Day: April 6, 2024

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It is likely that the BND will seek to bolster recruitment in the next 12 months despite budget constraints and restrictive policies. https://t.co/wU3fL5M0yQ

— Emin Bred (@emin_bred) April 6, 2024

This rhetoric is familiar to me. Ilham Aliyev’s rhetoric https://t.co/pytEFtEapt

— Emin Bred (@emin_bred) April 6, 2024

Russia has made thousands of attempts to interfere with European rail networks and sabotage critical infrastructure, targeting companies in Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Estonia. https://t.co/97pFcUhAIp

— Gabriella Dolce-Bengtsson (@gabidolceb) April 6, 2024

The salience of the phone call from the US President Joe Biden to  Chinese President Xi Jinping on Tuesday is their consensus that during the period since their summit meeting in Woodside, California, in November 2023, the US-China relationship “is beginning to stabilise”. 

Both sides agreed that their discussion was “candid and constructive.” The Chinese analysts estimate that there is a common will in Beijing and Washington “to prevent negative factors from influencing the general stability of bilateral ties.” 

Xi proposed three “overarching principles” to navigate 2024 — “peace must be valued”; “stability must be prioritised”; and, commitments should be followed up with action. 

In general, the phone call can be viewed in positive terms. Both Xi and Biden expressed the wish for stabilising bilateral relations, managing differences, expanding cooperation, and concurred that a stable and predictable China-US relationship is in their  interests. 

Washington announced after the phone call that Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen will be travelling to China on an extended visit through April 3-9. The US Treasury Department stated that she “will build on the intensive diplomacy she has engaged in to responsibly manage the bilateral economic relationship and advance American interests.” 

Earlier, during a press call at the White House, a senior administration official stressed that the Biden Administration has not changed its approach to China, “which remains one focused on the framework of invest, align, and compete. Intense competition requires intense diplomacy to manage tensions, address misperceptions, and prevent unintended conflict. And this call is one way to do that.”     

That said, she also listed areas of cooperation in important areas “where our interests align” — counternarcotics, AI, military-to-military communication channels and climate issues. She anticipated that “depending what happens in the coming year, there would be — we would hope there would be a chance for another in-person (summit) meeting, but don’t have anything even to speculate on when that might be. But certainly, value in that in-person meeting and the calls in the interim.” 

Yellen’s six-day visit will be followed by a trip to Beijing by Secretary of State Antony Blinken “in the coming weeks.” A call between the defence ministers is also expected “soon.” Indeed, a steady build-up is under way.

Biden initiated the call. Conceivably, Washington, faced with multiple problems at home and abroad, needs China more than the other way around. Bogged down in the conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine, it can ill afford a confrontation in the Taiwan Straits. Again, the US needs China’s cooperation in important areas such as fentanyl control, climate change, Artificial Intelligence, green-energy transition, etc. — and, most important, financial stability. 

Financial stability is a core issue. Yellen’s itinerary is anchored on her extended meetings with Vice Premier He Lifeng spread over two days. He Lifeng was appointed last November as head of office of the Central Financial Commission and has become the helmsman of the core financial and economic staff of the Chinese communist party. 

Yellen is due to meet Finance Minister Lan Fo’an,  Premier Li Qiang, Beijing Mayor Yin Yong, People’s Bank of China Governor Pan Gongsheng, and leading Chinese economists. Clearly, Yellen’s focus will be on financial stability, a crucial template of the US-China relationship.  

The US monetary policy is at an inflection point. Financial risks have risen and there is rising uncertainty in the global market. The anxiety shared by investors is evident in the surge in gold’s appeal as a safe haven asset. 

The global financial system is buffeted by multiple factors, such as unsustainable levels of debt, geopolitical confrontation, and a new era of low growth, low global investment and de-globalisation. But a major factor affecting the resilience of the global financial system is the current speculation regarding a US interest rate cut, which would have a ripple effect on the world economy. 

Historically, US monetary easing has been the harbinger of global financial crises. As the world’s first and second economies, the US and China will be in the cockpit to navigate any global financial crisis, of which the run on gold as safe haven asset by investors is an early  warning signal. 

The rise of gold prices reflects as much a panic toward the risks surrounding the global financial system as a lack of confidence in US dollar-denominated assets. The point is, the US’ irresponsible monetary policy has greatly affected the international demand for dollars and dollar-denominated assets. 

The enormity of the crisis in the US economy cannot be shoved under the carpet much longer. The US national debt today, estimated at $34 trillion, is almost equal to the combined value of the economies of China, Germany, Japan, India and the UK.

Enter China. China’s steady monetary policy has created policy space and tools in reserve for Beijing to cope with any new challenges lying ahead in the global financial system, while its foreign exchange market has become more resilient.                   

Thus, while a rate cut by the Fed raises fears of continued capital outflows from the US (as lower interest rates mean a lower return rate on investment in US dollar-denominated assets), there is every likelihood that it would make China the preferred destination for international capital inflows. 

Belying Western media hype that China is losing attractiveness to foreign investors, top US firms began flocking to China last month, pledging commitment to the Chinese market, announcing new investment deals and setting up new shop or factory floors. 

China can become a safe haven for international capital. Its economy is on an upward trend and given the tools at its disposal to ensure financial stability, China’s foreign exchange market is expected to maintain a relatively stable performance at a time of  increasing uncertainty in the global financial market. 

Why is this a big deal? The heart of the matter is that as the global price of gold soars, a rate cut cycle begins and financial risks deepen, China gets more options in the management of its assets portfolios and this could affect Beijing’s holding of US Treasury bonds. 

Beijing’s huge stimulus program helped the West to recover from the 2008 financial crisis. As the rest of the world teeters on the brink of recession, the last thing Western policymakers want is to ruffle China, the biggest driver of global economic growth. Their expectation is that China would help offset an expected slowdown in other parts of the world. 

But geopolitical issues come into play. The Taiwan question and Beijing’s friendly ties with Moscow top the list of contentious issues. Biden raised with Xi concerns over China’s “support for Russia’s defence industrial base and its impact on European and transatlantic security.” 

The Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin promptly pushed back that “Other countries should not smear and attack normal relations between China and Russia, should not undermine the legitimate rights of China and Chinese companies, and should not shift blame to China wantonly and provoke camp confrontation.” 

Beijing wouldn’t have forgotten that the Obama administration showed its “gratitude” within a couple of years after the 2008 financial crisis by unveiling the “pivot to Asia” strategy to clip China’s wings and contain its rise — a mindset that still defines  Biden administration’s flight path. 

Xi was upfront warning Biden that “China is not going to sit on its hands” faced with external encouragement and support for Taiwan’s independence. Nor, he said, is China “going to sit back and watch” if the US remains “adamant on containing China’s hi-tech development and depriving China of its legitimate right to development.” 

Biden’s response was that “It is in the interest of the world for China to succeed.”  

This article was published at Indian Punchline   

By Sergio Lopez

In today’s discourse on Bolivia, notions of liberalism, free markets, or traditional capitalist ideals don’t ever come to mind in contrast with mainstream discussions of 21st-century socialism, Keynesian policies, and a notable lack of economic freedoms. In fact, Bolivia was ranked 117 in 2021 by the Fraser institute in the Economic Freedom of the World: 2023 Annual Report. And it scored 43.4 in the Economic Freedom Index by the Heritage foundation, making it the 175th least free country (in economic freedoms) out of 184 countries ranked in 2023, these rankings underscore the entrenched nature of statist policies and their detrimental impact on Bolivia’s economic prospects.

Professor Antonio Saravia, a prominent Bolivian economist and researcher, encapsulates the prevailing sentiment regarding Bolivia’s economic landscape with his observation in an article about the current economic crisis in the country that: “Bolivia has a self-destructive psyche, a statist psyche that seems impossible to banish and that plunges us into an eternal cycle in which one crisis follows another.” This sobering assessment illuminates the enduring grip of statist policies and their adverse effects on Bolivia’s economic future.

Amidst this backdrop of economic constraints, the Alasitas Fair emerges as a beacon of liberalism and capitalism, offering a rare glimpse into a world were individual aspirations and economic freedom reign supreme. Held annually in La Paz, Bolivia, from the 24th of January for two weeks (though often extending beyond to the end of February), the Alasitas Fair, also known as the Feast of Abundance or the Miniature Market Celebration, is a testament to the resilience and ingenuity of a Bolivian culture that longs for economic liberty.

Originating in 1783 as a celebration of La Paz’s survival and liberation from a prolonged indigenous siege that ended al commerce and prosperity of the city for a period, the Alasitas Fair embodies a fusion of indigenous customs, Catholic traditions, and republican ideals. At its core, the fair pays homage to both “Nuestra Señora de La Paz” and the “Ekeko”, the Aymara god of abundance, blending spiritual beliefs with commercial activities in a harmonious display of cultural syncretism.

The centerpiece of the Alasitas Fair is the miniature replicas of goods and commodities, meticulously crafted and displayed to represent the desires, dreams, and aspirations of Bolivians. These miniatures are more than mere trinkets; they are manifestations of the individual’s longing for wealth, work, jobs, and the realization of their dreams. Each miniature symbolizes the innate human desire for prosperity and fulfillment, reflecting the capitalist and libertarian ideals of self-determination and individual autonomy.

Furthermore, the Ekeko, represented as a figurine of a merchant, serves as a powerful symbol of abundance and prosperity. As participants flock to the fair to purchase these miniature representations of their desires, many purchase miniature representations of the Ekeko and if the treat the miniature of the Andean god with respect he in exchange will offer them good fortune for a prosperous future. And the Ekeko is not represented by a beggar or a tax collector, much less by a government employee, it is represented by a merchant, giving testament to the intrinsic desire for commercial freedom in the Bolivian society.

Despite the oppressive regulatory environment of Bolivia, the Alasitas Fair thrives as a bastion of economic freedom and resilience. In the informal market created by the fair, participants engage in voluntary exchange free from government coercion, embodying the ideals of free enterprise and entrepreneurship. Here, individuals are able to pursue their dreams and aspirations without the stifling hand of authorities, demonstrating the inherent strength and ingenuity of the human spirit.

As controls and regulations increase the entrepreneurial spirit of people will find a way around it. In an article Jeffrey A. Tucker thoroughly explains this as the Informal Revolution. There he writes:

“Governments have always intervened in the economy, but today’s State—armed with modern data collection as well as an interventionist ideology—has taken us to a new level of regulation and taxation.

Faced with this, people find less costly ways to work, produce, and exchange, even if it means doing so unofficially. This is one reason the State can never achieve total economic control—witness the underground economies in the socialist world.”

As of 2022 Bolivia had an 83.7% of the employed population in the informal sector. The Alasitas fair is one of the notable examples that the State is never all powerful, people will always find a way to endure, will always find a way to prosper and will never stop looking for the future that they desire.

• About the author: Sergio Lopez is a Bolivian-American libertarian and a recent graduate in economics from the University of Arkansas. He is currently serving as a Mises Apprentice and as a Research Assistant in the field of Bolivian Economic History. Sergio has recently been accepted to pursue a Ph.D. in Economics at George Mason University and plans to specialize in Austrian Economics, Monetary Policy, and Economic History, furthering his commitment to understanding and advocating for the principles of economic freedom.
• Source: This article was published by the Mises Institute

By Gu Bin Joyce

China, under President Xi Jinping, has demonstrated a critical shift in its rhetoric on climate change. Unlike his predecessors, who emphasised climate equity and China’s identity as a developing country, Xi’s rhetoric constructs China as a global climate change leader. Despite China’s self-positioning, its ambivalence about carbon reduction actions hinders the effectiveness of this international identity construction. But ambitious rhetoric serves as domestic propaganda.

For a long time, China approached climate change from the perspective of climate equity to justify its limited obligations, defining itself as the largest developing country. Leaders stressed that it was unfair for China to undertake similar obligations to developed countries, as they were the innocent victims of significant historical carbon emissions from said developed countries.

Even after becoming the largest greenhouse gas emitter and the second largest economy in the first decade of the 2000s, China’s leaders still employed climate equity as a rationale to stick to its unnegotiable voluntary commitment. During the Copenhagen Conference, China adamantly refused to be bound by any extra international obligations. Before Xi, China firmly rejected the role of an international climate leader and advocated for developed countries to bear the leadership, as well as the costs, of a cooperative solution.

When Xi assumed power in 2012, China showed notable interest and willingness to engage in global governance, particularly regarding climate change. Since his first visit abroad as president, Xi has consistently emphasised that ‘China would proactively undertake more international responsibilities’. This commitment was quickly followed by the Belt and Road Initiative, as well as the Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative and Global Civilization Initiative.

Framing climate change as a global threat, Xi called for international cooperation and promised to ‘make new contributions’, showing China’s willingness to participate in global climate responses. At the Paris Conference, he emphasised that China has always been ‘an active participant’ in climate governance and has ‘the sincerity and determination’ to increase its contributions. To enhance the image of a responsible power, in September 2015 he announced a 20 billion yuan (US$2.8 billion) South–South climate change cooperation fund.

The United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement in 2017 gave China an opportunity to cast itself as a leader and responsible player in climate governance. Xi highlighted that China would steadily support the Paris Agreement, promised that China aimed to ‘peak carbon emissions by 2030’ and ‘achieve carbon neutrality before 2060’, and declared an end to the construction of new coal power projects overseas. While these ambitious pledges have contributed to constructing a positive image for China, they have concurrently elevated international expectations and observations. 

But Beijing’s ambitious rhetoric has not fully translated into international recognition. China is still ambivalent about phasing out fossil fuels, and this ambivalence showcases its greater concerns around energy security. After experiencing severe energy shortages in recent years, in 2022 Xi said China’s efforts to peak and zero out carbon emissions must be prudent, and ‘China won’t stop burning fossil fuels until it’s confident that clean energy can reliably replace them’.

While there has been a decrease in the share of coal, a primary energy source relied upon for decades, from 63.8 per cent in 2015 to 56.2 per cent in 2022, both domestic coal production and coal imports have continued to rise. Additionally, China experienced a record high in crude oil imports in 2023, the first year of recovery from the pandemic. Considering its ambivalence towards fossil fuels, doubts emerge regarding China’s ability to fulfil its climate commitments.

China’s evolving rhetoric not only aims to communicate its aspirations to the world but also targets the domestic audience. It plays a crucial role in internal identity building by conveying the message that the government is actively involved in responsible climate action, while also enhancing the legitimacy of the Communist Party. In his report to the National Party Congress in 2017, Xi suggested that if Mao Zedong made China independent and Deng Xiaoping made it prosperous, he would make it strong again.

Xi’s definition of ‘strong’ is not confined to a single aspect, but encompasses a comprehensive China Dream, including a strong China in global governance. Xi aimed to distinguish Chinese leadership from the traditional Western paradigms. In the 20th Party’s Congress, he concluded that ‘China has made great achievements in the past ten years in ecological civilisation’ and will steadily contribute as a responsible major power.

Catering to the revived nationalism, the domestic audience widely believes that China is one of the leading forces in climate governance. For instance, civil societies in China are shifting their focus from domestic climate change policy advocacy to highlighting China’s climate action contributions on the international stage. Some NGOs, like Global Environmental Institute, also engage in international cooperation, actively promoting China’s experience to other developing countries.

While China, has adopted proactive rhetoric positioning itself as a global climate governance leader, the effectiveness of this international identity construction is hampered by discrepancies between rhetoric and action. Still, growing domestic recognition suggests that the changing narratives serve a more pivotal function — as domestic propaganda. It remains to be seen how the international community and the domestic audience will perceive and respond to China’s evolving narrative.

• About the author: Gu Bin Joyce is studying International Relations at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.
• Source: This article was published by East Asia Forum

Although the Magna Carta typically is depicted as the birth of England’s fight to create democracy, the 13th-century struggle was to establish what would become the House of Lords, not the House of Commons.

The papacy’s role as organizer of the Crusades empowered it to ask for—indeed, to demand—tithes from churches and royal tax assessments from realms ruled by the warlord dynasties it had installed and protected. England’s nobility and clergy pressed for parliamentary reform to block King John and his son Edward III from submitting to Rome’s demands to take on debts to finance its crusading and fights against Germany’s kings. Popes responded by excommunicating reformers and nullifying the Magna Cartaagain and again during the 13th century.

The Burdensome Reign of King John

John I (1199-1216) was dubbed “Lackland” because, as Henry II’s fourth and youngest son, he was not expected to inherit any land. On becoming his father’s favorite, he was assigned land in Ireland and France, which led to ongoing warfare after his brother Richard I died in 1199. This conflict was financed by loans that John paid by raising taxes on England’s barons, churches, and monasteries. John fought the French for land in 1202, but lost Normandy in 1204. He prepared for renewed war in France by imposing a tallage in 1207; as S.K. Mitchell details in his book on the subject, this was the first such tax for a purpose other than a crusade.

By the 13th century, royal taxes to pay debts were becoming regular, while the papacy made regular demands on European churches for tithes to pay for the Crusades. These levies created rising opposition throughout Christendom, from churches as well as the baronage and the population at large. In 1210, when John imposed an even steeper tallage, many landholders were forced into debt.

John opened a political war on two fronts by insisting on his power of investiture to appoint bishops. When the Archbishop of Canterbury died in 1205, the king sought to appoint his successor. Innocent III consecrated Stephen Langdon as his own candidate, but John barred Stephen from landing in England and started confiscating papal estates. In 1211 the pope sent his envoy, Pandulf Verraccio, to threaten John with excommunication. John backed down and allowed Stephen to take his position, but then collected an estimated 14 percent of church income for his royal budget over the next two years—£100,000, including Peter’s Pence.

Innocent sent Pandulf back to England in May 1213 to insist that John reimburse Rome for the revenue that he had withheld. John capitulated at a ceremony at the Templar church at Dover and reaffirmed the royal tradition of fealty to the pope. As William Lunt details in Financial Relations of the Papacy with England to 1327, John received England and Ireland back in his fiefdom by promising to render one thousand marks annually to Rome over and above the payment of Peter’s Pence, and permitted the pope to deal directly with the principal local collectors without royal intervention.

John soon stopped payments, but Innocent didn’t protest, satisfied with having reinforced the principle of papal rights over his vassal king. In 1220, however, the new pope “Honorius III instructed Pandulf to send the proceeds of the [tallage of a] twentieth, the census [penny poll tax] and Peter’s Pence to Paris for deposit with the Templars and Hospitallers.”1 Royal control of church revenue was lost for good. The contributions that earlier Norman kings had sent to Rome were treated as having set a precedent that the papacy refused to relinquish. The clergy itself balked at complying with papal demands, and churches paid no more in 1273 than they had in 1192.

The barons were less able to engage in such resistance. Historian David Carpenter calculates that their indebtedness to John for unpaid taxes, tallages, and fines rose by 380 percent from 1199 to 1208. And John became notorious for imposing fines on barons who opposed him. That caused rising opposition from landholders—the fight that Richard had sought to avoid. The Exchequer’s records enabled John to find the individuals who owed money and to use royal fiscal claims as a political lever, by either calling in the debts or agreeing to “postpone or pardon them as a form of favor” for barons who did not oppose him.

John’s most unpopular imposition was the scutage fee for knights to buy exemption from military service. Even when there was no actual war, John levied scutage charges eleven times during his 17-year reign, forcing many knights into debt. Rising hostility to John’s campaign in 1214 to reconquer his former holdings in Normandy triggered the First Barons’ War (1215-1217) demanding the Magna Carta in 1215.

Opposition was strongest in the north of England, where barons owed heavy tax debts. As described in J.C. Holt’s classic study The Northeners, they led a march on London, assembling on the banks of the Thames at Runnymede on June 15, 1215. Although the Archbishop of Canterbury, Stephen Langdon, helped negotiate a truce based on a “charter of liberties,” a plan for reform between John and the barons that became the Magna Carta, the “rebellion of the king’s debtors” led to a decade-long fight, with the Magna Carta being given its final version under the teenaged Henry III in 1225.

Proto-Democratic Elements of the Magna Carta

There were proto-democratic elements in the Charter, most significantly the attempt to limit the king’s authority to levy taxes without the consent of a committee selected by the barons. The concept of “no taxation without representation” appears in the original Chapter 12: “No scutage or aid is to be levied in our kingdom, save by the common counsel of our kingdom,” and even then, only to ransom the king or for specified family occasions.

The linkage between debt, interest accruals, and land tenure was central to the Charter. Chapter 9 stated that debts should be paid out of movable property (chattels), not land. “Neither we [the king] nor our bailiffs are to seize any land or rent for any debt, for as long as the chattels of the debtor suffice to pay the debt.” Land would be forfeited only as a last resort, when sureties had their own lands threatened with foreclosure. And under the initial version of the Charter, debts were only to be paid after appropriate living expenses had been met, and no interest would accrue until the debtor’s heirs reached maturity.

Elite Interests in the Charter

The Magna Carta typically is depicted as the birth of England’s fight to create democracy. It was indeed an attempt to establish parliamentary restraint on royal spending, but the barons were acting strictly in their own interest. The Charter dealt with breaches by the king, but “no procedure was laid down for dealing with breaches by the barons.” In Chapter 39 they designated themselves as Freemen, meaning anyone who owned land, but that excluded rural villeins and cottagers. Local administration remained corrupt, and the Charter had no provisions to prevent lords from exploiting their sub-tenants, who had no voice in consenting to royal demands for scutages or other aids.

The 13th-century fight was to establish what would become the House of Lords, not the House of Commons. Empowering the nobility against the state was the opposite of the 19th-century drive against the landlord class and its claims for hereditary land rent. What was deemed democratic in Britain’s 1909/10 constitutional crisis was the ruling that the Lords never again could reject a House of Commons revenue act. The Commons had passed a land tax, which the House of Lords blocked. That fight against landlords was the opposite of the barons’ fight against King John.

• About the author: Michael Hudson is an American economist, a professor of economics at the University of Missouri–Kansas City, and a researcher at the Levy Economics Institute at Bard College. He is a former Wall Street analyst, political consultant, commentator, and journalist. You can read more of Hudson’s economic history on the Observatory.
• Source: This article was produced by Human Bridges.

Notes:

1. William Lunt, “Financial Relations of the Papacy with England to 1327. (Studies in Anglo-Papal Relations during the Middle Ages, I.),” (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1939) pp. 597-598 and pp. 58-59.

By Raphael Parens, Christopher M. Faulkner and Marcel Plichta

(FPRI) — On March 12, a delegation of US officials arrived in Niamey in a highly anticipated meeting on the future of US-Niger relations. The entourage of high-level US diplomats and military officials included the AFRICOM Commander General Michael Langley, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee, and Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Dr. Celeste Wallander. What many saw as a sign of renewed commitment after months of tenuous relations and the adoption of a pragmatic approach to dealing with Niger’s coup leaders, ended with Nigerien officials from the National Council for Safeguarding the Homeland (CNSP) releasing a statement calling the American presence in Niger “illegal.” While it is unclear what was exactly said in the meeting, the conversation certainly did not go well. As at least one scholar explained, the US side appeared to have “stumbled in several ways.”

The apparent rejection of a 2012 status of forces agreement has sent the Pentagon and State Department into a frenzy. The Pentagon has stated that it is seeking clarification on the CNSP’s statement and is reportedly engaging with Niger’s junta on ways to ensure the continuation of a  US troop presence in the country. Niger has been a key security partner in the Sahel and a crucial linchpin for US counterterrorism efforts, as it is host to a strategic US air base in Agadez. Further, it is unclear if the entire military wishes to move away from US assistance and whether the junta has been able to convince a broad enough swath of forces to support this decision.

What appears to be an abrupt shift in the CNSP’s position toward US forces in Niger is shocking but perhaps not all that surprising. Niger’s military regime revoked security agreements with the European Union back in December 2023. That move came on the heels of a visit by a Russian delegation led by Deputy Defense Minister Yunus Bek-Yevkrov, raising concerns about a burgeoning partnership between Niamey and Moscow. In January 2024, the Russian Defense Ministry released a statement confirming that Niger and Russia had agreed to develop closer military ties.

Niger’s pivot to Moscow has been slowly unfolding since a military coup toppled a nascent democratic government back in July 2023. According to one recent analysis, Niger’s junta has been “waiting for an opportunity to push US forces out of the country, as [doing so] was the prerogative for any Russian direct or indirect involvement.” Shortly after the coup, media reports alleged that Niger’s coup leaders sought assistance from the Wagner Group amid threats of a looming ECOWAS intervention. Despite his own precarious position at the time due to the June 2023 mutiny, Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin praised the coup leaders and rhetorically extended offers of Wagner’s assistance. The Russian Foreign Ministry, however, was slower to cozy up to the coup plotters.

Early analyses suggest that a key point of contention in meetings between the CNSP and US delegation was over US officials’ concerns over Niger’s relationship(s) with Russia and Iran. Researchers noted, however, the apparent contradiction in the Biden Administration’s Africa policy—one that champions African states’ rights and ability to choose their own partners but then lobbies against certain choices. In this case, early reporting suggests that US delegation warned Niger’s junta about forging closer relations with Moscow. The CNSP raised these specific points in its televised address, emphasizing the apparent contradictions and condescending attitudes from the US delegation—denying “the sovereign Nigerien people the right to choose their partners and types of partnerships capable of truly helping them fight against terrorism.”

For Niger, the shift away from the United States and apparent preference for alternative security partners is almost certainly a signal of a growing interest in aligning itself with Russia, a relationship that would most likely unfold with the arrival of forces from the Africa Corps. This may be easier said than done for Moscow given resource constraints in Ukraine and through its existing operations across Africa. However, Russia has not shied away from offering up security partnerships, even in the form of a small footprint. For instance, 1,000 Wagner forces arrived in Mali just two months before Russia invaded Ukraine, and despite the ongoing war and the Prigozhin mutiny, Moscow’s mercenaries have not gone anywhere. In addition, the Russian Ministry of Defense deployed roughly 100 personnel from the new Africa Corps to Burkina Faso in January, with promises to scale up that mission. Even a small force can put a nation firmly in Moscow’s camp and the Kremlin has aggressively pursued this strategy.

It is important to recognize Russia’s counterterrorism offer for what it is, though. Despite rhetoric that the United States and Europe have failed Niger, it is an illusion to think that the Africa Corps will fare any better. Rather, as in Mali, terrorist violence has significantly increased since the arrival of Russian Private Military Companies, not to mention the violence inflicted by the mercenaries themselves. Should Niger reach some sort of agreement that results in Africa Corps personnel in the country, Niger’s junta will be signaling a clear intention of shoring up their own security in an effort to hold on to power like those in Mali and Burkina Faso at the expense of counterterrorism overall. Moscow is keen to help them achieve this objective.

What then is the forecast for Niger? In the short and long term, a break with the United States in favor of Russia increases the potential for terror groups to use Nigerien soil for their operations. The Islamic State’s Sahel branch, for instance, appeared to increase its operational tempo as France ended its nearly decade long counterterrorism operation in the region. Additionally, the move by Niger’s leaders to break with the United States will also seriously challenge the fledgling Alliance of Sahel States—especially in the tri-border region where jihadists have benefited from porous borders and coordination challenges among the Burkinabe, Malian, and Nigerien armed forces. The nascent security partnership also lacks important aerial resources, which further complicates counterterrorism operations. Just a week after the CNSP’s decree on the legality of US troops in Niger, twenty-three Nigerien soldiers were killed conducting offensive counterterrorism operations in the tri-border area.

For the United States, Niamey’s cold shoulder creates serious questions as it erodes their footing in the Sahel. Defense officials continue to negotiate with the Nigerien junta over maintenance of some security presence despite the CNSP’s strong rhetoric on the legality of the US presence. Should the United States be unable to walk back the diplomatic hiccup and salvage some semblance of a security partnership, it will likely result in a necessary pivot toward another country to relocate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets for counterterrorism efforts. Early reporting suggests that the United States had already been in preliminary talks with several coastal West African states—including Cote D’Ivoire, Ghana, and Benin—that are under the threat of terrorism themselves.

Chad, a longtime US counterterrorism partner, also remains an option, but an upcoming election in May has seen increasingly repressive tactics by the current regime, including the killing of the head of the primary opposition party by Chadian security forces in February. Senegal and Nigeria also provide options, although both have downsides given their locations at the periphery of Sahelian conflict, domestic political problems, and stronger connections to other partners.

Looming over the entire counterterrorism approach is another key concern, Niger’s uranium. Niger is likely suffering due to France’s pivot away from its uranium supplies, which took up 75 percent of its export market in the past. Russia or Iran may provide appealing trade partners, although it is unclear whether Niger could successfully ship nuclear materials to either while evading international sanctions. But as the US delegation reportedly made clear to CNSP leadership, a uranium deal with the Iranians would be considered a red line. This clearly backfired with the junta and the United States has a mixed track record when it comes to red line rhetoric. For its part, sanctions have pushed Tehran to look for a variety of places to bolster its economy. Iran has moved quickly to establish full diplomatic relations with Niger and capitalize on the CNSP’s fractured relationship with the United States and Europe. Click here to enter text.For Niger, one of the poorest countries in the world, finding alternative export markets for its uranium may prove essential for the junta’s grasp on power.

US engagement with Africa does not end with Niger. While many question the value of the US-Niger partnership, the United States will ultimately need to grapple with the second and third order effects of a potential withdrawal. Investing in more palatable regimes will be costly and carry the same risks as those in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Ultimately, American policymakers will need a coherent strategy for engaging the democratic states in littoral West Africa in a manner that benefits all parties.

Niger faces an even tougher way forward. The junta’s choice to slam the door on the United States, whether justified or not, only increases the likelihood that terrorist groups thrive and expand while the junta and its partners adopt more extreme counterterrorism practices. Niger’s junta is clearly aware of this reality but puts self-preservation above lasting security for Nigeriens. The only question is how long they can stay in the eye of the storm.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a non-partisan organization that seeks to publish well-argued, policy-oriented articles on American foreign policy and national security priorities.

About the authors:

• Raphael Parens is a 2024 Templeton Fellow and a Fellow in the Eurasia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He is an international security researcher focused on Europe, the Middle East, and Africa and specializes in small armed groups and NATO modernization processes.
• Christopher M. Faulkner is an assistant professor at the US Naval War College. He researches and writes on issues related to irregular warfare, militant financing and tactics, private military and security companies (PMSCs), maritime terrorism, and civil-military relations. The views expressed are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the US Naval War College, Department of the Navy, Department of Defense, or US Government.
• Marcel Plichta is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of St. Andrews and a former analyst at the US Department of Defense. He has written on Wagner and US-Africa policy for Foreign Policy, Newsweek, and Lawfare. All views are his own.

Source: This article was published by FPRI