Day: June 17, 2024

By Lisa Vives

Once unthinkable, two sharply antagonistic parties have come together in South Africa’s new government of national unity.

The African National Congress has agreed to unite with their largest rival – the white-led, pro-business Democratic Alliance (DA) – after the ANC failed to win enough votes to be the majority party – a position it held for 30 years.

The ANC got 40% of the vote, while the DA came second with 22%.

Once seen as a defender of rich white people, the DA has persuaded a growing number of Black South Africans that it reflects their aspirations.

Two smaller parties, the socially conservative Inkatha Freedom Party which got 4% of the vote and the right-wing Patriotic Alliance (PA) – people of mixed race which got 2.06% – have agreed to join the unity government.

The PA promises to push for life sentences for those found guilty of corruption in government and will make random integrity testing mandatory for all public servants, especially the police. In 2021 it reaffirmed the party’s commitment to deporting ‘illegal foreigners”

ANC secretary-general Fikile Mbalula said the coalition deal is on track and that the agreement with opposition parties is a “remarkable step”.

“We are engaging beyond this sitting on what needs to be done to constitute the government of national unity. Our work doesn’t stop,” he said.

While the ANC was deeply divided over a deal with the DA, some of its senior leaders – backed up by allies in the trade union movement and the South African Communist Party – preferred a coalition with the Economic Freedom Fighters or Jacob Zuma’s MK party.

But Mr Ramaphosa was said to prefer a coalition with the DA and IFP, seeing them as the most reliable partners to tackle South Africa’s economic crisis and deteriorating infrastructure.

The DA also opposes the ANC’s creation of a welfare state and a government-funded national health service, calling it too expensive. They also object to the ANC’s Black economic empowerment policies, saying they discriminate against other racial minorities while leading to the enrichment of the ANC’s business cronies – which the ANC denies.

In 2022, the United Kingdom (UK) accounted for 14% of energy production and 10% of energy consumption in OECD Europe

Although production in the UK has been on a long-term declining trend, new oil fields are being added. For example, UK’s largest prospective oil field, Rosebank, is scheduled to add 300 million barrels of recoverable oil at a 70,000-barrel per day (b/d) peak flow, and it will begin operating by 2027 at a cost of $3.8 billion. Equinor will operate the field, which is located northwest of the Shetland Islands.¹

The $201 million Woodhouse Colliery coal mine project in northwest England is the UK’s only new deep coal mine in the last few decades. It is scheduled to start construction in 2024 despite legal and political opposition.^2,3

The UK will extend the life of its aging nuclear power plant fleet (4.6 gigawatts [GW]), instead of retiring it, to meet the country’s energy demand, and it plans to increase nuclear power capacity to 24 GW by 2050.^4,5

The UK Department for Energy Security and Net Zero is in final negotiations for funding the UK’s first large-scale hydrogen plant in the Stanlow oil refinery. The proposed facility will cost $720 million and will have a capacity of 10 GW by 2030.⁶

The UK has added five new international electrical interconnectors to neighboring European countries since 2019, which led to a 470% increase in total trade between 2018 and 2022 at 55 billion kilowatthours (kWh).

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the UK government banned imports of crude oil, natural gas, and petroleum products from Russia. This ban has resulted in a shift in the UK’s energy suppliers, away from Russia and to Norway and the United States.^7,8

Petroleum and Other Liquids

The UK’s proved oil reserves totaled 1.5 billion barrels as of January 1, 2024.⁹

Most of the UK’s oil and natural gas production is offshore, either in the North Sea or west of the Shetland Islands in the Scottish Territorial Waters. The UK produces three grades of light, sweet crude oil: Flotta, Forties, and Brent blends.

Flotta is the smallest and lowest-quality (36.64° API and 0.66% sulfur) stream produced in the UK. Forties blend is made up of oil from more than 50 fields spread over a large area of the North Sea, the largest of which is the Buzzard oil field. Forties blend is a light (about 39° API), sweet (about 0.7% sulfur) crude oil, but the overall quality can vary based on Buzzard field volumes, which are heavier (32.6° API) and sourer (1.44% sulfur) than the rest of the blend volumes. Brent blend is a light (40.1° API), sweet (0.35% sulfur) crude oil. More than two dozen UK fields contribute to the blend, although very little production comes from the once-prolific Brent field, which the stream was named after. The Brent blend is transported to the Sullom Voe terminal in Scotland’s Shetland Islands via pipelines. Despite the declining physical volumes associated with the Brent blend, it remains an important global financial benchmark.

A benchmark crude oil is a specific crude oil that is widely and actively bought and sold that other types of crude oil can be compared with to determine a price by an agreed-on differential. The Brent benchmark, the most widely used global crude oil benchmark, is composed of five crude oil blends: Brent, Forties, Ekofisk, Oseberg (BFOE), and Troll.

The Brent and Forties blends are produced offshore in the waters of the UK, and the Ekofisk, Oseberg, and Troll blends are mainly produced offshore in the waters of Norway. The Brent benchmark was originally based on the output of the Brent field, a single field in the UK’s portion of the North Sea. At its peak, in 1984, the Brent field produced more than 400,000 b/d from four platforms. During the late 1980s, production declined rapidly, and after a brief resurgence in the early 1990s, the declines resumed. In 2014, production stopped from two of the three remaining platforms operating in the Brent field.

As production from the Brent field declined, other fields and blends were added. Although the benchmark itself accounts for only a small portion of total world crude oil production, it remains a key indicator for world crude oil pricing.

The UK government regulates the oil, natural gas, and carbon storage industries through the North Sea Transition Authority (NSTA), previously known as Oil and Gas Authority (OGA). NSTA issues crude oil and natural gas licenses; collects data from license holders; and promotes investment, collaboration, and efficiency in the industry. Since 2021, NSTA has encouraged a North Sea energy transition. Closer coordination of offshore fossil fuel and renewable energy sectors (for example, wind, wave, and tidal) is likely to help the UK meet its 2050 net zero target.¹⁰

UK crude oil and other liquids production and consumption has been trending down the last two decades; 2023 production averaged about 794,000 b/d and consumption 1.4 million b/d. In 2023, the UK produced 27% of what it produced in 1999 at its production peak of 3.0 million b/d. Crude oil consumption in 2023 was 78% of oil consumption in 1999. Production declines are the result of aging oil fields and government policy shifting away from consuming fossil fuels. We forecast that both crude oil production and consumption will remain relatively flat through 2025.

Clair Ridge (also known as Clair Phase 2) was the UK’s top producing oil field, at 106,000 b/d, in 2023. It reached 115,000 b/d in 2022, which was just below its 120,000 b/d target peak. BP is the majority stakeholder in Clair Ridge, which is west of the Shetland Islands. Buzzard oil field, which used to be the top-producing field in the UK in 2021, was slightly behind Claire Ridge in production at 113,000 b/d in 2022 and 92,000 b/d in 2023.¹¹

Rosebank field, owned by Equinor (80%) and Ithaca Energy (20%), 80 miles (130 km) west of the Shetland Islands on the UK continental shelf is the largest prospective oil and natural gas field, scheduled to come online in 2026–2027 at a cost of $3.8 billion. Rosebank has an estimated 300 million barrels of total recoverable oil. Phase 1 targets 245 million barrels of total production, and Phase 2 will add another 55 million barrels of oil production, with a production plateau of 70,000 b/d potentially in the first phase.¹²

According to the NSTA, UK oil and natural gas capital expenditures will peak at £5 billion in 2024 and drop to £2 billion by 2029; however, exploration and appraisal expenditures will remain steady, averaging £0.310 billion from 2024 to 2029.¹³

The UK’s extensive network of pipelines carries oil extracted from North Sea fields to coastal terminals in Scotland and northern England. The network includes six major pipelines. Many smaller pipelines transport petroleum liquids from individual fields to the major pipelines for transport to the coast. Pipelines in the United Kingdom are privately owned and operated; however, any qualified shipper may access the pipelines.

Flows have decreased on the Forties Pipeline System by approximately 40% since 2017, which has led processing the plant to close due to lack of demand. Forties Pipeline System moves approximately 40% of the UK’s oil from the North Sea via Grangemouth to be processed for distribution throughout the UK in any given year.¹⁴

Sullom Voe Terminal, one of the UK’s historically important oil and natural gas infrastructural points on the largest of the Shetland Islands, has started decommissioning pipelines as part of the facility’s shift to greener energy. This shift includes utilizing renewable power options over an older, higher-emitting natural gas-fired power station and adding green hydrogen and carbon capture to the site. Some of the pipelines that are being decommissioned are connected to decommissioning fields such as the once prominent Brent field. Sullom Voe Terminal is also the onshore loading site for Clair Ridge field’s oil and natural gas, although BP has considered shifting to offshore loading facilities to bypass Sullom Voe’s aging and a potentially more costly loading site than offshore loading . Liquid fuels produced at the Claire Ridge field will eventually have to find new facilities to load its production because the Sullom Voe Terminal is scheduled to be decommissioned, if it’s not renovated well before Claire Ridge will end production.^15,16,17

Operators of the Flotta oil terminal on Orkney Island have agreed to serve the North Sea fields Golden Eagle (CNOOC), Piper (RSRUK), and Claymore (RSRUK) until the end of the fields’ lives in the 2030s. Flotta terminal is also close to securing a green hydrogen hub facility, among many other green technology ventures, in hopes of continuing operations after oil and natural gas production end sometime in the next decade.¹⁸

UK major refineries maintained a capacity to process 1.2 million b/d of crude oil in 2024.

The UK consumed 482,416 barrels of petroleum products in 2022, and 73% was consumed in transportation activities. Road transport-related consumption accounted for 54%, and air transport accounted for 16% of total consumption of petroleum products.¹⁹

Fields	First year of production	Operator	Location	Production (thousand barrels per day)
Data source: The North Sea Transition Authority
Claire Ridge	2005	BP	Scottish Territorial Waters	106
Buzzard	2007	CNOOC	North Sea	92
Quad 204 (Schiehallion area) and Loyal	2017	BP	North Sea	83
Catcher area	2017	Premier Oil	North Sea	57
Mariner (and Cadet)	2019	Equinor	North Sea	34
Kraken	2017	EnQuest Heather	North Sea	33
Forties	1979	BP	North Sea	27
Golden Eagle, Peregrine, and Solitaire	2014	CNOOC	Scottish Territorial Waters	26
Culzean	2019	TotalEnergies	North Sea	23
Penguins redevelopment	2023	Shell U.K.	North Sea	13
Total	;	;	;	494

Refineries	Ownership	Location	First year of operations	Crude oil capacity (barrels per calendar day [b/cd]);	Vacuum distillation capacity (b/cd)	Note
Data source:;Oil & Gas Journal, 2022 Worldwide Refining Survey
Eastham	Nynas AB/Shell	Eastham	1966	27,000	27,000	It produces bitumen for domestic use.20
Fawley	Exxon Mobil Corp.	Fawley	1951	248,900	—	A direct jet fuel pipeline to Heathrow Airport is being replaced.21,22
Grangemouth	Petroineoes	Grangemouth	1924	145,000	64,600	Scotland’s only refinery is expected to be converted into a fuel import terminal.23
Humber	Phillips 66 Co.	South Killingholme	1969	221,000	156,912	The only coking refinery in the UK also produces transportation fuels.24
Lindsey	Prax Group	North Killingholme	1968	120,582	78,868	TotalEnergies sold the refinery in 2021 to Prax Group for the Lindsey refinery that primarily produces gasoline and diesel.25
Pembroke	Valero	Pembroke	1964	199,500	95,000	It produces gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, heating oil and low-sulfur fuel oil.26
Stanlow	Essar Energy	Ellesmere Port	1924	195,000	130,000	It supplies 16% of UK road fuel and had to stop importing fuel from Russia in 2022 due to the dockworker’s union being unwilling to unload it;27;it could also host hydrogen plant.28
Total	;	;	;	1,156,982	552,380	;

Origin	Destination	Pipeline system	Operator	Capacity (million barrels per day)	Total length (miles)
Forties area fields	Dalmeny terminal, Hound Point terminal, and Grangemouth refinery and petrochemical complex (Scotland)	Forties	Ineos FPS Ltd	1	235
Ekofisk area fields (Norway) with a spur to UK fields	Teesside terminal (England)	Norpipe	ConocoPhillips	0.8	217
Bruce area fields;	Forties Pipeline System	Bruce-Forties	Serica Energy	0.3	154
Piper, Claymore, and Golden Eagle platforms and associated fields	Flotta terminal (Scotland)	Flotta	Repsol Sinopec Resources;	0.4	130
Ninian area fields	Sullom Voe terminal (Scotland)	Ninian	EnQuest PLC	0.9	109
Cormorant Alpha platform	Sullom Voe terminal (Scotland)	Brent;	TAQA;	0.1	91

Data source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Statistics, based on North Sea Transition Authority, ConocoPhillips, Repsol Sinopec Resources, TAQA, EnQuest, Ineos, and Serica

Natural Gas

The UK’s proved natural gas reserves were 4.6 trillion cubic feet as of January 1, 2024.²⁹

In the United Kingdom, natural gas production, transmission, and distribution are fully privatized. With a market share of 28%, British Gas, a subsidiary of Centrica, was the largest natural gas distributor in the United Kingdom as of the third quarter of 2023, according to the UK Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM). Octopus Energy (17%) and EON (14%) are currently leading a group of natural gas distributors that have slowly taken market share from British Gas, which had over half of market share in 2006.³⁰

The UK natural gas distribution sector changed significantly in 2005, when National Grid Gas sold four of the eight natural gas distribution networks to Scotia Gas Networks, Wales and West Utilities, and Northern Gas Networks. Before this sale, National Grid controlled the domestic natural gas distribution system.

UK natural gas production decreased to 1.3 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) in 2022, and consumption decreased to 2.5 Tcf). UK natural gas production has been steadily decreasing since peaking at 4.1 Tcf in 2000 due to aging natural gas fields and diminishing reserves, in turn, making natural gas imports more important. The UK has an intricate network of natural gas pipelines to receive natural gas from domestic production, Norwegian production in the North Sea, and from greater Europe via pipeline connections with Belgium and the Netherlands. The United Kingdom also has two natural gas pipeline interconnections with the Republic of Ireland, an undersea link from Scotland, and a smaller capacity link from Northern Ireland.

The natural gas consumption decreases to 2.5 Tcf in 2022 was driven by a decrease in both domestic and industrial uses. UK provisional data also show a decrease in consumption in 2023. 

Pipeline system	Origin	Destination	Capacity (trillion cubic feet)	Total length (miles)
Langeled pipeline	Nyhamna natural gas plant, Norway;	Easington, England	1.0	725
Interconnector UK;	Zeebrugge, Belgium	Bacton, England	0.9	146
	;	Zeebrugge, Belgium	0.7	146
Balgzand Bacton line (BBL);	Bacton, UK	Bacton, England	0.7	146
Shetland Island Regional Gas Export System (SIRGE)	Balgzand, Netherlands	FUKA pipeline	0.7	145
Central Area Transmission System (CATS)	Shetland natural gas plant at Sullom Voe	Teesside terminal (England)	0.6	251
Tampen and Gjøa	Norwegian North Sea field	FLAGS pipeline	0.6	14 (Tampen) and 81 (Gjøa)
Shearwater Elgin Area Line (SEAL)	UK North Sea field	Bacton Gas Terminal (England)	0.5	295
Frigg (FUKA)	UK and Norwegian North Sea fields	St. Fergus gas terminal (Scotland)	0.5	225
Vesterland	Norwegian North Sea fields	St. Fergus gas terminal (Scotland)	0.5	224
Far North Liquids and Associated Gas System (FLAGS)	UK and Norwegian North Sea fields	St. Fergus gas terminal (Scotland)	0.4	280
Scottish Area Gas Evacuation (SAGE)	UK and Norwegian North Sea fields	St. Fergus gas terminal (Scotland)	0.4	201
UK-Eire Interconnector	Moffat, Scotland	Loughshinny	0.4	120

Data source: North Sea Midstream Partners, Gassco, Shell, Apache Corp, CATS management Limited, Interconnector (UK), BG, BBL Company, and Digest of UK Energy Statistics

Coal

The UK had 29 million short tons in coal reserves in 2022.

The UK’s coal production and consumption have declined since peaking in the early 1900s.³² The decline continued into 2022; production totaled 0.7 million short tons (3% of the 2012 average), and consumption totaled 6.7 million short tons (9% of the 2012 average).

The $201 million Woodhouse Colliery coal mine project in northwestern England, the only new deep coal mine in the last few decades, is scheduled to begin construction in 2024, as of December 2023, despite legal and political opposition. The mine is 57 acres, and 80% of the coal produced in the mine will be exported throughout Europe.^.33,34

Efforts are underway to take advantage of flooded coal mines and geothermal energy below one-quarter of UK homes to naturally warm homes. The practice has already been implemented in the English former coal town of Gateshead to heat hundreds of homes and businesses.³⁵

Electricity 

In 2022, the UK generated 319 terawatthours (TWh) of electric power and maintained an installed generation capacity of 111 GW. In 2022, the UK’s renewable generation, which stood at 51.6 GW, surpassed fossil fuel generation capacity of 50.6 GW.

In 2022, the UK generated 319 billion kWh and consumed 287 billion kWh of electricity. Generation increased by 7%, and consumption declined by 3% compared with 2021.

Natural gas-fired generation (124 billion kWh) continued to account for the greatest share of UK total generation, at 36%, in 2022. Utilities are interested in building additional natural gas power plants despite legally binding commitments to net zero emissions by 2050.³⁶

Together, generation from renewable sources was 45% of total generation in 2022 (wind, 27%; bioenergy, 12%; solar, 4%; and hydro, 2%). Although slightly more wind capacity is onshore (52%) than offshore (48%), offshore wind accounted for 56% of the 85.6 TWh of wind generation in 2022. At 24.8 TWh, plant biomass made up 97% of biomass energy and 64% of bio energy in 2022.³⁷

The UK Department for Energy Security and Net Zero are in final negotiations for funding the UK’s first large-scale hydrogen plant in the Stanlow oil refinery. With an estimated cost of $720 million, it would have a capacity of 10 GW by 2030, and it would be paid for through the UK’s $25 billion energy transition fund.³⁸

UK nuclear generation increased for the first time since 2016, by 4% to 43 billion kWh, in 2022. The UK government plans to increase nuclear power capacity to 24 GW by 2050. The UK is holding a competition to produce some of its next generation of small modular reactors (SMR) to aid in reaching the 2050 goal. Six companies have expressed interest in building the next generation of nuclear facilities.³⁹

In addition to the existing nuclear power plants, the UK has four AP300, U.S.-designed, and factory-made for on-site assembly SMRs that are in preliminary planning for northeast England that will begin operating in the early 2030s. The new AP300 reactor design, expected to gain approval by 2027, is estimated to cost about $1 billion per reactor, compared with some of the older and more expensive units that can cost as much as $6 billion. Notably, this addition would be the UK’s first privately funded nuclear reactor.^40,41

The UK has continued to extend the life of its aging nuclear power plant fleet, like many other European countries including France, Belgium, and Sweden. Hinkley Point C has two new reactors in construction to replace a majority of the retiring nuclear capacity.⁴²

Site (operator)	Type	Reactor (net capacity,; megawatt electric)	Note	Start-up
Bradwell	Hualong One	B-1 (1,150)	;	Unknown
(China General Nuclear)	Hualong One	B-2 (1,150)	;	Unknown
Hartlepool	GCR	A-1 (590)	EDF hopes to extend its production further past initial closure dates.43	1983a
(EDF Energy)	GCR	A-2 (595)		1984a
Hinkley Point (EDF Energy)	EPR	C-1 (1,720)	Production has begun.44	2027
	EPR	C-2 (1,720)		2028
Heysham (EDF Energy);	GCR	A-1 (485)	EDF hopes to extend its production further past initial closure dates.45	1983a
	GCR	A-2 (575)		1984a
	GCR	B-1 (620)		1988a
	GCR	B-2 (620)		1988a
Oldbury	ABWR	B-1 (1,380)	;	Canceled
(Horizon)	ABWR	B-2 (1,380)	;	Canceled
Moorside (NuGeneration)	AP1000	3 x (1,135)	;	Canceled
Moorside (EDF Energy)	EPR	C-1 (1,670)	;	2034
	EPR	C-2 (1,670)	;	2034
Sellafield (Candu Energy)	PRISM	(311)	;	Canceled
	PRISM	2 (311)	;	Canceled
(GE Hitachi)	ABWR	1 (740)	;	Canceled
	ABWR	2 (740)	;	Canceled
Sizewell (EDF Energy)	EPR	C-1 (1,670)	Approval for construction has largely been granted.46	TBD
	EPR	C-2 (1,670)		TBD
Torne	GCR	1 (595)	EDF hopes to extend its production further past initial closure dates.47	1988a
	GCR	2 (605)		1989a
Wylfa Newydd (Horizon)	ABWR	1 (1,380)	UK government still intends on using the land to build nuclear plants despite cancellation of the previous project.48	Canceled
	ABWR	2 (1,380)		Canceled
Total planned and proposed capacity (11 units)		15,600	;	;

Data source: World Nuclear Association Note: ^aExtended the life of these reactors past their original closure dates. 

Energy Trade 

UK petroleum and other liquid imports decreased to 644,000 b/d and exports decreased to 547,000 b/d in 2022.

UK petroleum product imports and exports have risen after decreasing during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the UK and the EU banned imports of crude oil (December 2022) and petroleum products from Russia (February 2023).⁴⁹

The UK, the world’s leading cargo insurer, banned insuring Russian oil shipments for more than the $60 per barrel price cap established in December 2022. Prior to the ban, 33% of Russia’s oil cargo shipments were insured in the UK from March 2022 to November 2023.⁵⁰

The Netherlands is the source of most (19%) UK petroleum product imports and receives most (25%) UK petroleum product exports.

UK natural gas imports were 2.0 Tcf and exports were 0.8 Tcf in 2022.

The UK’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports from the United States have significantly increased; imports grew from zero in 2016 to nearly 420 billion cubic feet (Bcf) in 2023. Qatar LNG exports peaked in 2011 at about 761 Bcf. The UK’s pipeline imports from Belgium and the Netherlands have decreased from nearly 209 Bcf in 2018 to 1.3 Bcf because of lower natural gas pipeline supplies from Russia to Europe. Imports of piped natural gas from Norway have maintained a rate varying above and below approximately 1.0 Tcf since 2012.⁵¹

The UK has maintained a ban on LNG imports from Russia since January 1, 2023, despite the European Commission proposing its ban of natural gas and LNG from Russia for 2027. Prior to the ban, UK natural gas imports from Russia stopped by 2023. In February 2024, the UK government introduced additional Russian sanctions, some of which involved oil and natural gas. In particular, the sanctions affect the so-called shadow tankers carrying energy products from Russia, those who trade energy products from Russia, and the Artic LNG 2 development.^52,53

UK electricity imports fell by 46% year on year to 15.5 billion kWh in 2022. Meanwhile, exports increased by 399% to 20.8 kWh in 2022. The IFA interconnectors expansion assisted the large increase in exports, and when ElecLink came online in mid-2022, the UK shifted from importing to exporting electricity to France.⁵⁴

The UK had nine transnational electricity interconnectors with a total capacity of 9.8 GW as of early 2024. Greenlink, which connects Wales to Ireland, may add 0.5 GW by the end of 2024.⁵⁵ The highest-capacity and longest interconnector project proposed includes two 1.8-GW submarine cables that are 2,485 miles long from a 11.5-GW wind and solar Moroccan power plant coupled with a 22.5-gigawatthour/5-GW battery storage facility that is proposed to begin its first phase of operation in 2029.⁵⁶

UK coal exports and imports have diminished because of decreasing domestic coal production and all coal-based end uses, including electrical generation and industrial use.⁵⁷

Interconnector system	Connection	First operation; (expected start date)	Type of HVDC cable	Capacity; (gigawatts)(proposed)	Total length; (miles)
Data source: UK Office of Gas and Electricity Markets, NorthConnect, AQUIND, and Xlinks Note: HVDC=high-voltage direct current;
Interconnexion France-Angleterre (IFA)	France	1986	Submarine	2	45
Moyle;	Ireland	2001	Submarine	0.5	40
BritNed	Netherlands	2011	Submarine	1	160
East-West	Ireland	2012	Submarine	;	162
Nemo Link	Belgium	2019	Submarine;	1	87
Interconnexion France-Angleterre 2 (IFA2)	France	2020	Submarine	1	127
North Sea Link	Norway	2021	Submarine;	1.4	450
ElecLink	France	2022	Chanel tunnel	1	32
Viking Link	Denmark	2023	Submarine	1.4	475
Greenlink	Ireland	(2024)	Submarine	(0.5)	120
NorthConnect	Norway	(2025)	Submarine	(1.4)	400
AQUIND Interconnector	France	(2026)	Submarine	(2.0)	150
Neuconnect	Germany	(2028)	Submarine	(1.4)	450
Xlinks	Morocco	(2029)	Submarine	(3.6)	2,485
FAB Link	France	(2030)	Submarine	(1.4)	140
Grid Link	France	(2030)	Submarine	(1.4)	87
Total	;	;	;	9.8	;

Source: This article was published by EIA

Endnotes

1. Equinor, “Rosebank field to progress in the UK,” Equinor, September 27, 2023, https://www.equinor.com/news/20230927-rosebank-field-to-progress-in-the-uk
2. Reuters, “Britain approves first new coal mine in decades despite climate targets,” Reuters, December 7, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/britain-approves-first-new-coal-mine-decades-2022-12-07/
3. Bridget Dempsey, “West Cumbria Mining Ltd. issue update on proposed Whitehaven coal mine,” The Whitehaven News, December 24, 2023, https://www.whitehavennews.co.uk/news/24010886.west-cumbria-mining-ltd-issue-update-proposed-whitehaven-coal-mine/
4. World Nuclear News, “UK SMR selection contest: Six companies into next stage,” World Nuclear News, October 2, 2023, https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/UK%C2%A0SMR-selection-contest-Six-companies-into-next
5. Nina Chestney, “EDF Energy aims to extend life of UK nuclear power plants,” Reuters, January 9, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/edf-energy-aims-extend-life-uk-nuclear-power-plants-2024-01-09/
6. Newsbase, “UK Government Set To Back Country’s First Large-Scale Hydrogen Plant,” Newsbase, February 15, 2024, https://newsbase.com/story/uk-government-set-to-back-country-s-first-large-scale-hydrogen-plant-312488?source=europe-oil-and-gas-monitor
7. Gov.UK, “UK ban on Russian oil and oil products,” GOV.UK, April 14,2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-ban-on-russian-oil-and-oil-products/uk-ban-on-russian-oil-and-oil-products#context-for-the-uk-sanctions-on-russian-oil
8. Gov.UK, “UK sanctions relating to Russia,” GOV.UK, accessed March 7,2024, https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/uk-sanctions-on-russia
9. Oil & Gas Journal, “Worldwide look at reserves and production,” published December 4, 2023
10. Oil & Gas Authority, OGA Overview 2021, accessed February 14, 2024
11. UK OGA, “NSTA Field Production (PPRS),” accessed February 7, 2024, https://opendata-nstauthority.hub.arcgis.com/apps/984eeea3b1664049b12c02a28478bdaa/explore
12. Equinor, “Rosebank field to progress in the UK,” Equinor, September 27, 2023, https://www.equinor.com/news/20230927-rosebank-field-to-progress-in-the-uk
13. North Sea Transition Authority, “NSTA Projections of UK Oil and Gas Production and Expenditure (March 2024),” North Sea Transition Authority, March 4, 2024, https://www.nstauthority.co.uk/media/3xtnslm5/nsta-medium-term-projections-mar-2024.xlsx
14. Offshore, “Forties Pipeline System oil flows have declined by 40% over six years,” Offshore, September 27, 2023, https://www.offshore-mag.com/pipelines/article/14299456/forties-pipeline-system-oil-flows-have-declined-by-40-over-six-years
15. Nick Coleman, “Shetland Islands tout green energy solution for aging Sullom Voe terminal,” S&P Global, January 20, 2020, https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/012920-shetland-islands-tout-green-energy-solution-for-aging-sullom-voe-terminal
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By Sanchita Bhattacharya

As reported on June 11, the Taliban instructed the Hazara residents of Nowabad, located in the 6th Security District of Ghazni city, the provincial capital of Ghazni, to submit their land ownership documents to the group. The Taliban issued eviction orders, claiming the area had been “usurped” by the residents.;

On March 6, 2023, the Taliban forced the Hazara residents of Pusht-e Asmidan village in Al Badr District, Sar-e Pul Province, to leave their homes and evacuate the village. They also imposed a fine of AFN 36 million on the residents of this village, as most of them are from the Hazara community.

Taliban established a “Commission for Prevention of Usurpation and Recovery of Government Lands” in 2023. This Commission, in various provinces, registers government lands under the name of “Emirate Lands”. Earlier, in October 2021, the Taliban forcibly expelled hundreds of Hazara families from provinces of Helmand, Balkh, Daikundi, Uruzgan, and Kandahar.;

In addition to forced evictions, Hazaras have been targets of violent attacks. According to partial data collated by;Institute for Conflict Management,;at least 113 Hazaras have been killed and 25 injured, in 11 incidents since August 15, 2021 (data till June 16, 2024).

Some of the recent incidents include:;

On April 29, 2024, a gunman stormed the Shia-Hazara Imam Zaman Mosque in the Guzara District of Herat Province and opened fire on worshippers killing six, including a child.;

On April 21, 2024, IS-KP claimed responsibility for a magnetic IED attack targeting a bus carrying mostly Hazara civilians near a security checkpoint in Kabul, killing one and injuring 10.;

On January 11, 2024, two people were killed and 12 wounded in a grenade explosion outside a commercial center in the Dasht-e-Barchi neighbourhood, a Hazara enclave in Kabul city.;

On 6 January, 2024, a minibus with civilians was attacked by the IS-KP in the Dasht-e-Barchi areas of Kabul, killing five people and injuring 15.;

According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) report,;Human Rights Situation in Afghanistan, released on January 22, 2024, targeted attacks against Hazaras persist in various parts of Afghanistan. In the months of October and November 2023, at least 5 separate attacks against Hazaras were planned and carried out. UNAMA’s Annual Report, 2023, however, is silent on the wider persecution of Hazaras in Afghanistan.;

In addition to physical violence leading to death and severe injuries, Hazaras are also subjected to multiple forms of discrimination and restrictions, affecting a broad-spectrum of human rights.

According to the Freedom House’s Country Report on Afghanistan, dated June 5, 2024: “The emirate authorities imposed multiple restrictions on the 2023 commemoration of the month of mourning, Muharram. Mourners were told to avoid public displays of religious symbols and rituals, and mourning ceremonies were only to be held in select places of worship designated by the Taliban. Shias widely defied these restrictions, resulting in clashes with the authorities.”

After their return to power in August 2021, the Taliban soon resumed their anti-Hazara campaign. On August 18, 2021, the Taliban blew up the statue of Hazara leader Abdul Ali Mazari in Bamiyan province. Mazari had been killed by the Taliban in 1995, during their first regime. In December 2022, the United Nations called on the de facto Taliban authorities to respect the rights of minorities, specifically mentioning places of worship and education facilities, and singled out the Hazaras as a community ‘facing heightened risk’.

There are no official estimates of how large the Hazara population is, as a national census of the population has never been undertaken. Estimates suggest that the Hazara community has diminished significantly due to oppression and torture. They are variously estimated to comprise between 4 per cent and 10 per cent of the population.;

Hazaras speak a dialect of Dari (Farsi) called Hazaragi and the vast majority follow the Shia sect (Twelver Imami) of Islam. A significant number are also followers of the Ismaili sect. A large number of Hazaras live in Hazarajat (or Hazarestan), the ‘land of the Hazara’, situated in the rugged central mountainous core of Afghanistan, in the Bamiyan province and in cities such as Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif. Small concentrations are also found in the Badakhshan, Jowzjan and Badghis provinces. Ismaili Hazaras, a smaller religiously differentiated group of Hazaras, live in the Hindu Kush Mountain region.

Hazara women suffer from the selective Taliban policy of identifying ‘bad;hijab‘. On January 11, 2023, the UNAMA expressed concern about the “arbitrary arrests and detentions of women and girls” over;hijab. UNAMA documented the arrest of women in Kabul and Daikundi provinces and was “looking into allegations of ill-treatment and incommunicado detention, and that religious and ethnic minority communities appear to be disproportionately impacted by the enforcement operations.” The release process of these women reportedly required a;mahram;(male guardian) to sign a letter guaranteeing future compliance or else face punishment. The Taliban’s restrictions have far-reaching implications, especially on the mental health of Hazara women who are already dealing with the trauma of long-term conflict and targeted attacks.

The Ministry of Higher Education under the Taliban also published a decree in 2023, ordering the removal of all books belonging to the Shia sect or written by Shias, Salafis and the political opponents of the Taliban, deemed different from the Hanafi jurisprudence. The group also banned marriages between Shias and Sunnis. The formation of the provincial Ulema Councils in various provinces also had no Shia or female members.;

There have also been attacks on Hazara schools. For instance, on 30 September 2022, an attack at the Kaaj Education Centre in Dasht-e-Barchi killed more than 60 Hazara students and injured over 100, mostly female.

In repeated acts of desperation, Hazaras have migrated to the neighbouring countries of Pakistan and Iran over the years. They have also migrated to countries such as Australia and the United Kingdom in search of a peaceful, secure and better life. A May 18, 2024, report indicates that, since the Taliban took power in Afghanistan in August 2021, Hazaras have fled their home country to seek asylum in Indonesia as well. As of February, 2023 there were some 12,710 registered refugees with the United Nations refugee agency (UNHCR) in Indonesia, just more than half from Afghanistan, and most of these, Hazaras. The Hazaras have started a refugee learning centre – Cisarua Refugee Learning Centre (CRLC) – at Cisarua, Bogor Regency, south of Jakarta. There are at least seven such refugee-led learning centres in Bogor, which serve some 1,800 children, as well as three in Jakarta and one in the Thai capital, Bangkok.;

The Hazara people are experiencing persecution and violence in Afghanistan at the hands of political rulers and as well as terrorist organization, particularly the Islamic State, Khorasan Province. The Freedom House Country Report 2024 noted, for instance, “ISKP has continued its campaign of violence against the Hazara community. Mass casualty attacks against Hazaras included improvised explosive devices (IEDs) at a Shia mosque in Pol-e-Khomri in October 2023, at a west Kabul sports club the same month, and a commuter bus in west Kabul in November.;

The Hazaras are not only a religious, but also an ethnic minority in a country currently obsessed with Sunni-Pashtun dogma. With a deeply regressive and militant religious-ideological group currently in power in the country, they have been viciously persecuted, with little, if any, recourse for justice. As the Taliban hardens its purported ‘Islamic regulations’, which see the Hazaras as a deviant group, such persecution can only worsen.

• Sanchita Bhattacharya
  Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

By James Fite

Hunter Biden, the son of one of the most anti-gun presidents in recent history, now finds himself in the ironic position of Second Amendment champion. How ever did it come to this? The first son was convicted Tuesday, June 11, of three felony firearm charges, coming on the very day his own father gave a speech pushing for more gun control. Now, to avoid potential prison time and the lifelong label of “felon,” the younger Biden’s legal appeal must rely on an interpretation of the Second Amendment that’s very different from the president’s. In an ironic twist of fate, Hunter Biden has become an unlikely champion of the;uninfringed;right to keep and bear arms.

Grounds for Appeal

In Tuesday’s conviction, the 54-year-old son of the president was found guilty of lying about his drug use on a federal gun background form, lying to the federally licensed dealer, and illegally possessing the firearm for 11 days afterward. The defense team already made the argument that;Biden;shouldn’t have been asked about his history of drug use to begin with, saying that prohibiting people who used or were addicted to drugs from buying guns violates their Second Amendment rights.

Why, what a novel idea!

To be clear, for the first 179 years after the Constitution took effect on March 9, 1789, there were no “prohibited persons” in federal firearm regulation. Not until the;Gun Control Act of 1968;– so for just the last 56 of this nation’s history – has it been a felony crime for “prohibited persons” like drug users, convicted felons, and those who have been dishonorably discharged from the military or renounced their citizenship to buy a gun. For that matter, there were no federal restrictions on who could own what type of arms before the;National Firearm Act of 1934. Prior to that, someone in Hunter Biden’s shoes could own a machine gun and be just fine, legally.

And, of course, from the founding of the nation to this very day, anyone – even felons and drug addicts – were and are allowed to own;cannons, never mind Joe Biden’s insistence to the contrary.

The right to keep and bear arms applies to far more than just firearms (think swords, knives, and, of course, those pesky cannons). As protected by the Second Amendment, it comes from an older idea that had previously been articulated in the Declaration of Independence:

“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.”

The right to keep and bear arms is necessary to protect the right to life or liberty – without it, that so-called right is little more than pretty words on fancy paper. As such, suppressing this right for “prohibited persons” is suppressing their right to adequate self-defense, thus relegating them to a class that falls somewhere short of actual personhood.

Should Hunter’s appeal fail, he will be a convicted felon as well as a former addict. That won’t make it legal for someone else to execute him or lock him up in a cage somewhere; he’ll still have the right to not be attacked or unlawfully imprisoned. Yet the current law of the nation, while recognizing this, declares he does not have the right to arm himself adequately to protect his life or liberty from violent criminals hoping to do him harm.

Is Hunter Biden Making the 2A Case?

A win for Hunter Biden on Second Amendment grounds would be a serious blow to the legitimacy of laws like the;Gun Control Act of 1968;– and he actually does have a strong chance of success, especially after the Supreme Court’s 2022 ruling in;New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, Superintendent of New York State Police, et al.,;and especially if the Court also rules in favor of Zackey Rahimi in;US v. Rahimi.

The;Bruen;ruling requires all gun control laws be held to a strict historical standard, rendering unconstitutional any that don’t line up with how the right to keep and bear arms was interpreted historically. Both Hunter Biden (former drug addict and now felon) and Zackey Rahimi (who possessed a firearm while under a domestic violence protective order) would have been allowed to purchase and own a firearm throughout most of America’s history. As such, they claim that they still should be allowed that right today – and there’s a good argument to be made that a win for either would bolster the other’s case.

If either or both win their cases, perhaps it means that there can be no prohibited persons moving forward. Then again, maybe the ultimate ruling will just mean drug addicts and people under restraining orders won’t fall into that category anymore. Whatever the eventual outcome, the right to keep and bear arms is once again being examined for groups of people who have had their right to self-defense – indeed, their very personhood – oppressed for half a century.

• About the author: James is our wordsmith extraordinaire, a legislation hound and lover of all things self-reliant and free. An author of politics and fiction at LibertyNation.com (often one and the same) he homesteads in the Arkansas wilderness.
• Source: This article was published by Liberty Nation

That’s a bit of an exaggeration, but the Consumer Price Index (CPI), excluding owners’ equivalent rent (OER) fell to 1.4 percent in June 2023 and has remained pretty close, but mostly above 2.0 percent ever since. We all know the Fed targets the Personal Consumption Expenditure Deflator, where the OER has a smaller weight, but it is still worth seeing how much this one category affects the CPI.

OER is not just a major expenditure category, it is also unusual in the sense that literally no one pays it. This is the rent that homeowners would be paying themselves if they had to rent the home they lived in. For this reason, it’s probably fair to say that no one considers themselves worse off because OER has risen. (They may consider themselves poorer because the cost of buying a home has increased, but that is a somewhat different question.)

Anyhow, here is the picture since the start of 2020.[1]

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Author’s Calculations.

As can be seen, just before the pandemic inflation minus OER was actually slightly above the Fed’s 2.0 percent target. With the pandemic shutdowns, it plunged and even briefly turned negative. It then accelerated sharply in early 2021 as supply chain issues sent inflation soaring. OER actually dampened inflation somewhat as it was peaking in the spring of 2022. It would have scraped into the double-digits in June 2022. It then fell sharply over the next year, bottoming out at 1.4 percent in June of 2023. Since then, it has bounced around some but remained reasonably close to 2.0 percent.

Apart from the issue that no one pays OER, there is a reason to be interested in the CPI excluding both the current OER measure as well as the measure of rent proper. We know that inflation in both measures will be headed sharply lower in the months ahead because the indexes that measure the;rents;on;units;that change hands are showing sharply lower rents.

The CPI rental indexes are being held up now by leases signed one or more years ago. When these leases are up for renewal, they will show much lower increases, and many may report rent declines. As these new leases get incorporated into the CPI, the inflation shown in its rental indexes will fall sharply, possibly near zero. Instead of being a factor pushing up the overall inflation rate, rent may be a factor pulling it down.

Notes:

[1] To calculate the CPI without OER, I averaged the relative importance of January of each year and January of the following year and applied it as the weight assigned to year-over-year OER inflation in each month of that year. For 2024, I just used the January relative importance for the first five months of the year.

A new conflict is important for Aliyev to remain in power https://t.co/kRUjRVYV0a

— Emin Bred (@emin_bred) June 17, 2024

Intelligence bill eyes commission on Havana syndrome – Washington Times https://t.co/Td0skE8wVv

— Michael Smith (@MickWSmith) June 17, 2024

How a CIA ‘cover-up’ backfired on Joe Biden https://t.co/sbwBwBAM0B

— Michael Smith (@MickWSmith) June 17, 2024

белорусская Nexta и какой-то “Донбасс оперативный” первыми вбросили лубянские фейки с матча Румыния – Украина про флаги “днр” и румынских болельщиков, за ними подхватили не менее крупные ресурсы

вот и думайте, кто гэбэшные фейкомёты..

— Румынская сотня 🇷🇴🇪🇺 (@latiniano) June 17, 2024

Turkey vs Georgia: Where and how to watch live the UEFA Euro 2024 in your country  Bolavip