Day: June 11, 2024

The EU elections over June 6 to June 9 have presented a chaotically merry picture, certainly for those on the right of politics.; Not that the right in question is reliably homogeneous in any sense, nor hoping for a single theme of triumph.; A closer look at the gains made by the conservative side of politics, along with its saltier reactionary wings, suggests difficulty and disagreement. ;

In any case, papers such as The Economist were hopelessly pessimistic about the post-Eden fall, which may suggest that democracy, in all its unpredictable nastiness, is working.; The lingering nature of the Ukraine War, the obstinate, enduring presences of such nationalists as Marine Le Pen in France and Viktor Orbán in Hungary, all pointing to “a period of political rudderlessness”.; In truth, the rudders are being replaced. ;

In France, Le Pen has managed to point the gun of discontent at the centre of bureaucratic control and (hideous word) governance.; The two prominent targets: President Emmanuel Macron and Paris.; She has been aided by the fact that Macron has been inclined to pack key positions in government with loyal, reliable Parisians.; Last February, François Bayrou, an early Macron enthusiast and Justice Minister, found it hard to accept that 11 of the 15 important ministers in the government were from the Paris area.; This revealed a “growing lack of understanding between those in power and the French people at the grassroots level”. ;

On June 9, Le Pen proved had every reason to gloat, with the gains made by her party sufficiently terrifying French President Emmanuel Macron to dissolve parliament and call an election.; Parties of the far-right came first in Austria, tied for top billing in the Netherlands and came in as runners-up in Germany (where Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s Social Democrats were savaged) and Romania.

The party of Italian Prime Minister, Georgia Meloni, also did well, winning 28.9% of the country’s vote in the elections.; Predicted to get 24 seats in the European Parliament, the Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy) have done a shedding act on neo-fascism in favour of a smoother image, while still insisting that Europe’s identity had to be defended “from every cultural subjugation that sees Europe renounce its history to adopt that of others.”; Such messaging has come with slick shallowness on social media, including such posts as those featuring “L’Italia cambia l’Europa” (“Italy changes Europe”), or the voter instruction to “scrivi Giorgia” (“write Giorgia”) on their ballot.

Meloni’s march was so significant as to compel EU Commission chief, Ursula von der Leyen, to become a salivating groupie for the right – of sorts.; Her sharp policies on migration have drawn the approval of Meloni.; Speaking at April’s Maastricht Debate, organised by POLITICO and Studio Europa Maastricht, von der Leyen openly expressed her interest in linking arms with Meloni’s European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR).

The Italian PM has found herself to be an object of much political interest, indispensable to the chess pieces of Europe’s political manoeuvrings.; Italy’s reactionary flame has become, for instance, a matter of much interest to Le Pen. To the Italian newspaper, Corriere della Sera, Le Pen emphasised her insistence that a hard-right bloc of parties in the European Parliament could be formed, overcoming the current division between her Identity and Democracy (ID) group and that of Meloni’s ECR. ;

That said, any union of faux liberal types such as von der Leyen with those of the hard right of Europe is unlikely to be a fragrant one.; Von der Leyen has taken heavy shots at Le Pen’s Rassemblement National (National Rally), excoriating its pro-Russian position along with those of Germany’s AfD and Poland’s Konfederacja.; “They are Putin’s puppets and proxies and they are trampling on our values.”; The promise to Meloni: if you want my dour, camouflaged conservatism, forget the other reactionaries. ;

What was telling was that the young, having voted in 2019 for parties of the left such as the Greens, had had a change of heart.; In May an Ipsos poll revealed that 34% of French voters under the age of 30 were keen to vote for the 28-year old leader of the National Rally in the European Parliamentary elections.; In Germany, the 22% of Germans between 14-29 were keen to plump for Alternative for Germany (AfD), just under double from what was registered in 2023. ;

For Albena Azmanova of the University of Kent, this presents a curious predicament for those on the progressive side of politics (is there such a thing anymore?).; Dissatisfaction that would normally be mined by progressives for political advantage is being left over to the opposite wing of politics.; “The left is failing to harness that discontent, although its trademark issues – poverty and unemployment – are now more salient for voters than the far right’s flagship of ‘immigration’.” ;

An unanticipated phenomenon has manifested: younger voters in France, Portugal, Belgium, Germany and Finland folding at the ballot box for parties of the right and far right. The pendulum has well and truly swung.; Europe’s right, bulked by the young, is on the march.

We know that humans live relatively long lives, and we certainly know that we spend a larger proportion of those lives as children than other species. The question remains: how did we manage to extend this critical period of our growth? When and where did our ancestors start to stretch out the limits of physiology and build that long childhood? And where can we find evidence of this evolutionary process?

The very surprising answer is: in the mouths of babes—specifically, their teeth. But to understand how the timing of teeth tells us the story of, well, us, we need to first put teeth in context: as important milestones on the path to growth.

Different species grow at different rates. How fast you grow is determined by a complicated set of interlocking mechanisms that factor in everything from the mass of the animal to the stability of their environment and has led to the development of a branch of evolutionary biological theory that attempts to disentangle the factors that propel a species from one developmental milestone to the next: ‘life history.’ Understanding a species’ life history has major implications for biology: comparing the rate of growth between two species, for instance, gives us insight into different evolutionary strategies. For;Homo sapiens, who have some of the slowest growth on the planet, looking at life history becomes a critical way to address why our species has moved our milestones so far from those of our nearest relatives.

Teeth are one of the foremost tools in understanding how animals grow because they arrive in the mouth—erupt—at a very predictable time. This regular schedule reflects the critical importance of having the right teeth at the right time. Animals need different sizes and numbers of teeth at different ages. If you think about trying to fit an entire adult set of teeth into the mouth of a baby, you will rapidly understand why it is that humans come with two sets. Of course, having multiple sets is not the only option—some animals have endless sets, like sharks, and some have sets with some teeth that grow continuously, like hamsters. But for primates like us, there are two sets to worry about: our ‘milk’ or ‘baby’ teeth, and our adult, permanent set. The schedule of which teeth emerge when gives us a clear evolutionary signal of which teeth are needed when, and all teeth have very specific jobs to do.

From about five months in utero, human teeth start to develop. We are born with some of our baby teeth already partially formed, but still inside our jaws. The process of ‘teething,’ which parents, in particular, are acutely aware of, is actually;a long and drawn-out period;over the first few years of life as the deciduous—the formal name for baby teeth, which after all shed just like the leaves of deciduous trees—teeth erupt out of the jaw and into the mouth. First, the incisors in the front, which have the job of nibbling and biting, erupt around 4.5 months; then the lateral incisors to the sides of them around 7.5 months, then the first big bumpy chewing teeth, molars, around 10.5 months followed by the ripping and tearing canine teeth until the last big baby teeth, the chunky second molars, emerge at about 1.5–2.5 years old. That’s it for teeth until about 5 years old, when the very first permanent tooth comes into the mouth: the first adult molar, or, as it is known by biologists: M1.

Molars have been seen as key to explaining the timing of our life histories. Evolutionary biologists looking to explain patterns of growth and development in primates have observed that the timing of the eruption of M1is;linked very well;with the end of dependence on mother’s milk, or the end of infancy. The eruption of M2 has been linked with a stage of childhood usually referred to as the juvenile period, and;the ability to forage independently;in primates like chimpanzees. Finally, the eruption of the third of our big chewing teeth (M3—the wisdom tooth in humans) has been associated with reaching adulthood, the end of growth, and possibly the start of reproduction.

Careful;reconstruction of fossil teeth;has shown that earlier probable ancestors, like;Australopithecus africanus;and;Homo erectus, erupted their teeth into their mouths much faster than we do today. The timing of the eruption of molars particularly probably was very similar to that of our common ancestor with today’s chimpanzees, and modern-day chimpanzees erupt their first permanent molar (M1) at 2 to 4 years old, M2 at around 6 to 8 years, and finish the last (M3) at 12 years, a few years before they are ready to behave as full adults. Humans, by contrast, have molars that appear around age 5, 10–11, and about 18 years of age.

However, even though we have many similarities with our nearest primate relatives, we have somehow become untethered from the biological milestones that signal different life history events. The eruption of our teeth is not timed quite right for when we wean and move our babies onto solid foods. Even in societies where the pressure to end breastfeeding early does not exist, humans simply do not spend as long as infants on the breast as a primate our size should; we are done before M1 is ready. A;large-scale study of forager children;around the world found that by 10 years old when M2 isn’t quite erupted, children were still only half as competent at getting food as they would be at 20. Meanwhile, age at eruption at M3 is highly variable and not as clearly linked to reproductive age, with things like adolescent growth spurts confusing the picture.

This suggests that perhaps milestones like the timing of teeth are not all that matters in calculating how we got our unique human life histories. Perhaps our drive to grow long and slow means we have untethered our teeth from the behavioral milestones that our closest relatives still display, or perhaps we have just drawn out the time between these milestones in such a way that it is no longer clear how they fit in the primate pattern.

This does not mean that the timing of our teeth doesn’t matter, however. The factors that push our species out to the extreme ends of life-history schedules are not, of course, ours alone. Our costly investment in big brains has long been;theorized to be behind our extensive lifespans, but the same links between long lives and big brains have been seen in many other mammals. As a matter of fact, if you map the size of the brain against the timing of teeth, you get a very neat line right across all of the primates, and we fit that line perfectly.

Our first molars emerge at exactly the right time for a primate trying to build an enormous brain the size of ours. If you consider the function of teeth, it makes sense that the emergence of molars would coincide with important points for growth in our species—points at which we need to be able to take in and process more calories, using our molar teeth. New research shows that learning complex skills such as the foraging skills that humans need to exploit their ecological;niche may also be an important part of what humans do with their long childhoods—getting the right mix of nutrients for an energy-burning brain is a complicated business, requiring group communication, the invention of tools, and complex mental processes. Perhaps our teeth are right on track, after all.

• About the author:Brenna R. Hassett, PhD, is a biological anthropologist and archaeologist at the University of Central Lancashire and a scientific associate at the Natural History Museum, London. In addition to researching the effects of changing human lifestyles on the human skeleton and teeth in the past, she writes for a more general audience about evolution and archaeology, including the Times (UK) top 10 science book of 2016 Built on Bones: 15,000 Years of Urban Life and Death, and her most recent book, Growing Up Human: The Evolution of Childhood. She is also a co-founder of TrowelBlazers, an activist archive celebrating the achievements of women in the “digging” sciences.
• Source: This article was produced by Human Bridges.

By Dr. Justina Budginaite-Froehly 

(FPRI) — During the past 20 years of their NATO membership, the Baltic states achieved a multi-faceted transformation in their strategic posture establishment, military capability development, and level of interdependence with their NATO allies.

Once inexperienced newcomers, the so-called “one-issue” countries (referring to their focus on Russia as a strategic challenger to NATO) with no clear role in the alliance and doomed to have an “indefensible” territory, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have gradually turned into an exemplary NATO region demonstrating a deep understanding of regional security issues and making practical steps towards better preparedness, including proving their defensibility in practice. The Baltic states made substantial progress in cyber and energy security, strategic communication, defense spending, and military capability development. These achievements in the Baltic states’ military affairs serve as an example for other NATO member states often lacking the ambition to do and spend more on their security and defense. They demonstrate how to turn vulnerabilities and limited resources into chances and innovative solutions.

Reconnecting with the West

Immediately after regaining their independence in the 1990s, the Baltic states initiated the restoration of their armed forces. Though they did not start completely from scratch, given their statehood and military tradition during the interwar period (1918-1940) and their experience in irregular armed resistance during the Soviet occupation, the Baltic states were confronted with multiple constraints in the effort of (re-)building their national militaries. A Russian energy blockade, massive financial issues, and remaining Russian armed forces on the Baltic states’ territories until mid-1993 (Lithuania) and mid-1994 (Latvia and Estonia) were limiting conditions for rapid progress in the restoration and modernization of the armed forces. However, with the aspired accession to NATO representing the sole viable option for guaranteeing their future security, the Baltic states were highly motivated to move forward with reform implementation in order to exploit the window of opportunity for joining the alliance as soon as possible. Ten years later, in 2004, the Baltic states became full-fledged members of NATO. It represented a remarkable achievement for countries that spent 50 years as integral parts of the Soviet Union and were exposed to systematic attempts to destroy all forms of their independent societal structures including (and especially) the military ones.

As newcomers to the alliance, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were confronted with an international security agenda that was rather distant from their national agendas. NATO’s focus on counterterrorism and efforts in strengthening its expeditionary profile to perform crisis management operations outside its geographic area represented a major challenge for the Baltic states in finding their role in the alliance. However, determined to strengthen their standing among the allies (especially the US as the most crucial partner), the Baltic states made steps to adjust to the prevailing;Zeitgeist. They joined NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in 2005, intending to support the alliance in its counterterrorism operation through engagement in civilian and military tasks. Estonia became involved in military operations in the Helmand province, Latvia coordinated NATO’s military supply chains;through the Riga seaport, and Lithuania;took over the leadership;of the provincial reconstruction team (PRT) in Ghor province. In addition to that, the special forces units of the Baltic states were active in multiple locations in Afghanistan supporting the allies in various active combat operations. The mission in Afghanistan (although in itself fundamentally unsuccessful as the chaotic withdrawal in 2021 and the events in the aftermath have shown) allowed the armed forces of the Baltic states to adapt to NATO structures and enhance their interoperability with the allied forces.

The Baltic armed forces were at least partially re-designed as light flexible units able to conduct irregular warfare and engage with civilian players in common crisis management operations. Lithuania and Latvia decided to move to professional military service and thus abolished conscription in 2006 (Latvia) and 2008 (Lithuania). Out of the three Baltic states, only Estonia preserved the universal conscription model. While Estonia sustained military spending close to 2% of GDP throughout the years, the defense budgets of the remaining two Baltic states were scarce during this time, especially in the case of Lithuania, which spent less than 1% of GDP for defense for several years in a row. Limited defense financing and light-handed conscription abolishment were a consequence of the prevailing dangerous overconfidence in NATO’s ability to immediately support its allies in case of a potential military crisis. At the same time, the principles of host nation support — meaning obligations to provide effective logistical assistance for incoming allied forces — were not reflected seriously in the Baltic states. Insufficient investment in the development of national defensive capabilities left the Baltic states highly vulnerable amid the existing serious limitations for military logistics in the region that could hamper accessibility to NATO’s military supplies and reinforcements. These issues are still not fully resolved.

Closing Security Gaps

As a part of NATO’s commitment to the Baltic Sea region, its peacetime instrument — the Air Policing Mission — was extended to the Baltics in 2004. With Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia lacking their own national military capabilities in this area, NATO stepped in with rotational contingents to help protect the air space over the Baltics. The level of urgency for doing so was high — situated in an unfavorable geographic location between mainland Russia, the Kaliningrad enclave, and Belarus, the Baltic states were permanently confronted by provocative actions by Russian Force aircraft flying near the;Baltic states’ airspace;without using transponders, communicating with Air Traffic Control, or having filed a flight plan. The Air Policing Mission started with deploying Allied forces to the air base at Šiauliai, Lithuania. Initially designed as temporary support, the;Baltic Air Policing Mission;was declared;permanent;in 2012 after years of active advocacy of the Baltic states. After the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, the mission was;expanded;to include deployment of Allied air forces to the air base at Ämari, Estonia. As of March 1, 2024, the Latvian military base at Lielvārde is the;third NATO base;to host Allied fighter detachments for conducting the Baltic Air Policing Mission.;The Baltic states themselves have been actively involved in the mission through the host nation support framework, taking over the responsibility of its smooth logistical and organizational implementation.

In addition to closing security gaps in their air space protection, the Baltic states were active in advocating the broadening of NATO’s agenda to the areas of cyber, energy security, and strategic communication. The Baltic states had an early firsthand experience with hybrid security challenges. For example, Estonia;faced massive cyber attacks;in 2007 after a dispute with Russia regarding a relocation of a Red Army monument from Tallinn’s city center, Lithuania was exposed to ongoing Russian;energy blackmailing;due to dependence on Russian energy supplies, and Latvia faced challenges in managing its national security in the context of its large Russian-speaking minority. Based on these thematic specialization areas, the Baltic states became host nations of NATO Centres of Excellence: Since 2008, Estonia has been leading the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE), in 2012, Lithuania became the host nation of the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence (ENSEC COE), and since 2014, Latvia has hosted the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (STRATCOM COE). Although the final decision to establish these centers of excellence was made collectively on the highest political level in NATO, the Baltic states were the primary initiators of the;expansion;of NATO’s network of excellence to cyber, energy, and strategic communication areas — all representing crucial aspects of hybrid warfare which we can now witness in Ukraine and beyond.

Improving Strategic Posture

As a consequence of the deteriorating security situation on NATO’s Eastern flank since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, and especially since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, several important decisions leading to an upgrade of the strategic posture in the Baltics have been made. On the national level, Lithuania reinstated conscription in 2015, shifting its focus back to territorial defense. Latvia followed suit in 2023. Military expenditures began to rise well beyond NATO’s average. In the case of Lithuania, it rose from 0.8% of GDP in 2013 to;2.5%;of GDP in 2023. Estonia’s military expenditure rose from;1.9%;of GDP in 2013 to 2.7% of GDP in 2023. Latvia’s military spending grew from;0.9%;of GDP in 2013 to 2.3% of GDP in 2023. On a regional basis, the Baltic states reached NATO’s benchmark of 2% of GDP military spending already in 2018, signaling their serious attitude toward burden-sharing within the alliance. Further increases are planned in all three Baltic states as they are among those advocating for an increase in NATO’s common benchmark for military spending to;2.5%-3%;of GDP.

NATO’s commitment to regional security in the Baltics was equally strengthened. Following the annexation of Crimea, NATO decided to send troops to the Baltics under the Enhanced Forward Presence framework (eFP) to build up its deterrence and defense posture on the Eastern flank. Since 2017 Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have hosted multinational battlegroups led by framework nations — Germany in Lithuania, Canada in Latvia, and the UK in Estonia. After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, NATO;agreed;to scale up the multinational battlegroups in the Baltics from battalion to brigade size. In addition, Germany decided to permanently station an additional brigade in Lithuania — a decision made on a bilateral basis between Lithuania and Germany, thus contributing significantly to the current effort of upscaling Allied presence in the Baltic states. By stationing a substantial number of Allied troops in the Baltic states NATO made a crucial step towards strengthening its forward defense posture in the Baltic Sea region: For the first time in history, military escalation in the Baltics would be fought back collectively with NATO allies from the onset of a crisis. However, given the still-hampered military mobility in the Baltics, the question remains of how long NATO’s tripwire forces could hold back a full-scale Russian invasion while waiting for NATO’s reinforcements to arrive.

Important high-level political decisions towards creating an effective system of defense enablers in the Baltics were made during the NATO summit in Vilnius in 2023. Their goal was to move from the focus on simply stationing Allied troops on the ground to ensuring that they could perform their tasks effectively and longer. Lessons learned in Ukraine show the crucial role that a comprehensive air defense system plays in both protecting the civil population and enabling an effective territorial defense. In Vilnius, allies;agreed;to upgrade the current Baltic Air Policing Mission by initiating a Rotational Air Defence Model. The plan is already being;implemented, but without much public detail currently available. However, it was recently;announced;that the Netherlands is deploying a Patriot air defense system unit in Lithuania for exercises this summer. In the best case, this will mark the first rotational round of the new mission, which will be succeeded by consequent stationings by other NATO partners possessing Patriot systems (USA, Germany, Poland, Sweden, Romania, Greece, and Spain) or other comparable air defense systems (e.g. SAMP/T, which is used in Italy). In addition to the expensive long-range air defense systems that will be rotated among the Baltic states by NATO allies, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are also;developing;their medium-range air defense capabilities. While Latvia and Estonia are jointly purchasing the German IRIS-T system, Lithuania decided to buy an additional US/Norwegian NASAMS unit.

The current efforts to improve the air defense of the Baltic states are complemented by joint military efforts on land. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are developing a;land-based counter-mobility area;called the “Baltic defense line” along their border with Russia and Belarus, which aims to impede the movement of enemy forces invading the Baltics. In addition, several military procurement projects are ongoing to strengthen the firepower of the Baltic states’ armed forces. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are;purchasing;HIMARS rocket launcher systems with medium-range ATACMS missiles from the US and plan to;pool their resources;for these systems’ maintenance, service, and logistical support. Pooling and sharing of expensive and scarce military equipment — or at least managing its service and logistics together — is an important step forward for better military interoperability within the Baltic Sea region and for enhancing ties with other NATO allies, either through their direct involvement by providing such equipment on a rotational basis or through military procurement initiatives.

Interoperability needs to be improved on the structural level as well. The Baltic states are moving towards establishing divisions as the highest structural element of their armed forces. Estonia became the first Baltic nation with a division-level military structure: Based on the Estonian 1st and 2nd Infantry Brigades, a Logistics Battalion, the Headquarters and Signal Battalion, and an Artillery Battalion, the Estonian division was;established;in December 2022. Soon after, Estonia;transferred;the command of its division to NATO’s Multinational Corps Northeast, which also has the command-and-control responsibility for NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in the Baltic states and Poland. Lithuania will follow suit as it;plans its national division;based on the Iron Wolf Brigade, the Griffin Brigade, and the Aukštaitija Reserve Brigade, reaching full operational capability by 2030. Although currently not involved in considerations of creating its division, Latvia is also planning to;establish;new military units — five reserve and two high-tech battalions. The acquisition of appropriate military equipment will complement these structural upgrades. In addition to the division-level procurement projects that are already ongoing (e.g. HIMARS systems), further projects such as the acquisition of heavy weaponry, including tanks (most likely German Leopard), are being;planned;in Lithuania and also;discussed;in Estonia.

Finally, the Baltic states are strengthening their national defense industries. Lessons from; Russia’s war against Ukraine demonstrate how crucial the unhindered supply of ammunition and other weaponry is and what massive shortages currently exist in Western countries. Therefore, the Baltic states are seeking to both attract Western arms manufacturers to the region, as well as create better conditions for local defense-oriented businesses. As for Western manufacturers, close cooperation ties already exist between Lithuania and Germany’s Rheinmetall and Krauss-Maffei Wegmann. In 2022, they established a joint venture — Lithuania Defence Services (LDS) — which focuses on repairing military equipment for the Baltic states’ armed forces and NATO’s forces deployed in the region. The LDS’s primary;focus;is on repairs of Lithuanian Armed Forces’ Vilkas Infantry Fighting Vehicles, a Lithuanian version of the Boxer multirole wheeled armored vehicle, but also includes repairs of other Boxer systems, Puma IFVs, Bergepanzer 3 Büffel/Buffalo armored demining vehicles, different versions of Leopard 2 tank and self-propelled PzH 2000T. Furthermore, with the LDS, Lithuania became a primer;repair hub;for Leopard tanks damaged in combat in Ukraine. This is a further example of the successful anchoring of the alliance in the Baltic Sea region through growing mutual links of interdependence.

Further important initiatives in this area followed in recent months. In June 2024, the Lithuanian government;signed;an investment agreement with Rheinmetall regarding an ammunition factory to be built in Lithuania to produce the NATO-standard 155 mm artillery shells. In addition to international partnerships, all three Baltic states have declared their goal to increase self-sufficiency when it comes to the production of prioritized military equipment. They seek to create better conditions for local defense industry companies by encouraging the advancement of defense technology, improving the international competitiveness of their national defense industries, and allowing for strategic partnerships between their defense sectors and industries. These provisions are entrenched in the new;Defense Industry Law;that was adopted in March 2024 in Latvia, and a similar;Law on the Defense and Security Industry;that is expected to come into force in July in Lithuania. Estonia, too, is planning several amendments to its;Defense Industry Law;to reduce unnecessary restrictions and contribute to the competitiveness of local arms manufacturers.

All of these practical steps the Baltic states have taken to strengthen their security should be considered in the broader context of their unwavering support for Ukraine, including financial assistance and clear strategic communication on Russia’s war of aggression and its consequences for security in Europe. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are among the four;leading nations;in terms of governmental allocations for Ukraine in percent of GDP. They are among those working for Western countries to agree on a common fixed benchmark for financial support for Ukraine, with Estonia;proposing;to dedicate at least 0.25% of its GDP each year. These measures signal the Baltic states’ clear understanding of what is at stake in Ukraine since February 2022 and what it has to do with the security of Europe as a whole.

The Baltic Role Model for Europe’s Strategic Revolution

Despite their limited resources and unfavorable starting positions, the Baltic states achieved considerable progress in developing their defense policies, armed forces, and military capabilities during the past 20 years of their NATO membership. External shocks such as Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine were the most important triggers leading to unprecedented regional dynamics in the areas of security and defense. Strengthening practical links with NATO allies, intensifying regional cooperation, and ambitious national measures of the past several years not only contribute to security in the Baltic states themselves, but also have a positive impact on Europe’s strategic posture. Steadily growing defense spending, support for the development of national defense industries, and the launch of the Rotational Air Defense Model can be considered a part of the Baltic role model for other NATO countries and regions to follow while adjusting to new security realities in Europe.

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The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a non-partisan organization that seeks to publish well-argued, policy-oriented articles on American foreign policy and national security priorities.

• About the author: Dr. Justina Budginaite-Froehly is a researcher focusing on strategic security issues and geopolitics in the Baltic Sea region.
• Source: This article was published by FPRI

washington — Two men convicted by a U.S. jury in November of trying to sell Iranian petroleum in violation of sanctions imposed by Washington and of conspiracy to commit money laundering were sentenced on Tuesday. Each of the Texas men were sentenced to 45 months in prison, the Justice Department said. 

Zhenyu Wang, 43, a Chinese citizen, and Daniel Ray Lane, 42, of McKinney, Texas, schemed with co-conspirators to evade U.S. economic sanctions against Iran from July 2019 to February 2020 by facilitating the purchase of sanctioned oil from Iran, masking its origins and then selling it to a refinery in China, the department said in a statement. 

Lane was president of privately held Stack Royalties, a Texas-based company that sells oil and gas mineral rights to investment funds and private equity groups. 

Lane’s attorney, Paul Hetznecker, told Reuters late last year that the case was based on undercover government agents who offered Lane “millions of dollars in profits” if he took part in the scheme, after initially rebuffing their approaches. The attorney had called the case “an outrageous example of government overreach.” 

The pair were charged, along with three others, in 2020 in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. At least two co-conspirators have since pleaded guilty, court records showed. 

China is the world’s only major importer of Iranian oil despite sanctions that former U.S. President Donald Trump unilaterally reimposed on Tehran’s petroleum exports in 2018 after withdrawing the United States from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal between Tehran and six world powers.