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By Malik Samuel
In its quest to expand beyond North East Nigeria, JAS–ISWAP clashes aren’t in the global terror group’s interests.
In October 2023, Boko Haram’s JAS faction (Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunna Lidda’Awati Wal-Jihad) launched major offensives against the group’s other faction – Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). This forced ISWAP fighters to evacuate many of their island territories in the Lake Chad area, according to ongoing Institute for Security Studies (ISS) research.
JAS should have been on the back foot following several defeats in the past three years, a loss of territory, and the death of its leader Abubakar Shekau, which caused a mass exodus of its fighters. Instead, the group sacked ISWAP from some of its long-held territories. Those familiar with the clashes say JAS now occupies as much as 40% of the islands previously controlled by ISWAP. But ISWAP maintains control over the mainland in these areas.
JAS’ gains are linked to a crucial alliance with an influential former ISWAP commander, Mikhail Usman, AKA Kaila. Kaila, from the Buduma ethnic group, defected to JAS in early 2023 with some commanders and fighters. Among their grievances was the perceived marginalisation of the Buduma from ISWAP leadership positions.
As a predominant tribe in the Lake Chad islands, the Buduma are dissatisfied with being ‘lorded over by strangers’ – a reference to the Kanuri-dominated ISWAP leadership. They also object to ISWAP raising taxes on civilians living under its control. Riding on this dissatisfaction and his ambition for power, Kaila crossed over to JAS.
He masterminded the October attack and sold the idea to JAS. As a former senior commander, he knew ISWAP’s Achilles’ heel – without its Buduma fighters for whom the lake water is home, the group would struggle at water-based battles.
While Islamic State hasn’t stopped ISWAP’s preparations against JAS, it has asked for a pause in attacks
After Boko Haram split into two factions in 2016, Islamic State recognised ISWAP as an affiliate under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Barnawi. Since then, JAS has had some success against ISWAP. In August 2021, an ISWAP attack on a JAS base on the Barwa islands in Niger failed after 12 of the former group’s 20 vehicles were destroyed by improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
JAS retaliated five days later, wounding al-Barnawi in the ensuing battle. Around 25 November 2021, JAS attacked another ISWAP location at Shuwaram, killing about 180 fighters – ISWAP’s biggest casualty.
JAS’ capture of key ISWAP territories is arguably its most important success against its rival in recent years. Former fighters with knowledge of the dynamics within and between the groups told the ISS that while ISWAP isn’t panicking, it is preparing for major counter-offensives to reclaim ground. In April, two territories were reclaimed – Tumbun Allura and Falkima-Hakariya.
ISS sources say ISWAP doesn’t want to create the impression that it is weak. And given Kaila’s role in ISWAP’s defeat, the group intends to send a strong message to potential defectors.
While Islamic State hasn’t stopped ISWAP’s preparations, it has asked for a pause in attacks while it tries to persuade Kaila to return to ISWAP. But Kaila will be reluctant to return, given his role in spearheading the JAS attacks and the fact that his fighters took many of ISWAP’s weapons when they defected. Insiders told the ISS that Kaila reiterated this fear over the phone to Abu Rumaisa, al-Barnawi’s brother and ISWAP media head, a few weeks ago.
Islamic State may want to avoid reputational damage to its major affiliate in West Africa
Why is Islamic State keen to reconcile Kaila with ISWAP? It may be concerned that JAS shouldn’t be taken lightly. But it also recognises the damage that defections caused to the group, and reconciling defectors with ISWAP could again weaken JAS.
Having already moved hundreds of fighters to Nigeria’s North West and North Central as part of its expansion efforts, Islamic State also knows ISWAP cannot afford a lengthy, distracting and deadly confrontation with JAS.
Islamic State may also not want to risk reputational damage to its major affiliate in West Africa. Especially since Islamic State’s other franchise in the region – Islamic State Sahel Province (still referred to as Islamic State in the Greater Sahara or ISGS) – is being overshadowed by the al-Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nusratul Islam Wal Muslimin (JNIM).
Since separating from ISWAP in 2022, ISGS has been locked in a struggle for supremacy against JNIM. This rivalry affects ISGS operations, with JNIM emerging as its primary security threat. Between January and February 2024, Islamic State media outlet Al-Naba showed that ISGS carried out only eight attacks in the Sahel, with 57 casualties. JNIM claimed 145 attacks with 581 casualties in the same period, says al-Qaeda media outlet Az-Zallaqa.
JNIM also created more insecurity than ISWAP in the same period. According to Islamic State, ISWAP carried out 96 attacks in January and February, resulting in 205 casualties. Although fewer attacks occurred in February than in January, the casualty rate increased because IEDs were used in 41% of the assaults.
Governments should ramp up military pressure to complement the damage ISWAP and JAS inflict on each other
The proxy war between Islamic State and al-Qaeda across the Sahel and West Africa – manifested in the clashes between their affiliates ISGS and JNIM – along with the ISWAP-JAS rivalry in the Lake Chad Basin, should be good for counter-terrorism. The more these violent extremist groups fight each other, the more likely they are to be depleted.
Ongoing military operations across Lake Chad Basin by the Multinational Joint Task Force and national armies try to limit JAS and ISWAP’s operational spaces, forcing fighters to surrender. This could explain Islamic State’s reluctance to see ISWAP fight JAS, and its push to expand beyond North East Nigeria in search of more operational space.
What this means for governments is that they shouldn’t rely on these groups to self-implode. Instead, they should ramp up military pressure to complement the damage the groups inflict on each other.
Cutting their supplies and preventing recruitment in the Lake Chad Basin and beyond is also important. This can be achieved through tighter border control measures informed by cross-border intelligence gathering and sharing.
Conflict is a major conveyor of terrorism, with more than 90% of terrorist attacks in 2023 occurring in conflict-affected areas. That makes it vital to develop socially embedded conflict prevention tools focused on banditry, farmer-herder clashes and inter-communal violence. These measures would prevent terrorists from taking advantage of conflicts, as is currently the case.
- About the author: Malik Samuel, Researcher, ISS Regional Office for West Africa, the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin
- Source: This article was published by ISS Today
By Dr. Nand C. Bardouille
Just over six months into the Gaza war, Washington’s foreign policy stance on the conflict has placed it at odds with the 14 mostly Anglophone sovereign small states of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).
This is apparent in a rising chorus of contrarian views in CARICOM member states’ Gaza war-related diplomatic narratives in the United Nations (UN), as compared to the United States’ associated positioning, setting the tone for the daylight between these states and Washington.
Initially, CARICOM adopted a position that was generally more restrained in tone. This was the context in which the bloc began to spend political capital on lending its voice to an already incendiary situation, striving for balance.
This behaviour on the international stage is consistent with the view of international relations scholars that, in international politics, smaller states inter alia “might seek [status-related] recognition by great powers, as useful allies, impartial arbiters, or contributors to systems maintenance” (emphasis added). Yet, in full view of Gazans’ disturbing reality and a region roiled by a metastasizing Gaza war, this type of diplomacy has its limits.
Several months later, in a Statement on the Ongoing Situation in Gaza, CARICOM leaders underscored that they are “deeply distressed” by the ‘deteriorating’ state of affairs in Gaza.” (In line with K. J. Holsti, who calls attention to the signal importance of such foreign policy actors in foreign policy decision-making, it is apt to unpack their pronouncements on the matter at hand.) While they reaffirmed their condemnation of Hamas’ October 7, 2023 assault on Israel and resultant hostage-taking, they pilloried subsequent “Israeli actions that violate international humanitarian law and the human rights of the Palestinian people.”
It is instructive that while US President Joe Biden eventually described Israel’s conduct of its war against Hamas in Gaza as “over the top,” this did not change Washington’s policy course in respect of support for Israel. Along the way, the U.S. repeatedly scuttled UN-related attempts to call for a ceasefire, tying the UN’s hands. This amid Israel’s apparent refutation of a humanitarian crisis in Gaza, in a context where UN-Israel relations have seemingly“reached an all-time low.”
In stark contrast, CARICOM leaders doubled down on unequivocally calling for “an immediate and unconditional ceasefire in Gaza and safe and unimpeded access for the delivery of adequate and sustained humanitarian assistance.” That said, Jamaica’s Gaza war-related voting record in the UN General Assembly and public pronouncements have caused some consternation among commentators; and Prime Minister Andrew Holness had to set the record straight.
CARICOM leaders also contended that, for the regional grouping, Israel’s excesses in the occupied West Bank contribute to international instability. They tied their criticism of Israel’s wanton disregard of calls from within UN bodies for a ceasefire to the provisional measures-related order in the South Africa v. Israel case at the International Court of Justice.
And they did not pull punches when advocating for a two-state solution in keeping with UNSC Resolution 242.
The bloc continues to raise the alarm over this conflict in the Middle East, citing concerns regarding the wider implications for “regional stability and international peace.”
The normative character of CARICOM’s foreign policy approach is apparent in its Gaza war-related diplomatic trajectory, which is also illustrative of a cumulative tension vis-à-vis the United States’ imprint on the said conflict. This is because the United States’ foreign policy intentions qua state behaviour, in the Middle East and elsewhere, hinge on power.
For its part, Guyana has signalled its impatience with Washington’s Israel policy which, for some scholars, centres on a “special relationship”— one that purportedly plays an outsized role in “the totality of American foreign policy in the Middle East.”
Notably, Guyana abstained from a recent, widely criticized US-led draft resolution in the 15-member UN Security Council (UNSC). Guyana was elected in 2023 to join this UN body, for a two-year term (2024-2025), as a non-permanent member. That measure set a low bar. It just made the case for the imperative of an ‘immediate and sustained ceasefire’ in Gaza, compelling Guyana to underscore that the resolution stopped short of aligning with the international community’s call for an immediate humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza.
Russia and China, two of the UNSC’s five permanent members, voted against the draft resolution. It failed to pass, given the strictures of the UNSC voting system.
Guyana was among the 14 UNSC members which, shortly thereafter, backed another resolution. On this occasion, there was a clarion call qua demand for ‘an immediate ceasefire’ during Ramadan in 2024. The Security Council passed the resolution, with the U.S. conspicuously exercising an abstention regarding the vote-related proceedings.
This only served to further highlight Washington’s growing international isolation regarding foreign policymaking in the face of the decades-old Israeli-Palestinian conflict which, for months now having passed into uncharted waters, has been centre stage in international politics—eclipsing even the Ukraine war.
That the United States is haemorrhaging prestige in the Caribbean has not ceased either. This has ruffled feathers there in this geopolitical moment, putting the most significant strain on US-CARICOM relations since their post-Trump era revamp. No sooner had these relations benefitted from a reset under the Biden administration than have the last few months marked a stress point in those ties, which must be gauged anyway by their historically “mixed success.”
One source of things changing is that as postcolonial states, which are products of the struggle for political independence, CARICOM member states increasingly view the Gaza war through a normative qua ethical prism. In turn, it is a mirror onto their own quest for autonomy and unwavering belief in self-determination. (The fact is that these states’ postcolonial identities anchor their worldview, which is shaped inter alia by legacies of colonialism and the plight of those peoples who are still oppressed.)
Today, countries like Guyana turn to UN bodies like the UNSC to shore up diplomatic positioning in that regard.
In this thinking, all such peoples have a right to self-determination among the community of nations.
Washington’s decidedly skewed Gaza war-related foreign policymaking challenges such postcolonial conceptions anew, having a bearing on these states’ perceptions of their own status in the international system.
This a watershed moment, then, in the sense that coming into focus for CARICOM—indeed, shaping its view of Washington—is how the U.S. will earnestly respond to the international community’s outcry about the devastation wrought by six-plus months of war in Gaza and the ever worsening plight of its peoples.
Reports are Washington has put Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on notice that unless his government changes its war strategy, which has stoked the humanitarian crisis in that enclave, it might have to reassess facets of its Israel policy.
Just recently, though, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a legislative package that provides tens of billions of dollars in security assistance—among others—to Israel. The Senate has since passed the bill. And Iran’s recent direct airborne attack on Israel only galvanized US support for the latter, with this great-power rallying to Israel’s defence.
The question is whether such support emboldens Netanyahu to toe the maximalist line of far-right elements in his government by continuing to wage Israel’s war on Gaza—which, according to some analysts, possibly constitutes a never-ending war with ulterior motives. That Netanyahu now openly scoffs at international pressure for a Palestinian state says it all. This against a backdrop where, even if Netanyahu’s days in government are numbered, “his approach to the war [qua ‘use of force’ per defence establishment thinking on Israel’s National Security Doctrine] has broader support.”
The prevailing cosmopolitan view, which stands in opposition to the Netanyahu government’s position on the matter, is for a two-state solution to come to pass—as the only way to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
In a further sign of the (geopolitical) times, though, the UNSC failed to recommend full UN membership for the State of Palestine, owing to the United States’ casting a veto regarding the draft resolution in question.
Guyana was among the 12 UNSC members which voted in favour of the draft resolution, which reads:
“The Security Council, having examined the application of the State of Palestine for admission to the United Nations (S/2011/592), recommends to the General Assembly that the State of Palestine be admitted to membership in the United Nations.”
This draft resolution will go down in the annals of UN-anchored multilateral diplomacy as having produced an important moment for a show of support for Palestine, in what is perhaps Gaza’s darkest hour. It faces unprecedented, horrific destruction.
With the international spotlight on the diplomatic moment personified by the aforesaid UNSC vote, on April 19, 2024, Barbados announced its official recognition of Palestine as a State. Considering its timing, this move is likely intended (at least in part) as a rebuke of the United States’ reasoning behind its vote-related stand.
A few days later, the Government of Jamaica indicated that it took the decision to recognize the State of Palestine. In shedding light on this decision, Senator the Honourable Kamina Johnson Smith, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, called attention to Jamaica’s support for a two-state solution. Minister Johnson Smith said that this is the “only viable option to resolve the longstanding conflict, guarantee the security of Israel and uphold the dignity and rights of Palestinians.” Furthermore, she underscored: “By recognizing the State of Palestine, Jamaica strengthens its advocacy towards a peaceful solution.”
Minister Johnson Smith noted that her country’s decision to recognize the State of Palestine is in keeping with its “strong commitment to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which seek to engender mutual respect and peaceful co-existence among states, as well as the recognition of the right of peoples to self- determination.” She also linked the decision to the Gaza war and the resultant humanitarian crisis, reaffirming inter alia Jamaica’s backing of an immediate ceasefire.
Barbados and Jamaica have cast their lot with the 10 other CARICOM member states which have recognized the State of Palestine. They are St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Haiti, Grenada, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Belize, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Guyana.
Behind the scenes, CARICOM leaders and diplomats have likely (and in no uncertain terms) voiced their misgivings to their American counterparts as regards Washington’s approach to treating escalating tensions in the Middle East. The matter of the groundswell of support in CARICOM for an independent Palestinian State and for it to be afforded all attendant rights have surely come up, too, especially at a time when more countries are prioritizing recognition of that state.
Insofar as it is “embroiled in [the] Gaza conflict,” Washington is regularly in touch with Caribbean capitals. In an attempt to drum up support for what some analysts view as its one-dimensional determinism in foreign policymaking, Washington makes the rounds of these capitals.
This as the influence of the People’s Republic of China—which, along with Russia, is the United States’ strategic competitor—grows in the Caribbean.
To varying degrees—with a healthy respect for long-standing, country-level ties and the record of accomplishment—respective emissaries carry on with the daily business of diplomacy. Having regard to the deep “security and economic ties” between the U.S. and CARICOM, it is also the case that the latter grouping would not lose sight of the importance of the long game in its member states’ respective foreign policy approaches to America.
Still, attuned to their postcolonial identities, CARICOM member states are guarded in this moment. After all, their foreign policy inclination is to embrace “human and global interest.”
Such conviction is side stepped by others—if not rhetorically, then in praxis. For them, the competitive nature of the putative zero-sum international system is such that their own security is the overriding concern.
As CARICOM member states take stock of their contribution to the international community’s contemporary diplomatic manoeuvres on the question of Palestine, they are of the mind that they stand on the right side of history.
Yet for all their attention to the normative grounds for defusing the powder keg that is today’s Middle East, leaning in on the case for approaching the national interest in the same vein, CARICOM members run up against the broader context of their foreign policymaking. Simply put, à la the system-level, international relations are “geopolitically constructed.” This framing is the proximate cause of the Gaza war; but, it is not the only factor that one ought to assess. As already intimated, domestic and “unit-level factors” in foreign policymaking also play a consequential role in the grand scheme of things.
In this schema, it is highly debatable whether the top dogs seriously weigh moral ends.
In standing on principle, strengthening its status-related hand in international politics, CARICOM has notched another victory in the thrust-and-parry of the anarchic global system.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author(s) alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.
By Panarat Anamwathana
One of the most imminent problems facing Thailand today is its rapidly ageing population. Depending on measurements, Thailand is either the oldest or second oldest country in Southeast Asia, with Singapore being the other contender.[1] Thailand’s birthrate has been steadily dropping for decades, hitting a record low at 1.16 children per woman in 2023.[2] According to the World Bank, Thailand is currently experiencing its highest age dependency ratio since 2000 at 44%.[3] That same year, the Thai labour force shrank for the first time, showing a higher number of retirees (aged 60-64) than new entrants (aged 20-24).[4] Indeed, demographer Prof. Dr. Kuea Wongboonsin estimates that if the current trend persists, Thailand’s population will be halved within the next 60 years. In 2083, the projected number of children will have fallen from 10 million to 1 million, the working population will decrease from 46 million to 14 million, and the number of elderly rise from 8 million to 18 million.[5]
This would have profound negative effects on Thailand’s economic outlook, from labour shortages, rising healthcare and pension costs, and falling productivity and aggregate demand. Thai scholars and economists have identified demographics as one of the factors affecting the country’s slow growth.[6] Similarly, the World Bank has forecasted that Thailand’s economy will only grow 3% over the next two decades, the lowest in ASEAN, due to low levels of private investment and the ageing population.[7]
The new government under Prime Minister Sretta Thavisin has described this demographic change as a “crisis,” and is proposing various health-related policies to increase fertility rates. This paper argues that these measures are insufficient to alleviate the crisis, and do not adequately address the main causes of the problem. According to surveys from 2023, major concerns behind people opting to be childless are the pessimistic outlook for Thailand’s economic and political future, coupled with the high costs of care driven by cultural expectations of filial obligations. At the same time, younger generations of Thais seem to worry less than their predecessors about who would take care of them in old age, reflecting a shifting perception of familial obligations and expectations of state support. A more effective means to increase fertility rates would be for the Thai state to meet young people’s higher expectations of government assistance, expand social welfare, as well as work to improve their perception of Thailand’s economic and political prospects.
WHY IS FERTILITY DECLINING?
People of child-rearing age in Thailand currently are the older Gen-Z (aged 18-27) and Gen-Y or millennials (aged 28-43).
Their decision to refrain from having children is primarily driven by political and economic concerns and is closely related to their pessimistic outlook on Thailand’s future.
These sentiments are clearly presented in opinion polls from late 2023. In a September survey conducted by the National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA), only 44% of childless adults in Thailand indicated that they want children someday. Among the 334 respondents who do not want children, the primary reasons cited by 38.32% were the reluctance to incur child-rearing expenses, and concerns about the social and political environment’s negative impact on their children. The second most common reason (37.72%) is that they do not want the burden of childcare, while 33.23% indicate a preference for maintaining their current lifestyle and personal freedom. Other respondents cite concerns about their own parenting abilities (17.66%), prioritisation of careers (13.77%), and health issues (5.39%) as contributing factors.[8] Other scholarly studies offer similar findings: the additional costs of having a child are the main reasons young people do not want children, coupled with poor economic outlook, demanding jobs, unemployment, and the spread of COVID-19.[9]
Childcare expenses stand out as one of the most important deterrents, which is unsurprising given the extremely high cost of raising a child in Thailand. In 2022, a Bank of Thailand study showed that the cost of raising a child from birth to finishing an undergraduate degree in Thailand was roughly 1.6 million baht per person, roughly 6.3 times higher than GDP per capita.[10] Furthermore, the “child penalty” on wages is significant, especially for women. While the gender wage gap in Thailand has been decreasing over the past few decades, workers with children experience salary setbacks. A 2019 study from the University of the Thai Chamber of Commerce found that, on average, men and women with children respectively earn 17% and 22% less than their childless counterparts. The main reason for this is the time constraints associated with raising young children.[11] It is thus understandable that many young people choose not to have children, as doing so would not only increase their expenses but also negatively affect their earnings.
The other main deterrent to having a child is people’s pessimism towards Thailand’s future. This sentiment is reflected in a separate poll from December 2023 from NIDA, which surveyed Thai people on their expectations of quality of life and political landscape. Regarding political stability, 45.65% of respondents anticipate that the situation would “still be chaotic,” 28.40% predict “things to be more chaotic,” and only 14.34% responded that it would be “less chaotic.” Thai people’s outlooks on the country’s economic future are mixed, with 35.65% anticipating improvement in 2024 and 31.22% responding that the economy will “remain bad.” Similarly, while 31.98% of respondents believe that their quality of life will improve in 2024, 31.76% feel that it will “remain bad.”[12] If young people perceive bleak economic and political prospects for themselves and the nation, they will likely refrain from having children. While these data offer meaningful insights into why Thai fertility is declining, they do not paint a complete picture. There is an additional cultural factor to this demographic change.
“WHO WILL TAKE CARE OF YOU IN YOUR OLD AGE?”: A CULTURAL SHIFT
When young people say that they will remain childless, they are often asked, “Who will take care of you in your old age if you do not have children?” However, Thai youths do not seem to be concerned about this question, which signifies a shift in young people’s perception of their duties and relationship to their families, as well as their changing expectations of the state.
This question is asked with the assumption that children would take care of their parents when they grow old. It is rooted in the Asian concept of filial piety. The traditional Thai value of katanyu katavedi has no direct translation in English but it conveys a deeper meaning of gratitude towards parents for their sacrifice and hard work, and implies an obligation to reciprocate. It is thus a reasonable expectation of the older generation that their children be katanyu katavedi and care for them financially, physically, and emotionally in their old age.
It has been remarked that Thailand “got old before it got rich”; the country’s GDP per capita is far lower than that of other ageing societies in Asia like Japan and South Korea.[13] Without readily available social security that requires a high GDP and the expectation of katanyu katavedi, parts of Thailand’s rapidly ageing society might not have thought about how to take care of themselves in their old age. The elderly’s plan after retirement was simply to rely on their children or the young people in their families. It is estimated that in Thailand, one working person is responsible for the care of 6 elderly people.[14] This has put further financial strain on the working population and offers further insights into the findings of NIDA’s surveys. Adding expenses for children on top of these financial obligations has been almost unthinkable, making many people less likely to have children.
Furthermore, many young Thai people have started to move away from this traditional expectation. Some young people have begun questioning katanyu katavedi. For instance, they argue that as it was their parents’ decision to have children, they should not be obligated to repay them, causing much alarm and confusion among the older population, who in turn label such questioning as “ungrateful.”[15] Furthermore, due to economic demands and competitive labour markets, many parents have had to leave their children in the care of grandparents in the countryside or babysitters in urban areas, further weakening katanyu katavedi. However, this does not mean that young people intend to abandon caring for their parents. Rather, much of the working population do not have the same anticipation to be cared for in their old age, lifting the obligation of katanyu katavedi from the children they may or may not have. This can be interpreted as the import of the Western conceptualisation of family and parental relationships, in which parents tend to encourage children to be independent, sometimes as soon as they are of legal age. Young Thais have begun to plan for their childless retirement, with options for retirement and pension plans, care homes, and elderly communities becoming more available.[16] This independent retirement plan aligns with young people’s mixed outlook for Thailand’s economic and political future. They do not need to incur the financial costs of children or worry about the negative impact of society on their children, while making arrangements to take care of themselves in their old age.
Yet, the issue of katanyu katavedi bears more social weight than just a generational shift away about familial relationships, but also informs us of what young people expect of their societies and governments. Some have argued that katanyu katavedi was a means for the state or society to push the responsibility of social care to private citizens. In an ideal world, katanyu katavedi would not be obligated as there would be an adequate system of social care and safety net for the old, sick, and vulnerable. Indeed, while no government policy can be a substitute for loving familial relationships, it can alleviate some of the burden on the working population and perhaps encourage them to have children if they environment was emotionally less obligatory and financially less stressful.[17]
STRATEGIES FOR INCREASING BIRTHRATES
The best approach to Thailand’s ageing demographic is for the Srettha government to alleviate care expenses, and enhance public confidence in the nation’s economic and political future. The Thai state is however promoting measures that do not engage with the root causes of the problem and which are likely to be insufficient.
The Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) has announced that increasing Thailand’s fertility rate as one of its top 12 priorities and one of the “national agendas.” Dr. Cholnan Srikaew of Pheu Thai Party, the Minister of Public Health, has stated that the government aims to increase the birthrate to 2.1.[18]
To assist in this national agenda, the government’s 13th National Economic and Social Development Plan[19] (2023-2027) includes three slightly vague measures to assist in this national agenda: First, to create an “enabling environment” to have children by offering financial assistance to raise and care for children. Second, to change the attitude and values of people to recognise that “all births are important,” as well as to support diverse forms of family. Third, to give comprehensive support to those who decide to have children, such as fertility services and offering assistance to promote the growth and development of children.[20]
The Thai state appears to be making progress in the latter two measures. The MOPH launched a “Give Birth, Great World” campaign and announced that it is setting up fertility clinics at public hospitals to promote having children, and offer consultancy services and infertility treatment.[21] There are currently 800 fertility clinics in Thailand, but most are concentrated in urban areas. The MOPH aims to expand this number and establish at least one state-funded fertility clinic in every province.[22] It has announced that it will provide cheaper and easier access to reproductive technology for single people who want to be parents, or couples who have trouble conceiving, such as intrauterine insemination (IUI) and in-vitro fertilisation (IVF). The government is also working on legislation to make these services available to members of the LGBTQIA+ community.[23] Thailand is on track to pass a marriage equality bill within the year, expanding the definition of “family” and making it easier for people of diverse sexualities to have children.[24]
While these efforts are commendable, especially to make fertility services more accessible to a wider range of people, they are unlikely to reverse the trend of falling fertility rates. It is true that these services might be beneficial to certain subsets of the population, such as older individuals or those who are struggling to conceive, but the main concerns for people who decide against having children are not health related, and thus these measures do not address the causes of the fertility crisis. The government should instead focus on the first strategy of its development plan to create an “enabling environment” by alleviating some of the burden of care and improving the country’s economic and political stability.
This argument has been echoed by academics. For instance, Assoc. Prof. Napaphorn Atiwanichayapong argue that “social factors in all aspects” that have accumulated for many years are now the causes for declining fertility, including political instability and a highly competitive capitalist environment that has produced a poor economic outlook. To make young people more optimistic about society and their futures, the government will need to make “comprehensive” changes to Thailand and many of its systems.[25]
Expanding social welfare programmes and state-mandated benefits for both child and elderly care would directly address many of the deterrents to having children. In March 2024, the Thai parliament accepted a proposal to expand maternity leave to 180 days and paternity leave to 90 days. In the same session, however, it rejected a labour protection bill that would limit working hours to 40 per week, increase minimum wage to match inflation, allow for 15 days of leave per year for familial care, and mandate that workplaces accommodate breastfeeding mothers.[26] Increasing the minimum wage could have been the first step towards alleviating the financial strain on the working population, as well as improve their outlook for their own well-being. Similarly, the 15-day leave especially could have helped the Thai labour force care for their aging parents and family members. After the vote, many Thai netizens expressed their frustration with the Thai state for campaigning for people to have more children but remain unwilling to expand social welfare or assist working mothers. Some even say sarcastically that “extinction” seemed like a good option if the state failed to provide necessary benefits, while others imply that not having children is an appropriate punishment for a state that cannot protect or help its people.[27] Thai parliament’s actions are seemingly out of step with young people’s changing perception that the state should expand social welfare to support vulnerable members of society, rather than relying on personal obligations such as katanyu katavedi.
Another possible avenue would be to enhance public’s confidence in Thailand’s economic and political future. As it is, the Sretta government has inherited a stagnant economy due to the COVID-19 crisis, low exports, diminished private investment, and tourism spending below initial projections.[28] The government is still struggling to overcome legal and political hurdles to deliver its flagship stimulus policy of giving certain Thai citizens 10,000 baht (roughly 280USD) in digital wallets.[29] At the same time, political tension in Thailand escalated after the coalition government was formed under Sretta.[30] More charges are being brought against activists and academics.[31] Move Forward Party, the main opposition party that won the most votes in the 2023 general election, faces dissolution by the constitutional court.[32] Expanding medical access is largely insufficient to increase birth rates in the face of such low levels of confidence in the economy and political instability.
CONCLUSION
Without a doubt, Thailand will face an economic crisis if the trend of falling birthrates is left unchecked. However, the Sretta government does not seem to fully grasp the root causes of this problem. Their proposed policies of making fertility care more accessible, while commendable and could make a difference to the lives of poor or LGBTQIA+ people, are largely going to be ineffective in increasing fertility to meet its current goals. The majority of people are not deciding to be childless because they have no access to fertility treatment, but because they cannot afford the additional expenses of childcare and because they feel pessimistic about their future.
Understanding the cultural context and changes in expectations towards familial relationships and the state’s obligations towards its citizens is a good first step. Poll data and academic studies all concur that expanding social welfare to assist in the costs of caring for both infants and the elderly would alleviate some of the burden borne by Thailand’s working population. The state should also work to convince young people that it can improve the Thai economy and political stability, and create a good environment for future children. Without these measures, Thailand can expect the falling fertility rate to only worsen.
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
- About the author: Panarat Anamwathana is Visiting Fellow at the Regional Social and Cultural Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
- Source: This article was published by ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
By Daniel Lacalle
When we talk about monetary policy, people do not understand the importance of interest rates reflecting the reality of inflation and risk. Interest rates are the price of risk and manipulating them down leads to bubbles that end in financial crises, while imposing too high rates can penalize the economy. Ideally, interest rates would flow freely and there would be no central bank to fix them.
A price signal as important as interest rates or the amount of money would prevent the creation of bubbles and, above all, the disproportionate accumulation of risk. The risk of fixing rates too high does not exist when central banks impose reference rates, as they will always make it easier for state borrowing—artificial currency creation—in the most convenient—what they call “no distortions”—and cheap way.
Many analysts say that central banks do not impose interest rates; they only reflect what the market demands. Surprisingly, if that were the case, we wouldn’t have financial traders stuck to screens on a Thursday waiting to decipher what the rate decision is going to be. Moreover, if the central bank only responds to market demand, it is a good reason to let interest rates float freely.
Citizens perceive that raising interest rates with high inflation is harmful; however, they do not seem to understand that what was really destructive was having negative real and nominal interest rates. That’s what encourages economic agents to take far more risks than we can take and to disguise excess debt with a false sense of security. At the same time, it is surprising that citizens praise low rates but then complain that home prices and risky assets rise too fast.
Inflation is a huge advantage for the currency issuer. It blames everyone and everybody for the rise in prices, except for the only thing that makes aggregate prices go up, consolidate that increase, and continue to rise, even at a more moderate rate: printing much more currency than the private economy demands and setting rates well below the real risk levels.
The benefit of statism is that it puts the blame for high interest rates on banks, just as it blames supermarkets for consumer prices.
Who prints currency and disguises risk? Of course, we look at the ECB and the Fed, who dictate the increase in money supply through repurchases and fixed interest rates. However, central banks do not buy back state assets, print money, or impose negative real interest rates because they are evil alchemists. They do so because the state’s deficit—which is artificial monetary creation—remains unsustainable, public debt is atrophied, and state solvency is worsened by imbalanced public accounts. The central bank is not responsible for implementing fiscal policy. Thus, the state is the one that prints money out of nowhere and passes the imbalance to the citizens through inflation and taxes.
Banks, in an open economy, do not create money out of nowhere; they lend to real projects that are expected to be repaid with interest, and those loans have collateral. If commercial banks created money out of nowhere, none of them would go bankrupt. They only create money out of nowhere when regulation imposes risk-disconnected rates and eliminates the need for capital to sustain the government by accumulating its bonds and loans under the false construction that they are “no-risk assets.” Thus, the castle of cards built under the disguise of public sector risk always creates inflation, financial crises, secular stagnation, and liquidity traps. The amount of money created goes to unproductive expenditure, destroys the purchasing power of the currency, impoverishes citizens, and at the same time decapitalizes the most fragile companies, SMEs (small and medium enterprises). That’s what they call the social use of money. Seriously.
The ECB has announced a possible interest rate cut in June that is in danger of being premature and wrong. First, because money supply, credit demand, and supply are rebounding, inflation remains persistent and above the 2% target. Furthermore, the underlying trend is a much higher inflation level than the ECB’s target, even after two changes in the CPI calculation. After a 20% accumulated consumer price level since 2019, calling victory on inflation after two changes in the calculation of CPI and still elevated core inflation is insane. If we see the rise in non-replaceable goods prices, we can understand why citizens are angry. Real non-replaceable goods’ CPI is probably closer to 4-5% per year.
The ECB rate hikes are signaled by many market participants as the cause of the euro zone’s stagnation, but curiously, no one mentions that the euro area was already experiencing massive stagnation due to negative interest rates. Besides, if you need to have real negative rates to “grow,” you’re not growing but accumulating toxic risk. The ECB knows that the base effect, which played in favor of year-on-year inflation in 2023, will not be supportive in 2024. They also know that monetary aggregates were down a few months ago but are rebounding, and that the supply of credit has not collapsed. The ECB, like the Federal Reserve, knows that inflation is a monetary phenomenon and that there is no cost-push inflation, “greedflation,” or similar statist excuses. None of those factors can cause aggregate prices to soar, consolidate, or continue to rise; it is only the destruction of the currency’s purchasing power that causes inflation.
Of course, no central bank will acknowledge that inflation is its fault, among other things, because no central bank increases the money supply at will but to finance an unsustainable public deficit. However, no central bank will challenge a financial structure that is based on the myth that public debt is risk-free. Central banks know that inflation is a monetary phenomenon, which is why they attack rising consumer prices with rate hikes and money supply reductions. They just do it mildly because governments benefit from inflation.
The problem of lowering interest rates now, when there is no evidence of having controlled inflation and achieved a target that already erodes the purchasing power of the currency by 2% annually, is to fall into the narrative that the eurozone is in a poor economic situation because of monetary policy when it is due to the wrong fiscal policy, the disaster of the Next Generation EU Funds, whose failure is already only comparable to the forgotten Juncker Plan, a shortsighted and destructive energy, agricultural, and industrial policy, and a taxation system that shifts innovation and technology to other countries.
The ECB is aware that interest rates are not high and that the system’s money supply has not decreased as expected. In fact, it continues to repurchase outstanding bonds and will not carry out a significant reduction in its balance sheet in real terms until the end of the year. Lowering interest rates now includes the risk of depreciating the euro against the dollar and thus increasing the euro area’s import bill in real terms, reducing the inflow of reserves into the eurozone, and further encouraging public spending and government debt that has not been contained in countries like Italy and Spain, which boast of “growing” by massively increasing debt and where inflation, moreover, is not under control. All this reminds us of the mistakes of the past when Greece boasted to be the EU’s growth engine, and many said that Germany was Europe’s “sick member.” The ECB cannot pretend to be the Bank of Japan for two reasons: the eurozone lacks the luxury of Japanese society’s dollar savings structure or its iron citizen discipline, and, above all, because the failure of Japan’s ultra-Keynesianism has brought the yen to a 35-year low against the dollar.
To those who say that the euro and the ECB are the problem, I recommend that you exercise your imagination of what Spain, Portugal, or Italy would be with their own currency and populist governments printing as if Argentina were Switzerland. You don’t have to imagine it; remember when these countries had an inflation rate of 14–15% and they destroyed savings and real wages with the falsehood of “competitive” devaluations? It wasn’t that long ago.
- About the author: Daniel Lacalle, PhD, economist and fund manager, is the author of the bestselling books Freedom or Equality (2020), Escape from the Central Bank Trap (2017), The Energy World Is Flat (2015), and Life in the Financial Markets (2014). He is a professor of global economy at IE Business School in Madrid.
- Source: This article was published by the Mises Institute
Last fall, Grigory Golosov, a professor at St. Petersburg’s European University, said that Moscow has come up with a new means of going after those it doesn’t like: first declaring that those the Kremlin doesn’t like are part of an international movement and then declaring that movement to be “an extremist group” even if no such organization exists.
It did that with the LGBT community, Golosov says, adding that it is likely to do so with feminism, a move many Kremlin supporters already are calling for and noting that such moves will make it easier for Moscow to prosecute those advancing ideas at odds with Putin and his regime (windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2023/11/kremlin-deploying-two-more-means-of.html).
The latest victim of such an approach consists of those who promote regionalist and nationalist ideas. They do not form a single organization, but Moscow has decided that they do and thus can be treated in the same way that it has been persecuting the LGBT community in Russia.
Nine days ago, the Russian justice ministry called on the Russian Supreme Court to declare the Anti-Russian Separatist Movement and it structures extremist organization at a hearing on June 7 (minjust.gov.ru/ru/pages/izveshenie-o-vremeni-i-meste-rassmotreniya-administrativnogo-dela-7-iyunya-2024-g/).
In its letter to the Court, the justice ministry said that “the Anti-Russian Separatist Movement is an international movement for the destruction of the multi-national unity and territorial integrity of Russia;” but it did not provide any details about just what this Movement is and what its organizations international or local may be.
The Sova-Center monitoring and analysis group in reporting this development said that the experience of the LGBT movement strongly suggests that the Russian authorities will use this declaration as an “elastic” means of bringing new and additional charges against activists the Kremlin doesn’t like (sova-center.ru/misuse/news/persecution/2024/04/d49736/).
Russian prosecutors will no longer have to point to specific actions to bring charges of separatism against anyone. Simply declaring that someone is a member of this “Anti-Russian Separatist Movement” will be enough — even though as the Sova-Center points out no such “movement” exists.
According to the Sova-Center, Moscow is likely to use such a declaration against regionalist as well as nationalist groups and also against people outside of Moscow who are not interested in separatism at all but rather only in creating genuine federalism in the increasingly unitary Russian state.
This has sparked a large number of sharply critical comments by Russian independent news organizations and bloggers (kasparov.ru/material.php?id=662C9F2C5D0E6).