Day: June 20, 2024

By Mauricio D. Aceves

The bond between Mexico and the Middle East was born centuries ago with the first arrivals of the Ottomans and Arabs to the port of Veracruz in the Gulf of Mexico and the establishment of diplomatic ties between the Ottoman Imperium and the Persian Imperium in 1864. The “Ottoman Clock” in Mexico City’s downtown, the traces of Middle Eastern architecture found in the streets in Mérida, and the bronze-made “Lebanese Immigrant” in Veracruz are symbols of this cultural legacy. The Arab heritage in literature, arts, gastronomy and tradition is scattered across the Mexican landscape and society. In those years, diplomatic relations evolved with a calm rhythm, but the last decades have witnessed a different tempo.

The FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 represented a prospect for cooperation between governments and agencies in Mexico and the Middle East, especially regarding tourism, trade, and connectivity, considering the commitment to border security and combatting transnational crime. The event saw the most remarkable temporary migration of Mexican nationals to the Middle East in history, with over 120,000 Mexicans visiting Doha and other cities in the region.

A year later, on February 6, 2023, the 7.8 magnitude earthquake in Türkiye and Syria was another milestone in this engagement through reinforced diplomacy and humanitarian cooperation where specialized Mexican rescue teams and aid donations were deployed to the affected areas. The Turkish Airlines flight from Istanbul to Mexico City, begun in 2019, has become Mexico’s gateway to the Middle East for tourism and economic diplomacy. Trade and investment exchanges between Mexico, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other countries have also blossomed. In March 2024, the value of trade with the region, in general, was almost 85% higher than in January of 2018.[1] [2]

Mexico shares a similar position as the Middle East, which has been a vital crossroads of the world, allowing the transit of goods, religions, ideas, and people over the centuries between three continents. Mexico is the bridge between the compass rose of South and North America and between the Atlantic and the Pacific, boosting the nearshoring trend and the outcome of new global rivalries that have taken root over the past two years. Ambitious projects such as the Interoceanic Corridor of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, the Tren Maya (https://www.trenmaya.gob.mx/), have boosted the development narrative.

Thus, positioned today, Mexico has the capabilities to play a critical role in peace and stability. Mexico and the Middle Eastern and Asian countries traverse the same path. They look to position themselves regionally and develop a new geopolitical identity with high capabilities and weight on the global supply chain, connectivity, and the economic and political realm.

In this backdrop, Claudia Sheinbaum’s vision can bring new synergies with the region. The conversation on the Middle East has had political dimensions, especially regarding the Israel-Palestine conflict. In 2009, Claudia Sheinbaum, then a recognized academic and scientist, wrote in the pages of the national journal La Jornada, “Because of my Jewish origin, because of my love for Mexico, and because I feel like a citizen of the world, I share with millions the desire for justice, equality, fraternity, and peace […]”.[3] Traditionally, Mexico has supported and defended the two-state solution[4] and has a Representative Office in Ramallah. Balancing diplomatic relations and respect for human rights will be a priority and an early test of Sheinbaum’s policy towards the Middle East.

The G20 summit hosted by Brazil in mid-November will be the first opportunity to meet world leaders of Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, India, and Indonesia, among others, and introduce the new administration to the region and state foreign policy priorities. The initial interaction will include discussions on inclusion, inequality, food security, international governance, concerns that align with Mexico’s domestic interests. Additionally, as part of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Transpacific Partnership (CPTPP), the nations in the Indo-Pacific are essential partners in Mexico’s investment view.

As mayor of Mexico, Claudia Sheinbaum, a climate scientist, has been progressive, focusing on climate action, human rights, gender, and people-centric issues. As President, her values and projections will be much the same. Congruency over her career has been her greatest strength; mirroring these characteristics in the international arena will reflect Mexico’s existing foreign policy of a commitment to peace, national sovereignty and dialogue. Under Sheinbaum, the country’s global role could intensify, especially recognizing Mexico’s strategic location and security, welfare, and migration challenges.

In the following weeks, concerns about the Middle East peace process, disarmament, and non-proliferation will be present in the daily conversations in Mexico City. So far, diplomatic ties have been mainly driven by bilateral trade. Efforts will likely be made to step up and elevate this frame into free trade, complementary political, tourism, economic, and financial policies, and add scientific research, agriculture, education, culture, borders security and energy sectors as cooperation priorities.

Mexico has a Free Trade Agreement with Israel; agreements for economic and scientific cooperation and economic tourist and cultural promotion with Egypt; agreements of technical and scientific collaboration with Pakistan. It has Agreements for Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments (ARPPI) with India, Kuwait, Türkiye, Bahrein, United Arab Emirates; andn technical, educative and cultural cooperation agreements with Jordan. ARPPI and several agreements related to security and combat to crime, borders and connectivity have been signed with Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, United Arab Emirates and Qatar.[5]

Rosario Castellanos, poet and Ambassador of Mexico in Israel from 1971 to 1974 and a symbol for feminism even beyond diplomacy and literature, once wrote, “The Middle East and Latin America face common perils, yet they also share similar opportunities to overcome them”.[6] The new leadership of Claudia Sheinbaum is aware of this, and a new chapter for Mexico and the Middle East is about to start.

• About the author: Mauricio D. Aceves is an advisor for security and border issues at STRATOP Risk Consulting and an author in Foreign Affairs Latin America on contemporary Middle East and Central Asia issues.
• This article was written for Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations.

References

[1] Secretaría de Turismo, “Operación Toca Puertas en Estambul detonará el turismo de Turquía y otras regiones a México”, Secretaría de Turismo, April 25, 2024. https://www.gob.mx/sectur/prensa/operacion-toca-puertas-en-estambul-detonara-el-turismo-de-turquia-y-otras-regiones-a-mexico?idiom=es#:~:text=En%202023%2C%20llegaron%20a%20México,el%20gasto%20registrado%20en%202019.

[2] Secretaría de Economía, “Data México”, Secretaría de Economía, June 19, 2024. https://www.economia.gob.mx/datamexico/es/profile/geo/mexico?inegiMonths=201801

[3] Claudia Sheinbaum Pardo, “Salvar al mundo que hoy se llama Gaza”, La Jornada, January 12, 2009. https://www.jornada.com.mx/2009/01/12/index.php?section=opinion&article=002a2cor

[4] United Nations, “Aerchive: Mexico and the question of palestine”, United Nations, june 17, 2024. https://www.un.org/unispal/country/mexico/

[5] Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, “Tratados Celebrados por México”, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, June 19, 2024.  (https://cja.sre.gob.mx/tratadosmexico/buscador?keywords=&category_id=&theme_id=&country_id=151&organization_id=)

[6] Centro de Estudios Internacionales Gilberto Bosques, “Rosario Cstellanos: un esfuerzo diplomático de acercamiento cultural entre México e Israel”, Centro de Estudios Internacionales Gilberto Bosques, February 24, 2017. ( https://transpadmin.senado.gob.mx/analisisinvestigacion/monitor/ni-240217-rosario-castellanos/viewdocument)

During;his recent trip to Capitol Hill, former President Donald Trump floated a plan to finance the federal government in large part with revenue raised by import tariffs. The;details are sketchy, but the proposal’s main idea is to rely much less on the complex U.S. income tax code, which penalizes work and imposes huge compliance costs on both individual and business taxpayers.

The former, and possibly future, president’s idea draws attention to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century U.S. public finance, when, in fact, tariffs ranked among America’s principal sources of government revenue, along with the proceeds from selling public lands and from imposing selective excise taxes on consumer goods—most notoriously Alexander Hamilton’s tax on alcohol, which triggered the 1794 Whiskey Rebellion. The national government was of course much smaller then.

It was not until the 1860s, when Abraham Lincoln’s Treasury levied taxes on income to help support the Union’s military operations, that Americans first faced such levies. Although Lincoln’s income tax was declared unconstitutional, the ratification of the 16th Amendment on February 3, 1913—one of the fruits of an earlier Progressive Era—made income taxes a fact of life.

Individual income taxes have accounted for more than half of the federal government’s revenue ever since ($1.7 trillion of the $3.3 trillion total raised in;fiscal year 2024). Payroll taxes to finance the New Deal’s Social Security and the Great Society’s Medicare programs rank second (34.3% of total federal receipts). Import tariffs (“customs duties”) generate only $48 billion nowadays, just 1.5% of the total. The Trump plan would stand this on its head.

Implementing Trump’s all-tariff revenue plan would require a major retooling of American public finance. I and many other taxpayers would cheer the elimination of income-tax withholding and doing away with the intrusive and reviled Internal Revenue Service (IRS), some of whose criminal investigating “special agents” are authorized, as we recently were reminded, to carry firearms.

No one has estimated the level of tariff rates necessary to offset $3.3 trillion in income tax revenue that possibly would be “lost” under Trump’s plan. Would some tariffs be set at 100% of a product’s pre-tariff domestic price, as the Biden White House recently recommended for electric vehicles imported from China to;“protect American manufacturers from [China’s] unfair trade practices”?

Tariffs are simply taxes that domestic consumers pay when they purchase goods from overseas. If a tariff is set high enough, imports could drop to zero, along with any anticipated tariff (tax) revenue. Many Americans willingly pay 69 cents a pound for bananas; how many would pay $1.40 a pound? Or think big: The base price for a 2024 Porsche Boxster is currently $70,400; would you pay $140,800 for the identical car?

Like income taxes, there are ways to avoid tariffs. Tariffs encourage smuggling, for example, which would likely lead to the hiring and deployment of more customs agents. During colonial times and other high-tariff periods, customs agents often were as abusive as today’s IRS agents.

Tariffs imposed by one country also invite retaliation by others—a tit-for-tat among trading partners known as “countervailing duties.” The problem is: Tariff wars shrink international trade, increasing their harmful economic effects. Many economists are convinced that the;Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, along with other domestic policy blunders, triggered the Great Depression, or at the very least made it worse.

Despite the harm they cause, tariffs appeal to politicians because it gives them an opportunity to do what they do best: give away goodies to special interests at public expense.

The recipients in this case are domestic manufacturers and suppliers—and especially their unionized employees, who in an open, competitive marketplace often can’t compete with overseas producers of the same or similar products. Tariffs exploit the power of government to raise the costs of those overseas products, giving advantage back to the locals. While domestic producers (and their employees) might gain from protectionism, consumers lose, especially low-income consumers, who can least afford the higher prices.

Asking tariffs to replace income taxes and other federal revenue sources asks the wrong question. The right question is whether government is too large. If the answer is “yes,” tariffs would be a plus if they generate less revenue than other methods of public finance.

Unfortunately, in addition to taxing, Washington has other options for financing its profligate spending, including borrowing. The beast cannot be starved—a mantra of tax reformers during the 1980s—if those options remain on the table.

• This article was also published in Real Clear Markets

By Alexander Oakes

The Biden administration recently;announced;that it is canceling another $7.7 billion in student debt, and this will bring the;total amount;of student debt it has forgiven to over $160 billion since 2021.

The reason for this aggressive push on the topic of student debt, according to some;political analysts, is that in the three years Joe Biden has been in office, he has failed to do enough in regard to this issue. As expected, this has left some of his constituency—primarily the college-educated sectors—wanting, and this is especially true considering that leading up to his victory in 2020, forgiving at least $10,000 of student debt per borrower was one of his main campaign promises.

Of course, President Biden is not solely to blame for this “lackluster” performance on student debt forgiveness. He not only had to battle a Republican majority in the House in regard to this issue but also has had to battle the legal system.

In June 2023, the Supreme Court dealt what was, at the time, thought to be a;lethal blow;to the Biden administration’s debt forgiveness efforts by ruling that they were “unconstitutional.” Furthermore, just this month, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals based in New Orleans overturned a prior judge’s decision that allowed students who felt as if they had been “misled” by their universities to seek debt forgiveness—an angle that the Biden administration had been looking to take advantage of.

Considering that Biden has still;continued to forgive student debt;to the tune of nearly $200 billion—despite the ruling of those two aforementioned courts, and the Republicans for that matter—it makes sense why his college-educated constituents continue to hold him responsible. He can do it and has sort of done it, so why can’t he do more?

Now, whether or not this dissatisfaction from within that;prominent wing;of his base poses a real electoral threat or not is up for debate, but a far more pressing question is how this affects the electorate as a whole. Put another way, if one wishes to win an election in the United States—and Joe Biden clearly does—it requires casting a much wider net than, say, lifelong partisans. In fact, it is very unlikely that any candidate, no matter their charisma or popular policies, will win much of anything in the current political landscape if they can’t get at least some of the always-elusive swing vote.

So, does forgiving student debt help Joe Biden do this?

Put plainly, if Joe Biden loses the presidential election in November, this issue—which when compared to things like immigration and the economy seems somewhat unimportant—may actually be one of the main reasons why. The justification for that statement is that student debt forgiveness rewards college-educated voters, who generally;vote Democrat;anyway, at the expense of non-college-educated voters, which is who the Biden administration should be focused on.

To elaborate, Joe Biden was;applauded by left-wing outlets;in 2020 for securing 37 percent of the historically important white, non-college-educated vote. This was because before that election, the Democrats had been in a downward spiral when it came to this demographic, and 37 percent was, much to their joy, higher than expected. However, even though Biden was praised for sticking his finger in the proverbial dike in regard to this voting bloc, the Left still conceded that things were too close for comfort. In fact, that same outlet cited above;stated;that “if he [Biden] had won, say, 34 percent of them [white, non-college-educated voters] instead of the 37 percent he did win, he very well might not be president right now.”

This is why those numbers matter.

As of April 2024, Joe Biden is currently;polling;at not 37 percent, not 34 percent, but rather a mere 33 percent with white, non-college-educated voters. In addition to this, according to;further polling;conducted by the Pew Research Center, his opposition, Donald Trump, has doubled his support among black voters from 2020 (12 percent) and has also nearly broken even when it comes to Hispanic voters (44 percent). Therefore, given that these last two are some of the Democrats’ most reliable voting blocs—at least since the mid-twentieth century, that is—it is quite reasonable to conclude that Joe Biden is in a far weaker spot this election than he was four years ago.

However, what does race have to do with this, and are all of these numbers because of Biden’s student debt forgiveness?

At the end of the day, whether you are a “woke lefty” or a “based right-winger,” two statistical realities exist. The first is that Americans live in a majority white country, and subsequently, the white vote has more influence over US elections than any other voting bloc. The second is that black and brown Americans per capita are;statistically underrepresented;when it comes to possessing four-year degrees. When you put these two realities together, toss in a little student loan forgiveness, and then cross-reference that with recent polling data, what you have is quite the interesting electoral portrait.

Given Biden’s;historically bad economy, the fact that;inflation is high, and that the Biden administration just;spent;$95 billion on foreign wars—even though the;national debt;is a staggering $34 trillion and growing—it makes sense why his student debt forgiveness programs are not garnering support. In lay terms, with these programs, Biden is, essentially, taking money from people (non-college-educated voters) struggling with a demonstrably bad economy who may or may not vote for him and then giving that money to people who not only;outearn that first group, but who are also already likely to vote Democrat anyway. In a way, it is like he is trying to be some kind of reverse Marxist Robin Hood, but instead of being beloved by the people, he is instead beloved by the nobles, even though the people are actually the ones who can keep him in office. Anyway, enough on that.

At first glance, it makes sense why the Biden administration would think that these debt forgiveness programs are a good idea. After all, it is a fact that the Democrats;do perform disproportionately well;among the college-educated demographic, regardless of race or gender. However, when one factors in all of the other things that make a successful election bid, it appears that these forgiveness efforts are actually missing the mark.

Of course, a direct line of causality cannot be drawn between these programs and the declining support for the Biden administration among non-college-educated voters, which, again, include a disproportionate amount of black and brown voters. However, one would be hard-pressed to claim that after all the information covered here, there is not at least some correlation. Now whether that correlation is strong enough that this issue will end up having a measurable effect on the 2024 election is yet to be seen. Nonetheless, it seems that, for now, Biden’s time may be better spent letting people keep their money instead of trying to redistribute it, in Marxist fashion, to an already-secure sector of his base.

• About the author: Alexander Oakes is a Marine Corps combat veteran who is currently pursuing his PhD in Clinical Psychology at Arizona State University. He also hosts Nobody’s News Show on Youtube.com and is preparing to publish his first book, “How To Get Out Of Work: A framework for manipulation, deception, and misdirection” to be released later this year.
• Source: This article was published by the Mises Institute

The U.S. government’s budget deficit;in;2024 will be 27% larger than the Congressional Budget Office predicted just four months ago.

In February 2024, the CBO;projected;that spending would exceed revenues by $1.507 trillion during its 2024 fiscal year. Four months later, the CBO;updated;its deficit projection, increasing it by $408 billion. The CBO now estimates the U.S. government will rack up $1.915 trillion worth of red ink by the time the federal government’s 2024 fiscal year ends on September 30.

Reuters summarizes the additional spending that is blowing up the budget deficit: “The CBO said in an update to its budget outlook, opens new tab that higher outlays for student loan relief, Medicaid healthcare for the poor, higher Federal Deposit Insurance Corp costs to resolve bank failures and U.S. aid to Ukraine and Israel make up the bulk of a $408 billion increase in this year’s projected deficit since February, when it forecast a $1.507 trillion deficit.”

The CBO anticipates the Biden administration’s surge of spending in 2024 will bleed into 2025: “If realized, the forecast for the fiscal year ended Sept. 30 would mean a second consecutive substantial deficit increase for U.S. President Joe Biden after deficits fell substantially in 2022 as COVID spending subsided.”

CBO forecast that the deficit would climb further in fiscal 2025 to $1.938 trillion.

The CBO;describes;four factors accounting for 80% of the increase in the U.S. government’s deficit spending:

About 80 percent of the increase in the projected deficit in 2024 is driven by four factors that all boost projected outlays.

• A $145 billion increase in projected outlays for student loans stems mostly from revisions that the Administration made to the estimated subsidy costs of previously issued loans and from the Administration’s proposed rule to reduce many borrowers’ balances on student loans.
• Projected outlays for deposit insurance have increased by about $70 billion because the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is not recovering payments it made when resolving bank failures in 2023 and 2024 as quickly as CBO previously anticipated. (In CBO’s projections, that increase is almost entirely offset by deficit reductions in future years as those payments are recovered.)
• Newly enacted legislation increased projected discretionary outlays by $60 billion.
• Projected outlays for Medicaid have increased by about $50 billion, mainly because actual outlays thus far in 2024 have been higher than expected.

President Biden’s irresponsible efforts to forgive;student loan debt;account for 35% of the increase. Increased military expenditures directed toward Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan account for 23%. Bailing out the FDIC so it can bail out failing U.S. banks accounts for 17%, and the higher spending on Medicaid accounts for 12% of the newly projected increase in 2024’s budget deficit.

Much of the remaining increase in deficit spending can be chalked up to the rising cost of the national debt, which will have enduring effects over the next ten years covered by the CBO’s updated projections. Here’s;Reuters;again:

A strengthened economic outlook reduced the long-term deficits by $600 billion over 10 years in the latest forecast, but this was also offset by a $1.1 trillion deficit increase due to technical revisions, including upward revisions to outlays for debt interest and healthcare costs. CBO now expects net interest costs to reach $1.7 trillion in fiscal 2034, up from $658 billion in 2023.

Michael Peterson, CEO of the Peter G. Peterson Foundation, which advocates for deficit reduction, said report shows that the U.S. debt challenge was getting worse.

“The harmful effects of higher interest rates fueling higher interest costs on a huge existing debt load are continuing, and leading to additional borrowing,” Peterson said in a statement. “It’s the definition of unsustainable.”

Unlike its revenues, the U.S. government has full control over how much it spends. As the CBO’s updated projections confirm, the unsustainable part of the U.S. government’s worsening fiscal situation is its excessive spending.

By Abhishek Sharma

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has made NATO hyper-aware of the grave risks such events present to the stability of the international rules-based order. Furthermore, it is now looking into Chinese actions that go against the rules-based order in the West Philippine Sea and Taiwan Strait. These regional events have prompted NATO to elevate its strategic partnerships with its Indo-Pacific four (or IP4)—Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand—to address these issues. However, in its pivot to the Indo-Pacific, NATO preferably sees developing strategic ties with its Northeast Asian partners, Japan and South Korea, as the first important step in its long-term plans for the region. 

Evolution of NATO’s relations with Japan and South Korea

NATO’s relations with South Korea and Japan have advanced fast in the last few years, even though they have moved along different trajectories. The relations have progressed with Japan since the 1990s; however, the ties with South Korea developed only in the late 2010s. Japan’s relations with NATO have developed incrementally, however, with Russia’s invasion, this partnership has achieved a new pace of momentum, driven by Tokyo’s indivisible security outlook, which sees the geopolitical developments interlinked in the Eurasian and Indo-Pacific region.

This was evident in the Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s speech at the G7 Hiroshima Summit when he stated, “Ukraine may be the East Asia of tomorrow.” Similarly, during the 2023 NATO Summit, Kishida said that “[S]ecurity of the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific are inseparable” and added that he “welcome[s] the further increase in interest and engagement in the Indo-Pacific among our like-minded countries of the Euro-Atlantic area.” Although this strategic thinking is not new and can be traced back to the early 1980s when attempts were made to create institutional linkages, it is clear that Tokyo is attempting to diversify and deepen its security relations with NATO to deal with emerging security threats in the region.  

Under President Yoon Suk-yeol’s Global Pivotal State (GPS) vision, South Korea started pivoting towards the European Union (EU) to develop strategic, economic, and security partnerships with actors beyond its immediate periphery. This pivot has led to Seoul’s increasing interest in developing stronger relations with NATO and its members. In 2023, during the NATO summit at Vilnius, Yoon;expressed;his agreement with the indivisible security outlook: “In this hyper-connected era, the security of Europe and Asia cannot be separated.” Although much credit is attributed only to situational factors like the Russian invasion, scholars like Bence Nemeth and Saeme Kim have;identified;structural and situational factors contributing to fastening relations with NATO. However, unlike Japan, Seoul’s strategic outlook is;narrow, focused on Northeast Asia and the challenges posed by;North Korea. Although concerns regarding China exist, it remains cautious, avoiding the possibility of strategic association and Beijing’s undue attention.

In the last few years, Seoul and;Tokyo;have identified new areas like climate change, information operations, and military intelligence sharing with NATO as critical areas of cooperation, adding to the earlier list of cyber, space, emerging, and critical technologies. This expansion has been possible due to an upgrade in their strategic partnership framework, which was elevated from the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP) to;the Individually Tailored Partnership Programme(ITPP). The latter is a more ‘strategic and goal-oriented framework’—comprehensive, detailed and long-term (four-year period) as compared to the former, which is general and short (two-year period). This upgraded partnership framework attempts to establish greater strategic alignment between NATO and its Northeast Asian partners. Besides, this signals a clear political will to expand and deepen their security partnership with NATO and its members.;

Under the ITTP framework, the IP4 partnership is now institutionalised and is expected to grow further with the upcoming NATO summit in Washington, D.C.

NATO’s North-eastward move: What is the strategic rationale? 

NATO’s strengthening relations with Japan and South Korea must be viewed through strategic lens based on changing global alignments and the polarised security environment in Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific, which poses a significant threat to NATO and its members’ security. This increasing threat perception was clearly stated in NATO’s 2022 strategic posture, which noted the linkages between the security of the two regions. NATO understands that with increasing coordination between Beijing, Moscow, and its other like-minded partners across the region, it needs a strategy that is comprehensive and efficient in addressing these threats.

For instance, NATO sees increasing cooperation between Moscow and its friends—North Korea and Iran, both of whom have supplied critical weaponry as detrimental to its plans. Thus, it sees the benefits of forming closer cooperation with like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific, like South Korea and Japan, who have given Ukraine substantial military and economic assistance, demonstrating the vital importance of partners, even based in other regions. Sharing his support for the ties with Japan and South Korea, the NATO secretary general said, “Our growing ties send a powerful signal at a critical time: when countries like Russia try to rip up the global rules and laws, we stand united and strong to protect our way of life and prosperity.” 

On the other hand, for Seoul and Tokyo, developing comprehensive relations with NATO is critical to ensure that developments in Ukraine are not repeated in the Indo-Pacific. This partnership aims to create linkages across sectors, economy, technology, and military, and it seeks to develop effective deterrence against regional threats. While attributing, Russia is often cited as the sole factor. However, that is not the case. Scholars like Yu Koizumi have argued that Russia-Japan ties are not inherently adversarial, and the same could be said for South Korea. Even though the Ukraine situation is concerning for both states as liberal democracies, it does not present an existential threat to either.

However, this cannot be said about Chinese action in the Taiwan Strait, which for Japan is an existential threat and for South Korea, it raises profoundnational security implications. In this context, the only significant concern for Japan and South Korea militarily in the region is China, not Russia. Therefore, NATO relations with Japan and South Korea are driven by a systemic factor: China’s rise, which is not a situational event. Thus, this partnership is an attempt to strengthen deterrence in the region and counter any likely belligerent actions by Beijing. 

Upcoming opportunities and impending challenges

In addition to counterterrorism, space, and arms reduction, South Korea and Japan will strengthen security and defence partnerships in areas such as military intelligence-sharing and cybersecurity. With continuousstrategic partnerships getting institutionalised under a more robust ITPP framework, it would be more accessible for partners to collaborate and cooperate on issue-specific regional and global challenges across domains.

Strengthening Seoul and Tokyo’s defence relations will further increase this partnership’s success, establishing strategic linkages between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions. In this partnership, Seoul is particularly interested in working on cybersecurity with NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDOE) and Japan seeks to foster closer cooperation in countering hybrid threats such as information warfare and economic security. Conversely, NATO is also looking at building strategic ties, devoid of any military deployment, instead focusing on military-technological innovation, capacity building, and developing mechanisms for sharing situational awareness.  

With the attack on Ukraine, the threat to Taiwan now looms over NATO and its members when it comes to the Indo-Pacific. However, like in the case of Russia, where a broad consensus was reached in NATO, there is currently no explicit agreement between NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners regarding China. Similar inter-disagreements exist within the IP4 partners, particularly Japan and South Korea, regarding China.

In addition, ASEAN members remain suspicious of external interference, making this more complicated. These uncertainties emerge as an obstacle to further strengthening relations between the two partners when sharing common perceptions of strategic challenges in the Indo-Pacific and acting on them. Thus, as we advance, even if we may not see NATO’s role expanding in the region militarily, we will likely see closer and deeper strategic partnerships between NATO members with Japan and South Korea to strengthen deterrence and uphold rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific. 

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• About the author: Abhishek Sharma is a Research Assistant at the Observer Research Foundation.
• Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation.

Gold bars and Sen. Bob Menendez’s curiosity about their price takes central role at bribery trial  Bowling Green Daily News

Gold bars and Sen. Bob Menendez’s curiosity about their price takes central role at bribery trial  Yahoo News UK

The USA welcomes the upcoming Pashinyan-Aliev talks in Moscow  Radar Armenia

The collaboration between Bangladesh and the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) represents a pivotal partnership aimed at transforming the nation’s energy landscape. With a shared commitment to sustainable development and energy security, this partnership has catalyzed significant strides in renewable energy adoption, infrastructure development, and capacity building. These initiatives not only address Bangladesh’s pressing energy needs but also pave the way for a greener, more resilient future.

The Bangladesh-KOICA partnership is crucial for enhancing energy cooperation as Bangladesh diversifies its energy sources and prioritizes sustainability. KOICA is a significant actor in promoting renewable energy projects and improving energy efficiency in Bangladesh. Its long-term support and reliable partnership have facilitated advancements in energy infrastructure, helping Bangladesh meet its growing energy demands sustainably. This collaboration aligns with Bangladesh’s Vision 2041, focusing on sustainable development and reducing carbon emissions. KOICA’s expertise and consistent support in the energy sector exemplify effective international cooperation, addressing critical energy challenges and contributing to a sustainable energy future for Bangladesh.

KOICA has been actively engaged in energy cooperation initiatives with Bangladesh, aiming to enhance rural electrification and sustainable development. One notable project is the Solar-Powered Irrigation Pump and Solar Home System, approved on March 23, 2010, with a commitment of 2.50 million USD. Implemented in partnership with the Bangladesh Rural Electrification Board (REB), this project installed 1,250 stand-alone solar home systems and 20 solar-powered irrigation pumps across seven districts. Its primary focus is on providing electricity to impoverished farmers and villagers in remote areas. Another significant endeavor is the Mid-term Strategy for Energy (2021-2025), launched in 2021 and scheduled until 2025.

While specific financial details are not disclosed, this initiative aims to accelerate progress towards Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by integrating energy with other sectors like rural development and education. It emphasizes scaling up projects by leveraging additional development funds, promoting sustainability through independent program support, and mainstreaming initiatives such as the Green New Deal, digital transformation, and ICT. The strategy also addresses cross-cutting issues such as gender equality and environmental conservation, while enhancing project quality through evidence-based approaches and performance management. KOICA participates in the East Asia Climate Partnership Programme, focusing on renewable energy and climate change mitigation. This program provides technical assistance to bolster resilience against climate change impacts. It also mobilizes private sector resources to support sustainable development efforts in Bangladesh.

KOICA’s energy initiatives in Bangladesh are strategically designed to address critical development goals related to energy access, climate change resilience, and efficiency improvements. Under the first strategic objective, which aims to provide better access to modern energy for the energy-underprivileged (SDG 7.1), KOICA implements programs such as the distribution of clean cookstoves and solar home systems (SHS). These efforts aim to reduce indoor air pollution and provide electricity to rural households, particularly in remote areas where grid access is limited. KOICA supports the establishment of distributed micro-grid systems, enhancing energy reliability and linking these initiatives with broader rural development programs to maximize their impact across communities.

In response to climate change challenges (SDG 7.2), KOICA focuses on increasing renewable energy output through initiatives like solar and hydro power generation projects. These efforts not only contribute to sustainable energy production but also aim to reduce dependency on fossil fuels. Furthermore, KOICA supports the implementation of grid-connected power generation systems, facilitating the integration of renewable energy into Bangladesh’s national energy grid. Pilot projects for renewable energy serve as crucial demonstrations of feasibility and benefits, paving the way for wider adoption of sustainable energy solutions in the country. Under the third strategic objective, KOICA collaborates on improving energy efficiency and power quality (SDG 7.3, 7.a, 7.b) through technological cooperation. This includes initiatives to automate energy transmission and distribution systems, enhancing efficiency and reliability across the grid. Technical assistance for passive housing constructions aims to optimize energy use and improve thermal comfort, while efforts to enhance heating and thermal efficiency in buildings and industrial settings contribute to overall energy conservation. KOICA invests in capacity building through human resource development (HRD) and supports research and development (R&D) infrastructure, fostering local expertise and innovation in the energy sector.

KOICA’s comprehensive approach in Bangladesh underscores its commitment to advancing sustainable development goals related to energy access, climate change mitigation, and energy efficiency. By integrating these initiatives with broader socio-economic development strategies, KOICA aims to enhance resilience, promote environmental sustainability, and contribute significantly to Bangladesh’s long-term energy security and socio-economic progress.

In addition to KOICA’s initiatives, the largest rooftop solar project in Bangladesh is led by Youngone Corporation. Approved on June 20, 2021, this project targets completion by 2023 and is located in the Korean Export Processing Zone (EPZ) in Anwara Upazila, Chattogram. The project’s first phase involved installing solar panels on the roofs of 16 factories, achieving a capacity of 16MW. It was inaugurated by Youngone Corporation and aims to expand to 28MW by 2023 through multiple phases. The factories involved include Sungnum Apparels, Karnaphuli Shoes Industries Ltd, and Karnaphuli Polyester Products Ltd, showcasing a significant private sector contribution to renewable energy adoption and sustainability in Bangladesh’s industrial sector.

In Bangladesh, significant initiatives focus on renewable energy generation, water sustainability, environmental conservation, biodiversity enhancement, eco-friendly industrial development, support for the national power grid, and energy efficiency. One of the largest projects is the rooftop solar power initiative, with a capacity of 40 MW constructed in two phases. The first phase, completed and operational, contributes surplus energy back into Bangladesh’s national grid through a net metering system. The ongoing second phase aims to add 20 MW and is expected to finish within four months. Efforts in water sustainability include creating 25 water bodies capable of storing 500 million gallons of rainwater annually, with plans to double this capacity to 1 billion gallons, making it the largest artificial rainwater harvesting system in Bangladesh. In environmental conservation, 42 state-of-the-art green factories have been established, with plans to double this number.

These facilities incorporate eco-friendly technologies to minimize environmental impact. Tree-planting initiatives have seen over 2,500,000 trees planted since 1999, fostering a rich ecosystem with over 400 plant species and providing habitat for 137 bird species. The Korean Export Processing Zone (KEPZ) exemplifies an eco-friendly industrial zone, with 52% of its land developed as green space and the remainder allocated for industry and infrastructure. This development prioritizes environmental sustainability and biodiversity conservation. Projects contributing surplus solar power to the national grid help stabilize Bangladesh’s power supply, reducing reliance on fossil fuels. Technological upgrades in energy efficiency involve advanced technologies and practices in industrial processes, including innovations in synthetic fabrics and insulation features to reduce energy consumption and environmental impact.

Bangladesh has entered into a production-sharing agreement with South Korea’s Posco Daewoo Corporation for deep-sea mineral exploration. The contract, signed at Petrobangla’s headquarters in Dhaka, covers DS Block-12. Signatories included Begum Khadiza Naznin from the Energy and Mineral Resources Division, Ashfaquzzaman from Petrobangla, and Daewoo’s Senior Executive Vice-President Si Bo Joo. The tenders for Block-12, Block-16, and Block-21 were initially floated on February 5, 2016.

South Korean companies have expressed keen interest in Bangladesh’s nuclear energy sector. Korean Ambassador Lee Jang-keun noted that many Korean firms possess advanced technical capabilities across various fields, including nuclear power. He highlighted South Korea’s leadership in peaceful nuclear energy applications, from research to electricity generation. The Ambassador mentioned ongoing discussions regarding potential collaborations, drawing parallels with partnerships already established in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina recently articulated plans to establish an additional nuclear power plant in Bangladesh’s southern region, following the completion of the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant (RNPP). Ambassador Lee emphasized the importance of expanding bilateral commercial relations beyond the dominant ready-made garments (RMG) sector. He cited infrastructure, pharmaceuticals, and ICT as promising areas for future cooperation, noting efforts to diversify and deepen business collaborations. Ambassador Lee underscored infrastructure development as a particularly promising area for South Korean investment in Bangladesh. He mentioned the establishment of the Samsung R&D Institute in Dhaka, which has been operational since 2011 and employs 460 software developers. He highlighted recent advancements at the Korea Export Processing Zone (KEPZ), including the inauguration of a 100-acre Hi-tech Park. Looking ahead, Ambassador Lee expressed optimism about celebrating 50 years of diplomatic relations between Bangladesh and South Korea through collaborative initiatives and strengthened bilateral ties across various sectors.

The Bangladesh-KOICA energy cooperation stands as a beacon of effective international collaboration in sustainable development. By leveraging KOICA’s expertise and resources, Bangladesh has accelerated its transition towards cleaner energy sources, enhanced infrastructure resilience, and strengthened institutional capacities. As both actors continue to innovate and expand their joint efforts, the partnership holds immense promise in shaping a sustainable energy future for Bangladesh, contributing to global climate objectives, and fostering inclusive socio-economic growth.

By Han Jun Lim

Malaysia’s state elections in August 2023 convinced many that TikTok was the country’s new political zeitgeist, but it might be a weaker force than people originally thought.

TikTok became a major talking point in Malaysian politics following the 15th general election in November 2022, which;foreign;and;domestic;commentators dubbed the ‘TikTok election’ because it was the first since the voting age was lowered from 21 to 18. The Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) emerged with the most seats, a result that surprised. Although there were a number of factors behind this win, the use of TikTok was commonly viewed as significant.

Approximately;53.8 per cent of Malaysians;use TikTok and 67.2 per cent of Malaysia’s internet users are aged 20–40. Every major political party established;a social media presence;ahead of the election. PAS and their allies also benefited from third-party accounts that racked up;millions of views;by publishing pro-PAS content and endorsing the party’s candidates such as Muhyiddin Yassin, whom PAS endorsed for prime minister.

At first glance, TikTok campaigning seemed to have been the winning trick behind the PAS win. But the 2023 state elections raise questions about this narrative. Though the governments remained unchanged, PAS and their allies gained in all six states. The;overall engagement;with TikTok users during the 2023 state election cycle was far lower than in 2022. Pro-PAS accounts produced more content but attracted much less engagement ahead of the 2023 state elections. This suggests that there are other, more important factors at play when it comes to winning vote.

TikTok, like any other social media platform, needs to retain users to stay profitable. It does so by curating a feed that its algorithm predicts a user will like. But this often causes TikTok’s algorithm to only display videos in political alignment with the user, pushing people further in the direction of their preexisting political views. This can escalate from, for example, self-improvement videos, to misogynist, hypermasculine media.

This may help explain why TikTok helped galvanise youth support for PAS in the 2022 general election. PAS has been consistently vocal on TikTok and TikTok’s algorithm shows users content that is ideologically in line with their predispositions. PAS has thus had higher salience among the politically-interested and an advantage over its more moderate counterpart, the United Malays National Organisation.

Although Malaysia’s 2022 general election highlighted the potency of TikTok’s algorithm at play, it had less in the 2023 state elections. TikTok seems less reliable as a political tool, especially when coupled with factors such as the exhaustion of the electorate from back-to-back elections. TikTok’s algorithm relies on learning a users’ preferences to redirect them to related material, allowing it to serve as a platform for small or fringe organisations, as in the 2022 general election.

Relying on TikTok’s algorithm is a gamble for political parties and requires a strong understanding of political sentiment across the country. It is a minor factor in swaying voters and determining elections because it really serves to amplify existing political sentiment, shaped by perceptions of government approval, economic prosperity and other factors, rather than create a new constituency of voters.

Malaysia is not alone in experiencing the rise of social media campaigning. Its regional neighbours provide insight into possible future trends. Indonesia’s 2024;presidential electionsaw ‘political buzzers’ — paid groups saturating social media platforms with political propaganda. These large-scale social media campaigns favour larger parties with greater funding and make use of social media algorithms to create echo chambers.

In India, the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party used;large-scale social media operations;as part of its campaign efforts, distributing party propaganda across millions of WhatsApp groups, among other social media platforms. This propaganda overload allowed fake news and hate speech to slip through fact-checking protocols from Meta (Facebook) and Google. The problem is a compelling case for new laws or government bodies to prevent the spread of fake news.

The rise of social media campaigning in Malaysia raises both opportunities and concerns for political parties. Mass content production is a likely new avenue for campaigning political parties.

Malaysian politicians will continue to look to TikTok and other social media platforms to give themselves an edge in elections. But these platforms may prove to only be a minor factor in winning over a new generation of voters as social media algorithms’ reliance on mainstream views and political sentiment serve only to entrench pre-existing political views.

• About the author: Han Jun Lim is a student at The Australian National University.
• Source: This article was published by East Asia Forum