The speed of Georgia’s authoritarian descent has stunned many in Europe. Once hailed as a success story for public administration reforms, anti-corruption efforts, and European integration, Georgia now makes headlines for violent crackdowns on dissent, draconian laws curbing freedoms of speech and expression, illicit trade flows benefiting Russia, and the alleged use of chemical agents against protesters.
Tornike Zurabashvili is a researcher and practitioner focused on political, social, and security affairs in Georgia and the broader Black Sea region. He is a former chief editor of Civil.ge.
The authoritarian turn has already left its visible mark. Tbilisi, which just two years ago was a thriving hub for think tanks, civil society, and media gatherings, is no longer so. The opposition, frail but still diverse and vibrant, has been sidelined, imprisoned, or pushed into unofficial exile. Media outlets and civil society organizations have either ceased operations or have been working in survival mode. The protest movement, the last remaining pocket of physical resistance, has been steadily weakened, first through naked violence and then through cripplingly high fines, detentions, and other forms of harassment. Accounts of people leaving Georgia – some out of fear of retribution or some out of desperation – are becoming ever more common.
Georgia’s authoritarian turn is real, and the Georgian Dream is doing it by the book.
In short, Georgia’s authoritarian turn is real, and the Georgian Dream is doing it by the book. Having secured the loyalty of security forces, disciplined their own ranks, and taken control of all remaining cash flows, the authorities have consolidated power to a degree unprecedented in contemporary Georgian history. But asserting full dominance requires more than brute force, internal cohesion, and money. Just like in other authoritarian settings, the battle is waged as much on television screens as in rubber-stamp courtrooms, and on Rustaveli Avenue, the country’s main thoroughfare and the traditional site of anti-government rallies.
Winning the battle of minds
The GD has been far from innovative in information control, scrupulously following the well-worn playbook of repressive regimes. Like their peers in Russia, Belarus, and elsewhere, they have built their narrative around fear, portraying the nation, with its values and way of life, as being under threat from enemies, be it internal or external.
First, it was the previous ruling party, Mikheil Saakashvili’s United National Movement, but as GD’s post-2012 momentum waned, the storyline lost resonance in large swaths of the population. After this, the media and civil society organizations more broadly became the primary scapegoats. Then, after 2022, the infamous “Global War Party” entered the rhetoric of GD leaders, later accompanied by the equally opaque idea of a “Deep State.” The concepts were confusing, perhaps intentionally so, but the underlying message was simple, if not primitive: shadowy forces operate behind the scenes, pulling the strings of nations and deciding the course of global affairs. In this framing, Georgia appeared in the crosshairs of global powers (read the West), who sought to drag the country into a devastating war with Russia, but Tbilisi was heroically resistant to pressure.
The absurdity of these claims was laid bare by Mariam Lashkhi, a ruling party MP and deputy chair of the parliament’s Foreign Relations Committee, who, caught off guard by a journalist’s follow-up question – a rare breach of the usual GD script – likened, perhaps half in disbelief herself, the Global War Party to the ‘Freemasons’. Yet absurdity aside, the relentless repetition of such claims – that Georgia was under threat, first from hidden forces and, if it did not “behave,” perhaps later from Russia – has left a lasting imprint on public sentiment. In January 2025, nearly half of the respondents believed that the threat of war with Russia was real.
But claims of shadowy forces steering global affairs still lacked credibility: every enemy needs a face, and that face was missing. True, it was clear who GD was implicating – the US and Europe – but the connection was not always spelled out. With Trump coming to power and the new administration downplaying democracy rhetoric, including towards Georgia, the US ceased to be a viable target. GD therefore made a choice.
The EU, above all, the European Commission and its so-called “Eurobureaucrats,” became the new and almost exclusive target of GD’s propaganda narratives. Although this shift was partly a reaction to mounting criticism from Brussels over democratic backsliding, it also served another objective: GD recognized that consolidating its power required eroding Georgians’ historically high level of trust in, and enthusiasm for European integration and EU institutions, which always served as a benchmark for democratic progress for Georgians.
According to the EU Neighbors East 2025 report, the share of Georgians with a positive image of the European Union has dropped from 60% to 43% between 2024 and 2025.
So they launched a more aggressive information campaign against the EU. And it appears to have achieved some success. According to the EU Neighbors East 2025 report, the share of Georgians with a positive image of the European Union has dropped from 60% to 43% between 2024 and 2025. More alarmingly, for the first time in the survey’s history, those holding “neutral” views of Europe now outnumber those with a positive view.
What, then, are these narratives that power GD’s anti-Europe campaign? What exactly are Georgians being told about the EU? To answer these questions, I analyzed the narratives promoted by anchors and respondents over a 3-month period in 2025 on pro-governmental Imedi TV, the country’s most-watched television channel. Specifically, I analyzed Imedi Live, a prime-time talk show featuring top GD leaders and talking heads.
GD fueling Euro-skepticism
What I found was not surprising, but the intensity of the accusations was still striking, even for someone with prior experience researching disinformation narratives. First, what is supposed to be a political talk show is little more than a mouthpiece for GD and its splinter groups. Over the three months I analyzed, every guest was tied to GD, except for a few foreigners whose worldviews are closely aligned with GD’s foreign policy.
Over the three months I analyzed, every guest was tied to GD, except for a few foreigners whose worldviews are closely aligned with GD’s foreign policy.
Second, the theatrics were carefully orchestrated: anchors set the stage with outlandish openers about Georgia being under constant attack from external forces, followed by guests offering ready-made interpretations of global and European affairs – all clearly aimed at instilling fear. The questions, too, seemed guided to fit a predetermined narrative, while the answers were so uniform and rehearsed that it almost felt like a single script was being read. Importantly, every message pointed to Brussels: whether the issue was domestic or external, it was almost always the “Eurobureaucrats” who were blamed. Somewhat ironically, the real threat – the Russian Federation – was nearly absent in the rhetoric of GD leaders and their affiliates.
Broadly speaking, GD advanced five tightly coordinated narratives in its messaging.
First, according to GD, global powers seek to draw Georgia into a war with Russia. The versions vary, but the main line is that the country was allegedly asked by envoys of Western governments to open a second front against Russia, including by imposing sanctions on the Kremlin. “When one country’s ambassador meets with the prime minister, and says, ‘you start, and we will supply you with military equipment; the important thing is to hold out for ten days, and then you will have to switch to guerrilla warfare’,” says the mayor of Tbilisi.
GD maintains that they refused these demands and stood their ground, despite what they describe as subsequent “blackmail” – ranging from delays in granting EU candidate status and the suspension of the accession process to, more recently, hints at suspending visa-free regime. In this narrative, the EU is directly implicated, portrayed as an instrument in the hands of “informal oligarchic powers” and the “Deep State”. The argument also holds that Georgia is being punished for refusing to comply with orders from Brussels.
Second, a closely linked narrative portrays Ukraine as a victim of a power struggle between major powers. In this framing, Ukraine is presented as having been “sacrificed” and “used” in a proxy war, with European leaders allegedly seeking to prolong the conflict on the assumption that an end to the war would embolden Russia to attack the rest of Europe. “Ukraine is paying the ultimate price for Europe; it is in a bloodbath to save Europe [from Russia],” said one MP. The GD foreign minister echoed this sentiment in her appearance, asking quasi-rhetorically: “Why are the Baltic states so aggressive towards us? Perhaps this is a case where, for their own security, they prefer zones of confrontation [with Russia] to be farther away from them.”
This logic is repeated in a statement of a senior MP: “It became clear [from statements of French experts, military figures, and politicians] that Ukraine is fighting instead of them. They are saying openly that if Ukraine continues to fight, Russia will be slower to reach Western Europe. Their plan was that we would open a front and force Russia to spend its military resources in Georgia – to avoid the Baltics becoming the [next] victim.”
Third, the EU is depicted as a protector – a “patron” – of the “radical opposition,” especially the United National Movement, but also of CSOs and independent media, collectively described by GD speakers as “a network of agents.” GD MPs and officials accuse the EU representatives of interfering in Georgia’s internal affairs. In this narrative, nearly everything that has happened over the past decades – including the 2003 Rose Revolution, the post-2012 cohabitation period with UNM, protests in the last few years, the decision to boycott municipal elections, and many more – is portrayed as having been masterminded by outside powers. “We did not inherit an independent state [in 2012]… This was a state dependent on external forces, ruled from outside through the use of [local] agents,” said a senior MP. Another MP echoed this sentiment, saying that “what our opposition is asking – that we should stand on one single foot [an idiom for acting strictly in line with orders] and stay like that for a week just because a certain European bureaucrat wants it – will no longer happen.”
Fourth, the EU is accused of double standards. According to this narrative, Brussels tolerates non-democratic behavior within its own ranks while singling out Georgia for criticism. In this framing, police violence, restrictions on NGOs, and continued trade with Russia are justifiable, simply because similar practices also occur in European countries. GD representatives further argue that Georgia is far ahead of Ukraine and Moldova in terms of democracy, the fight against corruption, and economic development – and in some cases even ahead of EU member states – yet is treated unfairly because of its refusal to join sanctions against Russia.
Fifth, the EU is portrayed as an undemocratic actor, having lost touch with its constituents and run by unelected “Eurobureaucrats.” According to this narrative, EU officials are treating their partners in disregard of their sovereignty. “This is a very Soviet approach; they are acting like a Union government… previously, the USSR government was described as the Union government, and today it is the EU that has a Union government,” said the GD prime minister, commenting on Brussels’ decision to suspend the human rights dialogue. The foreign minister reinforced this position, stating that many of today’s EU decision-makers in Brussels are remnants of the political elites from the communist and Soviet period. “We see that, for some reason, the Georgia portfolio was delegated to Lithuanians and Estonians in the European Parliament… it needs to be assessed how these societies have departed from the post-Soviet, post-communist mindset,” she noted.
They also maintain that they expect Europeans to revise their approach and treat Georgia as an equal – that is, to restart cooperation on GD’s terms. “Georgia is no less important to the European Union than the EU is to Georgia, given our unique geographical location,” said a senior GD MP. “This need is not one-sided — it is not just that Georgia needs the EU; the EU also needs Georgia. This has its own geopolitical explanation and context, and this context must be understood,” added the GD foreign minister.
GD proxies weigh in
Somewhat paradoxically, despite GD’s heavy criticism of the EU and occasional hints that European integration was never a voluntary national aspiration but an externally imposed agenda, the EU integration remains GD’s officially declared rhetorical goal. GD leaders continue to assert, usually in passing, that they remain in favor of Europe as a civilizational choice and that the problem lies only with specific EU actors and institutions.
But it appears the spin doctors have carefully planned that as well. What GD cannot yet say openly is delegated to figures from outside the official party ranks, including the United Neutral Georgia, a newly established, GD-associated and seconded political group advocating for the country’s non-aligned status.
What GD cannot yet say openly is delegated to figures from outside the official party ranks
The messages peddled by United Neutral Georgia in Imedi Live do not fundamentally diverge from those of core GD figures; For them, too, the opposition is a “criminal network of foreign spies” seeking to overthrow the authorities. They too claim that Europe is in moral and economic decay, that Brussels is run by “powerful forces, corporations, and oligarchic families,” and that Georgia is a victim of double standards. But their rhetoric is far more aggressive toward Europe and markedly more assertive in advocating for distancing from the West.
The group representatives assert in their messages that neutrality “is the only solid guarantee of peace, stability, and economic progress” in the newly emerging multipolar world. “Through announcing neutrality, we will create a space where conflicting parties, large states, and regional and international actors can find a balance of interests and agreements,” they argue. “Georgia does not plan to be used as a battlefield, as a proxy state, or as a victim in the confrontation of large powers, just as it happened in the case of Ukraine.”
The group also advocates for direct dialogue with Russia. “We were deprived of the right to have a face-to-face dialogue with Russia. We were told by the West that dialogue should take place only in international formats, that they would help us with territorial integrity – but as you can see, there have been zero results.” They continue: “Why are you not giving us a chance? Why are they putting restrictions on us? Perhaps there is a way to address Russia’s interests alongside Georgia’s through a mutual alignment of interests.”
They also question the genuineness of Georgia’s popular support for Euro-Atlantic integration. They claim the 2008 plebiscite about NATO membership, which showed nearly 80% approval, was falsified and call for a new referendum. “Over the past few years, we have experienced a gradual desacralization of the issue of Euro-Atlantic integration, and today there is complete intolerance of the EU in Georgian society,” they argue.
Another narrative line casts the EU as an ideologically driven actor, often described as “liberal-fascist,” seeking to impose social and cultural values that are alien to Georgian traditions, religion, and national identity. “Is this the EU we want? The EU is not just a name; it must represent values. If it adopts new values, if it becomes fascist, liberal-fascist [to be more precise], do we want this kind of EU?” they assert in their statements.
The big aim
Individually, these messages are not new. Whataboutism, appeals to fear, logical fallacies, and conspiratorial reasoning – even when not substantiated with evidence – may well be found in the rhetoric of some European politicians, and at times, even leaders. But when such messages consistently target a single actor and are amplified by top leaders with high intensity and repetition, they signal a deliberate strategy of “unfriending.”
While it is true that Georgian Dream is sometimes compelled to respond to criticism from Brussels, the analysis also shows that their campaign is well-planned and serves a longer-term purpose. By gradually accustoming its voters to both aggressive and more extreme forms of Euroscepticism, the GD authorities aim to deflect accountability and shield themselves from popular scrutiny by the EU-friendly electorate.
If GD succeeds in eroding public support for Europe to the point where it is no longer a political factor, the last remaining check on its policies could disappear, paving the way for even greater consolidation of power.