Day: July 5, 2024

By Alden Young

Sudan Today

(FPRI) — Since fighting broke out between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the government-sponsored paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in April of 2023, according to the International Rescue Committee at least 25 million people out of a total population of roughly 48.7 million are in need of basic humanitarian aid. The crisis is escalating with fighting spreading to new parts of the country. Perhaps 37 percent of the country is confronting acute food insecurity.[1] Other statistics are also dire. Nine million people have been displaced within Sudan, while 1.7 million have been forced to flee to other countries. Most of the receiving countries such as Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, and South Sudan are already vulnerable. Initially the conflict was most intense in the capital of Khartoum and in the western provinces of Darfur and Kordofan, but in the last few months it has also spread to regions like Gezira state, the traditional breadbasket of the country.[2] The International Rescue Committee reports that, “Sudan is now the country with the largest number of displaced people and the largest child displacement crisis in the world.”[3] Many migrants who are able to head to the eastern regions of Sudan hope to eventually transit to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and from there potentially to other destinations.[4]

Ever since the outbreak of the conflict the international community has rallied to negotiate an end to the fighting. The United States and Saudi Arabia have teamed up to negotiate at least sixteen failed ceasefires, while the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and Egypt have all tried to develop alternative ceasefire and negotiating forums. In January, Mariel Ferragamo and Diana Roy assessed that “negotiation efforts were at a standstill.” [5]

Despite the magnitude of the crisis in Sudan a year after fighting broke out, the response from the international community has been paltry. The United Nations has asked for $2.7 billion dollars in order to address the dire humanitarian situation in the country. However, the conflict in Sudan, which is already a regional crisis involving neighbors such as Chad, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Egypt, Libya, and Ethiopia, has largely been overshadowed by the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza. To date, the United Nations says that it has received only $424.9 million dollars to address the situation in Sudan.[6] Some of the worst violence during the conflict has taken place in the state of West Darfur. In what many Darfurians experience as reminders of the violence that broke out nearly two decades ago. There have been many credible reports of sexual violence, mass expulsions, and ethnic cleansing. Notably, members of the Masalit ethnic group have been repeatedly targeted as supporters of the SAF by the RSF and their allied militias.[7]. The war in Darfur is in many ways a microcosm of the wider conflict, but it also points to the conflict’s direct origins in the long insurgency and counterinsurgency in Darfur.

The Origins of the Conflict: Awalad al-Bahar and Awalad al-Gharib

On April 15, 2023, during the last ten nights of Ramadan, violent clashes broke out in the Sudanese capital of Khartoum. While Khartoum has known many instances of civil unrest, violent protests, and severe bouts of state repression, the central districts have rarely been sites of sustained warfare. Omdurman, the western portion of the capital city, was attacked in 2008 by the Justice and Equality Movement, a Darfurian rebel force. This assault, which highlighted the capital’s vulnerability to attacks originating in the western provinces of Sudan, lasted only two days before being repelled and was largely confined to the capital’s western outskirts. Yet, in the minds of many residents of the capital, the 2008 raid was an uncomfortable reminder of the one-time sacking of the city in the late nineteenth century at the hands of the Mahdi Muhammad Ahmed’s armies.[8] Perhaps no one has come to symbolize the destruction of Khartoum in 1885 more than the Mahdi’s deputy Abdullah ibn Muhammad al Taishi, known as the Khalifa, who hailed from the Ta‘aisha Baggara people.[9] Popularly known as Chadian Arabs, today there are over six million Baggara in an area stretching over the borders of Darfur, Kordofan, the Central African Republic, Chad, and Niger.

When fighting erupted between the SAF and their paramilitary arm the RSF finally broke out on April 15, many residents of Khartoum were reminded of the sacking of Khartoum almost a hundred and fifty years earlier by the Khalifa and his army. The central figure in this drama, Daglo, is seen to echo many of the attributes of the Khalifa, and his rise to power after the Revolution of 2019 was accompanied by a sense of foreboding. This sense of dread and foreboding related to one of the consistent fault lines in Sudanese politics and society, the divide between the Awalad al-Bahar (the sons of the Nile) and the Awalad al-Gharib (the sons of the West). This divide between western Sudan and the central Nile region has historical depth dating to at least the nineteenth century and deepens the present conflict.[10] Yet, since Sudan became independent in 1956, the North-South conflict has seemed to dominate Sudanese politics. The North-South conflict was the impetus after all for Sudan’s first (1955 to 1972) and second civil wars (1983 to 2005).[11]

Yet, while the fight between Northern and Southern Sudanese fueled thirty-nine years of Sudan’s wars, and eventually led to the partition of Sudan into two independent states, other conflicts between and among Sudan’s regions have also been long brewing. Alex De Waal writes that, “It is my contention that, for almost a century, Darfurians have been unable to make their history on their own terms, and one reason for that is the absence of a coherent debate on the question, ‘Who are the Darfurians?’”[12]

In 2019, as Sudanese from all walks of life gathered outside of the military headquarters in Khartoum to demand the end of Omar el-Bashir’s thirty years of rule, the chant that rang out from the encampments of protestors was “We are all Darfurians.”[13]

Eight years after South Sudan voted to become an independent nation, dividing what had been Africa’s largest country by landmass, the emergence of this slogan as one of the principal battle cries of the demonstrations signaled that the secession of the South had not solved the identity question in Sudan. Even after a third of the country seceded, identity tied to ethnic, racial, and regional affinities continues to haunt Sudanese politics.

Thesis

In this paper, I argue that these hauntings have everything to do with the afterlives of Sudan’s wars. Much still needs to be written about the aftermath of Sudan’s two civil wars between Northern and Southern Sudanese partisans. Michael Woldemariam and I argue that partition does not end the relationship between the two sides and that the politics of each successor state remains deeply shaped by the events occurring in the other. Nevertheless, this article will primarily focus on the impact of the wars in Darfur, which spanned the first two decades of the 21^stcentury, and their impact on contemporary Sudanese politics.

It is obvious that partition leads to a dramatic shift in a state’s international relations. It is less obvious, however, that a victory in a long counter-insurgency campaign would equally lead to a dramatic shift in a state’s domestic politics.[14] The negotiated end of these protracted conflicts often results from what might best be described as elite pacts. Often secession is a preferable choice for both parties because it allows each to maintain a monopoly on power in their now separate territories. Paradoxically, these arrangements hold better in the uneasy stalemates reached by former enemies than they do amongst friends. Our initial test cases are Sudan and South Sudan, where former enemies are in power, and Ethiopia and Eritrea, where former friends govern. The ruling parties in Sudan and South Sudan, the SAF and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army, have found themselves in a cold peace despite occasional border clashes. Contrastingly, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front have found themselves engaged in sustained bouts of entrenched warfare. Woldemariam has theorized that the reason that foes are able to become allies and friends so often get mired in warfare is that with enemies, one party knows the other’s strength while each friend’s contribution to their collective victory remains mired in fog. Consequently, friends are often more willing than former foes to engage in unbounded conflict with one another. Among friends the necessary memory of prolonged bloodshed is lacking, which tempers the desire for new conflict.

An unexplored ancillary question is what happens to allies who are combatants in a separatist insurgency that is defeated before it can lead to secession. The conflict in Darfur from 2003 until 2020 provides an excellent opportunity to ask this question.

I argue that in discussing Sudan’s breakdown in its transitional arrangements between 2019 and 2023, it is necessary to place Sudanese politics in the context of the long insurgency and counterinsurgency in Sudan’s western provinces of Darfur and Kordofan. While historically Darfur has been the center of a number of complex insurgencies and ongoing violence, the wars in Darfur that would give rise to the militarized coalition that ruled Sudan after the fall of el-Bashir’s thirty-year rule in 2019, began in 2003.[15]

Allies in Victory

The Juba Peace Agreement (JPA), which was signed in October 2020, symbolized the formal end to the conflict between the SAF and its allied pro-government militias and the armed separatist movements taking place in Darfur and the two areas of Abyei and Blue Nile State. While the JPA was in theory a broad-based peace agreement, in practice, according to Joshua Craze and Kholood Khair, the JPA was “an agreement that was largely worked out between the leader of the RSF, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo’s [Hemedti] negotiators—at the time, partly on behalf of a united Transitional Sovereign (Military) Council—and a group of rebel leaders who had little legitimacy on the ground. The JPA thus amounted to yet another power sharing agreement for elite commanders that failed to bring communities from the Sudanese peripheries into the political mainstream.”[16] Essentially, the JPA was an elite bargain, which brought an end to the long war in Darfur by bringing a wide collection of the various elements into government, but the clear winners within the peace agreement were the RSF and the SAF. Having defeated the vast majority of the armed movements opposing the military and its paramilitary forces, the two generals Abdel Fattah Burhan and Mohammad Hamdan Daglo found themselves the clearly dominant partners in a ruling coalition that also contained civilian technocratic ministers and the representatives of the traditional political parties.

The civilians were themselves divided. There were significant recriminations against the Islamists who brought el-Bashir and his government to power in 1989. Many of the civilian parties that had long been in opposition demanded that former Islamists be banned from government service and excluded from the elections that were originally planned for 2022. Many former opposition leaders believed that the transitional government’s mandate should be to “de-Islamize the state and disempower Islamists.”[17] The other tension that divided the civilian forces was the question of whether traditional parties or neighborhood resistance committees represented the popular will. The resistance committees began forming after the failed uprising in 2013, though they only became a public political force in the months before the April revolution overthrowing El-Bashir. Nafisa Eltahir mentions that, “The committees tapped into social networks built over the years in neighborhood soccer matches, card games, and WhatsApp groups. They have been criticized for not including more women—so female activists created a #JoinTheCommittee campaign.”[18] Yet, a major fault line developed between the resistance committees and the traditional parties that formed the backbone of the Forces for Freedom and Change, because the Resistance Committees refused negotiations with the military and consequently cast doubt on the legitimacy of the entire transition. These two fault lines within the civilian parties greatly weakened them in relation to the military. Therefore in practice if not in theory, the military and its paramilitary forces found themselves the dominant powers from the beginning of the transition. It was this dominance that created the conditions that eventually allowed the rift between the SAF and the RSF to emerge.

The fighting that broke out in April 2023 was precipitated by the October 2021 coup that the senior leadership of the SAF initiated with the support of the paramilitary and militias groups that signed the JPA against their ostensibly civilian allies in the transition government. On October 25, the commander in chief of the SAF and the chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council orchestrated the arrest of the senior civilian members of the transition including Sudan’s Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. In his first televised address on the October coup Burhan argued that “… SAF acted to prevent civil war.” Burhan intended that the government of civilian politicians representing different popular factions was to be replaced by a “government of technocrats and former rebels committed to ‘[a] path towards the state of freedom and peace.’”[19]

Instead, the October Coup paved the way for the latent conflict between what Harry Verhoeven has called “frenemies” who made up the various elements of the Sudanese security establishment to break out into open warfare.[20] The SAF have always prided themselves on being a national unifying force in a country that is riven by ethnic, racial, and regional divisions as well as vast inequalities. Yet, this pride in the Armed Forces’ ability to act as a unifying element has consistently been belied by the Armed Forces perpetual involvement in counter-insurgency operations in the periphery. The SAF, like many post-colonial armies, was not defined by its antagonism with an external enemy, but rather by its long wars in the racialized hinterlands of Sudan. In an irony, it is these very hinterlands from which the vast majority of infantrymen were recruited to the SAF.[21] Political sociologist Robin Luckham famously pointed out that the idea inherited from British colonialism in countries like Nigeria that a professional military could by itself serve as a unifying force in sociologically fractious countries was almost always a myth. Instead, militaries, such as the SAF reproduce the social fault lines present in society at large inside of the professional military.[22]

Darfur and the Proximate Causesof the Conflict

The wars in Darfur have been incredibly complicated. In 2003, a few years before the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the ruling National Congress Party in Khartoum and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army in Juba, the fighting greatly intensified between Darfurian separatists insurgencies and the Sudanese government. The Sudanese government, after failing miserably in its initial campaign against the Darfurian insurgents, began to recruit and arm the various Arab tribes in Sudan. This policy reinforced the idea of Darfur as an Arab-African racial conflict.

In 2006, the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), colloquially known as the Abuja Agreement, was signed between the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese Liberation Army led by Minni Minawi. It proposed the integration of the Darfurian rebels from the Sudanese Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) into the SAF and the disarmament of the Arab Darfurian para-military movements known colloquially as the Janjaweed. Yet, barely two years later forces from JEM were attacking the outskirts of Sudan’s capital, Khartoum. Consequently, while many of the rebel forces that initiated the revolt in 2003 were neutralized, fighting continued among the Arab paramilitaries that were organized to fight the original insurgency. Julie Flint claims that by 2010, the largest cause of death in Darfur was fighting between various Arab tribes, which had been armed by the Government of Sudan. The fighting broke out and escalated after the signing of the DPA. It was combat about the spoils of peace often reinforced by fighters coming from across the Sahel, particularly from Chad. Flint notes that, “the protagonists, and most of the victims, are Arab pastoralists from tribes that supported the government’s counter-insurgency. They were offered loot, land, and sometimes salaries after years of marginalization during which their traditional rights of access to pasture and water were ended and the most basic services denied them.”[23] The recruitment of Abadala, or camel herding tribesmen, was initially based on historical grievances, which saw the Abadala Rizeigat deprived of dars or homelands when the colonial state began apportioning them in the 1920s and 1930s.

In the wars that broke out after the 1980s across the Sudans there were rarely winners in the absolute sense. Instead, there were periods of dominance. What was new in the immediate aftermath of the October coup was that instead of conflict in Darfur, a coalition of rivals had emerged solidly in power in Khartoum, including the leaders of rebel movements like JEM’s Gibril Ibrahim, the RSF, and the SAF. These forces emerged as the undisputed rulers of Sudan. Unfortunately, instead of either a coalition of civilian politicians and civil society forces, or a hybrid government composed of military elements and civilian politicians, what came to power was a coalition exclusively composed of various official and unofficial armed groups.

Despite various attempts to restore a hybrid government in Sudan after the October coup, these efforts faltered on the crucial question of security sector reform. How would the various autonomous armed movements in Sudan and most importantly the paramilitary RSF be integrated into the regular SAF? The question of how the reformed Armed Forces would eventually be put under civilian control was hardly even broached in the year after the coup. Instead, international mediation focused on force integration.

On December 5, 2022, civilian representatives from the Forces of Freedom and Change signed a tentative agreement with Burhan representing the SAF and Daglo, the head of the RSF. This agreement, which was the result of intense international mediation, was supposed to create a pathway for Sudan’s transition. As Michael Young writes:

“The agreement is essentially between two weak coalitions: pro-coup forces, led by ousted president Omar al-Bashir’s Security Committee, which realized that they were unequal to the burden of governing a country beset by economic, political, and military crises, many of their own making; and a fractious pro-democracy camp that lacks the support of its key constituency: the protestors who led the uprising against Bashir and who view this deal as an ersatz attempt at engendering civilian rule.”[24]

The deal emerged as a compromise between regional powers and the various armed and political forces within Sudan. Brokered by the African Union and Intergovernmental Authority for Development, and supported by the Quad (the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States), and Egypt, the hope was that the Framework Agreement could provide a pathway for all of the major stakeholders in Sudan to emerge as victors, granting bureaucratic power to the civilians and maintaining political power in the hands of the various armed forces. It was also meant to be a compromise between the two largest regional sponsors of the conflict in Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, which is believed to support the RSF, and the SAF, who have long standing ties to Egypt.[25]

Predictably, while Burhan and Hemedti could agree that political power would remain in the hands of the men with guns, leaving civilians to take up the boring tasks of keeping the lights on, they could not agree on how power would be split up between them. In particular, the Framework Agreement explicitly called for the reorganization of the security sector. Despite all parties signing onto the Framework Agreement in principle, as the time approached for the implementation of the agreement in April 2023, talks broke down. The sticking point for the military and the RSF was not naming a new civilian government, but “the timeline for integrating the powerful RSF into the military.”[26] Placing the complex web of Sudan’s armed forces under civilian control has been a long standing demand of the country’s civilians. Yet, the task became more complicated as the size of the RSF swelled after the 2019 overthrow of el-Bashir, by some estimates the RSF numbered more than a 100,000 in 2023 having grown rapidly from perhaps 20,000 to 30,000 during Bashir’s reign.

While the Framework Agreement was to be adopted by April 6th, even two weeks before implementation the nature of how security sector reform was to be carried out had yet to be settled. On March 26, Daglo told Reuters as he entered the security sector reform talks, “The process of security and military reform is not easy but it is important and our goal is a single army,” Daglo said at the launch of the talks on Sunday, adding that the RSF would not abandon “the choice of democratic transformation.”[27] Yet, just a few weeks later that is exactly what occurred. Talks on security sector reform broke down because of an inability to agree to a timeline for the integration of the RSF into the SAF. The timelines discussed varied widely: Daglo suggested that the integration process should take ten years, while the senior officer core of the SAF suggested that the process should be completed swiftly within just two years. No timeline was developed for the integration of the police, intelligence services, or the plethora of other armed movements spread across the country. Negotiations continued almost until the deadlines outlined in the Framework Agreement.[28] A new transitional government was to be established on April 11, and a committee was supposed to be established in order to draft a new constitution composed of nine civilian members, one individual representing the armed forces and one individual representing the RSF.[29] Instead, merely four days later violent clashes broke out across the country between the SAF and the RSF. It remains deeply contested who started the violence. But it is clear that in the first days of the clashes the RSF was able to attack the Sudanese Air force base in the north of the country in Merowe, the Khartoum International Airport, and the Presidential Palace. The army launched a direct assault on the large RSF base in the southern neighborhood of the capital, Soba.[30] The bitterness of the fighting was perhaps set by an early morning raid on the official residence of Burhan. During this raid at least thirty-five members of his personal presidential guard were killed, and Burhan who was at home at the time only narrowly escaped the residence alive.[31] The war, despite numerous efforts to resolve it, was now personal. The senior officer corps of the SAF felt deeply humiliated by the fact that the RSF were able to overrun the homes of the officer corps’ families and target their leaders personally. Meanwhile, the RSF, which primarily drew its strength from the Rizeigat, came to fear that any retreat would mean that they would be targeted for ethnic cleansing in revenge for sacking Khartoum, Omdurman, and Buhri.

Hurting Stalemate

Conflict in Sudan is now more than a year old and it shows no signs of abatement. Amel Marhoum, who was a liaison officer for the United Nations High Commission on Human Rights, remembers how last year it was so easy to believe that “… the fighting would last for a week or two, a month maximum, if it even dragged on in the first place.”[32] Yet instead of a quick victory the war in Sudan has settled into a hurting stalemate, where both sides are able to claim strings of victories that seem to suggest the tide has turned in their direction, only to suffer setbacks that suggest the momentum has moved decisively in the opposite direction. Very early in the war the RSF captured large parts of the capital and western Sudan, while the SAF maintained its foothold in the capital, denying the RSF an outright victory and its base in eastern Sudan. Yet, belying the fears that Sudan would quickly be partitioned into an Eastern and Western Sudan, neither side has been able to completely control their half of the country. In December 2023, the RSF invaded the agriculturally rich Gezira State, and now El-Fasher, the last major city in Darfur not under RSF control, is under siege.[33] These advances have led to indiscriminate attacks against civilians as the RSF burns villages and causes the mass exodus of civilians, while the SAF indiscriminately launches bomb raids from the air.

Yet rather than lead to a definitive advantage, the ongoing battles appear to be reinforcing a stalemate both militarily and politically. Repeated peace talks have failed. There is no shortage of military supplies entering the country and both sides are raising more troops from vulnerable civilian populations.[34] The current conflict is increasingly taking on an ethnic character and the fighting is escaping the control of both SAF or RSF leadership.

Currently, international efforts must focus on ending the war and addressing the looming famine stalking the country. According to the UN Food and Agricultural Organization nearly 20.3 million people in Sudan face acute food insecurity. However, in the face of crises in Ukraine and Gaza very little funding has been made available to address the situation in Sudan.[35]

The Food and Agricultural Organization advises that now is the time to act. Peace talks have resumed in Jeddah, and unlike earlier peace talks, there is pressure to make these more inclusive, involving regional actors like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Chad, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates. All of these actors have been actively sponsoring different factions in the Sudanese conflict. The challenge has been for the United States to support talks that could adequately represent the interests of the competing regional factions, while striking a balance between the divided armed groups in Sudan and Sudanese civil society. Yet, even if a permanent solution to Sudan’s conflict remains elusive, it is imperative that the United States support a cease-fire and the resumption of negotiations towards a transitional government before this year’s cereal planting season is lost in Sudan. Otherwise, famine will greatly increase the number of deaths in Sudan far beyond the scope of what is already one of the largest humanitarian tragedies in the world.

The United States should focus on the cessation of hostilities rather than worrying about the exact shape of the peace agreement that is reached between the relevant parties. The reason for this focus is that any peace agreement reached in the midst of current hostilities is likely to only hold for a short period of time before it has to be renegotiated. Peace in Sudan is likely to be a process rather than a final result.

• About the author: Alden Young is a 2023 Templeton Fellow in the Africa Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.
• Source: This article was published by FPRI

[1] “Crisis in Sudan: What Is Happening and How to Help,” International Rescue Committee (March 25, 2024): https://www.rescue.org/article/fighting-sudan-what-you-need-know-about-crisis.

[2] “Sudan: Impact of Long-Term Displacement in the East,” ACAPS: Briefing Note, March 8, 2024.

[3] “Conflict in Sudan: Over 8 million people displaced,” International Rescue Committee (April 12, 2024): https://www.rescue.org/article/war-sudan-over-8-million-people-displaced

[4] “Sudan: Impact of Long-Term Displacement in the East,” ACAPS: Briefing Note, March 8, 2024.

[5] Mariel Ferragamo and Diana Roy,“What Is the Extent of Sudan’s Humanitarian Crisis?,” Council on Foreign Relations, June 26, 2024. https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-extent-sudans-humanitarian-crisis

[6] Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations, “Sudan: Situation Report,” May 16, 2024

[7] “Sudan ‘Repulses’ Rebel Attack,” Al Jazeera, accessed March 29, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2008/5/22/sudan-repulses-rebel-attack-2.

[8] “Sudan ‘Repulses’ Rebel Attack,” Al Jazeera, accessed March 29, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2008/5/22/sudan-repulses-rebel-attack-2.

[9] P. M. Holt, A Modern History of the Sudan / P.M. Holt., The Praeger Asia-Africa Series (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1966).

[10] “Sudan ‘Repulses’ Rebel Attack,” Al Jazeera, accessed March 29, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2008/5/22/sudan-repulses-rebel-attack-2.

[11] P. M. Holt, A Modern History of the Sudan / P.M. Holt., The Praeger Asia-Africa Series (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1966).

[12] Alex de Waal, “Who Are the Darfurians? Arab and African Identities, Violence and External Engagement,” African Affairs 104, no. 415 (April 1, 2005): 181–205, https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adi035.

[13] Douglas H. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars: Old Wars & New Wars, (Woodbridge, Suffolk: James Currey, an imprint of Boydell & Brewer Ltd, 2016).

[14] Reuters, “Sudanese factions tackle forming single army in transition talks,” Reuters (March 26, 2023): https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burhan-says-sudans-army-will-be-under-leadership-civilian-government-2023-03-26/

[15] Mai Hassan and Ahmed Kodouda, “Sudan’s Uprising: The Fall of a Dictator,” Journal of Democracy 30, no. 4 (October 11, 2019): 89–103, https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2019.0071.

[16] Reuters, “Sudan factions agree to form transitional government on April 11,” Reuters (March 19, 2023): https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudan-factions-agree-form-transitional-govt-april-11-spokesperson-2023-03-19/

[17] Reuters, “Sudanese factions tackle forming single army in transition talks,” Reuters (March 26, 2023): https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burhan-says-sudans-army-will-be-under-leadership-civilian-government-2023-03-26/

[18] Reuters, “Sudanese talks hit roadblock over security sector reform,” Reuters (March 30, 2023): https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudanese-talks-hit-roadblock-over-security-sector-reform-2023-03-30/

[19] “What Is the Extent of Sudan’s Humanitarian Crisis?,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed March 31, 2024, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/what-extent-sudans-humanitarian-crisis.

[20] “Sudan ‘Repulses’ Rebel Attack,” Al Jazeera, accessed March 29, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2008/5/22/sudan-repulses-rebel-attack-2.

[21] Mai Hassan and Ahmed Kodouda, “Sudan’s Uprising: The Fall of a Dictator,” Journal of Democracy 30, no. 4 (October 11, 2019): 89–103, https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2019.0071.

[22] “Sudan ‘Repulses’ Rebel Attack,” Al Jazeera, accessed March 29, 2024, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2008/5/22/sudan-repulses-rebel-attack-2.

[23] Julie Flint. The Other War: Inter-Arab Conflict in Darfur. (Switzerland: Small Arms Survey, 2010).

[24] Michael Young, “Will the Framework Deal between Sudan’s Military Rulers and Civil Opposition Restore Civilian Rule?” Diwan: Middle East Insights from Carnegie (January 12, 2023).

[25] Nafisa Eltahir, “Sudanese General Accuses UAE of Supplying Paramilitary RSF,” Reuters (November 28, 2023): https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudanese-general-accuses-uae-supplying-paramilitary-rsf-2023-11-28/.

[26] Reuters, “Sudanese talks hit roadblock over security sector reform,” Reuters (March 30, 2023): https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudanese-talks-hit-roadblock-over-security-sector-reform-2023-03-30/

[27] Reuters, “Sudanese factions tackle forming single army in transition talks,” Reuters (March 26, 2023): https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/burhan-says-sudans-army-will-be-under-leadership-civilian-government-2023-03-26/

[28] Reuters, “Sudanese talks hit roadblock over security sector reform,” Reuters (March 30, 2023): https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudanese-talks-hit-roadblock-over-security-sector-reform-2023-03-30/

[29] Reuters, “Sudan factions agree to form transitional government on April 11,” Reuters (March 19, 2023): https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/sudan-factions-agree-form-transitional-govt-april-11-spokesperson-2023-03-19/

[30] Katherine Houreld, Ellen Francis, and Claire Parker, “Airstrike hit Sudanese capital as paramilitary force clashes with army,” Washington Post (April 15, 2023): https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/04/15/sudan-gunfire-khartoum-rapid-support-forces/

[31] Oscar Rickett, “Sudan: How an RSF attack on Burhan set the tone for a bitter conflict,” Middle East Eye (May 3, 2023): https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/sudan-attack-burhan-rsf-set-tone-bitter-conflict

[32] Amel Marhoum, Sara Bedri, and Filippo Grandi, “Reflecting on Sudan’s Civil War One Year Later,” Time (April 15, 2024): https://time.com/6966065/sudan-civil-war-anniversary-essay/.

[33] Radio Dabanga, “RSF attacks in Sudan’s El Gezira causes mass exodus, hundreds of youths detained,” (December 17, 2023): https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/rsf-attacks-sudans-el-gezira-causes-mass-exodus-hundreds-youths-detained

[34] Mat Nashed, “Sudan’s Civilians pick up arms, as RSF gains and Army Stumbles,” AlJazeera (December 24, 2023): https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/24/sudans-civilians-pick-up-arms-as-rsf-gains-and-army-stumbles

[35] Kaamil Ahmed and Sarah Johnson, “Sudan has the Largest Number of People Facing Extreme Food Shortages in 2023, UN Report Shows,” The Guardian (April 24, 2024): https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/24/sudan-extreme-food-shortages-2023-food-insecurity

Free societies cannot exist without free speech. Nor can free societies survive without independent media able and willing to speak truth to power. Both these free speech pillars have been badly corroded over the last four years, as I argued in The Spectator Australia on 17 April 2021 and again in a Brownstone article on 15 March 2023. The World Health Organisation (WHO) declared Covid-19 a public health emergency of international concern on 30 January 2020 and a pandemic on 11 March, by which time it had been detected in 114 countries and more than 4,000 people had died with the disease.

On 19 March, New Zealand’s Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern declared: ‘We will…be yoursingle source of truth.’ Although Ardern was the only national leader to articulate the belief in governmental monopoly of health truth so baldly, almost all governments as well as the WHO acted on the same belief to impose draconian curbs on dissenting and critical voices for the next three years. The net result was to worsen the pathologies associated with lockdown, mask, and vaccine policies, ensuring that the cure has indeed turned out to be worse than the disease.

In a completely unrelated matter, after twelve years on the run and in prison, Julian Assange was released last month following a plea bargain. A journalist, publisher, and whistleblower rolled into one, Assange’s sin was to have exposed the crimes of leading Western governments. Assange is not a US citizen and was not physically in the US during the release of the classified documents. It’s not clear therefore why he should have been subject to the extraterritorial assertion of US legal jurisdiction.

This is especially so when we recall that on 30 September 2011,Anwar al-Awlaki, an American of Yemeni descent, was killed by a US drone strike somewhere in Yemen – the first instance of a US citizen being the victim of a targeted assassination. The hit was executed on the orders of President Barack Obama without any due process of trial and conviction. An incident worth recalling in the context of Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s hystericaldissenting notein the Supreme Court’s recent judgment on presidential immunity.

Assange was given diplomatic sanctuary in the Ecuadorian embassy in London in June 2012. The asylum was revoked by Ecuador in April 2019. In May 2019, the US revealed a previously sealed 2018 indictment and added 17 espionage charges. He was arrested by the UK police in April 2019 and held in detention until his release and flight home to Australia in June 2024.

Australians have been and remain deeply conflicted by the whole saga, with opinion polarised between those who elevated his case to acause célèbreand are celebrating his return, and others who regard him as a traitor and are revolted by the fuss over his return. The differences in opinion transcend the left-right ideological and party-political divides. Simon Jackson, former CEO of Sydney University’s US Studies Centre, described Assange as ‘aconvicted felon’ – the language that Bidenites are using against Trump, with as much lack of success in damning him in the court of public opinion.

I have previously been critical of some policies of the Albanese government. In this instance, not only did he get the big picture right. He also eschewed megaphone diplomacy to engage insustained quiet diplomacyfrom the start, including intensive negotiations with the US Department of Justice. Ambassador Kevin Rudd in Washington and High Commissioner Stephen Smith in London were also engaged with the issue. They picked up the ball on assuming office, took ownership of the Assange file, kept their eyes on the prize despite multiple distractions, and delivered a pragmatic compromise to bring him home.

What If?

Assange pleaded guilty to a ‘conspiracy to disseminate national defense information.’ This is a charge that would have been just as applicable to the publication ofThe Pentagon Papersby Daniel Ellsberg. The journey from the latter to WikiLeaks and the persecution of Assange is the story of the fall of investigative journalism and the triumph of the national security and surveillance state in which most of the contemporary media is now nested. The key question today as in 1971 is not the right of journalists or the news media to publish classified information, but the people’s right to the information necessary to expose the crimes and corruption of public officials.

Wikileaks was set up in 2006 and published the Afghan and Iraq war logs in 2010 for the 2004–09 years inclusive, consisting of 91,000 Afghanistan war documents and almost 392,000 US army field reports from Iraq. In 2016, WikiLeaks published internal Democratic Party documents that revealed the extent to which theparty organisation had interfered in the primaries against Bernie Sandersto tilt the scales in Hillary Clinton’s favour. In 2017 WikiLeaks released details ofCIA hacking capabilitiesand software tools.

Information from WikiLeaks was initially published in collaboration with some of the world’s leading media outlets, including theGuardian, New York Times, Der Spiegel, El País,andLe Mondenewspapers, redacted to protect the identities of sources and personnel. Once the US state began to hound Assange, all these stalwarts of the MSM abandoned him.

What if Assange had founded WikiLeaks in 2019 and first come to global prominence in 2024 for leaking troves of documents that detailed the murky shenanigans behind lockdowns, masks, and vaccines, and collusion between state actors, Big Pharma, Big Tech, and legacy and social media? After all, by now we have enough reason to wonder about theinvolvement of key national security agenciesin the saga, starting with the US Department of Defense funding of gain-of-function research in foreign labs in order to do an end-run around US legal prohibitions. Nor can we ignore the geopolitical considerations in and consequences of the pandemic policies with respect to the strategic rivalry between China and the United States.

The ‘what if’ question is prompted by the chronological coincidence of three legal cases. On 26 June, theWall Street JournalreporterEvan Gershkovichwent to trial in a court in Yekaterinburg, Russia on espionage charges; Assange returned home; and, in a 6-3 split judgment based on a legal technicality that did not address the substantive merits of theMurthy v Missouricase, the US Supreme Court enabled the continued government censorship of social media posts so long as it was sophisticated and not overt and crude.

Four Grounds for Defending Assange

Regardless of the personal character of Assange for good or bad, what he did with WikiLeaks can be justified on four grounds.

First, countries often go to war based on lies and media manipulation: Japan’s conquest of Manchuria in the 1930s, the Tonkin Gulf resolution in 1964 that midwifed the Vietnam War, the 2003 Iraq war, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. War has traditionally performed certain functions in international relations as the arbiter of the creation, survival, and elimination of actors in the system, of the ebb and flow of political frontiers, and of the rise and decline of regimes. The right to wage war and acquire colonies was once an accepted attribute of state sovereignty.

However, based on the ‘better angels’ of human nature, there has been a long-term shift from the power end of the spectrum towards the normative end as the pivot on which history turns, with a reduction in societal, national, and international violence. Increasing normative, legislative, and operational fetters were placed on the right of states to go to war unilaterally in the twentieth century. Yet, the last century turned out to be the most murderous in history. In order to help reduce the mortality burden of international conflicts, civilised societies committed to the rule of law must protect those who would expose official mendacity to manipulate countries into foreign wars of choice.

Second, Assange revealed some acts of outright criminality with no military justification whatsoever. The mass release of secret documents by WikiLeaks began to reveal the true extent of the blood price of Iraq.WikiLeaks released video footage, dubbedCollateral Murder,of US helicopter airstrikes in Baghdad on 12 July 2007 in which more than a dozen civilians were shot dead. Between them, the 18-minuteshortand 39-minutefullversions have been viewed 20 million times on YouTube.

The roots of international humanitarian law (IHL) are to be found in the tradition of ‘just war,’ which focuses not simply upon the circumstances leading to the initiation of hostilities (jus ad bellum), but also on the conduct of hostilities themselves (jus in bello). IHL was very much a product of the Enlightenment which witnessed the rise of individualism as a counterpoint to the potency of raison d’état as sufficient justification for the unconstrained use of force. The ‘Law of Geneva’ took its name in particular from the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, which dealt with the wounded and sick, prisoners of war, and protected civilians.

Short of war, illegal covert operations against friendly foreign governments to benefit private commercial actors also deserve exposure. The‘Witness K’ and Bernard Collaery casedealt with Australian spies ordered to install listening devices in East Timor’s cabinet room. In 2018 Australiaprosecuted ‘K,’ a former memberof the Australian Secret Intelligence Service who allegedlyexposed breaches of domestic and international lawsby Australian intelligence operatives in East Timor. Canberra-based lawyer Collaery, a former Attorney-General of the Australian Capital Territory, who represented both East Timor’s interests and acted as K’s personal lawyer, was charged with disclosing protected information.

‘K’ pleadedguiltyin June 2021, was convicted, and given a three-month suspended sentence. Proceedings against Collaery were discontinued by the Albanese government in July 2022. Shamefully, no action was ever taken against the political and bureaucratic officials responsible for the illegal spying on a friendly and vulnerable government in order to benefit a private sector firm. The key beneficiary was Woodside Petroleum, which wanted access to the oil and gas fields in the Timor Sea.

Foreign Minister Alexander Downer signed off on embedding Australian spies in Australian foreign aid assistance to East Timor. On retirement from politics, Downer obtained a generous consultancy with Woodside. This is the man who seemsupsetabout the Albanese government’s campaign to secure the release of Assange, ‘a convicted man who stole national security communications and handed them over to the media.’

Third, it’s wrong to believe that US and Western malfeasance has no consequences vis-à-vis other countries. Instead of demonstrating unlimited US power, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria brutally exposed the limits to US power to impose American will on local populations willing to fight back. I argued in real time as a UN official that blowback from the illegal Iraq war would erode domestic public support for overseas military entanglements across the West, sap the US resolve to go to war against another Islamic country in particular, and that the big strategic victor of the war would be Iran.

The Iraq war gravely damaged the US global reputation as a country that respects the rule of law. As the influentialEconomistmagazinenotedon 23 May 2014: ‘The most glaring source of global scepticism towards American affection for international law can be summed up in one word: Iraq.’ It fed the global narrative that under the influence of the military-industrial complex, the United States is engaged in a permanent war, continually bombs other countries, makes more weapons than it needs, and sells more arms to foreign countries than is prudent.

Beyond Western allies, the US and Western behaviour also set the template for the mimetic actions of other countries. As power shifts away from the US-led West, it becomes correspondingly more important for citizens to check potential abuses by their own governments in overseas jurisdictions rather than fuel anti-Western sentiments. This is whatThe Hindu, one of India’s premier English dailies, had to say in aneditorialon 26 June:

Julian Assange did what journalists do in free societies. He published troves of secret documents exposing the conduct of America’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq…

[T]he pursuit of a whistle-blower for over 14 years [will] remain a blot on western democracies, especially the UK and the US, forever.

Fourth, the relentless pursuit of Assange and subsequently of Edward Snowden were important milestones on the path, via the national security, administrative, and surveillance state, to the rise of the biomedical state in which we now find ourselves. This thesis is of course captured in the subtitle of my book Our Enemy, the Government: How Covid Enabled the Expansion and Abuse of State Power. The media and judiciary are among the key public institutions that failed to expose and check government excesses and violations of citizens’ rights. In yet another parallel, no US official has apologised either for the crimes Assange exposed and his persecution, or for the Covid crimes against citizens and the persecution of the dissenters from the pandemic intervention orthodoxy.

Liberal judges can be impressively creative in inventing standing for plaintiffs in popular causes like environmental and racial justice. By contrast, conservative judges tend to be far more, well, conservative. Amy Coney Barrett and Brett Kavanaugh are Trump appointees. Had the two ruled the other way in theMurthy v Missouricase, the Court would have found 5-4 for the plaintiffs on the technicality of lack of standing and, hopefully, terminated state-coerced censorship by social media platforms. If President Trump had shown similar cowardice and ducked tough fights, neither Barrett nor Kavanaugh would be a Supreme Court Justice today.

While this is the proximate takeaway from the unfortunate verdict, the bigger ‘structural takeaway’ is the confirmation of the judiciary as part of the infrastructure of the state and not a totally independent actor that stands apart and holds the state to account. The state can henceforth eschew attempts to demand bans on individuals and simply ask the social media platforms to enforce their own rules more aggressively. This is sufficient plausible separation to protect both parties from legal jeopardy – at least until such time as someone is deemed to have the requisite legal standing (Robert F Kennedy, Jr?) and the court decides the case of state-directed censorship by social media on merits.

The WikiLeaks saga also showed that the draconian powers of the US government are able to direct and influence credit card companies and financial institutions to hew to the government line against the rights of individuals and legal entities. This aspect of the WikiLeaks saga too foreshadowed what was to happen in more extreme form during the Covid years, most notably in the hounding of the Canadian truckers’ Freedom Convoy and their supporters by Justin Trudeau.

Beyond Embarrassing Governments, Any Hard Evidence of Individuals Who Were Endangered?

One final thought. The WikiLeaks document dumps caused great embarrassment to some governments. However, for all the repetitions of the core charge against Assange that he put the lives of US and allied soldiers, including Australians, at risk, no credible evidence has been produced that this actually happened. The gaslighting foreshadowed much of the basis of Covid tyranny, that to publicly question the efficacy of lockdown, mask, and vaccine interventions and mandates was to engage in selfish behaviour that put whole societies at risk of grave health harms, and that the risk to the community’s health was sufficient to justify the most draconian clampdown on free speech and to dismiss doctors.

Conversely, if soldiers’ deaths can be attributed to unauthorised disclosures, then it’s fine to charge the leakers.

Nine years ago, UN special rapporteur on privacy Joseph Cannataci argued that the world needs aGeneva Convention type of law to protect people from the threat of massive clandestine digital surveillance. As this shows, not everyone connected with the UN system embraces illiberal instincts to authoritarianism!

• This was published at Brownstone Institute and is an expanded version of an article published in the Spectator Australia magazine (6 July).

By Chang-Yau Hoon and Asiyah Kumpoh

Since 1959, when Brunei Darussalam’s Constitution was established, Islam was formally declared the state religion. While Article 3(1) of the Constitution allows for the peaceful practice of other religions,[1] certain groups like the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, the Baha’i Faith, and Jehovah’s Witnesses are labelled “deviant” and are banned by the government.[2] The Sultan of Brunei holds the title of the head of the Islamic faith, granting the government significant leverage in utilising Islam for nation-building purposes.[3] This role highlights Islam’s pervasive influence across all levels of domestic governance, serving as a moral and ethical compass.

The enactment of the Nationality Act in 1961 united seven indigenous ethnic groups (puak jati), including Brunei, Kedayan, Murut, Tutong, Dusun, Bisaya, and Belait, under the broader Malay race, symbolising a consolidation of national identity. As a result, the Muruts, Dusuns, Bisayas and Belaits, who were originally non-Muslims, are now officially identified as Malay ‘by race’ by the constitutional provision. Over time, this reclassification defines the multifaceted character of Brunei Malayness and integrates diverse ethnic culture into a cohesive Malay identity.[4] Thus, as of 2021, the population of Brunei formally consists of Malays (67.4%), Chinese (9.6%), and others (23%).[5]

The term “religious minorities” carries considerable weight in Brunei, where Islam dominates. Christians and Buddhists form significant minority groups, alongside non-Muslim ethnic communities like the Dusun, Bisaya, Belait, and Murut, who uphold traditional beliefs. Despite conversions and intermarriage, many members of these groups maintain ties to their ancestral customs. Differential treatment towards religious minorities exists in Brunei, but the majority religion does not necessarily dictate people’s interactions with their surroundings.[6] Understanding the agency of minorities and the complexity of historical context is vital in exploring how they navigate their space in a Muslim-majority state.

This discussion specifically focuses on two minority groups: the Christians, and the Dusuns, an ethnic minority practising traditional faith. Christians are the second largest religious group in the country, while the Dusuns, being one of the most-studied ethnic groups in Brunei, present a unique illustrative example on the point of study. Past studies offer some valuable insights into the strategies employed by the Dusuns in balancing between their adherence to state policies and the preservation of their ethnic religion and culture. This Perspective examines how these groups manoeuvre their religious practices amidst state constraints within Brunei’s perceived “coercive” environment.[7]

REGULATING RELIGION IN BRUNEI DARUSSALAM

The national philosophy of Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB), declared during independence in 1984, solidifies Islam’s role in the governance of Brunei. Islam is enshrined in the constitution as the state religion, with separate Islamic courts overseeing family matters for Muslims.[8] Despite maintaining a dual legal system, recent decades have seen the gradual strengthening of Shariah Law, culminating in the full implementation of the Shariah Penal Code Order (SPCO) in 2019.[9] Brunei’s institutions and sectors align their policies with Islamic principles, shaping various aspects of public life. State-sponsored broadcasting regularly features religious content, and workplaces provide opportunities for non-Muslims to engage with Islam. The pervasive presence of Islam in education further raises awareness, with Islamic Religious Knowledge and MIB being mandatory complementary subjects for primary and lower secondary levels.

Despite these measures, previous studies suggest non-Muslims perceive Islamic education as merely educational rather than theological.[10] While religious minorities accept Islam’s role in society, concerns about religious freedom persist, with critics highlighting the legal and political marginalisation of these groups.[11] However, many scholars have argued against this as an overgeneralisation, highlighting instead Brunei’s unique approach to Islamic authority and religious tolerance.[12] Furthermore, in a royal speech at an Islamic ceremony, the Sultan reassured his people that MIB is a system that “preserves the rights of all residents regardless of their race or creed”.[13]

Although the implementation of SPCO symbolises state power, its strict enforcement is rare. In their everyday reality, non-Muslims experience minimal impact on their religious practices, with Christmas celebrations in private spaces continuing unhindered.[14] This challenges international negative perceptions of Brunei’s religious policies, emphasising the nuanced reality within the country.

“A PERIPHERY WITHIN A PERIPHERY”: THE CHRISTIANS IN BRUNEI

The Christian community in Brunei comprises the largest religious minority, constituting 6.7% of the population, with 3.7% identifying as Roman Catholics and 4% as Protestants. Catholicism was introduced in the 16^thcentury by Spanish missionaries, who established historical ties with the Missionary Society of St. Joseph (Mill Hill Missionaries), and the Catholic church in Brunei had in earlier times been under the administration of various ecclesiastical jurisdictions based in Labuan, Jesselton (now Kota Kinabalu), Kuching and Miri. In 2004, the Apostolic Vicariate of Brunei Darussalam was established, led by Bishop Cornelius Sim until his passing in 2021.[15]

Approximately 16,000 Catholics reside in Brunei, mainly migrant workers, and expatriates, with around 10% being locals, including ethnic Chinese and indigenous Bruneians. The government upholds the autonomy of non-Muslim religious institutions in clergy appointments. In 2020, Bishop Cornelius Sim, a former engineer of Chinese Bruneian descent, was elevated to the esteemed rank of cardinal by Pope Francis. Cardinal Sim interpreted his appointment as a deliberate gesture by the Pope to embrace marginalised communities, describing Brunei as “a periphery within the periphery” due to its small Christian population.[16]

The majority of Protestants in Brunei identify as Anglicans, followed by evangelical and charismatic Christians. This situation can be traced partly to the legacy of British colonialism, as evidenced by the official registration of only three Protestant churches, all of which are Anglican. These Anglican churches were established alongside mission schools to serve the expatriate community during the British administration era. The Borneo Church Mission, originally founded in England in 1846, had the goal of dispatching Anglican missionaries to Borneo. Brunei’s integration into the Diocese of Labuan, a British crown colony, occurred following the arrival of the first missionaries in 1848 at the invitation of James Brooke. Presently, Brunei remains part of the Anglican Communion Diocese within the Anglican Province of Southeast Asia.[17]

Despite Brunei’s geographical proximity to Sarawak, the country’s Christian community has evolved differently from that of its neighbouring state. In Sarawak, Christians represent the religious majority, comprising 42.4% of the population.[18] The Methodist mission, which began in Sarawak in the early 20^thcentury, experienced substantial growth among ethnic Chinese and Ibans but did not extend its presence to Brunei.[19] Similarly, the establishment of the Borneo Evangelical Mission in Sarawak by Australian missionaries in 1928 led to the formation of the Sidang Injil Borneo (SIB Church), which has expanded throughout Sarawak and Sabah but lacks legal presence in Brunei.[20]

Unlike Sarawak, where Christianity thrives, Brunei’s historical ties to Islam and the approach taken by the British administration had likely limited missionary influence there. While the majority of Christians in Brunei attend Anglican churches, independent congregations are emerging. Some of these share premises with Anglican churches for worship, while others meet in private homes or non-official locations. These unofficial churches face challenges due to their precarious legal status; often registered as secular organisations, they are vulnerable to raids by the authorities.[21] Despite governmental commitment to religious harmony, strict laws prohibit proselytisation and restrict religious practices. Foreign clergy entry is denied, and non-Islamic religious organisations face limitations in establishing places of worship.[22] Despite these challenges, the Christian community in Brunei upholds mutual respect and understanding, fostering peaceful coexistence among religious groups.[23]

MUTUAL TOLERANCE: THE DUSUNS AND THEIR PRACTICES

The Dusuns, primarily concentrated in Brunei’s Tutong District, historically practised animism although many have converted to Islam and Christianity.[24] Various terms like Bisaya, Bukit, and Kedayan were used in historical writings to refer to them, highlighting their tight-knit community and unique characteristics.[25] Unlike established religions, Dusun belief does not involve proselytisation; individuals are born into it but are not obliged to practise. However, those who do adhere to ethnic rites, show a strong attachment to their traditional beliefs.

At the core of Dusun faith is animism, where reality is perceived to be closely connected with spirit beings, particularly Derato, their cosmic god of prosperity and serves as mediator between humans and the supernatural world. The Dusuns traditionally worship Derato for abundant paddy harvests and conduct what is called the Temarok ritual, led by Belians, after the harvest season. This ritual involves food preparation and traditional music, and has become a significant communal ceremony among the Dusuns.

Despite modern influences, Temarok is still practised, albeit on a small scale. Even Dusuns who have converted to Islam participate in the celebration, as long as it aligns with their new religious teachings. The Dusuns encounter minimal discriminatory barriers when practising Temarok, and the only requirement is that the ritual takes place in private settings. This condition ensures the ritual’s stability and continuity, contrasting with stricter prohibitions faced by other religions in Brunei.

Another significant event in the Dusun calendar is Adau Gayoh, which signifies the conclusion of the paddy harvesting season. While it once overlapped with Temarok, it is now annually observed on 1 May. Adau Gayoh gatherings typically occur in private residences, with attendees often comprising family members. Remarkably, even individuals who have embraced other religions, such as Islam and Christianity, actively partake in Adau Gayoh, highlighting the acceptance of religious diversity within Dusun culture.

The dynamics between the Muslim-majority state and the Dusun minority is one of mutual religious tolerance and reciprocal acceptance. This symbiotic relationship is evident in the majority’s embrace of ethnic religious practices and festivals, which corresponds to the minority’s acceptance of Islam-centric policies outlined in MIB. The Dusuns’ tolerance is cultivated through their daily interactions with Muslims and exposure to Islamic teachings within the country’s educational framework. With Islam deeply integrated into the educational system, the Dusuns have developed a natural familiarity and tolerance towards Islam, considering it an integral part of their lives. This widespread exposure to Islamic information ensures that virtually all individuals in Brunei encounter aspects of Islam; this contributes to a broad understanding of the religion even without direct consultation of religious texts.[26]

Such exposure has wittingly or unwittingly shaped Dusun perception of the Sharia Penal Code Order announced in 2013. While initial apprehensions existed among the Dusuns regarding the SPCO’s impact on non-Muslims, additional information from mass media and communal gatherings has allayed their fears by clarifying that the policy primarily pertains to Muslims and is unlikely to substantially disrupt their daily lives.

The state’s acceptance of Dusun beliefs is rooted in their traditional presence and in Brunei’s historical narrative. Accounts from the inaugural British Resident at the turn of the 20^thcentury vividly illustrate the Dusuns’ role and status in Brunei society. As agricultural practitioners, they cultivated various lands, encompassing both private domains and state-owned territories. They were governed by their own appointed headmen entrusted with tax collection duties. Their contribution to state governance highlights their historical prominence and integral role in the socio-economic fabric of Brunei.[27]

In recent years, there has been a notable shift in the practice of Dusun cultural rituals towards public spaces as their venues. Temarok and Adau Gayoh, once private events, are now celebrated as communal and national heritage occasions. For instance, in 2022, an event in Belait District saw the joint celebration of Eid Fitr and Adau Gayoh, emphasising their importance in preserving Bruneian identity and promoting unity. Similarly, in May 2024, the National Adau Gayoh Festival was held in Tutong District aimed at preserving Dusun cultural values for the new generation.

Temarok’s performative aspect has also permeated national celebrations, local festivals, and even the state visits of foreign dignitaries. Recently, Temarok was embraced as a representation of Brunei’s national culture on international platforms, such as the Southeast Asian and Japanese Youth Program.[28] In these contexts, Temarok is regarded more as an ethnic ritual than a purely religious practice, owing to the role of official media outlets like Radio Television Brunei and Pelita Brunei in documenting and promoting it as a vital component of Brunei’s cultural heritage.[29]

There is a growing movement for ethnic preservation and the promotion of distinct ethno-cultural identities among the Dusuns and other ethnic groups. State recognition and endorsement of practices such as Temarok and Adau Gayoh indicate that Dusuns can freely engage in their ethnoreligious festivals without fear of oppression or prejudice. Additionally, the increasing integration of faith practices with ethnic culture has contributed to greater state tolerance toward the Dusuns. Consequently, ethno-religious gatherings, once private affairs, are now acknowledged as national expressions of ethnic representation and Brunei’s cultural heritage.[30]

This shift may stem from the state’s realisation that its cultural homogenisation efforts for nation-building have been largely successful and possibly reached their natural limit, and the saturation point. With such stability, the state can endorse public celebrations and the preservation of the diverse cultural heritage of the ethnic groups.[31] In Brunei, where formal interfaith dialogues are not extensively pursued, the state’s recognition through the public celebration of Dusun festivals gains special significance. These acts of recognition align with the objectives of interfaith dialogues, promoting positive community interactions grounded in principles of tolerance, respect, and goodwill.

CONCLUSION

In summary, the government of Brunei demonstrates a degree of respect for minority religions, albeit with imposed limitations. Despite these restrictions, the current religious diversity in Brunei appears unlikely to cause significant social friction, as adherents of the majority religion generally exhibit tolerance towards other faiths. Reports indicate that religious minorities do not express significant dissatisfaction with the state’s treatment.

The government’s strict laws aimed at safeguarding Islam’s sanctity pose challenges for missionary religions like Christianity. However, the Christian community has shown adaptability and coexistence, exemplified by their innovative approach of sharing Anglican church premises with other Christian congregations for worship services and gatherings. This proactive response enables the Christian community to navigate state restrictions while maintaining their faith within governmental boundaries.

In the case of ethnic minorities like the Dusuns, limited research has led to misconceptions about their religious constraints, which have assumed that they face similar challenges to minorities in other Muslim-majority nations. However, the relationship between the Dusuns and the state reflects a two-way tolerance shaped by historical intricacies. Long-standing state tolerance of Dusun beliefs and ethnic rituals enriches Brunei’s ethno-cultural diversity, underscoring the significant role of religious minorities like the Dusuns in shaping the multifaceted nature of “Malayness” in Brunei.

Overall, while challenges and restrictions persist for religious and ethnic minorities in Brunei, current conditions suggest a stable coexistence between them. As Brunei progresses, further research and comprehension of these dynamics will be essential for fostering religious harmony and upholding principles of tolerance and respect.

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For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.

• About the authors: Chang-Yau Hoon is Professor of Anthropology at the Institute of Asian Studies, Universiti Brunei Darussalam (UBD), and Visiting Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He was formerly Director of Centre for Advanced Research, UBD. Asiyah Kumpoh is Senior Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences (FASS), Universiti Brunei Darussalam and Director of Institute for Leadership, Innovation and Advancement, UBD. She was formerly Dean of FASS at UBD.
• Source: This article was published by ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute

Ever since October 7, egged on by Iran, Hezbollah has been escalating its cross-border clashes with Israel, while its leader Hassan Nasrallah has been stepping up his blood-curdling rhetoric, predicting Armageddon if Israel were to launch all-out war. Yet the truth is that Iran-Hezbollah would like nothing better. They have sound strategic reasons for not initiating formal armed conflict. So their tactic has been to ramp up the provocation, daring Israel to strike back and trigger war.

Iran learned a lesson from its abortive attempt at overwhelming Israel’s defenses on April 13. In its first-ever direct aerial assault,it sent some 170 drones, over 30 cruise missiles, and more than 120 ballistic missiles the 1,000 kilometers toward Israel.The Iranian leadership no doubt expected a massive military and propagandatriumph.

In the eventthe operation was a miserable failure.To supplement Israel’s Iron Dome defense, America and Britain sent jet fighters to help shoot down the missiles.At the same time Jordan refused to allow Iran to use its air space for the operation, while several Gulf States, among them Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, passed on intelligence about Iran’s plans.As a result about 99% of the aerial armada never reached Israel, and Iran learned that not only the West, but much of the Middle East disliked and distrusted it.

Fearing wholesale lack of support if any formal Hezbollah-Israel conflict were seen as Iran-instigated, Iran-Hezbollah has, in the words of the English poet, Alexander Pope, been “willing to wound and yet afraid to strike.”

On June 18 the Israel Defense Forces announced that a plan for an offensive to push Hezbollah further back from the border had been approved, but that a diplomatic solution was still the preferred option. The next day Nasrallah gave a televised address lasting more than an hour.

In previous wars with Israel, he said, Hezbollah had only hoped to be able to strike Israel’s Meron air base. Now, he claimed, the whole of Israel was within its range.

“And it won’t be random bombardment,” he threatened. “Every drone will have a target. Every missile will have a target.”

Boasting that Hezbollah had a large stockpile of drones, a “surplus of fighters” and unspecified “new weapons” that would be unveiled in due course, he said Hezbollah was manufacturing military weaponry in Lebanon and, despite Israel’s attacks on weapon-carrying convoys in Syria, had continued to receive weapons from Iran.

This, at least, was confirmed by the UK’s Daily Telegraph which, on June 23, reported that weapons are being flown from Iran into Lebanon and stored at Beirut’s main airport. The Telegraph based its report on whistleblowers at the airport who claim to have observed a marked increase in the arrival of weapons and also the presence of more Hezbollah commanders on the ground. The whistleblowers claim the operation has been escalating since the intensification of cross-border conflict between Hezbollah and Israel post-October 7.

The report claimed that currently the cache of stored weapons includes Iranian-made Falaq unguided artillery rockets, Fateh-110 short-range missiles, road-mobile ballistic missiles and M-600 missiles with ranges of 150 to 200 miles. Also at the airport it is claimed that there are AT-14 Kornets, laser-guided anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM), huge quantities of Burkan short-range ballistic missiles and explosive RDX, a toxic white powder also known as cyclonite or hexogen.

The allegations will raise fears within Lebanon that, in the event of war, the Rafic Hariri airport, just four miles from the city center, could become a major military target.

Staff at the airport claim that Wafiq Safa,Hezbollah’s second in command and the head of its security apparatus, has become a notoriously conspicuous figure at the airport.

“Wafiq Safa is always showing up at customs,” one whistleblower claimed. Workers collaborating with Hezbollah, he says, “walk around like peacocks” with new watches and smartphones, and drive new cars. “A lot of money [is] being passed under the table.”

Ghassan Hasbani, the former deputy prime minister and an MP for the Lebanese Forces party, said Hezbollah’s control of the airport has long been a concern for Lebanon, and more so if it becomes a potential military target in a conflict with Israel.

“Weapons being transported from Iran to Hezbollah across border entry points,” he said, ”…endangers both the Lebanese population and the non Lebanese travelling through and living in the country.”

Taking action, he said, is all but impossible without international intervention to implement relevant UN resolutions. “The entrenchment of Hezbollah is everywhere, not only in the airport but in the port, the judiciary, it’s across society. The public administration now is largely hijacked by Hezbollah…”

Ali Hamieh, Lebanon’s transport minister, said the allegations were “ridiculous” and invited journalists and ambassadors to view the airport. Hamieh, who was nominated to the government by Hezbollah, in fact exemplifies the straits to which the once independent sovereign state of Lebanon has been reduced. Hezbollah has acquired an iron grip on the levers of power and, in the process, reduced the nation to penury and political deadlock.

Lebanon has been without a president since October 2022, every possible nominee blocked by Hezbollah and its political allies. Moreover, compounded by widespread government corruption, the country is experiencing the worst financial crisis in its history. After prime minister Najib Mikati announced in March 2020 that Lebanon woulddefault on its Eurobond debt, the Lebanese currency began to plummet, leading to hyperinflation. In April 2023, Lebanese inflation hit a high at almost270%. It has taken a year to bring the level down to something like 52%, which still means unsustainable price increases for ordinary citizens, many of whom have become virtual paupers.

A further destabilizing factor is the huge refugee burden imposed on the country by the civil conflict in Syria. Lebanon maintains one of the largest refugee populations per capita in the world – more than 1.5 million, many of them Syrian.

Yet Lebanon, overwhelmed as it is with domestic problems, is faced with the prospect of being dragged into Iran-Hezbollah’s ideological conflict with Israel, and potentially suffer bombardment, destruction, casualties and deaths. The people of Lebanon resented their sons being recruited by Hezbollah and sent to Syria to support its president, Basha al-Assad, in his fight against his democratic opponents. How much more would they oppose a call by Nasrallah to take up arms against Israel. Which is why Nasrallah refrains from taking the decisive step, and would much prefer to point to Israel as the instigator of conflict.

Azerbaijan and the Middle Corridor

During his visit to Baku, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James O’Brien discussed the potential for transporting goods from Central Asia to global markets through the South Caucasus countries. In other words, he touched upon the implementation of the Middle Corridor project.

Azerbaijani analysts believe that the geopolitical “game” involving the U.S., which sidelines Russia, may seem advantageous for Armenia and Turkey, as they do not share direct borders with Russia. However, for Azerbaijan, this entails taking a significant risk.

“The recent debates have shown that all calculations must now consider the possibility of a second Trump presidency. To what extent will Washington support the Middle Corridor project under Trump, who advocates for isolationist policies and withdrawing the U.S. from its global leadership role? Will it support it at all? Is the South Caucasus part of Trump’s plans?” experts from the “Şərqə baxış” (“Look to the East”) group ask.

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• Azerbaijan refused to cooperate with another European institution
• Georgian NGOs: The threat of freezing the EU accession process is real
• Armenian government to compensate flood-affected residents

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“Knocking on Azerbaijan’s door”

“In his recent statement, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs James O’Brien, who visited the South Caucasus last week, highlighted Azerbaijan’s significant potential for transporting goods from the Caspian Sea through Georgia to global markets.

However, Americans also see substantial opportunities for transporting goods through Armenia to Turkey, the Black Sea, the Atlantic Ocean, and primarily the Mediterranean. Washington believes that the realization of these plans depends on an agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The U.S. is already discussing support for Azerbaijan and the implementation of the Zangezur corridor to access Central Asia. It was evident that this process would eventually reach this stage. Geographic realities made it inevitable that knocking on Azerbaijan’s door would be necessary.

In other words, U.S. interest in the South Caucasus extends beyond its presence in Armenia, encompassing a regional strategy. Amid closer ties between Georgia and Russia, the U.S. is trying to engage Armenia, viewing it as a transit country through which the Middle Corridor, connecting Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia, can pass, leaving Russia out of the equation.

The invitation of Armenia and Azerbaijan to the upcoming NATO summit in the U.S. is the most significant indicator of a new era.”

“A new leverage for Turkey”

“While one aspect of the new process involves a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the other involves the opening of borders between Armenia and Turkey.

In this regard, U.S. and Turkish views align. The Turks believe that to implement the Middle Corridor project under conditions favorable to the U.S., Turkey requires political and financial support from across the ocean.

At the same time, Ankara thinks that by bringing NATO into Central Asia, they will gain new leverage over the West. It’s no coincidence that, with this in mind, Turkey is striving to open its borders with Armenia as soon as possible.”

“Points of сoncern”

“There are two serious points of concern.

First, the only country along the Middle Corridor route that has a land border with Russia is Azerbaijan. The geopolitical game involving the U.S., which sidelines Russia, may seem advantageous for Armenia and Turkey, who do not have direct borders with Russia. However, Azerbaijan will have to take an explicit risk.

Given that Russia has stumbled but not fallen on the Ukrainian front, openly engaging with a ‘wounded bear’ does not promise a joyful ending.

Second, recent debates have shown that all calculations must now consider the possibility of a second Trump presidency. To what extent will Washington support the Middle Corridor project under Trump, who advocates for isolationist policies and withdrawing the U.S. from its global leadership role? Will it support it at all? Is the South Caucasus part of Trump’s plans?

In a situation where risks are evident and questions remain open, Azerbaijan must choose its steps wisely. A peace agreement with Armenia will inevitably have to be signed sooner or later. However, turning this agreement into a point of contention for major powers in the South Caucasus raises serious concerns.

In our view, the most optimal approach now is to adopt a wait-and-see position until the end of the U.S. presidential elections.”

Phil Steele gives Georgia football the No. 3 linebacker room in the country  247Sports

Breakaway Georgian region is discussing becoming part of Russia  MSN

Though Labour swept the polls, it lost Muslim and liberal votes due to its hostile stand on Gaza

The Conservative Party’s 14-year reign come to an end on Friday with a defeat not seen since 1832. The Conservatives won just 121 seats, which is the worst result in the party’s 200-year history. The Labour Party stormed into the government winning 412 seats out of the 650 up for grabs, just six short of its highest-ever total in its history.

Many reasons are given for the crushing defeat of the Rishi Sunak-led Conservatives. But their decline could be broadly attributed to the problems they created for themselves by walking out of the European Union-a move known as Brexit in January 2020.

There was a lesson from the polls for the victorious Labour party also. Though it swept the polls, Labour lost in constituencies with a substantial population of Muslims and liberals due to its hostile stand on Gaza.

Contentious Divorce

The divorce from the EU in 2020 proved to be contentious in British politics even after it was done and dusted. Brexit created instability in the Conservative government.

Prime Minister Theresa May gave way to Boris Johnson, who in turn gave way to Liz Truss. After only 49 days in office, Truss gave way to Rishi Sunak as these PMs struggled to stall economic decline.

Liz Cookman, writing inForeign Policyin 2023 about life in England after Brexit, said that families stockpiled blankets to ward off the cold as they sat shivering in their homes with no heating. Long lines of people, who could not afford to feed their children, formed at the local food bank.

Britain, she said, was a quagmire of misery. Most of the shops closed at 4 p.m. and didn’t even bother opening three or four days a week. There was an egg shortage, a potato shortage. Poverty and inequality were rising.

“Chief among all the culprits is the destructive effect of Brexit and bad governance,” Cookman pronounced. Britain became the world’s worst-performing big economy in 2023 according to the IMF.

Brexit stifled imports and exports. It contributed to a labour shortage of about 330,000. There was a loss of output to the tune of US$ 124 billion.

Brexit prompted finance professionals to relocate to Paris and elsewhere in Europe. FDI in the UK dropped to 1.7% in 2021.

Scotland, which has been in a union with England since 1707, began to pursue a second independence referendum: 62% of Scottish voters wanted to remain in the European Union.

In the 2016 referendum on Brexit, 52%had voted for exiting the EU. But in May 2024, 55% thought that it was wrong to have left the EU.

Reducing illegal immigration was a key part of the Conservative manifesto. But none of the promised measures was implemented. The COVID pandemic was mismanaged and casualties soared.

UK’s National Health Service (NHS) deteriorated significantly since the Tories took power in 2010. There remained a significant backlog for patients needing treatment for cancer, heart and kidney diseases. Many patients had to go abroad for treatment.

Critics argued that the government’s policies disproportionately favoured the wealthy. The enormouswealth of PM Rishi Sunak and his wife Akshata Murthy stood in contrast to the penury of the average Briton.

Following the US lead in foreign policy, the Sunak government continued to support Ukraine with weapons and training and failed to call for an immediate cease-fire in Israel’s war on Gaza where a massacre was on.

What will Labour’s Policies Be?

This is a million-dollar question. Labour victories, especially landslides, have been rarities in British politics, which has been dominated by the Conservative Party since World War II. Throughout its 120 years, Labour has been in power for only a little over 30 of them.

Labour is traditionally seen as being Left-of-Centre party. But like Tony Blair, the Prime Minister-to-be, Keir Starmer, is more Centre than Left. He has vowed to control budgetary spending. He has talked tough on immigration and social security. He appeals to conservative older voters as he is quite a flag-waving nationalist.

As for his relations with the US, he has said that he will work with whoever wins the Presidency in November.

On defence, Starmer has mirrored the Conservative promise to raise military spending to 2.5% of the GDP. NATO had recommended a 2% target.

Starmer has made it clear he will work with whoever wins the US Presidency in November.

On China, the party is likely to continue the policy ofcriticizing Beijing’s human rights record while recognizing that UK’s economy will collapse without trade with China.

Policy on Israel and Gaza

Speaking to UK radio station LBC in October 2023, Keir Starmer said that Israel “has the right” to withhold power and water from Palestinian civilians in Gaza.

The comment caused outrage among many left-wing and Muslim voters, leading to furious protests outside the constituency offices of several Labour MPs. The anger was compounded after the party refused to back a Scottish National Party (SNP) motion calling for an immediate ceasefire in Israel and Gaza.

However, Labour did pass its own similar motion shortly afterwards.

The party lost several seats after a strong showing from pro-Palestinian independent candidates, in a sign of anger towards Labour’s position on Israel’s war in Gaza.

Five independent candidates who have been vocal in their support for Gaza won, while a surge in votes for independents elsewhere denied Labour a victory in areas they were expected to win, CNN reports.

In Leicester South, Labour’s shadow cabinet member Jonathan Ashworth lost his seat by 979 votes to Shockat Adam, an independent candidate who made his support for Gaza a key part of his electoral pledge to voters.

“This is for Gaza,” Adam declared in his victory speech.

Many of the seats where Labour lost votes over its position on Gaza have sizable Muslim populations. According to the 2021 census, the populations of Leicester, Birmingham, Ilford and Blackburn are all more than 20% Muslim.

In Islington North, Corbyn was re-elected to the seat he has held since 1983 – but this time as an independent, rather than for Labour. Corbyn won 49.2% of the vote, while the Labour candidate came in second with 34.4%.

Corbyn said the voters of Islington North were “looking for a government that on the world stage will search for peace, not war, and not allow the terrible conditions to go on that are happening in Gaza at the present time.”

In Blackburn, Labour incumbent Kate Hollern – who won a majority of 18,304 at the 2019 general election – lost by just 132 votes to independent candidate Adnan Hussain.

In Dewsbury and Batley, the independent Iqbal Mohamed also defeated Labour incumbent Heather Iqbal. And in Birmingham Perry Barr, independent Ayoub Khan defeated Labour incumbent Khalid Mahmood by 507 votes.

The crushing defeat of the Conservative Party and their local version called Scottish National Party in the UK general election today is a cause for celebration. The Labour Party has returned to power after fourteen years of Tory rule.

It is a clear electoral victory for the Labour Party under the leadership of Sir Keir Rodney Starmer, who is now the new Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. The Labour Party’s victory marks a pivotal moment in British politics, reflecting widespread dissatisfaction with the Conservative Party’s handling of key issues over the past decade. The new government faces the formidable task of uniting a divided nation and delivering on the promises that fuelled their electoral success. However, despite this significant political shift, a wave of disillusionment continues to ripple through the public. In his victory speech, the new Prime Minister pledged to “restore trust in politics” and vowed to rebuild and govern Britain with a vision “unburdened by doctrine.” 

How can anyone trust a word from Keir Starmer, who has a habit of taking opportunistic political positions and changing his views on policies and his commitment to manifestoes? He changes more often in politics than the British weather. His politics of being “unburdened by doctrine” means establishing an ideologically free zone of politics and governance, which aligns with conservative values of capitalism and the interests of British and international elites. Even the Conservative Party leadership and supporters claim that the Labour policy offering is not drastically different from the policy agendas of the Conservative Party. There is no fundamental difference between Mr. Starmer and Mr. Sunak in terms of their approach to welfare policies. Both are committed to the requirements of capital more than to the everyday needs of people. How can Mr. Starmer promise to rebuild Britain while standing on the foundations and values of Conservative politics and policies?

The scepticism surrounding Sir Keir Starmer’s leadership stems from his perceived lack of a consistent ideological stance. Critics argue that his flexible approach to policymaking raises questions about his authenticity and reliability as a leader. Many question his commitment to working people and their needs. This concern is further amplified by the notion that his governance style might cater more to the interests of the corporate elite rather than addressing the pressing needs of the general populace. Moreover, the Labour’s policy platform mirrors that of the Conservatives suggests a troubling continuity rather than the transformative change many voters desire. If the new Labour government under Starmer’s leadership fails to distinguish itself significantly from the previous Conservative administration, it could lead to further disillusionment among the electorate.

However, Mr. Starmer’s public positions on the privatisation of public services, economic austerity, social welfare, and even on foreign policy issues like Gaza, Ukraine, war, nuclear weapons and NATO are not markedly different from those of Mr. Sunak. Both leaders follow similar policy trajectories in British politics, reflecting a convergence in their approaches on key issues shaped by the Conservative political culture. While Mr. Starmer and Mr. Sunak come from different political parties—Labour and Conservative, respectively—their stances on privatisation show a shared inclination toward involving private sector efficiencies in public services. On the issue of economic austerity, both have advocated for fiscal prudence, albeit with nuanced differences in their approaches to government spending and debt management.

In terms of social welfare, Mr. Starmer’s proposals do not deviate significantly from Mr. Sunak’s policies, suggesting a consensus on the need to balance welfare provisions with economic sustainability. Foreign policy positions of both leaders also align in many respects, particularly in their support for NATO and a firm stance on international security challenges. This alignment indicates a broader trend in British politics where major parties exhibit similarities on fundamental policy issues, reflecting a right-wing shift in their political positions. Therefore, the landslide victory of the Labour party is not a victory of progressive politics of social democracy. It is the consolidation of victory of extreme right wing politics.

The dominance of the Labour and Conservative parties has transformed British politics into a political oligarchy, where a very small number of unmeritorious economic elites shape public policy to uphold their interests with the support of the British state and government. This concentration of power within a limited political framework has led to significant consequences for the broader democratic process. The political influence wielded by these elites often results in policies that favour their economic and social interests, rather than reflecting the diverse needs and aspirations of the working people.

This collaboration between the ruling elites and opposition politics undermines the principles of democratic practice in Westminster where decisions are frequently driven by the priorities of a privileged few. The intertwining of political power and economic clout means that these elites can effectively circumvent mechanisms designed to ensure accountability and transparency. Their deep connections within both the Labour and Conservative parties enable them to exert disproportionate influence over legislative and regulatory frameworks, often to the detriment of wider societal welfare. In essence, the current oligarchal political landscape in Britain is detrimental for the deepening of democracy and public welfare in Britain. This has far-reaching implications for social equity, public trust in government, and the overall health of the democratic system.

The rise of far-right political parties like Reform UK, led by Mr. Nigel Paul Farage, in this election reveals disturbing trends of conservative consolidation in British politics. Such a political trend indicates a significant shift towards more extreme conservative ideologies, reflecting growing discontent and polarisation among the electorate. The increasing support for such parties suggests a backlash against traditional political establishments and a demand for more radical solutions to economic, social, and cultural issues.

The presence of far-right parties like Reform UK in the political arena also raises concerns about the potential erosion of democratic norms and values. Their often inflammatory rhetoric and divisive policies can exacerbate social tensions and undermine efforts to foster inclusivity and cohesion within society. It signals a troubling trend towards conservative consolidation, with potential implications for the country’s democratic integrity and social harmony. The electoral success of these parties encourages mainstream political entities to adopt more hardline stances to retain their voter base, further shifting the overall political discourse to the right. This conservative consolidation poses a challenge to the principles of pluralism and tolerance that are foundational to a healthy democracy in Britain.

For Starmer to truly rebuild Britain, he must go beyond the rhetoric of being “unburdened by doctrine” and present a clear, progressive vision that prioritises social welfare, economic equality, and robust public services focusing on health, education, employment and transportation. Only by doing so can he hope to bridge the gap between his promises and the expectations of a public weary of political platitudes. This requires a commitment to bold, tangible policies that address the root causes of societal issues and a willingness to challenge the status quo entrenched by years of conservative governance. Given Mr. Starmer’s political records, he is unlikely to break through the iron curtain of the conservative British establishment.

The overwhelming victory of Mr. Jeremy Corbyn, other independent candidates, and the Green Party shows that there is still electoral space for the revival of alternative and progressive politics in Britain. Mass mobilisation of all working people can ensure the defeat of conservative values and halt the forward march of right-wing politics in Britain, establishing a society based on peace and prosperity for all in this small island nation.

Journalist Jonathan Power has a new book, scheduled for release in October. A foreign affairs journalist for 60 years, Jonathan Power is a renowned journalist, filmmaker, and broadcaster, best known for his weekly column and commentary on foreign affairs that appeared in the International Herald Tribune (now The New York Times) for 17 years.

Power has probably been published on the opinion pages of the principal US newspapers more than any other European. With a global following, his column is syndicated to newspapers worldwide. He is also the author of eight books on foreign affairs, including “Like Water on Stone: The Story of Amnesty International”, published by Penguin.

He has travelled all over the world, writing, besides his column in the International Herald Tribune and the New York Times, long articles for Encounter and Prospect magazines, eight books on foreign affairs and many TV and radio documentaries, mainly for the BBC, one of which won the silver medal at the Venice Film Festival.

He has interviewed over 70 of the world’s most famous and influential presidents, prime ministers, and political and literary icons including Ignacio Lula da Silva, Indira Gandhi, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Georgi Arbatov, Sonia Gandhi, Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt, Olusegun Obasanjo, Julius Nyerere, James Baldwin, Andy Young, Jesse Jackson, Manmohan Singh and Paul McCartney.

Notably, Power was the first journalist to report at length in English on the trafficking of African migrants across the Sahara and into France. This inspired his first novel, “The Human Flow”—a love story set against the backdrop of the migrant flow from West Africa to Paris and London.

In addition to his writing, Power has consulted for organizations such as the Aspen Institute, the International Red Cross, the World Council of Churches, and the International Fund for Agricultural Development, UNICEF, and the Catholic Church’s Commission for Justice and Peace in England and Wales.

Prior to earning his Master’s degree at the University of Wisconsin, Power worked in Tanzania, where he provided advice to peasant farmers while living in a local village. He later joined the staff of Martin Luther King, living in the West Side ghetto, working with Jesse Jackson in the “End the Slums” campaign in Chicago. Notably, Power was the first journalist to report at length in English on the trafficking of African migrants across the Sahara and into France. [IDN-InDepthNews]