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Day: December 30, 2025
Georgia’s rapid autocratization throughout 2024–2025 disrupted its traditional ties with the West, giving way to new patterns in Georgian Dream’s foreign policy behavior.
In 2025, Georgian Dream’s foreign policy was characterized by political enmity with the European Union, a failed reset with the Trump administration, a bolder approach to engagement with Russia, expanded ties with China, and transactional dealings with other autocratic regimes.
From 2026 onward, contestation of the West and alignment with Russia and China are likely to become entrenched features of Georgia’s foreign policy. As Georgian Dream continues to dismantle the country’s traditional pro-Western foreign policy consensus, Georgia is set to drift further from the European political space and its evolving security thinking, while gravitating toward international formats in which Russia, China, and other autocratic regimes challenge Western primacy.
Irakli Sirbiladze is a foreign policy analyst and visiting lecturer at Tbilisi State University, and a ReThink.CEE Fellow 2023 of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.
EU: Railing Against ‘Brussels Bureaucrats’
Georgian Dream’s relations with the EU were at their lowest in 2025.
In its Enlargement Report, the European Commission dubbed Georgia “a candidate country in name only”, while its Visa Suspension Mechanism report warned that the country could risk losing visa-free travel to the Schengen Area unless Tbilisi returned to compliance. Over the past year, Georgia’s alignment rate with the EU’s statements and decisions on sanctions was at 40%, down from 53% in 2024. Georgia did not align with the vast majority of restrictive measures against Russia, Belarus, and Iran, and it did not participate in the EU’s crisis management missions – a pattern that has held since June 2023.
For GD, the EU has become the number-one external political enemy. The ruling party’s rhetoric has consistently portrayed the bloc as a threat to Georgia’s security, sovereignty, and traditions, accusing “Brussels bureaucrats” of interfering in internal affairs and seeking regime change. Georgian Dream officials have sought to reshape the Georgian public’s traditionally positive perception of the EU by portraying the EU as losing its welfare appeal and undergoing a crisis of democracy and identity.
The U.S.: Desirable but Unavailable
Georgian Dream hoped it could mend ties with the Donald Trump administration, particularly given its de-emphasis on democracy support and its prioritization of transactional engagement with the outside world. However, despite numerous public and private pledges and repeated claims of a shared worldview between Georgian Dream and the Trump administration, Georgian Dream failed to garner the administration’s attention to the extent that it would undo Biden-era decisions, particularly the sanctions on Georgian Dream’s patron, Bidzina Ivanishvili.
This can be attributed to the fact that Georgia does not tick the administration’s peacemaking and dealmaking boxes to warrant a major policy articulation. In fact, the administration engaged with Georgia in November 2025 to discuss how the country could support the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). This once again shows that Georgia can be engaged as long as it can offer value to Trump’s peace agenda regarding Armenia and Azerbaijan; however, it has not yet acquired strategic value of its own.
More Daring Russia Policy
Since 2012, Georgian Dream has strengthened economic and societal ties with Russia while refraining from restoring diplomatic relations or engaging in formal bilateral dialogue amid the continued occupation of Georgia’s two regions.
This formula survived the war in Ukraine: Georgian Dream further strengthened economic ties with Moscow, especially benefiting from the economic architecture that emerged following Russia’s full-scale invasion, while avoiding formal political relations or participation in regional formats in which Russia is present. For example, Georgia has refused to attend the so-called 3+3 platform, which brings together Turkey, Russia, and Iran with the three South Caucasus states while excluding the West.
One exception in 2025 was Georgian and Russian leaders sharing a common space. On December 12, Georgian Dream’s prime minister visited Turkmenistan to attend the International Year of Peace and Trust forum, sitting at the same table as the Russian leader for the first time since the 2008 war. It remains unclear whether this was a one-off, uneasy encounter or signals an emerging feature of Georgia’s approach toward Russia.
Closer Ties with China
In 2025, Georgian Dream expanded its ties with China. The bilateral relations were built on the strategic declaration signed between the two countries in 2023, which pledged to deepen cooperation beyond trade and transit relations. Throughout 2025, Georgian Dream officials conducted high-level visits to China, including by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. The relationship also expanded to include cooperation in law enforcement, on surveillance systems, and between the central banks of the two countries.
Yet the relationship is not without its limitations. While Georgia picked a Chinese consortium in 2024 to build the Anaklia Deep Sea Port, the contract is yet to be signed, raising doubts about the extent of the partnership and interest. The Chinese side also did not invite Georgian authorities to attend its Victory Day parade in September 2025, while the partnership between the two countries has yet to extend to defense and security cooperation.
Transactional Engagement with Fellow Autocrats
In 2025, Georgian Dream focused on engaging fellow autocrats to bolster domestic legitimacy and secure transactional deals. The Georgian prime minister’s official visits were largely limited to autocracies and illiberal actors, either because they shared GD’s authoritarian agenda or due to practical alignment on economic and transit-related interests. The UAE-based real estate company’s public commitment to invest over USD 6 billion in Georgia, while controversial domestically, was used by GD to signal political openness to foreign investment. Relations with neighboring and Central Asian countries were primarily focused on trade and transit.
2026 and Beyond
The developments discussed above, particularly the contestation of the West and alignment with Russia and China, are likely to become enduring features of Georgian Dream’s foreign policy rather than short-term aberrations.
The relationship with the EU is likely to remain contested, as accepting the EU’s democratic conditionality threatens Georgian Dream’s hold on power. If offered, Georgian Dream would welcome transactional, trade- and transit-focused engagement with the European Union, but it is unlikely to pursue political integration.
Georgian Dream may continue to seek closer ties with the Trump administration, although Washington appears to view Georgia as peripheral to its dealmaking agenda. While the relationship remains largely shaped by the Biden-era framework, U.S. unavailability and disinterest reduce political conditionality and give Georgian Dream a freer hand to erode democratic institutions and violate human rights.
Georgian Dream benefits politically and economically from deepening ties with Russia and China, as well as from transactional dealings with other autocracies. As the party reorients away from a pro-Western alignment, it remains to be seen whether Georgian Dream will pursue more regular bilateral engagement with Russia and whether it will finally agree to join the 3+3 framework.
Another development to watch is whether the Anaklia Deep Sea Port contract is ultimately signed with China, which would grant Beijing significant leverage over the country.
Last but not least, Georgia’s future foreign policy trajectory may also depend on how the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan unfolds. The process risks undermining Georgia’s dominant transit position in the region, potentially redefining the country’s strategic value for both East and West.
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The year 2025 confirmed that the international system is no longer anchored in the certainties that defined the early post-Cold War era. It did not, however, deliver a clean break into a fully formed multipolar order. Instead, global politics settled into an uncomfortable in-between phase marked by diffusion of power, strategic caution and persistent instability. As 2026 approaches, this transitional character looks set to harden rather than resolve.