In a December 17 interview with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty – Georgia office, Grigol Sakandelidze, former head of Operations Planning and Management at the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs’ Special Tasks Department, revealed key insights into MIA’s handling of protests. He highlighted the misuse of police special forces during demonstrations and excessive force in crackdowns. Sakandelidze also criticized the decline in U.S.-backed training programs and rising homophobic and xenophobic sentiments within the MIA. His account sheds light on the challenges and controversies shaping police operations in Georgia.
Career in MIA and Dismissal
According to Sakandelidze, he served in the Georgian armed forces from 1997 to 2016. In the fall of 2016, he transferred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) and became the head of Operations Planning and Management (G-3, Main Division) within the Special Tasks Department.
As he recalls, in the fall of 2017, a new minister of Internal Affairs, Giorgi Gakharia, took office. This was followed by the dismissal of leadership within the Special Tasks Department. As Sakandelidze stated, he was asked to appoint an individual to the Planning and Management Directorate who lacked the necessary education and experience. This person he noted, was a police officer from the Tbilisi division of the Special Tasks Department and had served as a sniper for many years. Sakandelidze rejected the candidate, claiming that the position required entirely different expertise. According to him, this individual was a “protégé of the deputy minister of the MIA”, and Sakandelidze was subsequently pressured to resign from his position.
A few months later, he returned as a regular police officer. After Zviad Kharazishvili (“Khareba”) was appointed as the head of the Special Tasks Department, Sakandelidze faced significant pressure. Due to this pressure, he submitted his resignation letter to him, though it was ignored. He then addressed Minister of Internal Affairs Vakhtang Gomelauri, which led to further harassment. In 2022, Sakandelidze ultimately resigned and emigrated from the country to the United States.
Structure of the Special Tasks Department
According to Sakandelidze, the Special Tasks Department consists of two main divisions: Police Special Forces and Crowd Control Units (which include riot police). Each division receives distinct training and operates with different objectives – Police Special Forces undergo specialized psychological preparation and have different operational goals compared to the Crowd Control Units. However, he revealed that due to insufficient numbers of riot police officers, the Ministry of Internal Affairs frequently deploys Police Special Forces to manage protests, a practice he strongly criticized as these units are not properly trained for crowd control as their training instead focuses largely on anti-terrorist operations.
“The problem lies in the training of police special forces, who receive anti-terrorist training. Anti-terrorist operations are focused on neutralization or elimination of the person, which is entirely different from the tactics employed by riot police. Riot police, are not trained to eliminate threats but to manage crowds”, he highlighted.
Leaders of the Protest Crackdown
Sakandelidze criticized the MIA for its “excessive and disproportionate use of force” during protests and discussed the leadership behind the crackdowns. He singled out Zviad Kharazishvili, who, according to Sakandelidze is manages the protests dispersal.
Sakandelidze also alleged that Kharazishvili has been given a free hand to appoint his own personnel, who in turn bring in their own subordinates. Sakandelidze pointed out that most of these personnel come from special units of the State Security Service, particularly the anti-terrorist forces stationed at Shavnabada military base, as well as the Special Tasks Department.
Over the years, crowd management tactics were trained under American programs, but this training has ceased. Sakandelidze mentioned that while he was still in office, the U.S. Embassy had announced a new tender to resume these trainings, “but for reasons unknown, possibly the pandemic, they never materialized.”
Sakandzelidze noted that Merab Malania who was appointed Deputy Minister of MIA in 2016 had a negative attitude toward cooperation with the United States. Sakandelidze recalled particularly his statements such as “The boss won’t like it” or “The boss will get angry,” referring to Bidzina Ivanishvili.
Protest Crackdown Plan and Order
Sakandelidze explained that the department in which he worked was responsible for drawing up plans for crackdowns on protests. “The head of the department supervises the process and receives orders either from a deputy minister or directly from the Minister of Internal Affairs,” he added.
He claimed that police officers stationed at checkpoints near occupied Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region are sometimes taken from their posts and used in protest crackdowns. He also said that officers from other regions and departments were being transferred to make up the shortfall.
Additionally, Sakandelidze also reported that some sportsmen are formally listed as Ministry of Internal Affairs employees, receive salaries, and are mobilized for protests. He noted that individuals from private security companies are also being used by Kharazishvili to suppress protests; it is known that Kharazishvili himself co-owns a security company.
Sakandelidze also alleged that agents provocateurs are planted at demonstrations – individuals who are later identified as unknown to other protesters – and added that homophobic and xenophobic sentiments are prevalent within the special forces.
Psychological Factors of the Special Task Forces
The main motivational factor for officers, he stated, is the prospect of receiving bonuses, as their salaries are “shockingly low.” He added: “I’ve seen happy officers saying, hopefully, I’ll be at the crackdown, and my bonus will come through.”
“I’ve seen happy officers saying, hopefully, I’ll be at the crackdown, and my bonus will come through.”
Advice to the Protesters
The interview concludes with key advice from Sakandelidze, who urged demonstrators not to break into small groups during protests. Instead, he recommended remaining in clusters of several dozen people, with each group having a leader. He also advised demonstrators that it was time to choose a central figure to coordinate their actions during the protests.