I cordially congratulate you on your reelection as the President of the …
Day: November 6, 2024
October 27, 2024, was one of the hardest mornings for many Georgians to wake up to. November 6 wasn’t any easier. Just as the pro-Western segment of the country was piecing together the evidence of the alleged scheme behind the shock victory of the Georgian Dream, figuring out the next steps, and searching within itself for the strength to continue the struggle, the re-election of Donal Trump in the United States plunged the country into a whole new level of uncertainty. The hard question now is what it takes to save democracy in one country when democratic values are under threat elsewhere. A bigger question, however, is whether democracy will remain our main focus at all.
Here is Nini and the Dispatch newsletter, back on duty to tell you how Georgia is coping and what Georgians are hoping for.
The official preliminary results of Georgia’s October 26 parliamentary elections came too soon and hit too hard. Opposition-minded Georgians thought they were prepared for anything, including the possibility that the ruling Georgian Dream party would inflate its share of the vote just enough to secure victory, or even go so far as to simply rewrite the results to give itself the 60 percent it promised to secure. But when Giorgi Kalandarishvili, the head of the Central Election Commission, announced the first results of electronic voting from the majority of precincts two hours after the polls closed, giving GD 53%, the first instinct of exhausted voters was to simply call it a day. Suddenly, the country was in a deafening silence, occasionally disrupted by the ruling party’s celebrations, which also weren’t joyful enough to do justice to a major victory in a crucial vote. It took a while for the opposition to make an appearance, and the president didn’t comment until the next evening.
In the first 24 hours after the announcement, the country went through all five stages of grief, but in a somewhat reversed order. First came Acceptance: it felt like everyone was just accepting the fact that “this is the country we live in,” and by the same evening you could hear from everyone from frustrated Gen Z-ers to elderly taxi drivers making emigration plans. The morning after was of Depression, when everyone woke up to find out that it was not a bad dream, the hand count only increased the ruling party’s share, and the ballot count was not on the list of main concerns of the independent observation missions.
Discussions eventually moved to a Bargaining stage – what if it was too early to give up, what if one had simply been cheated, and the main battle to protect one’s vote was still ahead? Voters and observers began to sort through the evidence and recall the campaign and election day developments, slowly realizing that nothing about the election suggested that it was free and fair. Then came Anger – anger at the CEC and the ruling party for possibly rigging the election, anger at the opposition, which voters criticized for not properly preparing for possible fraud, and anger at fellow citizens who either voted for GD or allowed the alleged scheme to unfold. And finally, there was Denial – denial of the legitimacy of the official results, leading the opposition and its voters to move from grief to working on a more coherent plan of action.
We all knew…
Despite the initial confusion, and despite the fact that the official results gave GD a significant advantage over the opposition, there is now a widespread sense that the elections were stolen. Part of the reason is that while opposition parties and independent observers are rushing to gather evidence, many of us have firsthand seen, heard, or experienced various parts of the alleged rigging.
We have known for years that the government has been expanding its influence throughout the country by enrolling more struggling families in various social programs, or by using civil service employment or the creation of new public agencies to expand its network of loyalists. For years, we have known that the courts have been under government control, making it less possible for such vulnerable families to protect themselves from the increasingly influential state apparatus. We all expected the ruling party to use all this to pressure voters in a familiar campaign pattern, and there were numerous reports of this happening in recent months. Alarms were raised when the party changed election laws in August this year, giving the government more sway over the precinct commissions.
It was common knowledge that the party relied on criminal groups to run its campaigns. Vote buying by the billionaire-led party was almost taken for granted at this point. While electronic voting was known to mitigate some of the usual risks of fraud, local observers – including in their interviews with Civil.ge – warned that it still left room for the same people to vote multiple times or for someone else. In the weeks leading up to the vote, various reports of mass confiscation of IDs left many confused, but in private or social media discussions, the dominant explanation was that it was simply a way to intimidate voters by creating a sense that the government would know who they were voting for. This, and other reports that ruling party campaigners were intimidating voters by creating a sense that the secrecy of the ballot wasn’t guaranteed, led many of us to intensify the campaign that there was no way for anyone to know the voter’s choice.
A day after carefully and anxiously practicing the new voting procedure and warning my social media contacts that voter secrecy was guaranteed, I went to the polls to find out I told them a big lie: after carefully filling in the party circle on the ballot with a marker, turning the ballot upside down and placing it in a folder, I went to insert it into the automatic ballot box. The machine, however, wasn’t having it and returned the ballot at least twice, prompting the commission supervisor to intervene. But it was nearly impossible for the supervisor not to see my choice – the marker ink had left traces on the back of the ballot, clear enough for my choice to stubbornly announce itself.
…but little did we know
We all knew, but little did we know. I remember trying to downplay the apparent breach of ballot secrecy as my individual mistake, and when others massively reported the same problem, I still failed to give it the weight it deserved. It wasn’t until we knew the official results, until watchdogs presented evidence that the CEC had falsely promised to address the secrecy problem, until we all rewatched the election day violations over and over again, until there was growing evidence of carousel voting, and until a surprise ruling by one honest judge saved us from being repeatedly gaslighted by the CEC that we knew: Georgian Dream, during its 12 years of rule, has created a large and ever-growing monster that cannot be defeated by sheer wishful thinking.
The elections have left part of the country with a gnawing sense of injustice and anger that they don’t know where to channel. Some voters continue to desperately demand a “plan” from the opposition, something clear and strong enough to have at least the illusion of effect. The opposition, too, under pressure from its supporters, keeps coming up with various plans of action, including the seemingly unsustainable plan of non-stop street protests.
And today’s election victory of Donald Trump in the United States, the country that has traditionally used its influence against GD’s anti-democratic moves, could only add to the confusion. Ruling party circles are acting cheerfully, assuring each other that with Trump they may have gained an ideological ally for the next four years. Opposition circles, on the other hand, find themselves in a new wave of bargaining, trying to convince each other that the Trump administration might be more hawkish than GD would like, and recalling that it was during Trump’s first term that Georgia received its first batch of Javelin missiles.
But Javelins, as effective as they are against Russian tanks, are unlikely to be of any use in Georgians’ own struggle against their undemocratic government. The opposition and its supporters will indeed have to maintain their primary focus on securing democracy and human freedoms and come up with new strategies that are more consistent, sustainable, and perhaps less sensitive to external geopolitical shifts. Nobody says it’s going to be easy.
Trump will prioritize pragmatism in Caucasus
The U.S. presidential election results are in: the Republican candidate Donald Trump has become the 47th president of the United States.
Around the world, including in Azerbaijan, people closely followed the election in this global superpower.
Azerbaijani political analyst Farhad Mammadov, in an interview with the independent channel Modern Talking, commented on possible changes in U.S. foreign policy towards the South Caucasus region under Trump.
“More China, less Europe”
“It can be said with certainty that Trump’s foreign policy will be more focused on China and less on Europe. That’s for sure. Containing China with economic tools and reducing subsidies and funding for the military in Europe are essential elements to consider,” noted Farhad Mammadov.
He also believes that Trump will address all the issues that were on Biden’s administration’s agenda.
“The truth is, it’s not yet known who he will work with on foreign policy. It’s important to know who will lead the Department of State. As you remember, during Trump’s last presidency, almost half of it resigned, and there was a shortage of personnel. I have no doubt the same will happen this time.
Less Europe means the EU will be forced to become more independent and establish itself as a geopolitical entity. We’ll see how they manage it. Without the UK, the EU will have a hard time, especially considering internal disagreements.”
“South Caucasus became a personal issue for Biden administration”
“Ukraine, the Middle East, and the South Caucasus—these three unresolved issues, which were highly important to the Biden administration, remain. With Ukraine, things are clear; the Middle East is about Israel, that’s also clear, but the South Caucasus has indeed become a personal issue for the Biden administration and particularly for Secretary of State Blinken.
For example, even I was surprised last year—during the peak of the Middle East crisis, when Blinken was shuttling between the capitals of that region—that there were reports of him finding time to call Aliyev and Pashinyan. Or, just recently, before the elections, President Biden sent letters to the leaders of the South Caucasus, urging them to reach a peace agreement by the end of the year. This all indicates that the issue has become personal for Biden and Blinken.”
“Trump’s complex of ‘doing what others didn’t’ will persist”
“Undoubtedly, from the very first days of his presidency, Trump will strive to achieve results on issues that Biden couldn’t complete. Whether he succeeds or not, he will eventually move away from this and look for his own personal legacy. Recall his focus on North Korea and his meetings with Kim Jong-un during his first term. It was important for Trump to show that he was doing what others before him couldn’t.
Regarding Ukraine, Trump’s views are clear. He favors a truce at any cost. Over the past one and a half to two months, we’re already seeing the West leaning toward a truce, but on conditions favorable to Ukraine. I believe this discussion will intensify, and Ukraine will have to focus on these conditions—EU membership, NATO… Although NATO is unlikely, they might make an effort with the EU.
Alternatively, if Russia creates too much trouble for Trump regarding China, Russia will also face difficulties. In other words, he operates in two extremes—either a truce at any cost or, if that fails, supplying things that Biden wouldn’t provide. This ‘I’ll do what others didn’t’ complex will dominate.”
“For Trump, pragmatism will be paramount, including in South Caucasus”
“In our region, I think there will be some activity. This will depend on who gets appointed to the State Department. With the Democrats, it was easier to predict such appointments. For example, Kamala Harris’s national security advisor, Phil Gordon, was one of the contenders, someone who previously worked on our region in the former administration. Right now, it’s hard to say whom Trump might appoint to the State Department.
Of course, the religious aspect will have an influence, and Armenians will try to impact the situation. But which Armenians? That’s also a very important question.
Pashinyan’s supporters, and Democrats from the diaspora had more contact with Biden’s administration. With Trump, we’re currently seeing more interaction with radical leaders of Armenian churches. On the other hand, these are all religious, ideological elements.
If Pashinyan previously engaged with America through his democratic values, now he will have to work with methods uncharacteristic for him. Since he is not a religious person and the church is not very important to him, he will need to take into account the views of his natural opponents.
However, the general approach to the region will be more pragmatic. Firstly, it is geographically distant for the US. Secondly, the contexts of Israel and Iran will play a decisive role. I’m certain that for Trump, pragmatism will take precedence over everything. In other words, they’ll simply start calculating, as accountants used to with an abacus, asking, “What does this give us? – Access to Central Asia. What do we gain there? – We gain a, b, c and d. And how do we access this? – Via the Azerbaijan-Georgia corridor. That’s it. Azerbaijan’s position will naturally grow.”
In terms of the region’s geopolitical and geo-economic value for external players, both in the West and East, Azerbaijan and Georgia fulfill 95% of it.
So, I think we’ll witness the informational veneer—like Christian unity, and so on—will exist the US, but the decisions will be made on a pragmatic basis.
Trump will prioritize pragmatism in Caucasus