Day: April 9, 2024

By Mark Soo

On March 26, Tokyo announced that exports of fighter jets produced under the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) initiative will be authorized going forward. The announcement came after officials from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) met with their counterparts in Komeito over the latter’s concerns of exporting Japanese-made fighters to countries in conflict, with the overriding question being whether such a move would be in line with the country’s pacifist principles. The cabinet justified the decision by pointing out that research and development activities under GCAP would no longer be hindered; the status quo had risked casting the country in a supporting role rather than being an equal partner alongside Italy and the United Kingdom.

Tokyo also announced that Japanese-made fighter exports will be limited to countries that have officially signeddefense partnership agreements, including Germany, India, and the United States. As such, the policy can fall underthe guidelines of The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, whereby such transfers can be done only if they would benefit Japanese national security or contribute to “peace contribution and international cooperation.”

It is expected that more military hardware can be approved for export to friendly countries under the new rules on approving sales and exports. The announcement would allow Japan to improve the standing of the Japanese defense industry and put Japan in a position where it can be seen as a reliable regional partner in East Asia.

Japan’s participation in GCAP can be traced back to the Mitsubishi F-X fighter jet project, which was launched in response to a ban on allowing the export of the F-22 to allied countries, including Japan, to comply with rules underthe Obey Amendment. Since Japan could not legally purchase the F-22, the option was made to initiate research for the production of a domestic fighter jet. The F-X was an attempt to replace the Mitsubishi F-2 fighter jets under service with the Japanese Air-Self Defense Forces (JASDF). Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) served as the primary contractor. The capabilities and technology tested by the Japanese Ministry of Defense (MOD) included advanced radar systems to counter stealth technology, receiving targeting information from other platforms such as hostile drones and fighter jets, the use of fly-by-optics to process information faster, stealth technology, gallium nitride semiconductors to improve radar performance, and a new, more powerful engine. The project ultimately produced the fighter jet known as the Mitsubishi X-2 Shinshin, which performed its maiden flight on April 22, 2016 fromNagoya Airfield to Gifu Air Field.

Fast-forward to 2017 and Japan and the UK signed an agreement to explore possibilities of jointly developing a new fighter jet; then, in December, 2022, it was announced that Italy, Japan and the UK would work together to develop the next fighter jet under GCAP. This allowed research experience from the F-X to be integrated into GCAP alongside the BAE Tempest fighter jet project. A trilateral collaboration agreement between the three countries to support long-term working arrangements and capability requirements was reached on September 12, 2023. Finally,  on December 14, 2023, a treaty was signed, which called for developing the fighter in Tokyo. The GCAP industrial hub and joint business construct would be in the UK. Japan would appoint a representative to serve as the CEO, while Italy would appoint a representative to serve as the first head of the organization.

The new rules for exporting Japanese-made fighters under GCAP are a first in allowing the export of lethal Japanese military hardware, hitherto impossible due to Article 9 in the Japanese Constitution – the ‘pacifist clause’ – and years of strict policies on exporting military hardware. It was only during Shinzo Abe’s second term as prime minister that he called for restrictions on exporting military hardware to be changed gradually in relation to a reinterpretation of Article 9. It is uncertain if Komeito will fully back restrictions on exporting military hardware from Japan or if they will gradually come to allow them under certain conditions. For now, there are no plans to export co-developed weapons aside from the future fighter, which will be in service by 2035.

This article was published at Geopolitical Monitor.com

By Prasanta Kumar Pradhan

For the first time since its inception, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) announced its ‘Vision for Regional Security’ at a ceremony held in its headquarters in Riyadh on 28 March 2024. While announcing the launch of the document, GCC Secretary General Jasem Mohamed Al Budaiwi stated that the “Vision for Regional Security is not just a political commitment, but an ethical dedication that unites us all.”1 He also stated that “our common security is the foundation upon which we build our hopes and dreams for a better future.”2 Similar sentiments have been previously expressed by the leaders of the GCC on multiple occasions. However, the national interests of the individual countries, the fluid nature of regional security and the complex geopolitics have hindered unity against the common security challenges. 

Principles, Objectives and Commitments 

The ‘Vision for Regional Security’ emphasises that it is based on the principles of shared destiny and indivisible security of the member states, and any threat to one is a threat to all the member States.3 This was also earlier mentioned in the Joint Defence Agreement of the GCC signed in 2000. 4 The vision document is based on the principles of respecting sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of the States. Based on these principles, the GCC aims to preserve regional security and stability, tackle the challenges facing them and settle the disputes through peaceful means. It also intends to build regional and international partnerships to deal with the regional threats.5

To achieve these objectives, the vision document emphasises joint efforts on the part of all the member states to avoid the use of force and prioritise dialogue and negotiation to resolve their differences. The Vision for Regional Security enlists a number of old and some new issues affecting regional security of the GCC. The document reiterates the traditional concern of the GCC countries on terrorism and extremism. It urges the member states to combat terrorism and extremism, stopping the flow of money to the hands of the terrorists and combat money laundering.6

The concern of the GCC countries over maritime security has also been reflected in the document. It calls for regional and international coordination to ensure maritime security and ensure trade and energy supply routes. As all the GCC countries are key suppliers of energy, any disruption in the sea lines of communication will directly affect their national economies.  

As the threat of a nuclear arms race in the region looms large with Iran and Israel having nuclear programmes, the GCC has urged to make the region a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ). It calls for a nuclear non-proliferation regime in West Asia, and at the same time, supports the right of the States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.7

With growing digitisation and the use of the internet, the number of cyber-attacks has also increased. They are also apprehensive that in case of any conflict, they would be highly vulnerable to cyber-attacks from their adversaries. Therefore, the vision document urges the member states to take effective steps to combat cyber security challenges.  

Apart from the traditional security issues, climate change, water and food security, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), energy security, defending economic resources and creating investment opportunities have also been prioritised and included in their conception of regional security.8 Historically, the GCC has consistently emphasised the imperative of collaboration among the member states in addressing these shared challenges. These non-traditional security issues have increasingly occupied the attention of the GCC rulers in recent years and have been articulated in the vision document. 

This is a clear reflection of the widening ambit of the GCC’s conception of regional security. The GCC has moved beyond the traditional interpretation of regional security and its analysis of regional security has become more comprehensive in nature and scope. Previously, the regional security issues were primarily articulated through official communiqués issued after the high-level summit meetings of the GCC. The unveiling of the vision document constitutes a formal and unambiguous articulation of their regional security vision and a reiteration of their commitment to work together in this regard.

Geopolitical Context

The document has come at a time when the West Asian region is engulfed in a turmoil since the beginning of the Israel–Hamas War in October 2023. The vision document makes explicit reference to the Israel–Palestine issue and calls for activating the Arab Peace Initiative.9 Among others, it calls for a two-State solution, the withdrawal of Israeli forces to the pre-June 1967 borders and the establishment of an independent Palestinian State with East Jerusalem as its capital. It seems like the devastating consequences of the ongoing Israel–Hamas War and its regional implications have had an impact on the formulation of the vision document. The GCC often expresses its concerns over other regional issues such as the crisis in Yemen, Syria, Libya, Lebanon etc., but the Israel–Palestine issue is the only regional issue which finds a mention in the vision document.  

The Israel–Hamas War has impacted the wider region as well, spilling over into the neighbouring Red Sea. The Houthis, whom the GCC member countries except Oman have fought against, have again become active. They have been targeting the ships in the Red Sea and as a result, a new tension has been created in the high seas. A coalition of more than 20 countries led by the US has started ‘Operation Prosperity Guardian’ to ensure the freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. The tensions in the Red Sea affects all the GCC countries, more specifically Saudi Arabia, as it shares a long border with the Red Sea. While Riyadh’s engagement with the Houthis was moving in a positive direction following the Saudi–Iran rapprochement, the Houthis involvement in the Israel–Hamas War has brought the Houthi trouble back for the Kingdom.

The Israel–Hamas War has once again brought the US–Iran tension in the region to the fore. Recent months have witnessed an increasing number of attacks on the US forces by different militia groups in GCC’s neighbourhood in Iraq, Syria and Jordan. The US has alleged that these groups are backed by Iran. The GCC countries are worried about any further military escalation between the US and Iran in their neighbourhood. 

The announcement of the document at this point is a conscious move on the part of the GCC to reaffirm its cohesion at the time of fast-evolving regional crises. It proposes a comprehensive framework of regional security which promotes negotiation and dialogue to overcome disagreements, violence and conflict. Furthermore, it reinforces the role of the organisation in mediating as well as resolving regional conflicts. While the vision document is an effort in the right direction, executing this framework in a volatile geopolitical and security environment will test the commitment of the individual member states and the unity of the GCC as a collective.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

About the author: Dr Prasanta Kumar Pradhan is Research Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi

Source: This article was published by Manohar Parrikar IDSA

• 1.“His Excellency the GCCSG Launches the Vision of the Gulf Cooperation Council for Regional Security”, Gulf Cooperation Council, 29 March 2024.
• 2.Ibid.
• 3.“Gulf Cooperation Council Vision for Regional Security”, Gulf Cooperation Council, 2024.
• 4.“The Joint Defence Agreement of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (CCASG)”, Ministry of Justice, State of Qatar, 13 March 2002.
• 5.“Gulf Cooperation Council Vision for Regional Security”, no. 3.
• 6.Ibid.
• 7.Ibid.
• 8.Ibid.
• 9.Arab Peace Initiative also known as Saudi Initiative is a proposal to end the Arab–Israeli conflict which has been endorsed by the Arab League.

The Republic of the Congo, or Congo Brazzaville, is a significant regional hydrocarbons producer in sub-Saharan Africa. Most of Congo Brazzaville’s hydrocarbons production is located offshore. Congo Brazzaville holds sizable proved natural gas reserves, but only a small portion of the reserves is commercialized because of a lack of natural gas infrastructure.

Congo Brazzaville exports most of its crude oil production, and revenues from crude oil exports play a large role in its economy, making its economy vulnerable to crude oil price volatility. In June 2018, Congo Brazzaville joined OPEC as a full member and is one of the six African nations in the organization.¹

Petroleum and Other Liquids

Congo Brazzaville held an estimated 1.8 billion barrels of proved crude oil reserves at the beginning of 2024, unchanged from the previous year. ²

Crude oil accounts for most of the total liquid fuels production in Congo Brazzaville; the country produces very small volumes of lease condensate and natural gas liquids. Congo Brazzaville produces and exports three main blends of crude oil: Djeno, N’Kossa, and Yombo. The Djeno blend is a medium, sweet crude oil blend and is the primary blend produced and exported from Congo Brazzaville. N’Kossa is a very light, sweet crude oil blend produced in small volumes and is a blend of N’Kossa and Kitina crude oils. The Yombo blend is a heavy, sweet crude oil blend with a high viscosity level. Yombo’s crude oil properties are well suited for blending, and it is exported in small volumes primarily to destinations in the Asia-Pacific region, such as the Singapore-Malaysia fuel oil blending and storage hubs.³

Crude oil grade	API gravity number (degrees)	Sulfur content (percentage)
Data source: Vortexa, TotalEnergies company website
Djeno	26.4	0.54%
N’Kossa	42.4	0.04%
Yombo	16.7	0.34%

Congo Brazzaville produced an average of about 273,000 barrels per day (b/d) of total liquid fuels from 2014 to 2023. Total liquid fuels production in Congo Brazzaville reversed its declining trend in the mid-2010s after a number of offshore fields in the N’Kossa Marine area were brought on line, enabling production to reach a decade-high of 347,000 b/d in 2018. Despite this recent growth, we expect the country’s total liquid fuels production to decline as a result of overall field maturation and a slowdown in upstream development. The Congolese government wants to attract new investment in upstream development by making changes to its legal and regulatory framework, but these efforts are likely to be insufficient in attracting investor interest and reviving the country’s liquid fuels production in the short term.⁴

Rising production from Congo Brazzaville’s offshore fields drove significant increases in total liquid fuels production in the latter half of the 2010s. The Moho Bilondo Phase 1b project in the northern part of the Moho Bilondo permit area began producing in 2015. The Moho Nord extension in the northern part of the same area started producing in 2017. TotalEnergies operates both developments. The Nene Marine offshore development in the Marine XII block and operated by Eni began producing in 2015. The Chevron-operated Lianzi offshore area is in a unitized offshore zone on the Congolese and Angolan boundaries. The Lianzi project is the country’s first cross-border development and the first in Central Africa.⁵

Congo Brazzaville has one operational refinery, the La Congolaise de Raffinage (CORAF) plant, in Pointe-Noire. The CORAF refinery has a nameplate capacity of 21,000 b/d, according to the Oil & Gas Journal. The Congolese government signed an agreement with Beijing Fortune Dingsheng Investment Company Limited to build a 110,000-b/d refinery in two phases at Pointe-Noire to meet increasing petroleum product demand in Congo Brazzaville and in the Central African subregion. The plant is reportedly still under construction and, according to Offshore Technology, is scheduled to begin operations in 2024.⁶

Natural Gas

Congo Brazzaville held an estimated 10 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of proved natural gas reserves at the beginning of 2024, unchanged from the previous year.⁷

Dry natural gas production averaged about 28 billion cubic feet (Bcf) between 2013 and 2022. Congo Brazzaville uses all the natural gas it produces for domestic consumption .⁸

Congo Brazzaville has not yet developed sufficient natural gas infrastructure for commercial export. So, a significant amount of Congo Brazzaville’s natural gas that is produced is flared (or burned off) as a by-product of oil production or is reinjected into oil fields to aid crude oil recovery. According to the World Bank Group, Congo Brazzaville flared about 64 Bcf in 2022, accounting for significant volumes of Congo Brazzaville’s production but far below the volumes flared by the top five flaring countries (Russia, Iraq, Iran, Algeria, and Venezuela) for that year.⁹

Coal

Congo Brazzaville does not hold any coal reserves and so neither produces nor consumes any coal. 

Electricity

Total electricity capacity in Congo Brazzaville showed a modest increase of about 0.3 gigawatts (GW) from 2013 to 2022, with most of the increase coming from fossil fuel-derived sources. Congo Brazzaville also had marginal growth in renewable sources such as solar. Electricity capacity derived from hydropower remained stable over the 10-year period.¹⁰

The World Bank estimated that only 50% of the Congolese population had access to electricity in 2021, which is an increase of 10% from 2010. Access to electricity varies significantly between urban and rural populations. Access to electricity for urban populations in 2021 was 67%, up from 57% in 2010, while access for rural populations was 12% in the same year, a 1% increase from 2010. Providing reliable access to electricity for rural populations is a significant challenge because of underdeveloped infrastructure in the electric power sector.¹¹

Much of the growth in electricity capacity has come from natural gas projects. Installed capacity increased because of the construction of the Centrale Électrique du Djėno (CED) and Centrale Électrique du Congo (CEC) power plants in 2007 and 2010, respectively, and the capacity expansions that followed in subsequent years. Eni, the leading natural gas producer in Congo Brazzaville, constructed the two natural gas-fired power plants to reduce natural gas flaring and commercialize more of the associated natural gas produced at its oil fields. Eni also upgraded the connecting power transmission and distribution network to provide electricity access to the densely populated Pointe-Noire area. Both plants are fueled by associated natural gas from the M’Boundi and Marine XII fields.¹²

Hydropower accounted for 25% Congo Brazzaville’s total installed electricity capacity in 2021. As of early 2024, the country had three hydropower plants. Congo Brazzaville has significant hydropower potential, estimated at 3.9 GW, but only 5% of this power has been developed. Several hydropower projects are reportedly under consideration for development. The status of projects is unknown, and the projects appear to still be in early stages of development or deliberation.¹³

Facility name	Status	Nameplate capacity (megawatts)
Data source: Andritz Group
Imboulou	Operating	120
Moukoukoulou	Operating	74
Djoue	Not operating	19
Chollet	Under development	600
Murala	Under development	150
Koeumbali	Under development	150
Loufoulakari	Under development	50

Energy Trade

Congo Brazzaville exports most of the crude oil it produces and keeps a small amount for its refinery for domestic consumption; the country does not import any crude oil. Congo Brazzaville exported an average of 252,000 b/d over the past decade .¹⁴

In 2023, Congo Brazzaville exported about 242,000 b/d of crude oil and condensate, and about 75% of total exports went to the Asia-Pacific region. China was by far the top-importing country by volume, taking about 158,000 b/d of Congo Brazzaville’s crude oil in 2023. India was the second-largest importer from the Asia-Pacific region by volume, taking about 13,000 b/d of imported crude oil from Congo Brazzaville. Europe and the Western Hemisphere (which is made up of North America, Central America, and South America as well as the Caribbean) as a region imported only 38,000 b/d and 22,000 b/d, respectively.¹⁵

Congo Brazzaville imports and exports several different petroleum products. According to estimates of seaborne trade flows of petroleum products by Vortexa, Congo Brazzaville exported an average of about 8,000 b/d of petroleum products from 2020 to 2023, primarily naphtha, liquefied petroleum gases (LPG), and fuel oil. Congo Brazzaville imported about 4,000 b/d of petroleum products over the same time, and more than 70% of these imports were gasoline and diesel/gasoil.¹⁶

Congo Brazzaville does not export or import any natural gas; all of its dry natural gas production is consumed domestically, flared, or reinjected back into wells to enhance oil recovery. 

A liquefied natural gas (LNG) project is under development as of March 2024, which would enable the country to begin exporting natural gas not used for domestic consumption as well as monetize natural gas that would normally be flared or reinjected. The project is made up of two separate floating LNG (FLNG) facilities to be located offshore in the Marine XII block, from which it will source its natural gas feedstock. The first facility, the Tango FLNG facility, is a fast-tracked project with a production capacity of 29 Bcf per year and is scheduled to begin operations by the end of 2024. The second, larger facility has a production capacity of about 115 Bcf per year and is currently under construction, but it is not scheduled to begin operations until 2025.¹⁷

Project name	Location	Status	Operator	Start date	Nameplate capacity  (billion cubic feet per year)
Data source: International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers 2023 Annual Report, Energy Intelligence, Fitch Solutions Country Risk & Industry Research  Note: FLNG=floating liquefied natural gas
Tango FLNG	Offshore Pointe-Noire	Under development	Eni	2024	29
Marine XII Block FLNG (Newbuild)	Offshore Pointe-Noire	Under development	Eni	2025	155
Total					144

Congo Brazzaville neither imports coal for domestic consumption nor exports coal.

Source: This article was published by EIA

Endnotes

1. Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. Congo Facts and Figures, accessed February 23, 2024.
2. “Worldwide Look at Reserves and Production,“ Oil & Gas Journal, Worldwide Report [Table], December 4, 2023.
3. “IMO 2020: Focus on Yombo Crude,“ Vortexa, August 8, 2019. “N’Kossa Blend data sheet,“ TotalEnergies company website, August 25, 2017. “Djeno Blend data sheet,“ TotalEnergies company website, January 30, 2018. “Crude oils have different quality characteristics,“ Today in Energy, U.S. Energy Information Administration, July 16, 2012.
4. U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Statistics database, accessed February 5, 2024. “Congo Licensing Round 2016,“ The Energy Year, January 9, 2017. Robert Perkins, ed. Richard Rubin, “Congo set for output slide without new discoveries and developments,“ Rystad Energy, September 10, 2020. 
5. “Chevron Confirms First Production From the Moho Bilondo Phase 1b Development Offshore the Republic of Congo,“ Chevron company press release, December 11, 2015. “Moho Nord: an Industrial and Human Challenge in the Republic of the Congo,“ TotalEnergies company website, accessed February 23, 2024. “Total starts up Moho Nord offshore Congo,“ Offshore-mag.com, March 15, 2017. “Chevron Announces First Production From The Lianzi Development Offshore the Republic of Congo and Angola,“ Chevron company press release, November 2, 2015. “Eni starts production at Nené Marine Field, offshore Congo,“ Eni company press release, January 5, 2015. “Congo Brazzaville Oil & Gas Report Q1 2024,“ Fitch Solutions Country Risk & Industry Research, October 2023. Rystad Energy, “Nene Marine, Congo,“ Upstream Asset Report, February 2024.
6. “2022 Worldwide Refining Survey: Global,“ Oil & Gas Journal, Worldwide Report [Table], January 2023. “Construction of a New Refinery in Pointe-Noire,“ press release, Republic of Congo Ministry of Finance, November 24, 2020. “Republic of Congo building $600-million refinery,“ The Energy Year, February 24, 2021. “Refinery profile: Pointe Noire II cracking refinery, Congo Republic,“ Offshore Technology, November 15, 2023. Elza Turner, ed. Daniel Lalor, “Refinery News Roundup: Upgrades in Africa,“ S&P Global Platts, July 13, 2022.
7. “Worldwide Look at Reserves and Production,“ Oil & Gas Journal, Worldwide Report [Table], December 4, 2023.
8. U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Statistics database, accessed February 5, 2024.
9. The World Bank Group, “Global Gas Flaring Data,“ Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership, accessed February 13, 2024. The World Bank Group, “Global Gas Flaring Tracker Report,“ Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership, March 2023. 
10. U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Statistics database, accessed February 5, 2024. “Dubai’s Renewables Capacity Pushes Past 1.5GW,“ Middle East Economic Survey, Vol. 65, Issue 03, January 21, 2022.
11. World Bank Group, World Bank Open Data Portal, accessed February 13, 2024. Atlas of Africa Energy Resources, United Nations Environment Programme, 2017, pg. 244.
12. “The Integrated energy access project in Congo,“ Eni company website, accessed February 13, 2024.
13. U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Statistics database, accessed February 5, 2024. Atlas of Africa Energy Resources, United Nations Environment Programme, 2017, pg. 242. Manuel Tricard, “Republic of Congo – Moving forward with hydropower,“ Andritz Group, accessed February 13, 2024. 
14. U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Statistics database, accessed February 5, 2024.
15. Vortexa trade flows database, accessed February 5, 2024
16. Vortexa trade flows database, accessed February 5, 2024.
17. International Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers (GIIGNL), 2023 GIIGNL Annual Report, July 20, 2023. Daniel Steimler, ed. Jaime Concha, “New LNG Supply Additions Ease Tightness Out to 2025,“ Energy Intelligence, February 20, 2024. “Congo Brazzaville Oil & Gas Report Q1 2024,“ Fitch Solutions Country Risk & Industry Research, October 2023.

Although he rarely talks about it, the most significant gift Donald Trump bequeathed to economic prosperity was deregulation. And the one sector that was deregulated more than any other was health care.

Since Joe Biden has been re-regulating the economy, it’s hard to think of a starker contrast between the two leading presidential candidates this year—and it affects all aspects of health care.

I am not alone in thinking that Trump might have won the 2020 election if he had campaigned on his health care accomplishments. Let’s see if this year’s election turns out to be different.

Covid Vaccines. Even before the world had heard the term “Covid,” deregulation of vaccine production was an early Trump administration success. Because of those early steps, when Covid did arrive, we were much better prepared. University of Chicago economists estimate that that Project WARP Speed produced Covid-19 vaccines at least six months before anybody expected it. That saved an estimated 183,000 lives.

Insurance Tailored to Individual and Family Needs. Imagine combining the average premium with the average deductible for health insurance purchased by a family of four in the Obamacare exchanges. In 2020, that totaled more than $25,000. In other words, a family not getting a subsidy had to spend more than $25,000 before getting any benefit from their health insurance plan! And they had to do that every year!

Not surprisingly, the unsubsidized part of the market was in a free fall. Democrats in Congress responded by creating “enhanced subsidies”—even for people who are wealthy. The government is now virtually giving health insurance away for free to average-income families.

If you are sick, things are far less rosy, however. The annual out-of-pocket maximum exposure for a family this year is $18,900. That’s the amount you may have to pay in the form of deductibles and coinsurance—over and above any premium payment. Families with ongoing, chronic conditions have to pay as much as that amount—every year!

As an alternative, President Trump used an executive order expanding people’s opportunity to buy “short-term” insurance. These plans look very much like the insurance that was popular before there was Obamacare. They often sell for as little as half the price of Obamacare insurance; they typically have lower deductibles and broader provider networks; and they offer much better protection for anyone who experiences a costly medical problem.

Congressional Democrats, with the apparent backing of the large insurance companies, have generally been quite hostile to these plans. President Obama limited them to 3 months duration. President Biden recently limited them to three months with a one-month renewal. Under Trump, they were available for one year, with renewals for two more years. A second type of insurance could bridge the gap between three-year periods—allowing a relationship with an insurer indefinitely.

Under the Trump approach, the short-term market could easily evolve into the closest thing we have ever had to free market health insurance, and that includes a free market solution to the problem of pre-existing conditions.

Note that Trump did not abolish Obamacare, or even restrict it (despite a lot of Republican rhetoric). The Trump approach was to expand people’s options. The Biden/Obama approach eliminates options.

Personal and Portable Health Insurance. Before there was Obamacare, some employers gave their employees pre-tax dollars to purchase individually owned insurance. This was insurance the employees could take with them from job to job and in and out of the labor market.

President Obama completely shut down this practice with a threat to fine any employer caught doing it as much as $100 per employee per day. This was countermanded by a Trump rule that has allowed (and even encouraged) employers to fund employee-owned health insurance since January 2020.

It is striking to observe how many significant health policy changes have been affected by presidential action alone—without any act of Congress. Yet congressional action is needed to take full advantage of the opportunities.

Under the Trump executive order, employees can only use their employer’s funds to buy “Obamacare compliant” insurance, which mainly means insurance sold in the exchanges. Moreover, the employees cannot get the subsidies other buyers get in the exchanges. Since the exchange plans are otherwise very unattractive, the take-up rate for this opportunity has been well below initial expectations. What is needed is congressional action to allow the employees to buy any kind of insurance—including the short-term plans described above.

Virtual Medicine. When Donald Trump took office,it was illegal in most cases (by act of Congress) for doctors to bill Medicare for consultations by means of phone, email, Skype, Zoom, Facebook, etc. One of the few positive aspects of Covid was the liberation of telemedicine.

Given the Covid crisis, telemedicine would probably have been liberated even if Hillary Clinton had been president. But it would likely have taken another year to accomplish that change. The reason: there are 10,000 tasks Medicare pays doctors to do. Because Medicare insists on setting the price for every one of them, in every institutional setting, and in every locality, figuring out what can and cannot be done by telemedicine and what the right price should be is an enormous challenge.

The reason telehealth emerged so quickly under a Trump presidency is that his administration believed in deregulating telehealth barriers and had been preparing for it long before Covid struck.

Chronic Illness. There is mounting evidence that patients suffering from diabetes, heart disease, and other chronic illnesses can (with training and the right support) manage a lot of their own care as well as—or better than—traditional doctor therapy can. If they are going to manage their own care, they can do an even better job if they are also managing the money that pays for that care.

HSAs are a natural vehicle. However, current law’s requirement of an across-the-board deductible makes HSAs incompatible with smart insurance design for chronic care. For example, an wise employer might want to make insulin available for free to diabetic employees in order to encourage its use. The same employer might ask noncompliant employees who show up in emergency rooms to pay for that care out of their own account.

Under guidance issued by the Trump administration, employers and insurers can now provide first-dollar coverage for the purchase of maintenance drugs for 13 chronic conditions without running afoul of HSA regulations.

More needs to be done. HSAs ought to be completely divorced from the high-deductible requirement. Let the market, rather than government, make decisions about the optimum role of cost-sharing.

Another important development in the first Trump administration was the move to encourage “focused factories” in Medicare. In contrast to the rest of the health-care system, Medicare Advantage “special needs” plans can specialize in 15 chronic conditions. These plans can exclude applicants who don’t have the condition. They can also ask health questions and request medical records.

The Obamacare exchanges would be enormously improved if they allowed the same sort of specialization and the same type of risk adjustment that we now find only in the Medicare Advantage program.

Round-the-Clock Primary Care. Concierge doctors used to be available only to the rich. Today “direct primary care” (DPC) is much more affordable. Atlas MD, in Wichita, Kan., for example, provides all primary care along with 24/7 phone and email access. They offer discounts on lab tests and generic drugs for less than what Medicaid pays. The cost: $50 a month for a middle-aged adult and $10 a month for a child.

An unfulfilled goal of the first Trump administration was to allow employers to put money into individual accounts from which the employees could make monthly payments to DPC doctors of their own choosing.

This should be a high priority in a second Trump term.

A Future Agenda. Space does not permit a discussion of other reforms, including liberating Association Health Plans, requiring hospital price transparency and expanding options under Medicare Advantage.

But I hope I have made clear that Donald Trump does not need a new health policy agenda. He merely needs to complete the agenda of the first Trump administration.

The vision behind the Trump agenda can be found in Reforming America’s Healthcare System Through Choice and Competition. This 124-page Health and Human Services document from 2018 argues that the most serious problems in health care arise because of government failure, not market failure.

It’s time to dust off that document and re-read it.

This article was also published in Forbes

The prospect of an Internal Revenue Service “weaponized” against political opponents, with collection agents packing guns, is raising concern in Congress. On the other hand, a more basic and longstanding problem has managed to escape notice.

The IRS gets workers’ tax money before the workers who earned it. This takes place through the practice of withholding money from workers’ paychecks, a development dating to World War II.

“Wars have always been the most important occasions for the introduction of new forms of taxation,” writes Robert Higgs (Crisis and Leviathan). “One way to capture more revenue is to reduce tax evasion by seizing the people’s earningsbefore the earners ever lay hands on them. This procedure has come to be known as tax withholding at the source, or simply withholding.”

The Current Tax Payment Act was signed into law on June 9, 1943, and the next year, employers withheld almost $8 billion for income taxes, followed by $10 billion in 1945. That was the last year of the war, but withholding carried on.

“We gave next to no consideration to any longer-run consequences,” explained Milton Friedman the famed economist who did a stint at the Treasury Department and author of Free to Choose. “It never occurred to me at the time that I was helping to develop machinery that would make possible a government that I would come to criticize severely as too large, too intrusive, too destructive of freedom. Yet, that was precisely what I was doing.”

The federal government likes getting workers’ money before the workers do, and nearly 80 years after the close of World War II, withholding remains in place. In effect, the system forces employers to act as tax collectors, which helps the government to enforce “diversity” goals and other intrusive measures.

WWII-style withholding also empowers expansion of the federal bureaucracy, with massive waste, fraud, and abuse on full display. This is destructive of freedom, accountability, and basic rights. What a worker earns through labor is “proper” to them. No other person or government entity holds a prior claim to workers’ earnings. The fix is not a complicated matter.

Instead of only their “take-home pay,” workers should get all the money they earn. They can pay their taxes in quarterly installments in the manner of freelancers and, as Higgs notes, all taxpayers before WWII.

It’s hard to find any legislator who advocates these simple policies, which would trim the power of the IRS now, as some contend, being “weaponized” against political opponents. As taxpayers and legislators should know, the IRS would not be the first federal agency to deploy special agents packing guns.

The federal Department of Education has only existed since 1980 and is best understood as a payoff to the National Education Association, the massive teacher union that endorsed Jimmy Carter for president. The Department boasts an enforcement division packing Remington Model 870 shotguns.

In 2011, a dozen armed enforcement officers raided the California home of Kenneth Wright, who had no criminal record, and threw him in a police car with his three children. As it turned out the U.S. Department of Education ordered the raid over the defaulted student loans of Wright’s estranged wife, who was not present.

This raid gives some idea of the abuses possible under a weaponized IRS with agents deploying firearms. The time is long past to trim the power of the IRS in particular and the federal government in general. Ending the dated practice of withholding is a good place to start.

This article was also published in The American Spectator

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