The South Caucasus News - SouthCaucasusNews.comSince the beginning of the year, the average price in hotels of all-star categories in Azerbaijan in the online hotel booking system booking.com was lower than in Georgia, Armenia and Istanbul (Turkey).
This is stated in the report of the State Agency for Tourism.
Thus, in January, the average price…
By George Leef
Among the many destructive ideas loose in American education is that black students should not be expected to master standard English because doing so is demeaning and demoralizing for them. Standard English is part of the power structure of “whiteness” that must be overthrown before we can have an equitable society. Professors at esteemed universities are making that argument and it appears to be catching on. Faculty who want to prove their “anti-racist” dedication are changing their teaching and grading to avoid penalizing black students who, after all, already face terrible obstacles in a society that supposedly looks down on them.
The most prominent advocate of this position is University of Michigan professor April Baker-Bell. In her view, “traditional approaches to language education do not account for the emotional harm or consequences these approaches have on Black students’ sense of self and identity.”
Before we go any further, do all black students suffer emotional harm if their English is corrected? There are many black scholars who write in perfect English. I don’t think either Thomas Sowell or Walter Williams ever decried their anguish at having to adopt standard English in their academic work. Professor Baker-Bell herself appears to have overcome the “emotional harm” of writing in standard English. It’s hard to believe that any of those academics would have been better off if teachers and professors had said to them, “Your writing is fine; it’s authentic. No need for you to adjust to the needless, old-fashioned rules of standard English.”
Another advocate of allowing black students to keep “their” language is Professor Asao Inoue of the University of Washington at Tacoma. In his book Antiracist Writing Assessment Ecologies: Teaching and Assessing for a Socially Just Future, Inoue contends that writing instructors should evaluate students based on their “effort” in writing and not on whether they succeed in producing perfect or even acceptable standard English work. In his view, black students must be handled with kid gloves lest they think that “white” America is looking down on their preferred manner of communicating. Once we get over that, we can have a just future.
Are those ideas good? Will it help make for a socially just country if we allow blacks to write as they’re used to? There is some disagreement over this, and not just from white professors.
One dissenter is Professor Erec Smith, who teaches at York College. He has written a book entitled A Critique of Anti-Racism in Rhetoric and Composition and in it, he makes a devastating attack on the notion that it’s wise to give black students a pass when they write poorly.
First, Smith (who is black) doubts that black students are so caught up in their identity that it would be harmful for them to change the way they communicate. He observes that many blacks have mastered standard English without any apparent suffering. A particularly telling case is W.E. B. DuBois, who is known for his opposition to the racist attitudes of 19thand 20th century America.
Smith relates that when DuBois was a student at Harvard, he once received a low grade on an English paper. That bothered him, but he had the good sense to realize that the grade had nothing to do with his race and that if he wanted to make his criticism of society as effective as possible, he needed to make his writing the best it could be. So he bore down in that course and signed up for other English courses that would sharpen his writing skills.
DuBois, in short, saw standard English as a tool he could use to help accomplish his objectives. Mastering it would empower him.
Conversely, the “anti-racist” writing notions abounding today disempower black students. Smith argues that the likes of Baker-Bell and Inoue allow blacks to retreat into self-pitying victimhood. Doing so solves no problems in America and actually gets in the way of constructive actions. Obsessing over “white privilege” doesn’t help black students succeed.
Another dissenter is Professor Jason D. Hill of DePaul University. In his article “The New Ebonics Movement and the Elimination of Whiteness,” Hill excoriates the “anti-racist” educators. He states that their ideas are “rooted in the de-colonialist and Anti-Western civilization agendas that seek to eradicate from school curricula any European universal foundations that underlie pedagogy, method and content.” That stance is politically expedient for them, but their hostility to teaching standard English will only damage the prospects for black students as they compete for jobs against others, including immigrants, who speak and write in better English.
The costs of this attack on language competency fall on black students, not on these “anti-racist” professors. Hill observes that they “are paid large sums to lecture white progressives on how they should alter their pedagogical styles to expurgate standard English requirements.” They desire to serve “as a managerial vanguard over Black victimization and suffering.”
Where would the “anti-racist” educators be if black students were able to improve their use of language so that they could obtain good jobs and no longer feel victimized by “white” society? They wouldn’t be nearly so famous and would have to do more of the onerous work of correcting student papers. Not a good trade.
And if composition instructors don’t correct black students on their poor English, what is the point of having classes? As Professor Smith observes, with the “anti-racist” approach, “Nothing exists to master; nothing is there to be taught.” Black students will like the high grades they receive for their efforts, but the time and money spent will have been for naught. W.E.B. DuBois would be disgusted.
I’d like to point out that getting language right isn’t the only aspect of life where learning to do things “the right way” matters. Consider music. If a black pianist wants to have a career in classical music (which is often attacked as oppressively “white,” but strangely enough, some black musicians still desire to succeed in it), he will have to master performance conventions developed in white Europe centuries ago. Is that a painful affront to his identity? If he thinks so, he’ll have to set his sights on a different career, but if he loves the music, he’ll eagerly learn how to play Bach and Beethoven the right way, not as he might instinctively prefer. Many have done so.
The notion that black students are somehow harmed by insisting that they master standard English is one of those many ideas so ridiculous that only a university professor could ever believe it.
By Termsak Chalermpalanupap
Former two-time prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra[1] has undoubtedly captured a great deal of media and public attention in Thailand lately. In a recent survey, the 75-year-old IT media tycoon turned politician was voted the most influential person in Thai politics, eclipsing Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin, who came a distant second.[2]
Thaksin’s youngest daughter, Paetongtarn (36), is now leader of Pheu Thai (PT), the main government party. Thaksin has been grooming her to be prime minister, and she is in line to be the fourth in the Shinawatra family to head a Thai government.[3]
But how soon Paetongtarn, a mother of two with little political experience, will rise to the premiership depends, according to political rumours, on how promptly Thaksin delivers on his “secret deals” with the powers-that-be in the restless conservative establishment.[4]
Ever since he returned from 17 years of exile overseas on 22 August 2023, Thaksin has been at the centre of political intrigues and rumours. What is unclear is whether he is actually the mastermind in the political arena, or just a struggling captive of his own schemes and controversial past.
On his first return, Thaksin looked normal, cheerful and healthy. He paid careful respect to the portrait of King Maha Vajiralongkorn – obviously set up by his family for media consumption. Then he moved swiftly to greet his supporters and several PT bigwigs, including Phumtham Wechayachai, a deputy PT leader and one of the key negotiators for the formation of a new government. Thaksin was then whisked to a Bangkok prison, presumably to start serving eight years of a jail term stemming from past three convictions for corruption and conflict of interest.
That same afternoon, PT’s premiership candidate, Srettha, won approval in parliament to be the 30th prime minister of Thailand.[5] Those who voted for the 61-year-old real estate tycoon included 152 senators who were allies of then Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-o-cha. Those senators who supported Deputy Prime Minister General Prawit Wongsuwan, a premiership candidate of Palang Pracharat Party (PPRP), mostly abstained.
The PT has switched sides to team up with the PPRP, Bhumjaithai, and United Thai Nation (three major parties from the previous Prayut Administration), after ditching the Move Forward Party (MFP), which came first in the May 2023 general election. Srettha getting the premiership is widely believed to be part of “secret deals” done between Thaksin and whoever represented the conservative establishment, most probably, in this case, General Prayut.[6] Thaksin and General Prayut used to be sworn enemies, but both have found common interest in stopping the MFP from gaining government power.
Against all poll surveys and pundit predictions, the MFP had scored a huge surprise victory in the general election. It beat the PT – the hottest frontrunner – and came first with 151 House seats and nearly 14.44 million votes (in the second ballot for party-list House seats). The PT finished second with only 141 House seats and about 10.795 million votes. The MFP alone won more House seats and popularity votes than the PPRP, Bhumjaithai, and United Thai Nation combined.[7]
The spectacular victory of the MFP happened despite Thaksin’s active participation behind the scenes from his exile base in Dubai to drum up support for the PT. He even dispatched Paetongtarn to attract young voters. In March 2022, Paetongtarn assumed a high-profile but informal role as the “Head of Pheu Thai Family”. But it was too little and too late. Her political debut could not stop the MFP from overtaking the PT in the election.
Thaksin’s return from exile is believed to be part of the “secret deals” widely discussed by news commentators and pundits. Their common assumption is that Thaksin, with the support of the PT, agreed to counteract the rise of the reformist MFP, protect the vested interests of the conservative establishment in general, and defend the monarchy in particular.
But what will Thaksin receive in return for his invaluable service?
For starters, Thaksin who had for more than a decade been talking about a homecoming,[8] would finally be allowed to return to Thailand safely, which he did on 22 August 2023. On the day of his return, PT’s premiership candidate, Srettha, won the top government post in parliament, with strong support of senators from General Prayut’s camp. This came in exchange for the PT’s break-up of their alliance with the MFP . The PT+MFP coalition had in July 2023 failed to win the premiership for MFP leader Pita Limjaroenrat – chiefly because of a lack of active support from senators.
Next, Thaksin would be given special consideration for his health issues while in fictitious “detention”. Before midnight on his first day in a Bangkok prison, Thaksin complained of severe chest pain and shortness of breath. He was rushed to the Police Hospital, arriving at 00:20 a.m. on 23 August, and sent to a premium suite on the 14th floor of the hospital. The whole process seemed well-planned and promptly executed.
According to the Corrections Department, Thaksin has had a long history of sickness, including long COVID and damage in his lungs, myocardial ischemia (reduced oxygen and blood flows in heart arteries), high blood pressure, and a weakened spine.[9] Thaksin had to be sent to the Police Hospital – instead of the prison hospital which would have been the case under normal circumstances – because he was suffering from some life-threatening heart conditions, and the prison hospital was not adequately equipped to handle such an emergency.[10]
Thaksin soon received the news that he had been waiting for. On 1 September, in response to Thaksin’s request for royal clemency, the Royal Gazette published the King’s decision to commute Thaksin’s jail term, reducing it from eight years to one.[11] However, in the published announcement, Thaksin was called a “male convict” (นักโทษเด็ดขาดชาย) who “admits guilt of his offence” (ยอมรับผิดในการกระทำ), and “repents for his wrongdoings” (มีความสำนึกในความผิด).[12]
Counter-signing the royal command was General Prayut, in his capacity as the caretaker prime minister. On 29 November, General Prayut was appointed a member of the Privy Council. The appointment, in effect, has removed the 70-year-old army strongman from national politics.
Thaksin might have hoped for a full pardon, so that he could return home as soon as his health permitted. Another setback is that his criminal record cannot be erased.[13] This means he is no longer eligible to hold public offices, certainly not a third premiership term.
Thaksin reportedly underwent several undisclosed treatments, including a surgery to repair torn ligaments in his right shoulder. He was seen in public only once, on 23 October, when he was wheeled out of his room to undergo CT and MRI scans.[14]
On 18 February, Thaksin was released under parole, having served the first 180 days of his one-year jail term under “detention” in the hospital. On his ride home, he was seen wearing a neck brace, and a protective elbow sling on his right arm.
However, unlike others released under parole, the Corrections Department said Thaksin did not need to wear any ankle electronic monitor device due to his old age and health conditions.
On 19 February, he was seen in a wheelchair at the Office of the Attorney-General, where he acknowledged a criminal case against him. He has been charged with violating Section 112, the so-called lese-majeste law, because of a media interview in Seoul in May 2015. He was accused of insulting the previous monarch, King Bhumibol, by implying that the king, who passed away in October 2016, had supported the Army’s coup against Thaksin a decade ago.
Thaksin was also charged with violating the Computer Law of 2017 for causing the creation and circulation of fake news harmful to national security. This particular violation carries a maximum jail term of five years; the violation of the lese-majeste law carries a jail term ranging from three to 15 years. Thaksin pledged not guilty to both charges. He was released on bail of 500,000 baht.
This is not the first time Thaksin has faced the charge of violating the lese-majeste law. Previously. all such similar charges against him had either been dropped by public prosecutors due to lack of evidence, or he was ruled not guilty in court.
The Chief Attorney-General has scheduled 10 April for announcement of his decision on how to proceed in this case against Thaksin. In late 2015, a different Chief Attorney-General put on record his opinion that the case was prosecutable, pending the arrest of Thaksin. Should the Chief Attorney-General decide to prosecute Thaksin, it will still take quite some time, perhaps years, before a final verdict can be reached. Meanwhile, Thaksin will be handicapped by uncertainties, not knowing how and when the lese-majeste case against him will end.
On 20 February, Thaksin received his first VVIP guest at home – former Cambodian prime minister Hun Sen. After a private lunch, Hun Sen returned to Phnom Penh without calling on Prime Minister Srettha.[15] Three days later, it was Srettha’s turn to visit Thaksin. Thaksin has been permitted to travel to his hometown of Chiang Mai, from 14-16 March, for an early Sheng Meng, to pay respect to his deceased parents and ancestors (Hakka Chinese in Moichu, Canton).
For a short while, the Constitutional Court’s ruling on 24 January to acquit Pita for holding iTV shares[16] raised new hope in the MFP. With his return as an MP, Pita could help the MFP score more political points as the chief opposition party in the House of Representatives. The MFP, after all, can be a potent counterbalance to the PT.
The short-lived optimism was soon brutally dashed by another Constitutional Court’s ruling just one week later. The Constitutional Court, in a unanimous decision by all its nine judges, ruled that the MFP had abused freedom and liberty in order to overthrow the democratic system of government of the constitutional monarchy; this is prohibited under Section 49 of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court ordered the MFP to stop all activities relating to the call to abolish Section 112 of the Criminal Code (the lese-majeste law).[17]
The Constitutional Court cited as unconstitutional two major incidents: the MFP’s use of Section 112 as a campaign issue in the general election of May 2023; and the MFP’s proposed bill submitted on 25 March 2021 by Pita and 43 MPs of the MFP to amend Section 112.[18]
However, the Constitutional Court’s ruling did state that any change to the lese-majeste law can only be done through proper legislative means.[19] This has raised a sticky legal question whether the Constitution Court could find fault with the 44 MPs of the MFP who submitted the controversial bill in 2021, since they were exercising their legitimate legislators’ rights.
After the ruling, the MFP removed from its website all references to its policy on Section 112. Yet, the MFP still questions whether the Constitutional Court has the authority to prevent MPs from doing their job in the House. On 6 March, the MFP proposed to the House Speaker the formation of an ad hoc House committee to study this issue.[20]
The MFP now faces a grim prospect of imminent dissolution as a follow-up punishment for the serious wrongdoings. The offences cited in the ruling of the Constitutional Court constituted a violation of Section 92 (Paragraph 1) of the 2017 Political Party Act. On 11 March, the Election Commissioners reached a unanimous decision to request the Constitutional Court to dissolve the MFP.[21]
The Constitutional Court, when it is its turn to act, may ask the MFP to testify to defend itself. In the case of Future Forward Party, the MFP’s predecessor, the Constitutional Court took less than two months to announce its final decision on 21 February 2020 to that party, and to ban its executive committee members, including founder and party leader, Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit, from national politics for ten years.
Facing a similar ban are Pita and other members of the MFP’s executive committee from 2020 to September 2023. Pita and four others are party-list MPs.[22] They can resign before the dissolution of their party and thus enable the MFP to keep those five House seats by filling them with others on the party’s list. After dissolution of a party, its MPs (who are not on the affected executive committee) will have 60 days to join another party and keep their House membership.[23]
Also facing a ban are those 44 MPs who sponsored the bill to propose amendments to the lese-majeste law in 2021. Apart from Pita, the others in this group included several well-known MFP rising stars, notably: Ms Sirikanya Tansakul, Viroj Lakhana-adisorn, Rangsiman Rome, Natthawudh Buapathum, Ms Benja Saengchan, and Pakornvudh Udompipatsakul.[24]
In addition, Pita was saddled with a new criminal conviction on 5 February for organising an unlawful “flash mob” within 150 metres of a royal residence (namely Princess Sirindhorn’s) near the MBK Mall. He is appealing the conviction, which includes 4 months of suspended jail term.[25] A criminal conviction, once finalised in the Supreme Court, disqualifies the convicted from holding public offices – just like in the case of Thaksin.
Once Pita and his colleagues are knocked out from active national politics, who shall then emerge to form the third generation of reformists to continue working for structural changes in Thailand? Some party insiders hold hope of seeing some among the MFP’s current economic advisors to step forward.[26] Ms Sirikanya, leader of the group, should be able to do so, at least temporarily.[27]
Obviously, most in the embattled MFP would not give in to despair. They believe the MFP, standing on the shoulder of its dissolved predecessor Future Forward Party, has woken up Thailand with its convincing call for reforms. A significant number of Thai voters have embraced the MFP’s reformist ideas and can-do mentality. More than 14 million of them voted for MFP candidates in the last election, even without knowing many of them personally. Their common goal now is to win more than 250 House seats in the next general election and form a single party government in order to change Thailand for the better.
However, in the next electoral battle, it will be much more difficult for any single party to score a majority victory. Traditional conservative parties are trying to rebrand themselves as “neo-conservative”, “modern conservative” or “liberal democratic”. They still enjoy implicit support from their allies in the bureaucracy, the military, and even the judiciary.
At the same time, the skilful PT will be able to make good use of its government power to gain popular support. It can also count on Thaksin’s political ingenuity and connections. Once again, the PT + Thaksin and the conservative establishment will still share one common interest in the unfinished crucial mission to stop the reformist movement.
Rumours are spreading, once again, that a “new secret deal” is being developed. Thaksin certainly hopes to be absolved of all remaining criminal charges in the pending lese-majeste case. More importantly, he also wants Yingluck to be able to return from exile without having to face any charges.
The former first Thai female premier mysteriously fled the country through the Thai-Cambodian border in August 2017. Her bail money of 30 million baht has been confiscated. One month after her disappearance, she was convicted for dereliction of duty (for failing to stop the massive corruption in the paddy pledging scheme of her government). And she was sentenced to five years in jail.
Spending time in a hospital, a la Thaksin, after returning from exile and awaiting a royal clemency will be more difficult to arrange for Yingluck. The 56-year-old single mother of one teenage son looks healthy and in high spirits in her seventh year of exile. One practical alternative for Yingluck is “home detention” in lieu of actual imprisonment.[28] All in all, Thaksin will be asking for quite a lot of favours for himself and Yingluck. But what can he give in return?
Several past rumours have turned out to be true: It had turned out that Thaksin has not needed to spend time in prison; Srettha – who has no leadership role in the PT – did become the 30th prime minister of Thailand; Paetongtarn did walk in unopposed to lead the PT; and Move Forward Party is facing dissolution, etc.
More exciting developments are unfolding in Thailand. And soon it will be clearer whether Thaksin is indeed the mastermind, or just a victim of his own complicated fate.
For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.
By Denys Reva and Tshegofatso Johanna Ramachela
Maritime drone deployment in offensive operations in the Black and Red seas provides a glimpse of the future of naval warfare. On 18 February, the United States (US) Central Command reported the first instance of Houthi rebels using uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) in the Red Sea. The attack was unsuccessful – the vessels were intercepted and destroyed.
A USV, or maritime drone, is a remote-controlled pilotless boat that can operate at sea. Variations are already being used for surveillance, monitoring ports and offshore oil and gas facilities, detecting marine pollution, and oceanographic surveys.
While uncrewed watercraft aren’t new, their recent deployment shows that technology has advanced to enhance naval operations. The proliferation of uncrewed technology is outpacing African countries’ legislative and defensive measures. Given existing maritime security challenges and inadequate border protection, are African countries prepared for uncrewed technologies to hit their shores?
The area receiving the most public attention, and where the deployment of uncrewed systems will likely be most rapid, is in direct attacks on ships and maritime infrastructure – e.g. those used by non-state actors, like the Houthi rebels. These incidents occur as global naval forces show increasing interest in their potential to yield strategic impact.
Four factors spur this interest. First is their affordability compared to traditional naval assets, with lower procurement, maintenance, and operational expenses. They come in different shapes and sizes, ranging from repurposed speedboats to more specialised vessels. Manufacturing costs vary based on specifications. Maritime drones currently used by Ukraine cost around US$250 000 per unit, while a recently launched corvette constructed for Ukraine amount to US$128 million.
Second, manufacturing a maritime drone is relatively simple. A functioning uncrewed vessel can be built from dual-use components readily available on the market. Several uncrewed surface vessels currently deployed in the Black Sea are considered ‘off the shelf’, with the engine and several other components adapted from commercial jet skis.
Third, uncrewed vessels pose a problem for conventional naval forces due to their design and the materials used for their manufacture. They are challenging to detect and identify when in or under water. Their smallness, speed, and high manoeuvrability also make them hard to destroy. Fourth, some drone variants have an operational range of over 800 km, allowing flexibility in how the vessel is used.
The successful deployment of uncrewed vessels, especially as part of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war, can be seen as a proof of concept for major arms-manufacturing countries. The United Kingdom, France, Turkey, and China are developing sophisticated naval drone technology, while other countries, including South Africa, are fast-tracking this technology’s development.
The US, in particular, aspires to acquire large USVs for offensive sea missions and medium-sized ones for surveillance and intelligence-gathering, reconnaissance, supply, and electronic warfare.
But features that make uncrewed vessels attractive and innovative for conventional navies also make them appealing to non-state actors.
The unsuccessful 18 February attack came days after the US Coast Guard operating in the Red Sea intercepted a vessel bound for Yemen with various weapons and USV components on board. The shipment allegedly originated from Iran, which has long invested in developing unconventional naval capabilities, including USV variants.
The Houthis themselves have a track record of using maritime drones in their military operations. The most successful deployment to date occurred in 2016, damaging a Saudi frigate and killing two sailors using USVs.
USV proliferation seems largely for now to be thanks to states delivering existing capabilities to non-state actors. The danger increases when these capabilities are passed on to other non-state groups.
This is particularly important for African states lacking the resources to monitor their maritime areas effectively –intercepting smuggling and trafficking and responding to rapidly unfolding maritime security incidents. While the Houthis don’t necessarily align themselves with active armed groups in Africa, there’s a well-documented arms smuggling route operating between Yemen and Somalia. Introducing uncrewed vessels as a source of potential maritime insecurity could compound Africa’s existing insecurity.
Evidence suggests that drug traffickers have also explored using uncrewed systems in their operations targeting the continent. In July 2022, Spanish police seized three uncrewed underwater drones intended for a French gang to support their drug trafficking operation from Morocco. This first incident is indicative of a potential trend of similar vessels being deployed for trafficking purposes.
The likelihood of criminals using USVs in Africa hinges primarily on a perceived trade-off between risks and rewards. Carina Bruwer, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Security Studies’ ENACT project, says, ‘Many illegal commodities, like drugs, are still moved in rather unsophisticated ways, such as on dhows and container vessels. This shows that these methods are still perceived as easy to get away with.’
For now, the relatively high cost of uncrewed systems for trafficking, compared to conventional methods, will likely serve as a barrier for criminal networks. This balance may change as cheaper equipment becomes accessible to non-state military groups. African countries should anticipate an increase in criminal actors’ use of remote-controlled vessels.
Addressing the emerging problem of USVs may involve leveraging uncrewed solutions. On 3 January, the US Navy commissioned a new task force to incorporate uncrewed systems and artificial intelligence into the US Fifth Fleet’s maritime operations. The fleet is responsible for a wide area of operations, including the Western Indian Ocean and Red Sea, and the initiative aims to improve maritime security and safety in the region.
The deployment of such systems as part of a hybrid fleet operating near the African continent could provide valuable lessons for African navies. Adopting similar platforms could strengthen their ability to tackle maritime crimes, improving detection and identification of vessels, including small crafts, in the region.
As non-state armed groups and criminal networks test the effectiveness and utility of uncrewed technology, so should African states. They must understand the potential threat posed by uncrewed vessels and existing legal loopholes to mitigate the consequences of the inevitable spread of this technology.
Key steps should include improving maritime law enforcement entities’ capacity to detect and respond to unauthorised use of the USVs and adopting appropriate legislation to prosecute future cases.
About the authors:
Source: This article was published by ISS Today
By Martin Sherman
Largely ignored in western commentary, a dispute between two western-aligned governments in Africa threatens to erupt into open conflict. The dispute focuses on distribution of the waters of the continent’s mightiest river system among its second and third most populous nations—Ethiopia and Egypt, respectively.
The roots of tension are twofold, one legal; the other engineering—the former entailing an almost one-hundred-year-old legal document; the other a massive hydroelectric enterprise in the deep gorges of the Ethiopian Highlands.
The history of the conflict traces back to an agreement from the colonial era when the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian agreement was concluded between Egypt and Great Britain regarding the utilization of the waters of the Nile River, with Britain representing its upstream colonies in the Nile River Basin—Sudan, Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika (today, Tanzania)—who had little say in determining its terms (Britain’s agricultural interests in Egypt and importance of the Suez canal for its empire were among the reasons cited for imposing the agreement so strongly skewed in its favor). For decades, the waters of the Nile have been administered and allocated according to this 1929 treaty, which granted Egypt veto power over construction projects on the Nile River or any of its tributaries.
With the end of colonial rule—prior to Cairo’s construction of the Aswan High Dam in 1960, which would flood extensive areas of Northern Sudan—this accord was followed by a later 1959 Agreement, concluded bilaterally between Egypt and post-colonial Sudan.
This latter agreement effectively reinforced the provisions of the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, making little allowance for the water needs of the other down-stream riparian states, including Ethiopia, which was not a signatory to either agreement and whose highlands supply more than 80 percent of the water that flows into the Nile River.
Inevitably, as populations—and water needs—increased, the hydrological realities began to change, challenging Egyptian hegemony over the river system and its utilization. However, the long-simmering conflict over the waters of the Nile between the upstream and downstream riparians only intensified in 2011 with Ethiopia’s decision to begin construction of a massive dam on the Blue Nile. Named the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), it is Africa’s largest dam and the continent’s largest hydroelectric power plant—and among the largest in the world.
The potential power generation from the dam offers Ethiopia a chance to dramatically increase the supply of electricity in a country suffering from a dire power shortage. Indeed, according to 2021 World Bank statistics, barely half the overall population (54.2 percent) and considerably less of the rural population (42.8 percent) has access to electrical power. Despite the fact that in recent years, the Ethiopian economy has been one of the world’s fastest growing—with access to electric power growing well over 400 percent in the first two decades of this century, it is still a country wracked by severe poverty, with which the GERD project offers a major opportunity to contend.
On the other hand, the Egyptians, afflicted by a grave lack of water, view with great trepidation the completion of a project that may potentially impede the flow of the river to their country, which is overwhelmingly dependent on the Nile for its water supply. Indeed, 85 percent of Egypt’s water comesfrom the Blue Nile, which originates in Ethiopia, and less than 7 percent from other indigenous resources, which include ground water, recycled effluent, desalinated water and sparse rainfall mainly along the coast.
The gravity of the Egyptian hydro-strategic predicament is reflected in the following sobering figures. During the last six decades, Egypt’s population quadrupled (from 27 million to around 115 million leading annual per capita water supply to plunge to 600-700-a quarter of what it had been from 660 cm. to 2,500 cm.). Moreover, Egypt is already below the United Nations’ water poverty threshold, and by 2025 the organization warns that it will be approaching a very low level, which water experts deem as constituting conditions of “absolute scarcity.”
The long-simmering conflict over the waters of the Nile between the upstream and downstream riparians intensified in 2011. With fluctuating ups and downs, it involved direct negotiations between the Egyptian and Ethiopian governments, mediation attempts with the participation of the African Union and South Africa, and a lengthy exchange of threats and counterthreats. Tensions flared again in February 2022 when Addis Ababa initiated the operation of the first of the dam’s thirteen turbines, unilaterally initiating the production of electricity, without consultation or coordination with any of the other Nile nations. Tensions heightened again recently when Ethiopia reportedly completed the filling of the dam.
Cairo has been frequently bellicose regarding the construction of GERD, which began to materialize toward the end of the four-decade-long incumbency of Hosni Mubarak in February 2011. Immediately after his overthrow, in late March the plans were made public, and several days later, the foundation stone was laid by the then prime minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi.
The Egyptians vigorously opposed the subsequent construction operations, engaging in at times belligerent diplomacy in an effort to dissuade the Ethiopians from their ambitious undertaking. In fact, Egyptian rejection of Ethiopia damming the Blue Nile system within its sovereign borders pre-dates the GERD initiative.
Going back over four decades, Cairo has proclaimed that water could become a casus belli as reflected by former President Anwar Sadat, who sternly pronounced: “The only matter that could take Egypt to war again is water.”
Similarly, a decade later, then-Egyptian Foreign Minister Boutros Boutros-Ghali—later the U.N. Secretary-General—warned that the next war in the Middle East would be fought not over politics, but over the waters of the Nile.
Thus, Stratfor cited a June 1, 2010, dispatch, according to which a high level Egyptian security/intel source, in regular direct contact with [President Hosni] Mubarak and [then-intelligence head Omar] Suleiman” said:
If it comes to a crisis [with Ethiopia], we will send a jet to bomb the dam and come back in one day, simple as that. Or we can send our special forces to block/sabotage the [planned]dam.
Even though Mohamed Morsi, the leader of the short-lived Islamist regime (2012-13) was generally less menacing toward Addis Abba, he too—under pressure from his military—warned Ethiopia that “all options are open,” a reference to a possible airstrike, guerrilla sabotage, or destabilization of the Ethiopian government. These remarks were made at a meeting called by Morsi to address the discontent of the military over Egypt’s lack of resolve in dealing with the GERD initiative and were inadvertently broadcast publicly. This caused considerable diplomatic embarrassment for Egypt, which scurried hurriedly to walk back their impact.
After Morsi’s overthrow shortly afterwards, current Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, reiteratedthat “no one can take a drop from Egypt’s water, and if it happens there will be inconceivable instability in the region.”
Yet, despite considerable bluster from Cairo, Addis Ababa has remained seemingly unperturbed.
Thus, as The Economist commented on the impasse:
[Y]ears of talks failed to produce a deal on how Ethiopia would fill and operate the dam. The African Union tried to mediate, as did America. … Egypt wants Ethiopia to promise to release certain amounts of water to top up the Nile. But Ethiopia is loth to ‘owe’ water to downstream countries or to drain the reservoir so much that electric output suffers.
Subsequent diplomatic efforts proved fruitless in resolving what is essentially an archetypical “zero-sum game”. After all, with a fixed (indeed decreasing) supply of water and increasing populations (and hence, demand for water) of the Nile nations, gains for upstream riparians (such as Ethiopia) must almost inevitably come at the expense of downstream ones (such as Egypt).
According to one expert, even today:
Egypt’s share of the Nile still falls [well] short of its annual water needs. … Consistent increase in demand for water and proportionate decrease in its supply makes the future of Egypt even grimmer.
Consequently, the pursuit of some consensual arrangement, adequately satisfactory to both sides, has proved consistently futile.
Almost at exactly the same time as the construction of the GERD began, significant events—albeit causally unrelated—began to emerge about 2000 kilometers (1,250 miles) to the north, in the Sinai Peninsula that abuts Israel’s long southern border, and which precipitated increasingly grave security hazards for both Cairo and Jerusalem.
This was the beginning of a long and brutal Islamist insurgency directed against Egyptian security forces, but which did not spare luckless civilians from gruesome attacks. The insurgency began during the uprising in Egypt that led to the overthrow of Mubarak in 2011 and initially involved Bedouin tribesmen, some of whom harbored long-standing grievances against the central government in Cairo, but later attracted radical jihadist elements from countries such as Syria, Iraq, and Libya. In 2014, one group, Ansar Bait al-Maqdis switched its allegiance from Al-Qaida to ISIS and renamed itself Sinai Province, making itself part of that pitiless Islamist organization.
The Egyptian military engaged with the insurgents, launching two operations under the Morsi regime in 2012 and 2013 to quash the violence, but in 2013 following an abduction of Egyptian officers, violence surged again.
Interestingly, it was during the insurgency that el-Sisi, now Egypt’s president, was appointed to the post of defense minister by then-President Morsi, who dismissed el-Sisi’s predecessor, Muhammad Tantawi. Ironically, it was el-Sisi who later deposed Morsi to succeed him as president.
After Morsi was ousted, violence increased. The Egyptian forces responded forcefully, including against civilians, with measures that involved, inter alia, demolition of houses and evacuation of residents to create anti-smuggling buffer zones. These harsh actions fanned the flames of resentment with the local population due to, among other things, government dereliction and lack of suitable schools and health services. Numerous civilians were also abducted and butchered by the jihadi insurgents.
The military action raged on for more than a decade involving incidents of appalling violence. One of the goriest attacks, in November 2017, involved the slaughter of more than 300 Sufi worshipers, including about 30 children, in an El Arish Mosque in Northern Sinai.
At times, terror attacks erupted beyond the Sinai. For example, there were several lethal cross-border attacks against Israel that inflicted numerous fatalities on soldiers and civilians. Moreover, in 2015, a Russian airliner was brought down, reportedly by Sinai-based terror groups, resulting in more than 220 deaths.
After years of strenuous and sustained military effort, in January 2023 President el-Sisi declared victory, proclaiming that “we have defeated terrorism“, after a conflict of a decade and more, involving around fifteen Islamist organizations that reportedly left almost 3,500 Egyptian security personnel dead and nearly 12,500 wounded, with up to 5,000 insurgents killed.
At this juncture, several points of strategic importance for Israel should be underscored. For Egypt to subdue the insurgency required employing considerable military resources over a protracted time period, beyond the level that Egypt was permitted to deploy in Sinai by the 1977 Camp David Agreements. Indeed, although the effective demilitarization of the Sinai was the corner-stone of the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, given the challenges posed by the jihadi insurgency, Israel reluctantly agreed in some cases to the deployments of personnel and equipment over and above the stipulations of the agreement. In other cases, Israel expressed chagrin at Cairo’s unilateral breaches of the restrictions, even filing formal official complaints in this regard.
Currently, it appears that the jihadi insurgents have been largely subdued, although some “post-victory” violence—involving fatalities among security forces in El Arish—has occurred.
So, the situation that prevails today in Sinai is one in which the authorities have managed to restore “the lid” on a simmering pot of latent violence, seething in a disgruntled civilian population with a considerable military presence still required to maintain a semblance of law and order.
Indeed, in light of what some see as Cairo’s rather lethargic efforts to advance development and human rights in the peninsula, there is little guarantee that a future resurgence of the previous levels of violence will not re-assert itself in the future.
Accordingly, given the effort in terms of personnel and materiel called for to impose law and order in Sinai and prevent a renewed threat of its takeover by jihadi warlords, one can only ponder how Cairo would react if faced with another situation, which could gravely threaten vital national interests elsewhere and require siphoning off resources currently deployed in Sinai.
The troubling question that now arises is this: What would be the impact on Cairo’s ability to impose law and order in Sinai if it perceives Ethiopia’s dam construction as creating an untenable situation regarding its ability to provide vital amounts of water to its population, and thus finds itself compelled to mobilize for coercive action to contend with the situation?
The threat to Egypt’s water in this regard is thrown into sharper relief by the significant role agriculture plays in Ethiopia’s economy, “accounting for 40 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP), 80 percent of exports, and an estimated 75 percent of the country’s workforce.”
Indeed, one would need a giant leap of faith in Ethiopian altruism to entertain the possibility that Addis Ababa will refrain indefinitely from using the waters of the GERD for expanded irrigation, rather than merely for hydroelectric power generation as is currently foreseen.
If the impasse with Ethiopia persists, and the grave water situation in Egypt continues to deteriorate, Cairo may well be forced to prioritize the wellbeing of the millions in the Nile delta over its endeavor to maintain its control over the remote Sinai Peninsula, and draw off resources currently allocated to the continued pacification of the Sinai warlords.
This will inevitably result in giving greater rein to the anti-regime—and anti-Israel—radicals, who, in the past, have launched attacks against Israel and been heavily involved in smuggling arms into Hamas-controlled Gaza. These are likely to be exacerbated significantly if GERD-induced reductions in Egypt’s military capabilities take place.
On paper, the Egyptian armed forces are far superior to those of Ethiopia. Indeed, in many—if not most—measures of military might, the Egyptians outstrip the Ethiopians by a factor of tenfold and more.
Thus, Cairo’s military budget is reportedly almost $10 billion ($9,400,000,00), while that of Addis Ababa is well under one billion dollars ($888,099,450). In terms of total aircraft, Egypt exceeds Ethiopia by over one thousand to under one hundred. In terms of fighters, the ratio is almost 250 to less than twenty-five. Likewise, Cairo outstrips Addis Ababa in helicopters by almost 250 to barely thirty-one, and 100 to six when it comes to attack helicopters. With regard to land forces, much the same holds true. While the Egyptian army has almost 5500 tanks, the Ethiopian military fields less than 700. As for artillery, Egypt has around 3000 pieces (about half of them self-propelled); Ethiopia has barely 700, with just over sixty self-propelled.
Of course, as a landlocked nation, Ethiopia has no navy or other marine-borne forces of any significance, while the Egyptian navy boasts twenty large surface warships (thirteen frigates and seven corvettes) as well as eight submarines. This, together with two helicopter-carriers, provides Egypt with a clear advantage over Ethiopia in its ability to project military power.
While in theory, the Egyptian armed forces are far superior to those of Ethiopia, in actual conflict, matters may be a little more complex than dry figures on fire power and projection capability. Significantly, in the only recorded military conflict between the two countries (in 1874-76), the Egyptians were in fact severely defeated.
Add to this that Egypt would face several significant obstacles in attempting to either destroy or cripple the GERD, or intimidate the Ethiopians by military means regarding its operation
After all, Egypt will have to project military force—whether air force or special forces—over considerable distance. However, skeptics should note that in the past Egypt has proven itself both willing and capable of deploying military forces considerable distances from the homeland, albeit with less than overwhelming success in actual combat.
In the early 1960s, Cairo dispatched up to 70,000 troops to then-North Yemen—almost exactly the same distance away as the GERD—for ideo-political rather than existential reasons (i.e. support for republican forces against royalists.) By contrast, the issues involved in the dispute with Ethiopia are viewed as far more important for the survival of the country. Interestingly enough, despite heavy losses in the 1962-67 Yemen engagements, by 2015, then-bitter memories seemed to have faded, with a military contingent in a now-united Yemen being deployed against the Shia Houthi rebels.
Significantly, there are reports that Cairo is engaged in an active search for military bases in various countries bordering Ethiopia, such as Eritrea, South Sudan, Somaliland, and Djibouti, largely due to GERD-related concerns.
Accordingly, it would be foolhardy to discount the possibility of a military operation against Ethiopia to defend what it considers a vital national interest.
Arguably, one route for such an operation would be via Sudan, which has a more ambivalent attitude toward GERD, as it is likely to reap several benefits from the project—including enhanced flood control and increased electricity supplies. Moreover, it would be most likely to suffer severely from the consequences of an attack on the reservoir. Indeed, if Egypt is successful in causing large-scale damage to the dam wall, there is a real risk of severe flooding of extensive downstream areas, particularly in southern Sudan and involving grave diplomatic repercussions for Cairo.
As the diplomatic process staggers on into its second decade, lurching from failure to impasse, Cairo faces a real possibility of escalating tensions with Addis Ababa that may, or may not, ignite into actual violence. In this regard, it should be recalled that around 95 percent of the population of the entire country is clustered around the Nile and its delta, while only about 1 percent reside in the Sinai Peninsula and the country’s other deserts. Accordingly, the specter of the reduction of the Nile’s flow, particularly in time of drought, will compel Cairo to gear for such a “worst-case” eventuality—draining off resources from other areas of potential conflict.
Although Ethiopia is one of the world’s poorest countries, it also has one of the fastest growing economies in the world. One of the major ways Addis Ababa views enhancing national welfare and elevating income is via the utilization of the potential for generation of hydroelectric power provided by the rivers that flow down from its lofty mountain ranges. To this end, Ethiopia has embarked on an extensive enterprise of constructing dams not only on the Blue Nile but on other rivers in the country. While its downstream neighbors stand to enjoy some benefits from these projects, including additional power, they may well be subjected to considerable adverse effects as well.
Kenya is a case in point. Indeed, there is concern that some 300,000 Kenyans who depend on Lake Turkana, the world’s biggest desert lake that is fed almost exclusively by the Omo River that originates in Ethiopia, will face running short of both drinking water and fish should Ethiopia move ahead with plans to construct two additional dams upstream (here & here) on the Omo river.
Indeed, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) recently placed the lake on its list of endangered “World Heritage Sites” because of the “disruptive effect” of an existing Ethiopian dam and irrigated sugar estates in Ethiopia across Kenya’s northern border. One UNESCO environmental expert warned that the current situation, and Addis Ababa’s future plans, augur ill for the local communities who rely on the imperiled lake for their livelihood.
According to Ethiopian authorities, the allegations are unfounded. They claim that their studies indicate that the dam will stabilize the river’s flow and control water levels in the flood-prone region.
Despite Ethiopian reassurances, concerns from critics remain, with fears that the upstream dams will cause salination, and even toxification, of water sources, reducing fishing grounds and creating tensions and conflict over access to shrinking supplies of potable water.
So, while certain benefits are planned to accrue to Kenya—particularly in terms of increased electrical power—many have qualms that the detriments of the upstream disruptions will outweigh the downstream gains.
Ethiopia, for its part, shows little signs of flexibility.
In recent years, Washington has not always been an entirely neutral observer in the face of Ethiopian intransigence and unilateralism. In 2020, in an apparent flash of chagrin over the rebuff of its mediation efforts regarding the GERD project, the Trump administration decided to cut up to $100 million in aid to Ethiopia. The measure was reportedly triggered by Addis Ababa’s decision to begin filling the GERD without agreement with Cairo and Khartoum. In a Financial Times interview, Ethiopia’s then-ambassador urged the US to reconsider the decision, invoking “the 117 years of diplomatic relations” with Washington, and expressing the hope that these “will not be damaged by an issue not related to the two countries.
The Trump cuts in aid to Ethiopia were intended to be applied until Ethiopia relented and conceded to some agreed US/World Bank-led accommodation with its downstream riparians.
However, it seems that the US’s punitive measures were short lived. With the changing of the guard in the White House, the Biden administration reversed its predecessors’ policy, apparently unconvinced that withholding funding had produced anything of substance beyond angering the Ethiopians.
Somewhat later, in 2023, US aid was paused for reasons unrelated to GERD, due to theft and mismanagement of the aid, only to be resumed once again several months later.
US policy toward Ethiopia has thus been buffeted in opposing directions in recent years, now hither, now thither. Addis Ababa’s pugnacious attitude and its less-than-unblemished human rights record have tempered them, while the need to avoid pushing them to the Chinese, always willing to partake in Africa’s infrastructure development (including those associated with—$1.2 billion in transmission lines from the site, and partial financing for purchase of the turbines) has helped sustain them. Washington’s diplomatic balancing act has been made tougher by its explicit commitment to Egypt’s water security, something Cairo sees as gravely imperiled by the operation of GERD.
A thorough analysis of the US perspectives of the full spectrum of potential GERD GERD-related flashpoints cannot ignore the possible nexus between the ability of Cairo to maintain law and order in the remote Sinai Peninsula and the necessary resources to ensure adequate quantities of water to the major population centers along the Nile. After all, should diplomacy fail, and a situation arise in which the recalcitrant Ethiopians compel the Egyptians to siphon off forces from Sinai because of mounting friction over the Blue Nile’s northward flow, the resurgence of jihadi violence that could result would undoubtedly run counter to US interests, especially if Israel finds itself having to violate Egyptian sovereignty to protect its long southern border.
Even without the potential menace that it sees GERD imposing on its water system, Egypt is in a highly tenuous hydro-strategic situation anyway. Rising temperatures, scanty rainfall, intrusive sea levels and land subsidence, coastal flooding, eroding shorelines, increasing soil salinity, recurring drought, and together with diminishing flow in the Nile, all combine to exacerbate Egypt’s vulnerability regarding its water supply. These factors, together with its robust population growth, raise stark questions as to Cairo’s ability to continue to ensure adequate water supplies to its people in the future.
Indeed, Egypt today is using more than its renewable supplies annually, a deficit that is predicted to increase with time. Significantly, some of the threat to Egypt’s water arises well beyond its own borders. As other populations—and demand for water—in upstream riparians on the Nile climb, there is increasing pressure on them to set aside decades-old restrictions, rooted in colonial times and imposed on them by a once hegemonic Egypt, and to begin to utilize the river’s water for their own people. Aptly, the headline of a 2021 article in the Atlantic Council reflected this grim reality, pronouncing “Egypt has a water problem—and no, it’s not only the GERD“.
Clearly then, in the longer run, naturally occurring water sources will not suffice to sustain Egypt, and reshuffling the same cards will not produce any satisfactory outcome.
For example, the Egyptian government has been trying for decades to limit water intensive crops. However as Hamza and Mason have pointed out, although “agricultural policy has aimed at limiting rice and sugar cane in order to save water losses, … so far this policy has not been very successful.” They note that: “Considerations of social stability outweigh considerations of water efficiency (understood quantitatively) especially to safeguard groundwater quality and prevent the seawater intrusion.”
Although some time has passed since this assessment, it still appears substantially valid. Indeed, a decade and a half later, Nader Noureddine, a professor of agriculture and irrigation at Cairo University cautionedthat such restrictions “will affect the salinity of the soil in some farmland, which will be devastating to the agriculture sector.” Ominously, he warned, “Increased salinity will mean that the farmland will be destroyed forever and in an irreversible way.”
Underscoring the myriad obstacles in the way of governmental efforts to restrict the cultivation of water intensive crops, a former head of the Egyptian Farmers Union asserted: “The law is an ultimatum for farmers—they either go to jail or face hunger.”
Indeed, whatever the value of these claims are, in light of the ongoing water crisis, the planned restructurings of Egyptian agriculture clearly has not been able to surmount the plethora of cultural, social, and political obstacles facing it. So, while clearly some reforms are essential, it seems unlikely that this could be considered a timely stand-alone solution to the problem
Accordingly, if Washington is to realistically approach its previously mentioned “commitment to Egypt’s water security“, no matter the outcome over GERD, the unavoidable conclusion is that the solution that must be pursued is the artificial production of water—with the most likely alternatives being purification of sewage/wastewater and/or large scale desalination.
Activity of this sort is currently being undertaken. but it is merely a small fraction of what is needed. However, this may just indicate that the daunting challenges of GERD could be transformed into an opportunity, paving the way for a-US led mega-infrastructure initiative, hopefully taking the lead over the Chinese.
By Daniel Lacalle
Thirty major central banks are expected to cut rates in the second half of 2024, a year when more than seventy nations will have elections, which often means massive increases in government spending. Additionally, the latest inflation figures show stubbornly persistent consumer price annualized growth.
In the United States, headline PCE inflation in February will likely grow by 0.4%, compared with a 0.3% rise in January, and consensus expects a 2.5% annualized rate, up from 2.4% in January. This is on top of the already 20% accumulated inflation of the past four years. Core inflation will likely show a 0.3% gain, according to Bloomberg Economics, which means an annualized 2.8%, building on top of the price increases of the past years.
Thirty central banks easing and seventy national governments increasing spending in an election year means more fuel for the inflation fire in a year in which money supply growth has bounced significantly from its 2023 lows.
Central banks ignored monetary aggregates when they shrugged off the risk of inflation in 2020, and now they are, again, easing way too fast when the battle against inflation has not finished. Furthermore, the only real tool that central banks have used is hiking rates, because different parallel measures of money growth, including reverse repo liquidity injections, have kept money supply growth at an elevated rate even when the balance of the G7 central banks was moderating, albeit at a slower pace than announced.
Cutting rates may come too late because, by the time it is implemented, it will cause a double negative. Government deficits will be cheaper to refinance, bloating an already record-high public debt yet again, but those cuts may have little impact on small and medium enterprises and families because they suffer significantly more from the accumulated effects of inflation, which means weaker margins, more difficulties to make ends meet, and impoverishment.
We must also remember that these persistent levels of official inflation come after relevant tweaks in the calculation of the consumer price index. We certainly know one thing: consumers do not pay attention to the annualized rate of growth in prices, but to the accumulated level of destruction of their purchasing power, and everyone, from Europeans to Americans, knows that they have become artificially poorer by the insane fiscal and monetary policies implemented in 2020.
Nobody who takes inflation seriously would even consider easing in an election year, adding trillions of dollars of deficit spending to the fire of inflation. Furthermore, the history of inflation warns us about giving up easily and too fast.
The Fed is making a big mistake by cheering the headline economic figures that come from disguising a private sector recession with a massive increase in public debt and weakening employment figures embellished by temporary jobs and public sector hiring. Additionally, it is making a mistake by giving dovish signals that make market participants take more risk. There has been no relevant reduction in the money supply if we include the different layers of liquidity injections. Announcing forthcoming rate cuts will certainly make speculative debt rise but will hardly change the credit demand from the backbone of the economy, small businesses, and families. Since the US government has rejected any calls for normalization and instead added more deficits and debt as if rising bond yields were not a problem, citizens and businesses have already suffered greatly from ongoing inflation and rate increases. As such, the rate cuts will help an already bloated government spending and the zombie corporations that keep access to capital markets. Everyone else will be hurt both ways, with inflation and lower access to credit.
You may think all the above problems are policy mistakes, but they are not. This is a slow process of nationalizing resources. Inflation and artificial money creation through deficits and monetization are a gradual transfer of wealth from real salaries and deposit savings to the government. You are basically becoming poorer to sustain an ever-increasing government size. The next time you read that massive deficits and monetary easing are good policies for the middle class, ask yourself why you find it harder each year to pay for goods and services. The mistakes made in 2020–2024 will cost the middle class many more taxes, even if the government promises it will only be “taxes on the rich,” the oldest gimmick to raise your taxes. More taxes, persistent inflation, the hidden tax, and the loss of value of your wages. That is “easing” for you. A private sector recession with headline economic figures bloated by government debt. The recipe for stagflation.
“Зимой прорывы теплосетей, весной – дамб и плотин, летом ждем засуху и лесные пожары, осенью, похоже, снова наводнения”Катастрофы в Оренбургской области не случилось бы, если бы власти тратили деньги на ремонт и строительство, а не на войну, пишут в блогах https://t.co/M77oNr2nVF
— Радио Свобода (@SvobodaRadio) April 8, 2024
#EU Council Committee members to visit #SouthCaucasus regionhttps://t.co/FzWvGY8fDm
— Lurer (@Lurer11) April 8, 2024