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South Caucasus News

Turning Point In South Caucasus: Border Guards Replace Military Units Along Newly Delimited Portion Of Armenian-Azerbaijani Border – OpEd


Turning Point In South Caucasus: Border Guards Replace Military Units Along Newly Delimited Portion Of Armenian-Azerbaijani Border – OpEd

Flags of Armenia and Azerbaijan

In April, Yerevan and Baku agreed on the delimitation of the Armenian-Azerbaijan border in the north the return to Azerbaijan of four villages to Azerbaijani control, an action that sparked protests not only there but in Yerevan and other Armenian cities (jamestown.org/program/armenian-protests-over-return-of-four-villages-to-azerbaijan-threaten-peace-process/).

That led Yerevan to request and Moscow to agree to pull its so-called “peacekeepers” from the region, something the Russian government did as part of its withdrawal of these units from within Azerbaijan now that Baku has established full control over that region (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2024/05/russia-has-removed-its-guards-from.html).

But now, Yerevan and Baku have taken the next and most critical step: they have replaced the military units that had been along the pre-agreement line with border guards along the newly established state border between them, a major step forward in the delimitation and demarcation of the border and toward a genuine peace treaty (kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/400277).

Protests may continue or even expand among Armenians who believe that any territorial concessions to Azerbaijan are an existential threat to the survival of Armenia. But the fact that the government of Nikol Pashinyan has weathered these protests and taken this step toward the creation of a genuine peacetime border is impressive.

A great deal of work nonetheless needs to be done to make this a border of peace rather than a line separating two armed nations. Armenia will have to build new roads to allow those living along the border the ability to move about freely, and Azerbaijan will have to avoid any actions in the areas it has regained control of that will feed Armenian fears.

But what has happened is a signal victory for Pashinyan’s policies and for peace in the south Caucasus and deserves to be celebrated as such even though there will be those both in his country and in Moscow who will undoubtedly continue to fan the flames of conflict as further delimitation talks between Yerevan and Baku proceed. 


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South Caucasus News

Spain Dismantles Two Criminal Organizations That Smuggled Hundreds Of Chinese Nationals


Spain Dismantles Two Criminal Organizations That Smuggled Hundreds Of Chinese Nationals

money dollars currency handcuffs crime

Europol said it supported the Spanish National Police (Policía Nacional) in dismantling two criminal organizations that smuggled hundreds of Chinese nationals using a variety of fraudulent methods.

According to the Spanish authorities, the criminal networks smuggled over 1,000 victims, most of whom were later sexually exploited. These rings are alleged to have earned EUR5 million from their criminal activities, Europol said.

According to Europol, such a complex investigation had to be conducted in two phases: in the first, Spanish law enforcement authorities arrested 35 suspects for belonging to a criminal organisation, facilitating illegal immigration and forging documents. Following these arrests, the Spanish police arrested 34 more suspects for allegedly issuing fraudulent documentation to facilitate the legalisation of the migrants. 

As a result of the operation, Europol said that 69 arrests were made, as well as 7 luxury vehicles seized and EUR80,000 in cash, as well as various electronic devices and documentation.

Europol said it provided operational analysis support during throughout the investigation and, on the action day, deployed an analyst on-site to Toledo, Spain to provide on-the-spot assistance and forensic expertise.

From fake work contracts to sham marriages

The investigation revealed that the two dismantled organisations were established in Guadalajara, Madrid and Toledo (Spain) but had branches scattered throughout Spain, including Barcelona, Coruña, San Sebastián, Seville and Valencia. They carried out their criminal activities independently, although they occasionally cooperated when necessary.

Europol said the criminal organisations provided victims with fraudulent work contracts and fake registrations in municipalities where they never lived in order to obtain legal status in Spain. They even arranged sham marriages and provided advice on how to successfully pass the interviews during the application procedures.

Several law firms collaborated with the criminals by helping them draft the fake documentation. These firms received between EUR500 and EUR1,000 in exchange for each victim.

Links to Europe’s largest Chinese prostitution ring

The case is connected to an operation task force that Europol has been supporting since 2020 and which led to the dismantling of Europe’s largest Chinese criminal network involved in trafficking in human beings for sexual exploitation.

The case is also linked to an operation targeting a criminal organisation trafficking human beings for the purposes of sexual and labour exploitation in Mallorca (Spain). The operation took place in March 2024 and resulted in 17 arrests and the protection of 13 victims.


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South Caucasus News

Guantánamo Scandal: Eleven Men Were Set To Be Freed Last October, Until ‘Political Optics’ Shifted After Hamas’ Attack On Israel – OpEd


Guantánamo Scandal: Eleven Men Were Set To Be Freed Last October, Until ‘Political Optics’ Shifted After Hamas’ Attack On Israel – OpEd

This is a guard tower at the US military prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Credit US Navy

Thanks to NBC News, and the four anonymous US government officials who spoke to them, for exposing the latest scandal involving the US prison at Guantánamo Bay — the refusal of the Biden administration to release eleven men, for whom long months of negotiation had secured a safe and viable resettlement option, because of the perceived “political optics” of freeing them after the attacks on Israel by Hamas and other militants on October 7.

Within Guantánamo circles, this scandal was well known, but attorneys for the men had been subjected to a Protective Order issued by the government, preventing them from talking about it, and, as a result, they had all dutifully kept quiet, as had others, like myself, who had got to know about it.

Their silence is, in itself, an indictment of how the US government operates at Guantánamo, as I also recognised when I refused to publicize it, because of the fundamentally lawless situation in which these men are held.

It’s crucial to understand that the decisions that were taken to release these men — made unanimously by high-level US government review processes — were purely administrative, and completely outside the US legal system.

This not only prevents the men and their attorneys from being able to appeal to a court if the government fails to release them; it also, more crucially, means that they are essentially prisoners of the executive branch, and that, therefore, criticizing the executive runs the risk of endangering their release.

If you’re reading this, I hope you recognize quite how grotesque this situation is — that men unanimously approved for release from Guantánamo cannot seek their release through the courts, because the decision to release them rests solely with the executive branch, and that, if senior officials fail to prioritize their release, there is nothing that anyone can do about it; there is no court to appeal to, and no way of even publicly criticizing the government’s inaction, because doing so risks the wrath of the handful of powerful men — President Biden and his senior officials — who hold the keys to the jail.

The predicament the prisoners and their lawyers face disgracefully confirms that, despite having been open for over 22 years, Guantánamo is as fundamentally lawless now as it was when the prison first opened.

A brief history of Guantánamo’s persistent lawlessness

When Guantánamo was first established, in January 2002, the Bush administration declared that the men and boys it had rounded up and sent there had no rights whatsoever as human beings.

Long years of legal struggles eventually secured habeas corpus rights for the prisoners, and led to 32 men having their release ordered between 2008 and 2010 after District Court judges examined their cases, and ruled that the government had failed to establish that they had any meaningful connection to Al-Qaeda, the Taliban or associated forces.

This period, from 2008 to 2010, was the only time that the law had any meaning for the men held at Guantánamo. Sadly and shamefully, it came to an end when politically motivated appeals court judges rewrote the rules governing the habeas cases, in particular by requiring the lower court judges to regard everything submitted as “evidence” by the US government — however risible — as “presumptively accurate,” making it almost impossible for the lower courts to continue to order the release of prisoners.

Since the summer of 2010, only one habeas corpus petition has been granted by the courts, and, as the law was shut down, administrative reviews took over instead — Obama’s Guantánamo Review Task Force, which, in 2009, reviewed the cases of the 240 men inherited from George W. Bush, and recommended two-thirds of them for release (all but three of whom were eventually freed), and the Periodic Review Boards (PRBs), established in 2013, an ongoing parole-type process that led to an additional 38 men being approved for release in Obama’s second term in office.

All but two of these men were freed before Obama’s presidency came to an end, and, after the horrors of Donald Trump’s four years as commander in chief, when Guantánamo was fundamentally sealed shut, Periodic Review Boards under Joe Biden once more began approving release for the majority of the men whose ongoing imprisonment without charge or trial had been previously upheld by the PRBs.

The eleven men who were supposed to be released in October are amongst 16 men in total (over half of the 30 men still held at the prison) who have been approved for release by the PRBs (and in three cases by the earlier Guantánamo Review Task Force). I have been focusing on their stories for the last 16 months — through posters, updated every month, showing quite how long they have been held since the decisions were taken to release them, and, between February and April this year, in a series of ten articles published on the Close Guantánamo website and on my website here.

Every month these tallies become ever more shocking. As of today, May 22, these 16 men have been held for between 607 and 1,301 days since they were approved for release, and, in the three outlying cases based on the deliberations of the Guantánamo Review Task Force, for 5,234 days.

The NBC News story

In NBC News’ story, none of the above was mentioned. The journalists who wrote it — and their editors — either didn’t know or didn’t care that these men are as fundamentally without rights as they were when Guantánamo opened — or that they are essentially prisoners of the president and his senior officials.

These are major journalistic failings, but we must at least be grateful that they have finally brought this shocking story to light.

As they describe it, the eleven men “are either citizens of Yemen or have ties to the country,” according to the officials, and “were scheduled to be resettled in Oman,” located on the south eastern coast of the Arabian peninsula, just to the north of Yemen, which successfully resettled 28 Yemeni prisoners between January 2015 and January 2017. The reason that Yemenis need resettling in third countries is because of provisions inserted by Republicans into the annual National Defense Authorization Act, which prevent the repatriation of prisoners to proscribed countries including Yemen, Libya and Somalia.

According to NBC News’ sources, officials — presumably led by former ambassador Tina Kaidanow, who was appointed as the Special Representative for Guantánamo Affairs in August 2021, and is “responsible for all matters pertaining to the transfer of detainees from the Guantánamo Bay facility to third countries” — “spent months negotiating the terms for the detainees to be transferred to Oman, including measures intended to guarantee the men wouldn’t become a security threat and any possible compensation they would receive.”

“Compensation,” I should note, is highly unlikely, as the US government has never offered any kind of compensation to former prisoners, refusing, ever, to acknowledge any kind of wrongdoing on their part. It is more probable, therefore, that the reference in NBC News’ article was to whatever money the US would provide to Oman to support the resettlements, as arranged via strictly confidential “diplomatic assurances.”

The sources added that the planned release of the men in October “was imminent when it was called off at the last minute,” as the administration had “already notified Congress that the transfer would take place,” a requirement that Congress imposed on the executive branch under President Obama, requiring the administration, by law, to provide Congress with 30 days’ notice prior to the release of any prisoners.

Several of the officials who spoke to NBC News said that “the decision to stop the transfer was not related to any concerns raised by Oman or last-minute disagreements between the US and Oman.” Instead, they expressed their belief that “it was the result of members of Congress, primarily Democrats close to the president, privately raising concerns about the timing” — the “political optics after Hamas’ attack on Israel,” as NBC News described it.

The officials’ decision to speak out came about because, although Republican administrations seem to have completely lost touch with any sense of outrage about their own government’s actions, Democratic administrations still harbor some individuals who care about flagrant and ongoing abuses of justice like Guantánamo.

They explained that, more than seven months since the planned release was abandoned, “the administration has not set a new date for the transfer,” and “the detainees remain at Guantánamo with no clarity on when, or if, it will happen.”

The officials said they were “concerned” that “the likelihood that the transfer takes place before November’s presidential election diminishes the closer the election gets,” and feared that, if Donald Trump is re-elected in November, the eleven men “will remain at the detention facility for at least another four years.”

The officials also explained that they were worried that “the stalled process” that has left these men “sitting in detention for months without clarity about when they could be transferred could become a human rights concern” — although, on that latter point, every administration that has been in charge of Guantánamo has shown little or no concern for human rights criticisms, and the Biden administration is no exception, as was shown last year when they essentially blanked high-level and damning criticisms of the prison’s operations that were submitted by United Nations Special Mandate holders.

In a report issued last June, Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, concluded, after becoming the first ever UN Rapporteur to visit the prison in February, that, despite some improvement in conditions over the years, the prison’s operations overall constitute “ongoing cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment,” and “may also meet the legal threshold for torture.” Two other devastating opinions were issued by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, one of which indicated that the very basis of the detention system at Guantánamo “may constitute crimes against humanity.”

According to the officials, the deal for the transfer of the eleven Yemenis “is still under discussion with Oman, including about specific timing and conditions.” They added that “it could happen this year,” although they were all clearly concerned that the importance of freeing these men has fallen off President Biden’s radar.

One senior administration official, perhaps seeking to provide cover for the president, suggested that Oman “has at times since October not wanted the transfer to take place,” although they stressed that the cases were not “collecting dust somewhere,” adding that the administration was “actively looking at all those administrative steps to make it happen,” while acknowledging that “there are frustrations.”

Pressure is needed to prioritize these men’s release

All of us who care about Guantánamo — and the desperate need for these men to be freed from what has become their unforgivably long executive imprisonment — need to put pressure on President Biden and the Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, to overcome their “political optics” problem, to re-energize the transfer process for these eleven men, and also to commit resources to finding homes for the five other men who have long been approved for release, but who are not part of the Oman deal — a Tunisian and a stateless Rohingya who have been refusing, since 2010, to deal with the authorities regarding their release, a Kenyan whose government apparently doesn’t want him back, and a Somali and a Libyan.

In addition, it should be noted that, by refusing to free these eleven men because of “political optics” regarding Hamas’ attacks on Israel, the Biden administration has, lamentably, slipped into an all too familiar pattern of casual Islamophobia, whereby all Muslims, whether Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, or Yemenis at Guantánamo, are allowed to be perceived as terrorists.

In Gaza, this refusal has led to the deaths of tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians, with barely a murmur of dissent from the administration, and at Guantánamo it has, not for the first time, led to men without rights becoming political playthings, as though it means nothing that they have never been charged with a crime, that high-level US government review processes have concluded unanimously that it is safe to release them, and that they are, fundamentally, the personal prisoners of just two men — President Biden and Antony Blinken.

They need to be freed.

  • I wrote the above article for the “Close Guantánamo” website, which I established in January 2012, on the 10th anniversary of the opening of Guantánamo, with the US attorney Tom Wilner. Please join us — just an email address is required to be counted amongst those opposed to the ongoing existence of Guantánamo, and to receive updates of our activities by email.

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Turning Point In South Caucasus: Border Guards Replace Military Units Along Newly Delimited Portion Of Armenian … – Eurasia Review


Turning Point In South Caucasus: Border Guards Replace Military Units Along Newly Delimited Portion Of Armenian …  Eurasia Review

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NPR News: 05-26-2024 8PM EDT


NPR News: 05-26-2024 8PM EDT

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Federal Election Commission: Sen. Menendez paid $2M to Paul Hastings law firm, defense attorneys – Ottumwacourier


Federal Election Commission: Sen. Menendez paid $2M to Paul Hastings law firm, defense attorneys  Ottumwacourier

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Sen. Bob Menendez reveals his wife has breast cancer as presentation of evidence begins at his trial – Spectrum News NY1


Sen. Bob Menendez reveals his wife has breast cancer as presentation of evidence begins at his trial  Spectrum News NY1

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India-Iran Agreement On Chabahar Port: Boost For Global Supply Chain – Analysis


India-Iran Agreement On Chabahar Port: Boost For Global Supply Chain – Analysis

By Vinod Rai

India and Iran signed a 10-year contract on 13 May 2024 for the operation of the Shahid Behesti terminal at the strategically important Chabahar port in Iran. Chabahar is a deep water port in Iran’s Sistan-Baluchistan province. It is the Iranian port closest to India and is located in the open sea, providing easy and secure access for large cargo ships. Situated on the Gulf of Oman and initially proposed for development by New Delhi in 2003, it will serve as a crucial gateway for Indian goods to access landlocked Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Positioned as a hub for transit trade between India, Iran and Afghanistan, the port offers an alternative route to the traditional Silk Road through China. With its strategic location near the Strait of Hormuz and the Indian Ocean, the port provides a vantage point across various regions such as West Asia, Indian Ocean and Africa.

Map 1 is also part of the proposed International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a multi-modal transportation project, initiated by Russia, India and Iran, envisaged to link the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea via Iran, and onward to northern Europe via Saint Petersburg in Russia.

The port provides a strategic alternative that can bypass China and Pakistan’s Gwadar Port. It will reduce transit time and significantly reduce freight costs. It will also enhance India’s role in the supply chain and provide an alternative entry point for humanitarian aid. The operationalising of this transit line will hugely strengthen India’s energy security by providing multiple options for trade routes. The benefits will accrue not only to India but to all other countries committed to a free trade and strategic environment.

India Ports Global Limited (IPGL), the agency to implement the project, will invest approximately US$120 million (S$162 million) to equip and operate the port for the duration of the contract. India has also offered a credit window in rupees equivalent to US$250 million (S$337.5 million) for mutually identified projects to improve infrastructure related to the port.

Chabahar a Much Delayed Project

The New Delhi Declaration, signed in 2003 by then Iran President Muhammad Khatami and then Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, recognised that the countries’ growing strategic convergence needed to be underpinned by a strong economic relationship. For India, Chabahar held immense strategic and economic significance, as it provided a route to reach Afghanistan — land access to which had been blocked by a hostile Pakistan.

The project, however, could not make much headway since India had begun to have close links with the George Bush administration in the United States (US) who had alleged that Iran, along with North Korea and Iraq, was hosting anti-US design. The US had discouraged the development of any strategic relationship between Iran and India. While India could construct a 218 kilometre-road from Delaram in west Afghanistan to Zaranj on the Iran-Iraq border to link with Chabahar, the development of the port itself remained stalled.

It was finally in April 2015 that India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Afghanistan’s President Ashraf Ghani sought to work closely to make the port project a reality and to develop it as a viable gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia. It was agreed that routes additional to the existing ones will provide a major impetus to Afghanistan’s economic reconstruction efforts. While work progressed briskly post Modi’s visit to Iran in 2016, the project faced headwinds yet again with the Donald Trump administration taking a strident view against Iran. Nevertheless, with deft diplomatic negotiations, India managed to get a waiver from the US administration for the project, citing the strategic importance of the project as access to Afghanistan. The Indian cause was assisted by the fact that the Chinese government was actively pursuing the Belt and Road Initiative.

After this diplomatic breakthrough, India set up harbour cranes and other port handling facilities to operationalise the port. Since December 2018, IPGL has handled more than 90,000 20-foot-equivalent units of container traffic and more than 8.4 million metric tonnes of bulk and general cargo since then.

The Benefits

With the operationalisation of the long-term investment, Chabahar has the potential to become an important hub to connect India with the landlocked countries of Central Asia and Afghanistan. However, to better realise its commercial and strategic potential, the development of the port must be integrated with the larger connectivity project of the INSTC. The INSTC envisages the movement of goods from Mumbai to Bandar Abbas in Iran by sea; from Bandar Abbas to Bandar-e-Anzali, an Iranian port on the Caspian Sea, by road; from Bandar-e-Anzali to Astrakhan, a Caspian port in Russia by ship across the Caspian Sea; and onward to other parts of Russia and Europe by rail.

It is undeniable that the project, once completed, will provide immense geopolitical security and trade benefits. However, its completion has its own challenges with the adverse sentiment of the US and the volatile situation prevailing in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, India has shown remarkable deftness in obtaining a waiver from the US to enable the signing of the 10-year contract and it is hoped that such deft handling will ensure its successful completion.

  • About the author: Mr Vinod Rai is a Distinguished Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), an autonomous research institute in the National University of Singapore (NUS). He is a former Comptroller and Auditor General of India. He can be contacted at isasvr@nus.edu.sg. The author bears full responsibility for the facts cited and opinions expressed in this paper.
  • Source: This article was published at Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS)

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Shifting Discourse Between Xi And Putin On Ukraine – Analysis


Shifting Discourse Between Xi And Putin On Ukraine – Analysis

By Arran Hope

On May 16, Vladimir Putin, newly returned as president of the Russian Federation, traveled to Beijing. There, he was met by President Xi Jinping for their annual in-person meeting. Coverage from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) noted that the two countries’ bilateral relations “have weathered wind and rain, have become stronger over time, and have withstood the tests of the unpredictability of international storms (中俄关系历经风雨,历久弥坚,经受住了国际风云变幻的考验)” (FMPRC, May 16).

The meeting was accompanied by the signing and release of a Joint Communique (联合声明) (MFA, May 16). These two documents are part of the regular rhythm of Sino-Russian relations in the “new era.” Between these annual peaks in diplomatic activity, the two leaders—and self-described “old friends (老朋友)”—engage in a number of other conversations, both in person and over the phone (Youtube.com/CCTV, May 17).

Since the beginning of February 2022, in addition to signing three joint communiques, the two men have met in person five times (three times to coincide with the communiques, and also at the Beijing Winter Olympics on February 4, 2022; in Uzbekistan on September 15, 2022; and in Beijing at the Belt and Road Summit on October 18, 2023), and have conducted four phone calls (on February 25, 2022; on New Year’s Eve, 2022; on New Year’s Eve, 2023; and on February 9, 2024).

The readouts and texts of these 12 exchanges and agreements provide a window onto the relative priorities of the two sides. The general trend is one of increased convergence of interests in deepening of the relationship. Changes in the language, in terms of shifts in particular formulations, the omission of certain phrases, and the incorporation of new terms, may carry implications for the relationship. Several are worthy of mention here.

The Fall of Ukraine 

One current that flows through these communiques and conversations is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The first meeting and communique took place shortly before Russian troops set foot in Ukrainian territory; the first phone call was held the day after the war had begun; and the rest have occurred in the shadow of the conflict. There are some consistencies across the last 28 months. For instance, whenever the war is mentioned, it is referred to mainly as the “Ukraine crisis (乌克兰危机),” and less frequently as the “Ukraine issue (乌克兰问题)”—it is not referred to as a war (or even a “special military operation,” to use a preferred Russian characterization).

The first phone call, on February 25, 2022, is in many ways an anomaly (MFA, February 25, 2022). Other calls always describe the relationship in positive tones, noting the “the spirit of mutual support and friendship (友好的精神),” “permanent good-neighborliness (永久睦邻友好),” or the desire to “maintain close contacts (我愿同普京总统保持密切交往).” This first call, however, dispensed with such niceties. Xi frostily pointed out that “recent dramatic changes in the situation in eastern Ukraine have drawn great attention from the international community,” and warned that the PRC would “decide on its position based on the merits of the Ukrainian issue itself.” Such a terse exchange is likely a reflection of the PRC’s initial shock at Putin’s decision to invade, and an uncertainty about how best to respond. As the war has progressed, however, any disagreement has been washed away. As Xi put it in the most recent call, on February 9: “Looking back on the road we have traveled, we have weathered many storms together.” References to storms, turbulence, and inclement weather, are frequent euphemisms deployed to describe an adverse international environment.

Across the three joint communiques, the variation in the level of attention paid to Ukraine is stark. The first communique was issued before the invasion, so naturally does not directly refer to Ukraine. The second and third communiques map onto each other more closely, however. The second contains nine sections, the last of which is largely dedicated to the conflict, while the third contains ten, of which the ninth is again focused on Ukraine.

In the second communique, the Russian side appears willing to make concessions to the PRC in terms of its framing of the conflict, “positively assessing the objective and impartial position of the Chinese side on the Ukrainian issue,” “reaffirming its commitment to restarting peace talks as soon as possible,” and further welcoming the “constructive ideas set out in the document entitled ‘China’s position on the political settlement of the crisis in Ukraine.’” These statements should not be mistaken for any fissures in the relationship. As the communique emphasizes throughout, both countries maintain “strong support for each other’s core interests, national sovereignty and territorial integrity” and, crucially, their relationship is “without limits, and there is no forbidden zone for cooperation (没有止境,合作没有禁区).”

The most recent communique, however, has toned down much of this rhetoric. Gone is the reference to a limitless friendship, but gone too is much of the discussion of Ukraine. The coverage in the 2023 communique is two thirds longer than that contained in the latest version. Much of this text is almost identical, though there are a couple of differences. Reference to the PRC’s position paper has been dispensed with, for instance (FMPRC, February 24, 2023). In its place is a statement that “the root causes must be eliminated (必须消除危机根源)” and a reference to the “indivisibility of security (恪守安全不可分割).” The latter phrase appears in the 2023 communique, but not in the section on Ukraine. Taken together, this could suggest a tacit endorsement of Russia’s claim that its actions in instigating the conflict were legitimate.

Additional Linguistic Shifts

Other changes in the language of these texts are worth noting. In 2023, Xi famously was overheard saying to Putin, “Right now there are changes, the likes of which we haven’t seen for 100 years. And we are the ones driving these changes together (这也是百年变局的一部分,我们共同来推动它),” to which Putin replied, “I agree.” This formulation, “changes unseen in a century (百年变局),” was a frequent refrain last year, also appearing in both the two leaders’ in-person meetings as well as their phone calls (see China Brief, November 21, 2023). It did not appear in the 2023 communique, so it is unsurprising that it is absent in this year’s. More notable, however, is its absence in the readouts of both the February 9 phone call and the May 16 meeting. It is unclear why this formulation has apparently fallen out of fashion.

A related phrase, the construction of a “new type of international relations,” which did appear in last year’s communique, has disappeared this year altogether. The PRC’s three global initiatives have also had mixed reception in the communiques. In 2022, the Russian side “reaffirmed its readiness to continue to work on the global development initiatives proposed by China;” in 2023 saw an articulation of all three initiatives individually; but 2024 saw only the Global Development Initiative get a mention by name, while the set were less specifically referred to as “a series of global initiatives have important and active significance (一系列全球倡议).”

Another potentially concerning shift is Russia’s stance on Taiwan. Putin has made a point of affirming the one-China principle in every meeting, call, and communique since February 2022, but this year’s communique went one step further. This time, the Russian side also “firmly supports the Chinese side’s initiatives to … achieve national unification (支持中方 … 实现国家统一的举措).” This appears to be the first time that Russia has endorsed the PRC’s desire for unification with Taiwan—yet another instance of a further emboldening of these two states.

Conclusion

The shift in language pertaining to Ukraine across the readouts of the nine discussions and three communiques that have been released since February 2022 suggest that, as far as the PRC and Russia are concerned, the “crisis” is now less of a concern. The recalibration of the language, both in terms of the phrases used and the level of attention given to he conflict reflect a degree of confidence on both sides. The PRC is unambiguously supportive of Russia. Initial concerns, which were reflected in a degree of censure on the PRC’s part, have given way to a greater sense of impunity. There is a sense that the Ukraine crisis is manageable, and so sights can now be set on the real task at hand—accelerating the emergence of a multipolar world.

Linguistic analysis of the sort contained above with that of additional official statements and analysis of wider political and geopolitical developments. It reiterates, however, the PRC’s support of Russia, and the conception that the two “exceed” the traditional model of geopolitical alliances, as the 2023 communique puts it. There is no clearer statement than one which comes near the top of the latest communique: “the development of the Sino-Russian partnership for comprehensive strategic cooperation in the new era is in the fundamental interests of the two countries and peoples (发展中俄新时代全面战略协作伙伴关系符合两国和两国人民的根本利益).”

  • About the author: Arran Hope is the Editor of China Brief at The Jamestown Foundation. He was previously a reporter for The China Project, and holds degrees in Chinese Studies from the University of Cambridge and Columbia University.
  • Source: This article was published at The Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief Volume: 24 Issue: 11

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South Caucasus News

Sri Lanka: Economic Recolonisation Bill Tabled In Parliament – OpEd


Sri Lanka: Economic Recolonisation Bill Tabled In Parliament – OpEd

Buddha statues in Colombo, Sri Lanka.

By Dr. Dayan Jayatilleka

A bill named the ‘Economic Transformation Bill’ (ETB) was tabled in parliament this month by President Ranil Wickremesinghe while the country is debating whether Parliamentary or Presidential elections should be held first. Both are due within the next 12 months.

In Parliament in August 2000, Ranil Wickremesinghe’s UNP torched copies of President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s draft Constitution with its expansive autonomy provisions and tricky transitional arrangements. In 2024 the Opposition should do the same to Ranil’s Economic Transformation Bill, with far better reason.

The ETB is the line of decisive demarcation in Sri Lanka’s politics and contemporary history. It will impact the Presidential and Parliamentary elections.

National People’s Power (NPP) party Economic Council member Sunil Handunetti announced on 23 May that the party will take legal action against the Government’s proposed ETB, which the government has said is aimed at bolstering the country’s economy.

If the Bill becomes law and is not reversed by an incoming President and Government, it will mark the point at which Sri Lankan capitalist development was ended and Sri Lankan national entrepreneurship buried alive by foreign big business. The project of ‘national development’ dating from 1948, with its foundations laid in the pre-Independence period in the Legislative Council by the Ceylon National Congress, will be ended.

This Bill is the 21st century equivalent of the Waste Lands Ordinance imposed on the island by British colonialism. It should be called the Economic Re-Colonization Bill or the Economic Transformation Back to Colonialism Bill. Under the guise of ‘equitable treatment’ the Bill explicitly prohibits preferential treatment, i.e., state support, of domestic investors over foreign investors. Thus, it rejects the Asian and especially the East Asian model of development in favour of the obsolete Washington Consensus and the neoliberal model.

The Bill will drastically shift the balance between the national and the foreign in our economy and on the island in general, tilting heavily to the foreign and against the domestic. It will facilitate foreign economic invasion while it condemns and criminalizes the Sri Lankan state safeguarding the national economic space and supporting competition by national enterprise.

Negating Democracy

The Bill attacks the cornerstone of our Constitution. Popular sovereignty is the foundation of our democratic Republic. We choose our leaders through regular, periodic elections. In a multiparty democracy, political parties compete by presenting their ideas of what is best for the country. By choosing and voting, i.e., by deciding, the citizens endow a party or candidate with a mandate to put those ideas into practice.

The ETB seeks to establish an ironclad ‘economic Constitution’ within the Constitution. It seeks to freeze economic policy to that prescribed in this Bill, which is so detailed that it actually specifies percentages. This brackets out and renders irrelevant the economic policies which the people would have chosen among competing ideas and sets of proposals more suitable to the needs of that time.

If an elected Government decides that there should be greater balance between agricultural production for export and for domestic food security, it would be unable to do so if this Bill became law and remains on the books, because integration into the world economy and a shift to export production are inscribed in it.

The Bill seeks to establish an ‘economic dictatorship’ or economic policy oligarchy within our democracy. This is the so-called Economic Commission, six members of which are appointed by the President. It is the unelected Economic Commission that prescribes the economic policies to the (largely elected) Cabinet of Ministers: “The Economic Commission shall formulate and recommend to the Cabinet of Ministers the national policies on investment, international trade and investment zones…”

The Bill is Ranil’s ‘Big Bang’ which destroys the state sector of the Sri Lankan economy while exterminating the larger national economic development project and aspiration. It is the local version of the policy adopted on Western advice in Russia in the 1990s by Boris Yeltsin. The West no longer pushes that advice – one of Russia’s US advisors in the 1990s, Prof Jeffrey Sachs, has long since recanted and adopted the opposite view. The effects of ‘Big Bang’ shock therapy were so indelibly ghastly that the Russian public opted for Putin to restore the role of the state, and decades later, remains determined never to return to nihilistic, state-negating ‘Yeltsinist’ 1990s.

Acid Test

Any party or parliamentarian who votes for this Bill will reveal that he/she has no problems with liquidating the public sector and worse, privileging foreign business while starving local business of support.

Any party or parliamentarian which/who is absent or abstains at the vote, reveals that their problem with rampant foreignization does not run to the extent of voting NO.

Any party which permits a ‘free’ vote on the Bill will show how many of its MPs are with Ranil either out of conviction or ‘commission’ (so to speak) and will be laying a bridge to Ranil, for its MPs and voters.

Any party which fails to vote against the Bill effectively subtracts itself from the category of contender as ‘the Alternative’ to the present economic dispensation and trajectory.

If the SLPP (Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna), the party of the former nationalist President Mahinda Rajapaksa, and SLFP (Sri Lanka Freedom Party), founded by S.W.R.D Bandaranaike in the 1950s to promote a Sri Lankan national economy, do not vote against the ETB, they risk losing what remains of their nationalist-statist vote base to the NPP.

If the SJB (Samagi Jana Balawegaya)—a breakaway party of Wickremasinghe’s UNP—doesn’t vote against the Bill, it reinforces the charge of its JVP-NPP rival, one of whose formidable speakers Vijitha Herath wittily refers to the SJB as “the UNP’s Sajith wing”, and Handunetti, who charges that the SJB “sits in the Opposition benches but doesn’t oppose Ranil’s policies and therefore isn’t an authentic Opposition party”.

The ETB and the voting patterns in parliament may well decide the outcome of the two national electionsdue with the next 12 months (or more likely next 6 months).

  • Dr Dayan Jayatilleka is  veteran Sri Lankan political scientists and a former Sri Lankan representative to the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, where he served as the Vice President of the Council  from 2007-2008.