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As has been the case after every terrorist attack during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s time in power, the attacks on the Crocus City Hall in Moscow in March and on churches and synagogues in Dagestan more recently have sparked calls for ending the moratorium on the death penalty (see EDM, March 26, June 25).

Moscow has officially observed the measure since 1996 (Interfax, July 1). This time, these calls have acquired greater significance as the Russian Constitutional Court argues that such a step cannot occur without an amendment to the constitution. That, in turn, cannot happen without a referendum, a position Russian politicians have seconded (Vedomosti, June 26;Argumenti.ru, June 29). If such a referendum is held, it would almost certainly involve other constitutional changes as well. This was the case when Putin sought to amend the constitution in 2020 to allow him to remain in office well into the 2030s. Simultaneously, he included other changes to Russia’s basic law (see EDM, July 8, 2020). The likelihood that there will be more terrorist attacks in Russia in the near future means that pressure is building on the Kremlin for a referendum on the death penalty and other issues (RBC; Business-gazeta.ru, July 1).  

Precisely what those constitutional changes might entail is uncertain, as the Kremlin has studiously remained above the current fray (Vedomosti, March 25). At least some changes may come in an unexpected form—namely, proposals for how Russia should be reformedafterPutin leaves the scene. This is precisely the area where some of the fundamental problems now facing the Russian Federation are being discussed most fully. That is even more likely because these alternative visions of the future are driven by many of Putin’s same concerns and because of the criticism these proposals have received. Such commentaries suggest the authors of these ideas have either gone too far or not far enough, thus giving Putin and his team the possibility of selecting from them without appearing to have accepted any of the proposals as such (The Moscow Times, June 26,July 1).

The most comprehensive of these opposition constitutional proposals has been offered by three Russian social theorists of the Moscow-based Institute for Global Reconstitution, Artemy Magun, Grigory Yudin, and Yevgeny Roshchin (Moscow Institute for Global Reconstitution, accessed July 2). The proposal calls for a wholesale restructuring of the Russian federal system that would eliminate existing republics and put 20 to 30 super regions in their place, which the authors say would provide the basis for genuine federalism. As two of the sharpest critiques of their ideas note, the three commentators, who ostensibly seek to democratize and decentralize the country, ignore the concentration of power and wealth in Moscow that would vitiate the impact of any redrawing of the map mentioned above. Such an act could trigger disaster for the country and thus continue rather than depart from Putin’s longstanding approach.

In aMoscow Timescommentary on July 1, retired Russian diplomat Boris Bondarev pointed out that, in recent days, “ever-more documents are being published that represent responses to the sacramental question: how are we to organize Russia?” He added that a future referendum could well be called upon to address these constitutional issues (The Moscow Times, July 1). Earlier, on June 27, independent Moscow commentator Sergey Shelin made similar arguments, though he was even more critical. Shelin suggested that redividing the country will not help in the current situation and may be extremely dangerous, provoking precisely those citizens the Kremlin wants to ensure it controls. He asserted that the center should instead focus both now and in the future on developing municipal institutions where real democracy is far more likely than at the regional and republic levels (The Moscow Times, June 26).

Such criticism might seem to preclude the Kremlin’s use of these ideas. Shelin’s critique, however, shows why that might not be the case. It also highlights how Putin could use a referendum to change the Russian system in ways that, on the surface, would resemble some of the opposition’s proposals. At present, the Russian Constitution makes the regions and republics the most important elements of the federal system, something the Institute for Global Reconstitution’s proposed replacement constitution continues. Nevertheless, a referendum could elevate the status of urban entities formed from above as done up to now and as the institute proposes for the future relative to existing federal subjects. That would be fully consistent with Putin’s current policies but represents perhaps a fatal blow to federalism as such (Window on Eurasia, May 6). In short, the Kremlin leader may draw on the arguments of his opponents and their critics in pursuit of his own centralizing agenda.

Putin has an additional reason for moving in this direction. In recent months, the federal subjects have been undercutting his migration policies by adopting very different approaches. The metropolises and the Muslim republics have remained welcoming to migrant workers from Central Asia, while the predominantly ethnic Russian regions have increasingly moved to restrict their entrance and limit their activities. According to Moscow analyst Aleksandr Shustov, this divergence is increasingly dividing the country and threatens its stability (Ritmeurasia.ru, June 22).

Putin could well reject amending the constitution, confident that he can ignore its provisions when it suits him and use repression to keep the federal subjects in line. However, as the recent experience with migrants shows and as proposals akin to the Institute for Global Reconstitution’s reminder, such tactics alone do not always work. Consequently, the Kremlin leader may see constitutional changes that would reduce the status of the republics and regions while elevating that of the municipalities as being in his interest, which is certainly consistent with his current policies.

Additionally, winning more support by allowing for the reimposition of the death penalty might be in the Kremlin’s interest. He may also welcome the chance to have the Russian Constitution named after him, much as Stalin did in the 1930s. Thus, just as was the case four years ago, focusing on only one issue—be it term limits in 2020 or the death penalty now—obscures Putin’s broader agenda, an agenda only constitutional changes can ensure will be put in place. That, at the very least, is what opposition proposals for the country and their critics may prevent.  

• This article was published at The Jamestown Foundation

By Wanjiru Njoya

In this age of relativism, where one often hears reference to “your truth” and “my truth,” there are so many varying interpretations of truth that the concept of truth itself seems devoid of meaning. It is fashionable to see the concept of truth as indistinguishable from opinions or preferences.

For example, Mari Fitzduff writes that, “for many of us, far from our beliefs being “true,” they are actually born out of a particular social context, allied to physiological needs such as a differing neural sensitivity to threats and the greater certainty that a group can provide. Thus, beliefs are often what is termed “groupish” rather than necessarily true.”

The task of deciding which group has the “true” version of facts is then left to expert fact-checkers who will pronounce on what is true or false.

In that light, it is easy to see why those who update dictionaries seek to reflect the common usage of words, rather than to reflect what is true. Dictionary definitions do not purport to be true nor do they claim to reflect any underlying universal truth underpinning the words defined; they are simply statements of how words are conventionally used. For example, theCambridge Dictionarydefines a woman as “an adult wholives and identifies as femalethough they may have been said to have a different sex at birth”—that is how the word “woman” is now commonly used, and being defined in that way by the dictionary does not mean that anyone who lives and identifies as female is, in truth, a woman.

Aristotle famously defined truth as facts corresponding with reality: “To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true.” In “Mises and the Diminished a Priori,”David Gordondefines an a priori proposition as

“a proposition that can be known to be true just by thinking about it: you don’t need to examine the world to see whether it’s true. “2 + 2 = 4” is a priori true: once you understand what the proposition says, you can grasp that it’s true. You don’t need to keep counting objects to see whether the claimed equality holds true.“

What does it mean to describe a proposition as true in that sense? In describing praxeological axioms as true, the word “truth” is deployed to mean that “if A implies B, and A is true, then B must also be true.” Science strives for accuracy and tests its propositions empirically or logically to ensure that they are accurate and valid and seeks to establish the correct facts. In ordinary language, we say it istruethat 2 + 2 = 4, but “truth” in that context only means accuracy. It expresses a scientific principle that is true in the sense that equating 2 + 2 with 4 is the only formula that works. Anyone who accepts the suggestion of decolonized mathematics that 2 + 2 = 5, or indeed any number we want, would soon find their planes falling out of the sky and their infrastructure collapsing.

Beyond that, the question of what it would mean to say that science strives for “truth” is contested among philosophers. Indeed, many philosophers would say that there is no ultimate truth, in that what is said to be true is always open to question. InThe Intellectuals and Socialism, Friedrich von Hayek explains why intellectuals are inclined to question everything:

Orthodoxy of any kind, any pretense that a system of ideas is final and must be unquestioningly accepted as a whole, is the one view which of necessity antagonizes all intellectuals, whatever their views on particular issues. Any system which judges men by the completeness of their conformity to a fixed set of opinions, by their “soundness” or the extent to which they can be relied upon to hold approved views on all points, deprives itself of a support without which no set of ideas can maintain its influence in modern society. The ability to criticize accepted views, to explore new vistas and to experience with new conceptions, provides the atmosphere without which the intellectual cannot breathe.

InHuman Action, Ludwig von Mises also explains that neither the natural nor social sciences are concerned with truth in the philosophical sense: “Granted that science cannot give us truth—and who knows what truth really means—at any rate it is certain that it works in leading us to success.” Thus, praxeology, the science of human action, does not seek the truth in the grand “meaning of life” sense that characterizes many philosophical perspectives and perhaps all religions. In Mises’s view, praxeology does not “claim to reveal information about the true, objective, and absolute meaning of life.” Instead, praxeology “is neutral with regard to all judgments of value and the choice of ultimate ends. Its task is not to approve or to disapprove, but only to establish facts.”

Many liberals are also wary of the concept of “truth” and avoid it altogether not only because they are relativists who reject the notion of objective truth, but also because the concept of “truth” is associated in popular discourse with things peoplemustdo. Many people think that if something is true, then it follows logically that others must be forced to do it. For example, they would think that as soon as it is established to betruethat something is harmful to health, it follows that it must be banned to force people to promote good health. Thus, the enemies of liberty often march under the banner of truth, armed with true principles about what is needed to promote human health. Liberty falls by the wayside. It is true that smoking is harmful to health, and on that basis, the Tory Party in the United Kingdom wants to ban it. As Rothbard warned:

And remember, if today they come for the smoker, tomorrow they will come for you. If today they grab your cigarette, tomorrow they will seize your junk food, your carbohydrates, your yummy but “empty” calories … Are you ready for the Left Nutritional Kingdom, with everyone forced to confine his food to yoghurt and tofu and bean sprouts? Are you ready to be confined in a cage, to make sure that your diet is perfect, and that you get the prescribed Compulsory Exercise?

Rothbard warns against this “neo-Puritanical” combining of the theological quest for truth with the statist quest for power: the power of the state to tell everyone what they must do.

In the postmodern age, far from being devoted to the pursuit of truth, statists promote the ideology that truth is anything you want and that each of us can therefore have our own version of the truth. They are devoted not to the pursuit of truth but to the version of “truth” that they think will promote their political goals. As Lew Rockwellobserves: “In class after class, the postmodern message is the same: what we call truth is wholly subjective, what we call science is merely the momentary professional consensus, and what we call reality is a fiction made up to sooth our psychological need for order in the universe.”

Far from being designed to embrace the truth, postmodernism rejects the very notion that anything is true.

• About the author: Dr. Wanjiru Njoya is a Scholar-in-Residence for the Mises Institute. She is the author of Economic Freedom and Social Justice (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), Redressing Historical Injustice (Palgrave Macmillan, 2023, with David Gordon) and “A Critique of Equality Legislation in Liberal Market Economies” (Journal of Libertarian Studies, 2021).
• Source: This article was published by the Mises Institute

The bureaucrats of the administrative state have enjoyed much discretion under the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision inChevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.(1984). In that case, the Court developed the following test when dealing with agency interpretations of statutes they administer:

“First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. (italics added)”

So, the crux of theChevrondoctrine is that if a statute is ambiguous, the Court defers to the agency so long as the agency has adopted a reasonable construction. In the mid-1980s, the decisionwas not seenas a landmark decision. Those who did pay attention saw it as part of judicial restraint—the Court deferring to experts in executive branch agencies. But as the administrative state grew, the impact ofChevrongrew. The agencies enjoyed more and more discretion in the realm of regulation. Those desiring to curtail the administrative state argued thatChevronhad to go. InLoper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, decided last week,Chevronopponents got their wish.

The vehicle used by the majority was the Administrative Procedures Act, whichrequiresthat a “reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.” TheLoper Brightmajority reasoned that “agency interpretations of statutes—like agency interpretations of the Constitution—are not entitled to deference. . . . The text of the APA means what it says.”

The majority also argued that courts are better suited than agencies to interpret statutes. Courts frequently employ the tools of statutory construction in their everyday work and are thus accustomed to grappling with the best interpretation.

The Court concluded its analysis as follows:

The experience of the last 40 years has thus done little to rehabilitate Chevron. It has only made clear that Chevron’s fictional presumption of congressional intent was always unmoored from the APA’s demand that courts exercise independent judgment in construing statutes administered by agencies. At best, our intricate Chevron doctrine has been nothing more than a distraction from the question that matters: Does the statute authorize the challenged agency action? And at worst, it has required courts to violate the APA by yielding to an agency the express responsibility, vested in “the reviewing court,” to “decide all relevant questions of law” and “interpret . . . statutory provisions.”

WhileLoper Brightis a setback for the administrative state, it is not a silver bullet. In a sense, we have traded unelected bureaucrats for unelected judges in construingcertain statutes. While a judicial review of agency interpretationsis welcomed, we fool ourselves if we believe salvationis foundin unelected judges. The modern judiciary—with its love for policymaking rather than declaration of preexisting law—is a problem itself. While a more rigorous judicial review might be an ingredient in the recipe for reform, it is not the answer.

We must always remember that the very existence of the administrative state raises structural problems.

The benefits of separation of powers and bicameralismare lostwith the administrative state. When the power, for example, to regulate securities is concentrated in a federal agency, this one entity exercises all legislative, executive, and judicial power. Such a concentration, the Framers recognized, was the very definition of tyranny. Restraint of governmentis rejectedfor empowerment of government. Moreover, the benefits of bicameralism are lost. An agency rule does not have to pass through two different bodies (the House and Senate) where compromise or a flat-out refusal are possibilities. The agencies are echo chambers bereft of the limitations and the purposeful push toward deliberation found in the tri-partite design.

The administrative state is also contrary to popular sovereignty. Since the people have never transferred power to a fourth branch of government, the administrative state isultra vires. The principals (the people) have never authorized the administrative state (the agent) to act on their behalf. Under acknowledged concepts of agency law, arrangements made by an agent are binding on the principal only if it is within the authority actually granted or reasonably apparent. In the American case, we look in vain at the Constitution of 1787 and its amendments for a grant of power or a reasonable implication. It is simply not there. Thus, the claims that the experts in the bureaucracy can bind the people are false. The first principles of the American Revolution counsel against this usurpation.

While there is much to cheer in Loper Bright, the administrative state remains a constitutional problem. Loper Bright is a nice first step but is not a panacea for what ails us.

• This article was published at The Beacon