Day: June 22, 2024
There has been much talk of a “far-right surge” in the European Parliament. For example,;BBC;ran a headline, “Far right eyes Europe vote surge…,” shortly before the elections. On June 5th,;Politico;reported, “As the far right surges, this week’s European Parliament election will reorder the Continent’s political landscape.” One of CNN’s;post-election headlines;ran, “Far right surges in European Parliament elections but center still holds.” These sorts of headlines may make for exciting reading, but they reveal a profound lack of understanding of what is really going on politically in Europe.
First, while you will always find pockets of far-right thinking in Europe’s political system, the notion that new and emerging political parties on the right are generally “far-right” is simply false. For example, if you go to the webpage of one of the major emerging political groups that is;supposed;to be part of the “far-right surge,” the;European Conservatives and Reformists, you are greeted not by neo-Nazi slogans, but by commitments to “safeguarding citizens and borders,” “respecting the rights and sovereignty of member States,” “protecting the global environment at a cost we can afford,” “improving the union’s efficiency and effectiveness,” and “cooperating with global partners.”;
If you peruse the website of the Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia), the political party associated with the supposedly “far-right” Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, in search of reactionary and extremist ideas, you will be deeply disappointed. The website displays a fairly humdrum list of policies to promote economic growth, a safer Europe, a better health system, policies to support families and boost the birth rate, opposition to bio-surveillance (“green pass”), and the need to combat illegal immigration.;
Here, for example, is a translation of one paragraph from the Brothers of Italy’s European;electoral platform, concerning immigration:
It must be Europe that decides who enters its territory and not criminal organizations or external actors interested in using migratory flows as a weapon to destabilize governments. Immigration must be framed within a context of legality and addressed in a structural manner. Saving lives is a duty, as is protecting those entitled to asylum, but the model favored by the left—characterized by indiscriminate acceptance and never-implemented redistributions (of migrants)—has proven to be a failure.
Anyone who describes these sorts of policies as “far-right” is either deeply deluded or simply determined to discredit their political adversaries by any means available. Yet this sort of lazy, dishonest, and demonising treatment of the new right in Europe, which mostly ignores the;actual;electoral platforms of new-right parties, is now standard fare in mainstream Western media.;
The term “far-right” should be reserved for political groups that oppose constitutionalism, are rabidly racist, or want to institute an authoritarian State akin to fascist Italy or Nazi Germany. But instead, the term has degenerated into a cheap label used to discredit political conservatives.;
This label is being attached willy-nilly to people who take political positions that are not in vogue among those who self-identify as “Woke” and/or “progressive,” even if these same positions were considered fairly conventional a couple of decades ago: People are labelled “far-right” if they defend the idea of a national identity, want an orderly immigration process, advocate for laws that are tough on crime, believe in traditional marriage and biological markers for gender; or believe that civil rights like informed consent are still relevant during a pandemic.
If you really want to understand why new parties are emerging on the right, throwing around the “far-right” label will not get you very far. What is really happening is that the traditional right-wing parties, many of which are represented by Europe’s largest political group, the;European People’s Party, have jumped ship on a lot of traditional right-wing commitments, creating a vacuum to be filled by the “new right.”
For example, rule of law and limited government have been replaced, under the watch of mainstream “right-wing” parties, with vaccine passports, lockdowns, intrusive hate speech laws, crippling “green” taxes and regulations, and the Orwellian idea that we should clamp down on “disinformation,” lest citizens be exposed to “dangerous” ideas.
The old right has overseen a Europe of uncontrolled and disorderly immigration, with no proper vetting of migrants and little consideration for the impact of large-scale migration on local communities. And the old commitment to the right to law and order has given way to a palpable complacency and inaction in the face of a growing crime problem in Europe’s cities.
This has created a pent-up political demand for parties prepared to avow traditional right-wing commitments, such as law and order, orderly immigration, freedom of speech, pro-family taxation and welfare policies, and limited government.;
In some cases, this political vacuum has been filled with egregiously xenophobic, racist, and authoritarian rhetoric. But in many other cases, parties dismissed as “far-right” are simply questioning the wisdom of open border policies, exposing abuses of the refugee system, defending free speech, and trying to moderate the green agenda so that it is not so oppressive for farmers and ordinary citizens.
If having serious concerns about immigration and being opposed to far-reaching environmental regulations is considered “extreme,” then it appears that being “extreme” is now pretty normal in Europe: one;recent opinion;poll shows that immigration is one of the leading concerns for European voters, after the economy and war. In addition, the abysmal performance of the Greens in these EU elections—dropping from 71 to 53 seats—suggests that the Greens’ enthusiasm for ambitious climate regulations is not shared by many voters.
In short, two of the central concerns of the new right—uncontrolled immigration and excessively burdensome environmental regulations—are actually shared by a sizeable number of European voters.
Finally, there was no “surge” to speak of among the new and emerging parties on the right: more like a moderate consolidation.;
The new right in Europe is still significantly outnumbered in the EU Parliament by centrists and leftists. For example, the;European Conservatives and Reformist;and;Identity and Democracy;groups, which are the most organized sections of the new right, grew from 118 to 131 seats in a 720-member parliament. The;European People’s Party, with 189 MEPs, has enough allies on the left to continue to maintain a commanding presence in the parliament.
The rise of alternative-right parties in these EU elections is thus vastly overstated. Nonetheless, the steady consolidation of the new right, combined with the decisive triumph of Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National over Macron’s Renaissance party in these elections, shows that there is a growing appetite among European voters for candidates and parties that make stricter border controls and scaling back environmental regulations a major part of their electoral platforms.
This does not fundamentally upend the balance of power in the European Parliament. However, it does suggest a rightward shift in public sentiment in Europe, and this will inevitably have an impact on the policymaking process. Most notably, we are likely to see “centre-right” parties like the European People’s Party adopting a softer line on the environment, and a harder line on immigration, going forward. Anything else would put their own political future in jeopardy.
- This article appeared at Brownstone Institute and is republished from the author’s Substack
By David Camroux and Earl Wang
If the purpose of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s European tour in May 2024 was to rewarm increasingly frosty relations with the European Union and weaken transatlantic ties, it was a failure. The European Union’s announcement of duties on Chinese electric vehicles (EVs) and the anti-Chinese tone of the G7 Leaders’ Communique less than a month later made this clear.
Three countries were carefully chosen by China for Xi’s European tour. In France, Xi celebrated;60 years of diplomatic relations. The two sides leveraged the occasion to sign;cooperation agreements and letters of intent;across the environment, aviation, agriculture, cultural exchange and more. As a;committed supporter;of the European Commission’s;anti-subsidy investigation into Chinese EVs, France was seen by China as a key interlocutor to lobby against potential import duties.
Serbia has been an EU candidate since 2012. Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic’s;EU-sceptic and Russia-friendly stances;have complicated EU–Serbian relations, and cosying up to China is rather counter-productive for Belgrade. But for Xi the visit was, above all, an occasion for;China to denounce the United States;in foreign affairs by commemorating the 25th anniversary of NATO’s bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.
Hungary is an outlier in EU foreign policy. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban is;friendly with both Russia;and;China, and;Hungary was the first European country;to sign an agreement on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with China. China is now the largest foreign investor in Hungary — accounting for;75 per cent;of Budapest’s total foreign investment — especially in sectors such as lithium-ion batteries and EVs.
In Paris, Xi had a bilateral meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron, followed by a trilateral meeting with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.
Two contentious subjects were on the table for both meetings — the;Russian invasion of Ukraine;and;EU–China economic and trade relations. Macron and von der Leyen called on China to exert its influence on Russia to help end the war in Ukraine and stated that they count on China’s commitment not to supply military or dual-use assets to Russia. But Xi remained inflexible in;refusing to address the requests, maintaining that China had and would continue to act as a peacemaker. Instead, Russia and China;reinforced their strategic partnership;in mid-May 2024.
China looks favourably on the more strategically autonomous Europe;advocated by Macron. But Beijing has deluded itself in thinking that Macron’s autonomy is an echo of former French president Charles de Gaulle’s strategy 60 years ago, when France established diplomatic relations with Beijing and withdrew from the NATO command structure. In reality, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has given NATO — and France — a renewed sense of purpose. A more autonomous and capable Europe is now seen;to strengthen the transatlantic alliance.
Economic and trade relations were also discussed, spanning fairness and reciprocity, state subsidies, over-capacity and;de-risking;as well as;economic security.;Xi responded;that China is against ‘de-coupling’ and pushed back on the idea of a ‘Chinese over-capacity problem’. ;
Xi’s approach in Serbia and Hungary was drastically different from in Paris. In Belgrade, Xi stressed China’s ‘ironclad friendship’ with Serbia. The two sides;upgraded their bilateral relations;from a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ to ‘building a China–Serbia community with a shared future in the new era’.
Xi insisted on the need for continuous cooperation on the BRI and the 14+1 cooperation mechanism in response to the European Union’s attempts to confront China’s ‘divide and rule’ tactics through its;Global Gateway strategy. Xi also ‘[rejected] hegemonism and power politics’ as a foreign policy signal to both the United States and the European Union.
In Budapest, China and Hungary upgraded their bilateral relations to an ‘all-weather comprehensive strategic partnership for the new era’. Besides touching on cooperation on the BRI and the 14+1 mechanism, the;Xi–Orban meeting statement;included two important aspects.
The first concerned Xi’s appreciation of Hungary’s support of Chinese policies on Hong Kong, human rights and Taiwan. Hungary had;blocked the European Union’s unanimous statementcriticising China’s implementation of the National Security Law in Hong Kong and inked a highly controversial;agreement with China on joint police patrols.
The second aspect was that Orban concurred with Xi on the over-capacity concerns raised by Macron and von der Leyen and;the need for ‘de-risking’. As an EU national capital, Budapest has been an obstacle for unity in the European Union’s foreign policy towards China.
After Xi’s European tour, the;European Union announced;provisional duties of between 17.4 per cent and 38.1 per cent on Chinese EVs, on top of the;standard 10 per cent duty;on imported EVs. Three days later at the;G7 Summit in Italy, Canada, Japan and the United States joined European participants in condemning Chinese subsidies and over-production, and also warned of potential sanctions on Chinese entities ‘enabling’ Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The Europeans also highlighted serious concerns regarding Taiwan and the South China Sea.
Beijing’s tit-for-tat approach — anti-dumping investigations against;EU pork;after;cognac;— will hardly contribute to warmer EU-China relations. More importantly, China has failed to understand that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a;watershed moment for Europe. It marks the end of a purely ‘normative power Europe’ and signals the arrival of a Europe;incorporating;realpolitik;thinking;— shifting towards a more pragmatic and realist approach. Xi’s selective tour of European capitals did not change that fundamental adjustment.
About the authors:
- David Camroux is honorary senior research fellow and adjunct professor at the Centre for International Studies (CERI) Sciences Po. He is also the Co-coordinator of the Franco-German Observatory of the Indo-Pacific.
- Earl Wang is doctoral researcher and adjunct lecturer at CERI Sciences Po. He is also a researcher in the Franco-German Observatory of the Indo-Pacific and is associated with the Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM).
Source: This article was published by East Asia Forum
By Soham Patil
In our modern world, most states are;democracies;or at least call themselves;“democratic.”;The adoption of democracy is hailed as one of;humanity’s;greatest achievements. Once upon a time, humanity broke out of the shackles of monarchies and has never looked back since. Nowadays, all citizens in democratic countries are free and safe from despots. Except, that is far from the truth.
Democratic systems have been around for a long time.;Ancient Greece;comes to mind as the most prominent example of democracy in antiquity. While modern democracies are wildly different from the ones in ancient Athens, they are still susceptible to the pitfalls applicable to all democracies.
Democracies violate freedom of association. Proponents of democracies often argue that everyone is given a vote and that this equates to fair and just representation. However, this binds the citizenry into the;social contract;since they are forced to abide by the results of the democracy even if they did not consent to a government. Simply giving everyone a vote is not valid restitution for forcing them to abide by the rules of the state. This hasn’t stopped democracies from attempting to manufacture consent to their social contract by claiming that a right to vote is sufficient as consent. If four thieves sneak into a house and then outvote the homeowner to transfer possession of the home to them, the result could hardly be termed just. Democracies aren’t infallible and do not justify decisions as moral based solely on the will of the majority.
Further, democracies tend toward the redistribution of property when it becomes politically popular. This can happen in many forms. Often, democracy is used to justify the expropriation of property from the well-off and economically competent to members or citizens who are more amenable to the cause of a political party. Every citizen is liable to become a victim if they fall on the wrong side of democracy. This explains the extreme politicization of our lives. Being a peaceful, agreeable person is no longer enough.
It is also often argued that democratic systems are a representation of freedom since there aren’t rigid ruler/subject hierarchies as in a monarchy. Previously, under a monarchy, the ruling class was well-known, and all other citizens were subjects. Thus, a clear distinction between those who rule and those who do not rule was made. Supporters of democracy frequently contend that all citizens are rulers in some way because of their ability to vote. By this logic, no rights violations occur in democracies because all citizens are a part of the state. Any property stolen from a citizen was consented to because they are a part of the democratic system. This is fallacious because citizens have rights that exist independent of the state. These rights are known as;natural rights;and cannot be granted by the state. They can only be violated. Democracies do not escape moral culpability through elections.
It is clear that democracy is prone to tyranny. Such is the case not only when democracy is;“done wrong”;but almost always as democracies will inevitably break down into a competition of self-interested groups. Despite these failings, democracy is still presented as the political system that ought to be followed by;“free” countries. The reason for democracy’s;good public perception is that it blends in nicely with the progressive dogma of equality and inclusiveness. Since all votes are equal, an all-inclusive harmonious society should form akin to that of a;rainbow nation.
Unfortunately, liberty is incompatible with equality in most cases. It should be no surprise that democracies routinely violate natural rights in the quest for the establishment of a more equal society. By thriving upon envy and greed, democracies erode the moral foundation of a society. While the intentions of democracies are noble, their results are not. A free order will be one based upon the freedom of association and property rights rather than democracy.
- About the author: Soham Patil is a high school senior at Symbiosis International School. He is passionate about Austrian Economics and Philosophy.
- Source: This article was published by the Mises Institute
By Ghadi Joudah
In regions with limited rainfall, desalination is a practical means of sourcing plentiful water for farming and human consumption. However, the process of turning seawater into freshwater is notoriously energy intensive.
Indeed, desalination is a significant contributor to carbon emissions in the water-scarce Arabian Peninsula. That is why Saudi Arabia has been investing in green energy sources to power its desalination plants.
“Using renewable energies for desalination is crucial as it contributes to reducing the operation’s carbon footprint and water production costs,” Sultan Al-Rajhi, spokesperson for the Saudi Water Authority, told Arab News.
Due to the scarcity of freshwater resources in a region with a rapidly growing population, seawater desalination is essential to keep pace with demand, he added.
“Saudi Arabia depends on desalination of seawater due to the nature of the desert climate, in which the presence of surface water and natural rivers is rare,” Al-Rajhi said.
In fact, desalination accounts for about 75 percent of the Kingdom’s water supply.
“Therefore, investment is being made in desalination of seawater to meet the demand for population and economic growth witnessed in the Gulf region as a whole.”
Each year, the Kingdom requires an average of 5.5 billion cubic meters of freshwater. The need for water is especially high during the Hajj and Umrah seasons, when well over a million pilgrims arrive from around the world.
Home to more than 37 million people, the Kingdom is the world’s third-largest consumer of water per head of population. Agriculture alone accounts for around 84 percent of total water consumption.
Desalination is a complex process that involves removing salt and other impurities from seawater. Since the process requires a significant amount of energy, adopting renewables such as solar to power these facilities has become a top priority.
“To develop climate-resilient infrastructure for sustainable desalination, Saudi Arabia should prioritize innovative and renewable technologies,” Abdulaziz Daghestani, area sales director of water utilities and country director at Grundfos, told Arab News.
Grundfos is a Danish company that is working with regional states to provide innovative pumping solutions for water supply, wastewater management, heating and cooling, and industrial processes.;
According to Daghestani, integrating advanced monitoring systems can help optimize desalination operations and enhance efficiency.
“Using real-time data and analytics, we can improve water management practices and make timely adjustments to meet the varying increasing demand for human consumption and agriculture,” he said.
The Qatrah program, which means “droplet” in Arabic, was launched by the Ministry of Environment, Water, and Agriculture in 2020, and aims to reduce excess water usage by eliminating waste, and encouraging the conservation and reuse of existing freshwater.
Its objective is to lower daily per-capita water consumption from 263 liters to 150 liters by 2030. To do this, the ministry has created a unified framework, known as the National Water Strategy, for the country.
However, despite these efforts to improve the sustainability of water systems, desalination remains a crucial means of meeting water demand, making the adoption of clean energy sources and efficient production techniques a critical priority.
Al-Khafji Desalination Plant, located in the Kingdom’s Eastern Province, is the world’s largest solar-powered water desalination project, providing the region’s water requirements through an innovative and environmentally friendly approach.
The plant can generate up to 90,000 cubic meters of freshwater per day using innovative technology created by the King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology.;
Its new Solar Saline Water Reverse Osmosis method uses a process known as ultra-filtration during the pre-treatment phase.
The method involves forcing seawater through a semipermeable membrane that only allows water molecules to pass, while blocking the salt and other contaminants. The resulting purified water is then collected for distribution.
Since its launch in 2018, more than 7 million cubic meters of freshwater produced by the plant have already been utilized.
“Using reverse osmosis technology is considered to have the lowest rates of carbon emissions as a result of the increase in energy efficiency through the development of this field in recent years,” said Al-Rajhi.
“The rate of carbon emissions per cubic meter in some desalination systems has been reduced to 91 percent compared with thermal desalination systems.”
Solar is not the only source of renewable energy that can be adopted to power the desalination process.
“This is in addition to the prospective use of hydraulic turbines to convert the kinetic energy resulting from the flow of water into electricity to generate clean energy,” said Al-Rajhi.
This shift toward renewables not only addresses the high energy costs associated with desalination but also supports Saudi Arabia’s commitment to sustainable development.;
Inger Andersen, executive director of the UN Environment Programme, has praised the Kingdom’s water conservation agenda, which is part and parcel with its environmental mission, the Saudi Green Initiative.
Saudi Arabia is correct to prioritize “not over-extracting and being very wise around environmental management.”
“That is why we are quite impressed by the Saudi Green Initiative,” she told Arab News.
This transition to cleaner energy sources reflects a strategic decision to enhance the Kingdom’s energy efficiency and reduce its dependence on fossil fuels, while simultaneously addressing the challenges posed by climate change.
Integrating renewable energy into desalination processes marks a significant step toward achieving a more sustainable and environmentally-conscious approach to water production.
Categories
NPR News: 06-22-2024 7PM EDT
By Rahim Rahimov
On June 2, Speaker of the Georgian Parliament Shalva Papuashvili signed into law the controversial bill “On Transparency of Foreign Influence” as the parliament overrode Salome Zourabichvili’s presidential veto (see EDM, May;13,;22). The Russian-style “foreign agents” bill was originally withdrawn in 2023 under intense public pressure but was reintroduced by the ruling Georgian Dream party in 2024 (Csf.ge, February 21, 2023;;1tv.ge;;Venice.ceo.int;;Imedi.ge, May 21;;Rustavi2.ge;;JAM-news, June 3).The law on foreign influence and, more importantly, the aggressive way in which it was pushed through have sharpened social divisions and fueled anti-government protests. The law reflects a series of controversial policies that the Georgian Dream government has forced on civil society, including laws on family values, offshore transfers, amendments to the media law, and changes to the electoral code.
Analysis of the recent developments highlights Georgia’s growing confrontation with a civilizational dilemma. The law on foreign influence is not only a manifestation of the domestic struggle for power in Georgia but also a reflection of two competing world views—a democratic, pro-Western movement, on the one hand, and a non-democratic perspective, on the other (see EDM, April;9,;24,;May 1). In a political sense, how informal rules and practices as well as cultural norms and structures play out in the struggle for power are the main distinction between the two predominant views. Georgian civil society, which is the primary target of the Georgian Dream law, currently performs its traditional function in countering the concentration of power in only a few hands as the division of power has become merely formal and opposition parties are weak and fragmented. Defining the level and scale of informal practices and norms currently at play is crucial in determining whether a particular political regime is democratic or non-democratic.
The informal practices in today’s Georgia are epitomized by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishivili, who has been dubbed the country’s de facto leader though he does not hold public office (see EDM,;January 18,;February 6). Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze’s lamentations that Ivanishvili’s $2 billion assets are effectively under Western sanctions can be interpreted in two, albeit not mutually exclusive ways. First, Kobakhidze’s statements primarily attribute current tensions with the West, including the adoption of the foreign agents law, to Ivanishvili’s business interests. Second, the premier’s words downplay the Russian factor in Tbilisi’s decision-making, as the ruling Georgian Dream party does not want to appear to be directly associated with Moscow (Agenda.ge, December 30, 2023;;Civil.ge, April 29;;Sakartvelosambebi.ge, May 13;;Gov.ge, May 14;;Transparency.ge, accessed June 18). The split in the country’s geopolitical orientation threatens to destabilize the domestic situation further in the face of upcoming parliamentary elections in October.
Georgian Dream Feigns Continued European Course
On December 13, 2023, the European Union officially granted candidate status to Georgia (see;EDM, November 14, 2023). In an immediate response, Irakli Garibashvili, then-prime minister and current Georgian Dream party chair, stated, “The future of Georgia lies in the European Union, and there is no alternative to it. Our nation and my government expect that EU member states will take a strategic and forward-looking decision this week that will firmly anchor Georgia … with the family of European democracies” (Garibashvili.ge, December 13, 2023). Two weeks later, Georgian Dream created the position of honorary chair with Ivanishvili assuming the “ceremonial” position.
Since then, the ruling party has taken a completed U-turn (see EDM,;February 6,;April 9,;May 1). Illustratively, Garibashvili soon changed tone, remarking: “We are not ready to become a member country” (Interpressnews.ge, April 20). Civil society organizations in Georgia have tried to mitigate the damage done by government rhetoric pushing back on EU membership. They continue to contribute to promote European values and practices within Georgian society to ensure that the country, even informally, remains on a European course.
The Georgian Orthodox Church, however, has opposed many of civil society’s efforts. The church itself enjoys widespread moral authority throughout Georgia, and that role is recognized and enshrined in the country’s constitution. Yet, while the constitution recognizes the Georgian Orthodox Church’s special role in the country’s history, it does call for the church to operate independent from the state (Matsne.gov.ge, June 29, 2020;;Caucasuswatch.de, February 24, 2022;;JAM-news, January 30, 2023; see;EDM, March 13;;Georgefox.edu, accessed June 19).
The church is historically linked to and enjoys warm relations with the Russian Orthodox Church. Indeed, the Patriarchate of the Georgian Orthodox Church has not recognized the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine granted by the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople in 2019, which made the Ukrainian church independent from the Russian Orthodox Church (JAM-news, April 24, 2022;;Sova.news, March 27, 2023). According to Georgian scholars Beka Mindiashvili and Gigi Ugulava, the Russian and Georgian churches are connected through the shared ideology of “political orthodoxy” (Ostwest.space, November 28, 2023).
As such, church officials have publicly supported the law on foreign influence (Interpressnews.ge;;Facebook.com/sazupatriarchate, April 27). Incidentally, former Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze recalled in his memoirs that Ivanishvili made donations to renovate the Sameba church in Tbilisi, apparently in a move to curry favor with church leadership. The most transformative and pro-western Georgian leader, former President Mikheil Saakashvili, also sought to appease the Patriarchate of Georgia. He increased state funding for the Patriarchate to a record level and, more importantly, approved the change of the national flag to the current iteration as encouraged by Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia Ilia II. Shevardnadze had earlier declined to approve the flag change. The Georgian Dream government raised the state funding for the Patriarchate once again in 2024, upholding the tradition of Georgian government’s paying homage to the church’s power and influence (Civil.ge, October 20, 2021; Frontnews.ge, March 19).
Another vivid manifestation of the clashing two world views is seen in Georgian Dream’s dogmatic approach to the country’s sovereignty and the national aspiration to integrate with the European Union. The dogmatic approach is vivid in the adoption of the law on foreign influence. The Georgian Dream government regards sovereignty as the end goal and sees it exclusively as the state’s complete independence and control over civil society. In the name of that sovereignty, the ruling government tends to monopolize power and decision-making while ignoring another equally important aspect of sovereignty—namely, the sovereignty of the people.
In contrast, democratic states tend to take an instrumental approach to sovereignty to serve the welfare of citizens. The instrumental approach would allow the government to use its sovereignty to uphold Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution to facilitate European integration and serve its citizens’ aspirations. Georgian Dream officials, however, have framed the foreign agents law as serving to consolidate state sovereignty. Such a stance resonates strongly with the Georgian Orthodox Church’s framing of sovereignty as “complete state independence,” without which “no good deed will come out for the country.” Seemingly competing with that view, Article 78 of the constitution obligates the government to “take all measures within the scope of its competences to ensure the full integration of Georgia into the European Union” (Matsne.gov.ge, June 29, 2020;;Civil.ge, April 29). At the time of writing, it remains unclear how the ruling party intends to walk this tightrope.
The Georgian Dream’s approach to sovereignty is intended to take Georgia away from the European integration (see EDM,;February 6, May;10,;25, 2023). The ruling party, nevertheless, does not want to make that decision. Instead, it wants to provoke the European Union to reject prospective Georgian membership and pin the blame on Brussels. Georgian Dream officials are clearly aware that, as a supranational organization, the European Union requires member states pool together parts of their national competences for the common good. The European Union’s policies on the Schengen Area are instructive in this regard. Those member states that have become a part of Schengen have agreed to delegate part of their sovereignty to Brussels. The dogmatic approach would block the free movement of people among EU member states. The applied instrumental approach, in contrast, facilitates full free movement to serve the welfare of citizens.
The European Union granted candidate status to Georgia even before it satisfied the necessary requirements for the candidacy (see EDM,;November 14, 2023;;January 8). The Georgian Dream leaders rushed to take credit for it ahead of the parliamentary elections (Eurasianet, November 10, 2023;;OC-media.org, December 14, 2023). Brussels had previously granted visa-free travel to Georgia in 2017. In the early 2010s, Russian President Vladimir Putin had publicly requested a visa-free regime with the European Union, later complaining that Brussels had not granted his request. He claimed that a visa-free travel regime was critical to “beginning the process of real integration between Russia and the European Union” (Kommersant, November 17, 2011;;TASS, January 19, 2014). On March 31, 2024, Bulgaria, a Christian Orthodox country and EU member state, celebrated partially joining the Schengen Area after 13 years of waiting (Novinite.com, June 20). Other Orthodox countries, including Greece, Cyprus, and Romania, have enjoyed numerous benefits as EU members. While EU membership has had its own complications for these countries, the benefits have far exceeded the costs largely due to the access to the huge single market, economic and investments opportunities, as well as strengthened cooperation on defense and security. As Cristian Ghinea, who served as the Romanian minister for European funds, put it “EU funds for us is like gas money for Russia, or oil money for Saudi Arabia” citing new roads, running water in rural areas, and new or improved waste management systems as among the concrete benefits of membership (Ekathimerini.com, January 6, 2022).
Overall, it is Georgia’s sovereign choice, including that of the government and the people, to pursue or end aspirations for EU membership. Currently, official Tbilisi’s discourse and behavior create an impression that Georgian Dream officials do not want to officially initiate the abandonment or refusal of the country’s European course themselves. Instead, they seem to be angling to provoke the European Union to refuse Georgia’s European perspective. Illustratively, Kobakhidze claimed that the law on foreign influence will in fact “create a better basis for ensuring Georgia’s accession to the European Union” (Agenda.ge, May 28). He rationalized this position by alleging that the law “will contribute to the fulfillment of the main recommendation of the European Union—depolarization.” Thus, it will strengthen the democratic institutions through “pacification of the country.”
In the case of Brussels’ suspension or withdrawal of Georgia’s candidate status and/or potential refusal to open accession talks, Georgian Dream would use that to try to discredit the European Union in the eyes of the Georgian population, on the one hand, and rally popular support for its controversial policies, on the other. This is why granting Georgia candidate status even though the government failed to satisfy the necessary requirements was a prudent and preemptive act (Eeas.europa.eu, September 20, 2022;;Georgiatoday.ge, November 22, 2023). As Georgian expert Kornely Kakachia evaluated last year, Georgian Dream was “aiming for EU candidacy status, if only to claim credit for it ahead of parliamentary elections” (Caliber.az, December 12, 2023).
Georgian Dream’s Perspective on Moscow
An increasingly public debate has centered on the question of whether Georgian Dream acts in direct collaboration with Moscow (see EDM,;August 11, 2022, February;6,;22, May;15,;25,;July 3,;August 10, 2023,;February 15,;March 19,;April 9). No solid proof yet confirms or rejects the notion that the foreign agents law and Georgian Dream’s policies are directly connected to the Kremlin. Even so, an overlapping consensus is already emerging between official Tbilisi and Moscow. As any other state, Russia pursues its own interests and, therefore, sees an added strategic value in Georgia following the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from Azerbaijan and Armenia’s pivot to the west.
The Georgian Dream government is keen to seize this opportunity (Chegem.su, May 2;;Chatham House, May 23). In this context, media speculation and related reports have resurfaced suggesting the possibility of the creation of a confederation between Georgia and the self-proclaimed, Russian-recognized breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (see;EDM, June 17). Theoretically, such a scenario might be possible. In its April 27 statement in support of the law on foreign influence, the Patriarchate of the Georgian Orthodox Church emphasized the aspiration “to live in a united state with our Ossetian and Abkhazian brothers.” This was echoed in Kobakhidze’s Independence Day address, in which he proclaimed, “let us live … together with our Abkhazian and Ossetian brothers and sisters.” Whether Georgian society would agree, Abkhazia and South Ossetia would accept that arrangement, and Russia would seriously consider such a scenario remain open questions (Civil.ge, December 12, 2006;;Kavkaz-uzel, March 8; see;EDM, March 19;;Ekhokavkaza.com, April 3;;Chegem.su, May 15;;YouTube, May 26). Such speculations may be intended to check the public reaction and simultaneously divert attention from the law on foreign influence.
Nonetheless, as Abkhazian expert Inal Khashig put it, “the Georgian choice must be between those who choose a European future and those who are ready to continue dreaming about Abkhazia” (Chegem.su, May 27).The law on foreign influence, among other intentions, seeks to affect civil society primarily by countering potential domestic objection to that status for Abkhazia. Almost simultaneously, a similar law is under consideration in the Abkhazian parliament (Sakartvelosambebi.ge, February 8;;Abkhazworld.com;;Ekhokavkaza.com, May 15).
Russia’s most realistic interest in the confederation scenario is to influence Georgia’s foreign policy orientation through the purported confederate regions (Korrespondent.net, March 7, 2014). Russian leaders, including Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, have repeatedly claimed that Moscow needs a legally binding obligation from the West that NATO will not expand into the post-Soviet republics (Kremlin.ru, February 10, 2007;;Mid.ru, September 1, 2017;;Geopoliticalmonitor.com, May 25, 2018). When this was declined, the Kremlin considered overriding the foreign policy decisions of those states through setting up a confederative structure with pro-Russian regions in those countries. This was apparent in Moscow’s vision of Ukraine through the Minsk agreements that were presented before the full-scale invasion in February 2022.
Wider Impact on South Caucasus
In the South Caucasus, each country has its own comparative advantage and strategic value. Armenia’s comparative advantage is found in its large and powerful diaspora and related bonds with the United States and France as well as countries across the Middle East and Europe. That of Azerbaijan is connected to its energy resources and alliance with Türkiye. In contrast, Georgia’s comparative advantage is based on emerging (until recently), albeit vulnerable European-style democracy; partnerships with the transatlantic community; and its key geographic location. The Georgian Dream law has seriously challenged these advantages. The lack of further integration with Europe could severely limit Georgia’s strategic value in the region.
For Armenia and Azerbaijan, the law on transparency of foreign influence itself is not the chief worry. Rather, the related distancing of Georgia from Europe is the main source of concern. Georgia is the door for landlocked neighbors Armenia and Azerbaijan to the Black Sea and Europe. The central reasoning of the transnational infrastructure projects that underpin the Azerbaijani-Georgian strategic partnership is to diversify transit supply and export routes away from Russia. In the current circumstances, this might be challenged. For their part, Moscow and Tehran hope to restore a railway line from Russia to Armenia and Georgia via Abkhazia and then extended further into Iran. This challenges Baku’s proposal to open the Zangezur Corridor and further develop Azerbaijani portion of the North-South International Transport Corridor (see EDM,;March 19,;January 25,;February 22, 2021;;Al-Monitor, December 2, 2023;;Gfsis.org, February 2024;;Iarex.ru;March 14).
Georgian Dream’s recent policies may serve to inflame several unresolved regional disputes. For example, the disagreement between Baku and Tbilisi over the status of the David Gareji monastery on their shared border has yet to be resolved (see EDM,;July 8,;July 30, 2019). Under the constitutional agreement between the state and the church, “monasteries (acting and non-acting), their remains, and the land they are built on” are the possession of the Georgian Orthodox Church (Forbcaucasus.wordpress.com, August, 2014).
Georgia’s relations with Armenia have traditionally been ambivalent The Armenian and Georgian churches have a series of unresolved disputes over property ownership (Azatutyun.am, June 13, 2011). Currently, Nikol Pashinyan’s government and the Georgian Dream appear to be pursuing ideologically divergent paths at a time when Yerevan’s apparent pivot to the West necessitates stronger ties with Georgia. Additionally, the European Union has pledged to investing more in improving Armenian-Georgian connections (Al-Monitor, April 13).
Azerbaijan’s closest ally, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has refrained from endorsing the Georgian Dream’s recent policies. At a meeting with Kobakhidze in Ankara, Erdogan voiced “hope and desire for the developments to conclude in favor of the Georgian people.” He reaffirmed continuous support for “Georgia’s efforts to integrate with Euro-Atlantic structures.” Just days later, Kobakhidze lamented that Türkiye had considered an even stricter draft bill on foreign influence than that of Georgia but faced no criticism from the West (Tccb.gov.tr, May 16;;Imedi.ge, May 23). This is symptomatic of other related disagreements between Tbilisi and Ankara.
In the wider picture, focusing solely on the Russian factor in Georgia carries an adversarial effect. Doing so ultimately downplays the agency of Georgian society. Two domestic factors will primarily matter in turning the October parliamentary elections into Georgia’s watershed moment: whether citizens will flood to polling stations and maximize voter turnout and whether the opposition parties will be able to overcome their differences and unify ahead of the elections.
Conclusion
The need for high-voter turnout in Georgia and the political opposition to unite becomes particularly vivid against the backdrop of a civil society that has remained vibrant and Western partners have demonstrated an unequivocal position. Protest rallies alone are not enough to be a game-changer. Businesses, civil servants, and other segments of the population have not voiced their position clearly for diverse reasons. Only 11 universities supported protests rallies while over 35 did not. An almost negligible number of civil servants and businesses have spoken out against the Georgian Dream’s policies. Archbishop Zenon (Yarajuli) is the only high-ranking clergy who opposed the foreign agents law (Netgazeti.ge, April 24; Imedi.ge, May 14;;JAM-news, May 27). Thus, the results of the October elections will crystallize the country’s future course and provide a definitive decision on whether Georgia turns irreversibly authoritarian or reinstates its democratic path. As history has confirmed again and again, citizens’ indifference and political passiveness manifested through low-voter turnout is capitalized upon by a hybrid regime in choosing which path to follow.
Unsurprisingly, Western sanctions and incentives have yet to cause Georgian Dream to repeal the law on foreign influence. The imposition of sanctions may be symbolically important but, if not meticulously designed, may make little practical difference (Accentnews.ge, May 21;;1tv.ge, May 25; Idfi.ge, May 27). The main sensible benefits of sanctions and incentives could materialize if the opposition concentrates and instrumentalizes those sanctions and incentives to convince Georgian citizens to vote. Zourabichvili has shown strong leadership in that regard. Some hobbling attempts have been made by the opposition parties themselves but have yet to produce any tangible results. While opposition parties trade accusations against each other, Georgian Dream officials demonize the opposition as a whole (Interpressnews.ge, May 30, 2021; Civil.ge,;April 29,;May 24;;Agenda.ge, May 10;;YouTube, May 21;;1tv.ge, May 22;;Rustavi2.ge;;Georgiatoday.ge;;Sakartvelosambebi.ge, June 3).
The ruling Georgian Dream party likely bets not on purported collaboration with Russia but mainly on citizens’ indifference manifested through low-voter turnout, opposition parties’ inability to unite, and related failures to convert massive public protests into political capital. That said, the ruling party appears to be preparing for diverse scenarios, including a united opposition, overwhelming voter turnout, and disputed election results. Illustratively, the government’s amendments to the current electoral code provide for the abolishment of the Central Election Commission advisory group and the position of deputy head, who was to be nominated from the opposition. The currently fragmented opposition is a strong advantage for Georgian Dream in the lead-up to the October 26 elections dubbed as a “referendum for or against Europe.” In contrast, the Georgian Dream’s main disadvantage is the vast popular support for European integration manifested through public protests and various opinion polls. Whether those poll results will correlate with the election results depends on Georgian citizens, who simultaneously aim to resolve the country’s civilizational dilemma.
- About the author: Rahim Rahimov is a political analyst focusing on the South Caucasus and Russia. He tweets @r_rahimov.
- Source: This article was published by The Jamestown Foundation