleanse or commit other atrocities against the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh.” 

Read More: Column: Don’t Just Remember the Armenian Genocide. Prevent It From Happening Again

Despite this, the U.S. failed to match those words with any meaningful action, an approach that could create a credibility crisis and embolden other would-be aggressors. To rectify this, the Biden Administration should suspend military assistance to Baku via the enforcement of statutory restrictions outlined in Section 907 of the FREEDOM Support Act, which was enacted in the early 1990s in response to Azerbaijan’s first war on Nagorno-Karabakh and humanitarian blockade against Armenian civilians. Indeed, this is what the chairs of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, Bob Menendez and Jack Reed, urged in a recent letter to Secretary Blinken.

For decades, successive U.S. administrations have waived Section 907 restrictions on national security grounds. The State Department says it is reviewing assistance to Azerbaijan but refuses to publicly enforce restrictions out of fear this would undermine peace talks with Armenia and push Baku into Moscow’s arms. But if withholding the enforcement of these restrictions was meant to compel behavioral change in Baku, then clearly this strategy has failed.

The U.S. must also directly target Azerbaijani officials complicit in the perpetration of human rights abuses with sanctions, including under the Global Magnitsky Act. The Biden Administration can use Thursday’s upcoming emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council convened by France to pursue robust guarantees for Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenians. This must include an international peacekeeping force on the ground and a humanitarian mission that ensures Armenians are not left at the mercy of Azerbaijan. 

How the U.S. responds to Azerbaijan’s latest assault on Nagorno-Karabakh will be a test of its commitment to not only combating authoritarian expansionism—but also in the duty to prevent further atrocities. A failure to change course would not only threaten the survival of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenians, but send a dangerous signal to despots the world over.

On March 5, the Israeli Haaretz newspaper published an astounding article titled, “92 Flights from Israeli Base Reveal Arms Exports to Azerbaijan.”

The article reported that on March 2, Azerbaijan’s Silk Way Airlines’ cargo plane landed in Israel’s Ovda military airport. Two hours later, it returned to Baku via Turkey and the Georgian Republic. In the last seven years, this is the 92nd cargo flight from Baku to Ovda, the only airfield in Israel that is allowed to export explosives. These military shipments increased substantially during Azerbaijan’s attacks on Armenia/Artsakh in 2016, 2020, 2021 and 2022. President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan has described Israel’s covert relations with Azerbaijan as being like an iceberg – nine-tenths of it is below the surface.

Israel supplies almost 70-percent of Azerbaijan’s weapons and in return receives about half of its imported oil. Haaretz quoted foreign media sources disclosing: “Azerbaijan has allowed the Mossad [Israel’s intelligence agency] to set up a forward branch [in Azerbaijan] to monitor what is happening in Iran, Azerbaijan’s neighbor to the south, and has even prepared an airfield intended to aid Israel in case it decides to attack Iranian nuclear sites. Reports from two years ago stated that the Mossad agents who stole the Iranian nuclear archive smuggled it to Israel via Azerbaijan. According to official reports from Azerbaijan, over the years Israel has sold it the most advanced weapons systems, including ballistic missiles, air defense and electronic warfare systems, kamikaze drones and more.”

Haaretz revealed that Azerbaijan’s Silk Way Airlines “operates three weekly flights between Baku and [Israel’s] Ben-Gurion International Airport with Boeing 747 cargo freighters.” In addition, some Eastern European countries circumvent the ban on the sale of weapons to Azerbaijan by shipping them via Israel.

The restriction of the sale of weapons by Europe and the United States to Armenia and Azerbaijan created an opportunity for Israel to earn billions of dollars in weapons’ sales to Azerbaijan.

Haaretz reported that “Israel has exported a very wide range of weapons to the country [Azerbaijan] – starting with Tavor assault rifles all the way to the most sophisticated systems such as radar, air defense, antitank missiles, ballistic missiles, ships and a wide range of drones, both for intelligence and attack purposes. Israeli companies have also supplied advanced spy tech, such as communications monitoring systems from Verint and the Pegasus spyware from the NSO Group – tools that were used against journalists, the LGBT community and human rights activists in Azerbaijan, too.”

The Stockholm International Peace Institute wrote: “Israel’s defense exports to Azerbaijan began in 2005 with the sale of the Lynx multiple launch rocket systems by Israel Military Industries (IMI Systems), which has a range of 150 kilometers (92 miles). IMI, which was acquired by Elbit Systems in 2018, also supplied LAR-160 light artillery rockets with a range of 45 kilometers, which, according to a report from Human Rights Watch, were used by Azerbaijan to fire banned cluster munitions at residential areas in Nagorno-Karabakh,” even though Israel and 123 other countries have banned the use of cluster bombs.

Haaretz reported: “In 2007, Azerbaijan signed a contract to buy four intelligence-gathering drones from Aeronautics Defense Systems. It was the first deal of many. In 2008 it purchased 10 Hermes 450 drones from Elbit Systems and 100 Spike antitank missiles produced by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems and in 2010 it bought another 10 intelligence-gathering drones. Soltam Systems, owned by Elbit, sold it ATMOS self-propelled guns and 120-millimeter Cardom mortars, and in 2017 Azerbaijan’s arsenal was supplemented with the more advanced Hanit mortars. According to the telegram leaked in Wikileaks, a sale of advanced communications equipment from Tadiran was also signed in 2008.”

According to Haaretz, “Israel and Azerbaijan took their relationship up a level in 2011 with a huge $1.6 billion deal that included a battery of Barak missiles for intercepting aircraft and missiles, as well as Searcher and Heron drones from Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). It was reported that near the end of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020, a Barak battery shot down an Iskander ballistic missile launched by Armenia. Aeronautics Defense Systems also began cooperating with the local arms industry in Azerbaijan, where some of the 100 Orbiter kamikaze (loitering munitions) drones were produced – drones that Azerbaijan’s defense minister called ‘a nightmare for the Armenian army.’”

In 2021, “an indictment was filed against [Israel’s] Aeronautics Defense Systems for violating the law regulating defense exports in its dealing with one of its most prominent clients. A court-imposed gag order prevents the publication of further details. A project to modernize the Azerbaijani army’s tanks began in the early 2010s. Elbit Systems upgraded and equipped the old Soviet T-72 models with new protective gear to enhance the tanks’ and their crews’ survivability, as well as fast and precise target acquisition and fire control systems. The upgraded tanks, known as Aslan (Lion), starred in the 2013 military parade. Azerbaijan’s navy was reinforced in 2013 with six patrol ships based on the Israel Navy’s Sa’ar 4.5-class missile boats, produced by Israel Shipyards and carrying the naval version of the Spike missiles, along with six Shaldag MK V patrol boats with Rafael’s Typhoon gun mounts and Spike missile systems. Azerbaijan’s navy also bought 100 Lahat antitank guided missiles.”

In 2014, “Azerbaijan ordered the first 100 Harop kamikaze drones from IAI, which were a critical tool in later rounds of fighting. Azerbaijan also purchased two advanced radar systems for aerial warning and defense from IAI subsidiary Elta that same year…. Two years later, Azerbaijan bought another 250 SkyStriker kamikaze drones from Elbit Systems. Many videos from the areas of fighting showed Israeli drones attacking Armenian forces…. In 2016, during Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to Baku, Aliyev revealed that contracts had already been signed between the two countries for the purchase of some $5 billion in ‘defensive equipment.’ In 2017, Azerbaijan purchased advanced Hermes 900 drones from Elbit Systems and LORA ballistic missiles from IAI, with a range of 430 kilometers. In 2018, Aliyev inaugurated the base where the LORA missiles are deployed, at a distance of about 430 kilometers from Yerevan, Armenia’s capital. During the war in 2020, at least one LORA missile was launched, and according to reports it hit a bridge that Armenia used to supply arms and equipment to its forces in Nagorno-Karabakh. More advanced Spike missiles were sent in 2019 and 2020.”

It is appalling that the descendants of the Holocaust are supplying such massive lethal weapons to Azerbaijan to kill the descendants of the Armenian Genocide.

For months, the negotiations over the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh seemed to be going in Azerbaijan’s favor. Armenia’s government had publicly and explicitly said it recognized the breakaway territory — which is the center of the two countries’ decades-long conflict — as part of Azerbaijan. All that was to be worked out, in essence, were the details. So why did war break out again?

The Backdrop To War

At issue is Nagorno-Karabakh, a mountainous enclave of Azerbaijan that historically has been home to both Armenians and Azeris. On the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the population of what was then the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast was roughly 75 percent ethnic Armenian. A nationalist movement in the 1980s sought to separate the territory from Azerbaijan and join it with Armenia. The ensuing war in the early 1990s killed some 30,000 people and resulted in Armenian-backed separatists seizing the territory from Azerbaijan.

Diplomatic efforts to settle the conflict brought little progress, and the two sides fought another war in 2020 that lasted six weeks before a Russian-brokered cease-fire effectively recognized the loss of Armenian control over parts of the region and seven adjacent districts.

In 2022, Baku and Yerevan embarked on negotiations aimed at finally resolving the conflict. Azerbaijan’s stated goal has been to regain full control over the rest of Karabakh, and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian has indicated that he was willing to comply.

But the Karabakh Armenian leadership has been more recalcitrant, fearing that Azerbaijani promises to peacefully “reintegrate” ethnic Armenians amounted to a smokescreen for a plan to eventually squeeze them out of the territory for good. International mediators had been trying to find a compromise to the standoff but with little to show for it.

So Why Did Azerbaijan Attack Now?

On September 19, Azerbaijan launched a wide-scale attack against Nagorno-Karabakh and the remnants of its armed forces, forcing residents of the region’s capital, Stepanakert (Xankendi in Azeri), to hunker down in bomb shelters and those in outlying settlements to evacuate to the center. After a day of attacks, the offensive achieved Baku’s stated aim: The de facto ethnic Armenian Karabakh authorities agreed to disband and disarm their armed forces.

The worst fears of violence now appear to be averted, with the Azerbaijani and ethnic Armenian sides agreeing on an immediate cease-fire. But the offensive laid bare how the dynamics of the conflict are all on Azerbaijan’s side, to the point where Baku felt that it was in its interest to accelerate the process with force, despite the possibility of facing international condemnation and risking the lives of the people in Nagorno-Karabakh it says are its citizens.

Azerbaijan has been dissatisfied with the pace of negotiations, complaining that the Karabakh Armenian leadership was digging in and becoming intransigent. Baku also may have seen a moment of opportunity when Armenia’s traditional security guarantor, Russia, had turned against the Armenian government and its leader, Pashinian. And finally, Azerbaijan likely calculated that whatever international costs it might face for the assault, they would not be too painful.

Was The Azerbaijani Offensive Unexpected?

The ostensible trigger for the operation was a mine explosion that killed six Azerbaijanis early in the morning on September 19, near the city of Xocavend, which is now under the control of Russian peacekeepers and a part of wider territory that Azerbaijani forces retook in the war in 2020. The Azerbaijani side blamed the mine attack on Armenian saboteurs from Karabakh.

But the preparations for the assault had been going on for weeks. Azerbaijani troops had massed on the line of contact separating Azerbaijani-controlled territory from the rump Karabakh entity that remained following the 2020 war. There were also reports of military cargo flights between Azerbaijan and Israel, suggesting that Azerbaijan may have been rearming in preparation for more fighting.

Baku’s rhetoric had also taken a notably sharper turn in recent weeks, as well. Azerbaijan “will not tolerate the presence of any gray zone in its territory,” Hikmet Haciyev, a senior adviser to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, said in late August. It was a reference to the part of Karabakh Azerbaijan did not yet control.

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Well before this summer, analysts say that Azerbaijan had been using military escalations to push along the diplomatic process.

Talks between the central government in Baku and the Karabakh Armenians had stalled, with Azerbaijanis complaining about their interlocutors’ intransigence. “The Karabakh Armenians refused to talk about anything except independence,” said Farid Shafiyev, the head of the Azerbaijani government-run think tank Center of Analysis of International Relations. He noted that the de facto ethnic Armenian government had organized an election of a new president in early September 2022, a step that in Azerbaijani eyes confirmed the unwillingness to accept their rule.

But the Karabakh Armenian authorities’ position had been “evolving,” with a greater willingness to accede to Azerbaijan’s demands, said Olesya Vartanyan, the senior South Caucasus analyst at the Crisis Group think tank. “They were ready to meet in Azerbaijan and discuss the integration process — what Baku had been demanding.”

As the standoff dragged on, the risk of another attack from Azerbaijan rose. “The absence — or more accurately the stagnation — of the political process exacerbates these concerns,” Zaur Shiriyev, a Baku-based analyst for Crisis Group, said in an online discussion on September 15, just days before the offensive began. “If a military escalation occurs in the Armenian-populated areas of Karabakh in the coming days or weeks, it wouldn’t be a surprise.”

The Russia Factor

Accelerating the process was a rapid collapse in relations between Armenia and its traditional big-power patron, Russia. As part of the 2020 cease-fire agreement, a contingent of 2,000 Russian peacekeepers were deployed to the part of Karabakh that ethnic Armenians still controlled. But they have proven unable or unwilling to push back against steady Azerbaijani pressure on the territory. And Russia itself — despite having treaty obligations to defend Armenia in case of external attack, as both are members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a mutual defense pact — has not intervened in spite of repeated Azerbaijani incursions across the border into Armenia.

This led to an increasing estrangement between Yerevan and Moscow that came to a head this month, when the Armenian government took a series of seemingly calculated steps to signal its displeasure with Russia. Among them: It dispatched Pashinian’s wife, Anna Hakobian, to Kyiv to deliver a package of aid; it announced it intended to sign the treaty to join the International Criminal Court, which would in effect obligate it to arrest Russian President Vladimir Putin; and it withdrew its representative from the CSTO. “They crossed about three Russian red lines simultaneously,” said Thomas de Waal, an analyst at the think tank Carnegie Europe.

Baku appears to have been emboldened by the Russian-Armenian rift, says Shujaat Ahmadzada, a nonresident research fellow at the Baku-based Topchubashov Center, which focuses on international relations and security. “It points to Russia here more than other factors,” he said. “The only actor that could have caused problems to a degree [for Azerbaijan] was Russia, and now, given the Armenia-Russia decoupling, I think they believe the time is right.”

How Has The World Reacted?

As their position vis-a-vis Azerbaijan has weakened, and the alliance with Russia frayed, Armenia has been seeking international support wherever it can get it. It hosts border monitors from the European Union, is buying weapons from India, and regularly tries to bring up the conflict at the United Nations Security Council.

But it has thus far failed to get any international actor to take substantive action to slow Azerbaijan down, which also likely played into Baku’s thinking, Ahmadzada says. “If I were in [Armenia’s] shoes, I would not be expecting significant actions against Azerbaijan coming from the West,” he said.

Indeed, while the reaction from abroad to Azerbaijan’s September 19 attacks was swift and critical, it was limited to expressions of concern. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken called Aliyev to “urge Azerbaijan to cease military actions in Nagorno-Karabakh immediately.” The European Union said it “condemns the military escalation” and that the “violence needs to stop.”

“The international community is just making statements. It’s just statements,” said Edmon Marukian, an Armenian ambassador-at-large. “You know, statements are not helping when you’re attacked and somebody is trying to kill you.”

What Now?

The offensive managed to secure a concession that Azerbaijan has been demanding — and the ethnic Armenian Karabakh leadership has been fiercely resisting — for months: the disbanding and disarmament of the armed forces of the Karabakh authorities. Meetings between representatives of the Karabakh Armenians and of the central government in Baku are scheduled for September 21 in the Azerbaijani city of Yevlax.

A statement before that meeting from the de facto Karabakh presidency said that the talks would discuss the region’s possible “reintegration” into Azerbaijan and the Karabakh Armenians’ rights and security “within the framework of the Azerbaijani Constitution.” Those are conditions that Karabakh Armenians had previously considered unacceptable, but with Azerbaijan gaining the upper hand once again, their leaders had no choice but to accept them.

A week before the offensive, Armenian historian and diplomat Gerard Libaridian gave a lecture in the United States for his new book, A Precarious Armenia. He discussed the ongoing negotiations and argued that, as time goes on, Armenians’ bargaining position will become worse and worse.

“The more we wait, the less leverage we have…. Today, we cannot get what we could get last year. Last year, we couldn’t get what we could have gotten four or five years ago,” he said. “The more we have waited, the harder Aliyev has become.”