In the aftermath of the 26 October elections in Georgia, the OSCE/ODIHR report became a focal point of international and local media attention. The preliminary report , released on 27 October, the day after the elections, raised serious concerns about voter coercion, extensive voter tracking, compromised secrecy of the ballot, procedural inconsistencies, limited access to audit procedures, unilateral decisions by election commission chairpersons, frequent dismissal of complaints without investigation, and frequent last-minute changes to the legal framework of the Central Election Commission.
Ryan Sherman is a lecturer and project manager at Ilia State University in Tbilisi, Georgia
Major media outlets like The Guardian, The New York Times, and Reuters noted that while the OSCE report highlighted these issues, it stopped short of labeling the election as fraudulent, leaving us all with the pressing question: “How much fraud is too much fraud?”
Yet, notably absent from much of the coverage is a critical clarification: determining an election’s legitimacy is beyond the OSCE’s mandate. This very point was emphasized during its October 27 press conference, and as is clear from its 2010 Election Observation Handbook – the OSCE’s role is solely to assess whether the electoral process meets international standards, based on observations of a representative sample.
The methodology applied to the Georgian context raises concerns of its own, and it is worth digging into the details. (Please bear with me for a few paragraphs, but I’ll do the hard work for you). The OSCE Mission to Georgia deployed 529 observers to monitor 3,700 polling stations. While the exact percentage of polling stations observed is not specified assuming two observers per station, 7% of polling stations would have been covered. A more generous estimate of 10% coverage still leaves over 3,300 polling stations unobserved. That’s 400 stations with no more than two observers per station, foreigners who do not speak Georgian, in their distinctive vests with OSCE logos, clearly identified, all there to support the integrity and openness of the electoral process.
And still, the OSCE report indicates transparency issues in 24% of the stations, indicating a significant level of irregularity. If this sample is representative, that would mean some 799 compromised stations — more than double the number actually monitored. And, as we all know, significant variability in dynamic contexts is the anathema to representative sampling.
Further concerns arise when considering the statement of an OSCE spokesperson at the press conference, who described “a clear picture of a sophisticated, widespread and well-orchestrated scheme,” while another representative highlighted “cases of vote-buying and double voting both before and during the elections, especially in rural areas,” in a “widespread atmosphere of pressure and party-organized intimidation.”
These concerns about non-representative sampling are not merely speculative. The OSCE’s limited positive assessment that “the voting process was generally well-administered within polling stations” stands in stark contrasts with reports from local monitors (ISFED, wevote, TI) and a continuous flow of social media footage showing chaos inside stations — confrontations, multiple voting, voters accompanied to voting booths, election workers struggling with mismatched IDs, and individuals being forcibly removed from the voting precincts. Many more videos can be seen under the Facebook hashtag #მევნახეგაყალბება (“I saw fraud” in Georgian).
More widespread still are videos of the notorious electoral tracking lists: (video 1, video 2, video 3, video 4, video 5, video 6, video 7, video 8) — a minority of random citizens who managed to capture a few seconds of footage.
On November 1, Edison research published an analysis of the discrepancy between its exit polls and CEC results, indicating a difference that “cannot be explained by normal various alone and suggests local-level manipulation of the vote. A day earlier HarrisX came to a similar conclusion, based on the analysis of its polling results and saying that the discrepancy between its exit polls and CEC official results “cannot be explained by statistical variance, pointing to possible voting irregularities.”
Again, please note, designating an election “fraudulent” falls outside the OSCE mandate.
Where do we go from here?
Demand that state organs implicated in alleged fraud conduct an impartial and thorough investigation of themselves?
Many Western leaders and commentators now seem to have settled into a patronizing stance, implicitly asking, “How much fraud is too much fraud?” After all, this is Georgia, out on the periphery, a post-Soviet otherworld — I think they’re used to it — maybe on some level they are okay with it? Let’s issue statements calling for investigations, and see what happens.
Or perhaps we can call an international assembly, and have each country in the EU vote on just how much fraud is acceptable in an election for a country with EU candidate status.
Or maybe there already is a corrective formula, cooked up in some obscure office in Brussels. Perhaps it works like this: In the case of a post-Soviet state, take your 54% winning result and plug it in. Purchased votes? That’s covered by the Loyalty Incentive Factor. Votes made under pressure? Enter the Compliance Coefficient. Carousel voting? Just apply the Déjà Voting Ratio. Fake IDs, phantom voters, misuse of administrative resources, control of election commissions, disqualification mishaps—no need to worry. We’ve got a calculation for that too.
Reality on the Ground
Georgia faces worsening destabilization as a result of a pervasive campaign to manipulate the electoral process. The election process lacks the most basic element for success — public trust in fairness and legitimacy. The “true will” of the people has become an immaterial abstraction, because that is exactly what the elections were supposed to, and failed, to establish. Welcome now, to the realm of Kafka, where additional proof is perpetually demanded, trapping those with the most rational position in an absurd loop.
Equally important, though far less frequently discussed, is Europe’s credibility with the Georgian people. For the past many years, there has been growing — and understandable — frustration in the West, as its influence in Georgia, once warmly welcomed and celebrated, now faces an increasingly hostile government.
But far more weary than the diplomatic core are Georgians themselves — weary not only of flawed elections — not only of protesting in the streets — but of Western partners who say good things but never show up when it really matters. Under an increasingly illiberal government, it remains to be seen how much more people are able to resist the descent into authoritarianism. As Radiohead put it, “While you make pretty speeches, I’m being cut to shreds.”
The worst outcome is already at the door — a withdrawal of Western support that would effectively isolate Georgia, pushing it firmly toward Russian influence. And while European leaders may feel that financial aid and diplomatic incentives — dangled carrots — no longer sway the nation’s course, turning away altogether will carry dark consequences.
Not only would such an outcome cause great harm to Georgian society, it would also mark another profound failure of Western policy and diplomacy. As Europe weighs its options, it is crucial that its frustration not fall on the Georgian people themselves.
In his novel Kvachi, one of Georgia’s most celebrated 20th century authors, Mikheil Javakhishvili, expresses a nearly identical thought. In a conversation between the protagonist Kvachi and his friend, he writes: “Over there the English ships are sailing away; Europe has gone. We’ve been abandoned again in Asia. Those ships have taken away our last hope and left us with ‘independence!’ … Up till now we had two paths: either Russia or Europe. Now we’re left with one.”
Georgia and Europe have been here before, even if Europe does not remember. Javakhishvili, who was killed during Stalin’s purges in 1937, reminds us that for Georgia, the loss of Western support has historically left the country with little choice. Today, the stakes are no different.
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