Day: March 31, 2024

Pegasus Project helps give horses wings with airshow  KETK | FOX51 | EastTexasMatters.com

Iran Ramadan | World News | postregister.com  Post Register

Iran Ramadan | World News | postregister.com  Post Register

By James C. Roberts

A mantra heard often in conservative circles these days is “No more endless wars.” News flash: All the wars alluded to ended – usually in American defeat or the withdrawal of American forces before the mission was completed.

This baleful trend began with the Vietnam War. As a Vietnam veteran myself, I am still deeply troubled by the carnage occasioned by that long and bloody conflict.

Ronald Reagan called the Vietnam War a “noble cause,” and so it was. The objective of the American commitment was to preserve an independent South Vietnam, which was under assault by the North Vietnamese, whose forces had unlimited support from the Soviet Union and Communist China. Put in context, the Vietnam conflict was a “hot” war in a larger worldwide “cold” war against communist aggression led by the Soviet Union.

Facing a presidential election in 1964, and desirous of keeping the American commitment to the war on the front pages, President Lyndon Johnson opted for a policy of gradual escalation, a disastrous decision (abetted by the craven acquiescence of US senior officers) that left 58,000 US troops dead, more than 200,000 wounded, and far greater losses for our South Vietnamese allies. The betrayal of South Vietnam led to a dozen countries falling to communism, the degradation of American military might and foreign policy resolution, and a widespread loss of respect for the armed forces that persisted until the election of Reagan 15 years later.

The Vietnam tragedy could have been avoided if LBJ had applied decisive military force early in the war, as Richard Nixon did in 1972 to bring North Vietnam to the peace table. Mining all of North Vietnam’s harbors and an unrestricted bombing of key North Vietnamese railroad lines, bridges, and important infrastructure facilities would likely have sufficed.

To quote Reagan again, after the American defeat in Vietnam:

“Let us tell those who fought in that war [Vietnam] that never again will we ask young men to fight, and possibly die, in a war our government is afraid to let them win.”

Unfortunately, most of Reagan’s successors, including his vice president, George H.W. Bush, didn’t adhere to that sound advice.

An Unfinished Job

When Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990 and threatened Saudi Arabia, President Bush put together an impressive coalition and a formidable military force of 500,000 who invaded Iraq and largely destroyed Saddam’s troops. Bush, unfortunately, declined to finish the job by pushing on to Baghdad and taking out Saddam Hussein, thus squandering the opportunity to occupy Iraq and reconstitute its armed forces and government. Instead, he allowed Saddam to remain in power and become an increasingly grave threat to the security of the region. This failure resulted in his son invading Iraq to remove the dictator – an action that seriously damaged his presidency.

When Afghanistan-based terrorist Osama bin Laden orchestrated an attack on the US. on September 11, 2001, it brought Americans together to a degree not seen since World War II. The patriotism and desire for revenge for the atrocities inflicted were white-hot. Millions of young Americans expressed a willingness to enlist in the military.

The new president, George W. Bush, could have called for a national mobilization and effectively occupied the country and destroyed the Taliban. Instead, Bush urged the public to go shopping and then pursued an incremental, piecemeal commitment of troops to Afghanistan without any goals or strategy.

Then, on March 20, 2003, Bush launched an invasion of Iraq with the objective of taking down the government of Saddam Hussein. While the goal was clear, there was no strategy regarding what to do next. Retired Army General David Petraeus recalls asking his superiors, “How does this game end?” and not getting a response.

The best explanation of America’s intended mission in Iraq came from Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. Essentially, Wolfowitz predicted that, having toppled Hussein, the Iraqi people would greet US troops as liberators and then America would use revenues from oil sales to rebuild the country.

We all know how that turned out. The 150,000 troops committed were far too few to effectively secure Iraq, which led to the country dissolving into ethnic warfare. Meanwhile, American Viceroy Paul Bremer made a series of unilateral and disastrous decisions, perhaps the worst being the disbanding of the Iraqi army, leaving 500,000 young military-age males unemployed – but in possession of their weapons. Another catastrophic decision was to fire all Iraqi civil servants who had any ties, at any level, to Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party. This action effectively removed most of the government workers with administrative experience.

Meanwhile, an undermanned US military force struggled to stabilize the ethnic maelstrom that consumed Iraq.

Pacification Strategy

The 150,000 troops engaged in Iraq meant an even smaller number of troops available for the war in Afghanistan. To Bush’s credit, the troop surge that he ordered in Iraq (against tremendous opposition, even within his own party) and led by Gen. David Petraeus, had largely pacified the country by the last year of his presidency.

Incoming president Barack Obama effectively squandered the hard-won gains achieved by the surge, however. The new president (with the full support of his vice president, Joe Biden) pulled all US troops out of Iraq, which resulted in the quick reversion back to disorder and the re-emergence of ISIS, the terror group that took control of large swaths of the country.

Petraeus presented Obama with a detailed plan for stabilizing Afghanistan and the number of troops needed to defeat the Taliban. After innumerable meetings in the White House Situation Room, Obama gave Petraeus less than half the number of troops he requested and then, incredibly, announced the date when those troops would start to withdraw.

One can imagine the Taliban leaders sitting around their campfires, laughing hysterically as they read the Obama strategy. The fruits of that plan were manifest in the catastrophic withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2022 – ordered and overseen by Joe Biden.

The Modern Theater

Biden appears to embody all the worst traits of presidents LBJ, both Bushes, and Obama. The Middle East and Eastern Europe are now in flames, thanks largely to Biden’s feckless malpractice.

Biden precipitated the disaster in Ukraine by showing weakness in Afghanistan and in stating that, basically, a small Russian invasion of Ukraine would not necessarily be a bad thing. When the expected invasion came, he offered to speed up Ukraine’s surrender by giving Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky an armed escort out of the country. When the Ukrainians proved to be courageous and skillful fighters who halted the invasion, Biden promised assistance for “as long as it takes”, but over the past two years has delivered aid in fits and starts and denied Ukraine the advanced equipment and aircraft that could break the stalemate and defeat the Russians.

Unsurprisingly, there has been no Biden statement to the American people on strategy or goals or any explanation of how preserving an independent Ukraine is in our national interest.

Ukraine is the latest entry on the list of “endless wars,” and Biden’s terrible record on the conflict invites that description. There are important differences, however. First, Ukrainians are a people united in their love of country and have proved their willingness to fight and die for it.

Second, the country is led by a fully functional government (unlike Iraq and Afghanistan) which has the overwhelming support of the Ukrainian people. Third, the country has a well-led military whose soldiers and sailors are battle-hardened and fierce in their determination to defeat the Russian invaders.

Fourth and finally, Ukraine (unlike Iraq, Afghanistan and, initially, South Vietnam) does not require the deployment of American troops on the ground. The Ukrainians are capable and willing to do the fighting themselves. All they are asking for is equipment and ammunition.

Of all the presidents involved in the sad history of recent military conflicts, the only exception since Reagan is Donald Trump. As president, Trump employed troops sparingly, but when he did so, he acted decisively. He ordered Secretary of Defense James Mattis to destroy ISIS and ISIS was promptly destroyed. He kept the Iranian mullahs in their box by ordering the killing of Qasem Soleimani. He kept Xi Jinping in line by employing tough sanctions on China, and he fostered peace in the Middle East by negotiating the Abraham Accords.

On Ukraine, however, Trump has been mostly silent, saying only that the Russian invasion would not have happened if he had been president – probably true – and that he would settle the conflict in 24 hours, which is an absurd prediction.

A defeated Ukraine, occupied by the Russians, would be a huge problem for America. Maintaining an independent Ukraine is in America’s self-interest. Donald Trump, speaking for the Republican Party, should place the blame for the crisis in Ukraine squarely on Joe Biden. Then he should call for a strategy of victory that expels the Russians from Ukrainian territory.

Finally, the votes are there in the US House of Representatives to pass a desperately needed aid package for Ukraine. Trump might consider urging Speaker of the House Mike Johnson to enable the bill to reach the House floor.

• About the author: James C. Roberts served in the Reagan Administration from 1981-1984 and is the founder and executive chairman of Radio America, a national conservative radio network with more than 630 affiliates.
• Source: This article was published by Liberty Nation

By William Chislett

Tractors driven by angry farmers have inundated Madrid and other cities as part of protests in other countries, including France, the EU’s largest agricultural producer, Greece, Germany, Poland and Portugal, against conditions that are eroding their livelihoods.

Farmers are suffering to varying degrees from falling prices (the average price of products they receive was 9% lower in the third quarter of 2023 than a year earlier), rising costs, heavy regulation, burdensome paperwork, the impact of climate change, already acute in Spain, and increasing competition, viewed as unfair, from cheap foreign imports that do not have to meet the same strict EU requirements. A common complaint is that they are expected to farm during the day and spend long evenings with burdensome paperwork.

EU-wide agriculture generates a mere 1.4% of the bloc’s GDP, provides 4.2% of employment and receives around a whopping 30% of the EU budget. Alarm bells ring when the farming sector rebels, because of the importance of food production and the need to maintain rural communities. Spain grows one in four of the fruits and vegetables produced in the EU, more than half of the world’s olive oil and 25% of the world’s citrus fruits.

Agriculture has undergone huge change since the 1959 Stabilisation Plan during the Franco regime, which moved the country from autarky to a market economy. The sector’s share of GDP dropped from 23.5% in 1960 to 2.6% in 2022 and of employment from 39% to 3.6% (see Figures 1 and 2). More than half of merchandise exports in 1960 were agricultural (around 20% today). Yet the sector remains at the heart of life: most city-dwellers have family connections with the countryside and often second homes there. Farmers are popular.

Figure 1. GDP by sector, 1960-2022 (%)

	1960	1975	2022
Services	41.7	51.3	74.6
Agriculture	23.5	9.6	2.6
Industry	30.8	30.2	17.4
Construction	3.9	8.9	5.4

Source: Leandro Prados de la Escosura (2017), Spanish Economic Growth, 1850-2014, Palgrave Macmillan, London.

Figure 2. Employment by sector, 1960-2022 (full-time equivalent, % of the active population)

	1960	1975	2022
Agriculture	39.0	20.4	3.6
Services	32.1	44.3	78.2
Industry	20.7	24.9	11.3
Construction	8.3	10.4	6.9

Source: Leandro Prados de la Escosura (2017), Spanish Economic Growth, 1850-2014, Palgrave Macmillan, London.

Today, there are around 900,000 farms in Spain of very different size, most of them under five hectares, and around 660,000 of their owners receive some kind of EU aid. The workforce in agriculture is rapidly ageing: 41% are over the age of 65 and 4% under 35. There are also sharp regional differences: just 0.3% of jobholders in the Madrid region work in agriculture compared with 11% in Murcia. Completing this snapshot is a productivity that is well below the EU average: €1,183 per hectare in 2022 as against the bloc’s €1,433, and less than half of Italy.

Spanish farmers are particularly incensed by what they view as the non-enforcement of the law guaranteeing wholesale major supermarket buyers pay fair prices, while consumer prices have soared, and by the competition from non-EU imports, which rose 80% in volume between 2012 and 2022.

The impact of Spain’s drought is acute and prolonged. The year 2023 was the driest on record as a result of abnormally high temperatures. By the autumn, 40% of territory was in a state of drought. Nine million people are still suffering water restrictions, mainly in Catalonia and Andalusia.

Agricultural production dropped sharply in 2022, with the fall much larger than in the EU as a whole. Output last year was reportedly down again, particularly in cereals. Olive oil production was 15% higher than in 2022, but 34% below the average of the previous four years, according to estimates. High temperatures during flowering hit the quantity and quality of the blossoms.

The surging price of olive oil, a staple of the country’s cuisine, has made the ‘liquid gold’ the most stolen supermarket item this year, resulting in security tags on bottles, normally reserved for the most expensive alcoholic drinks. The price has soared from €5 a litre or less four years ago to as high as €14.

In response to the protests, the European Commission weakened last month some parts of its flagship Green Deal environmental policies, removing a recommended target to cut farming emissions from its 2040 climate road map. The map no longer includes a reference to a 30% reduction target in methane, nitrogen and other gases linked to farming, part of the measures to make the EU carbon neutral by 2050. Agriculture is responsible for 14.2% of the bloc’s greenhouse gas emissions.

A bill to halve the use of chemical pesticides by 2030 was also withdrawn, and EU farmers no longer have to set aside part of their land to foster biodiversity, under green farming measures. They will be able to continue receiving subsidies from the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) budget by growing cash crops and nitrogen-fixing crops on set-aside land, provided pesticides are not used there.

The Commission also modified the duty-free measures for Ukrainian imports, which are due to remain until June 2025, by capping imports of sugar, poultry and eggs. The measures were first introduced following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 to help the country’s economy, which is very dependent on agricultural products.

Spain’s farmers are at the heart of what is known as ‘Emptied Spain’, the large swathes of the countryside suffering depopulation and with it inadequate services. In all, 17 of Spain’s provinces have lost around 900,000 inhabitants in the last 20 years, while 10 others, mostly coastal but also including Madrid, have seen their population rise by 10 million, mainly lured by the vibrant tourism industry. There is no let-up in the exodus, albeit at a slower pace.

Rural dwellers are beginning to organise politically. The 2022 snap election in Castile and León –Spain’s largest region (18.6% of the country), comprising nine provinces and bigger than 17 of the 27 EU countries, but where 57% of their 2.4 million inhabitants live in just 3.4% of the territory– saw a new party, Soria ¡Ya! (‘Soria Now!’), created from the anger at abandonment by the political class, win all three seats assigned to the province of that name in the 81-seat regional parliament.

The farmers’ protests come ahead of June’s elections for the European parliament when hard-right parties are expected to gain ground. Portugal’s hard-right Chega quadrupled its number of parliamentary seats in this month’s general election to 48 and its share of the vote rose from 7.2% to 18.1%. In the case of Spain, the farmers’ discontent is a breeding ground for VOX, the hard-right party founded in 2013, which entered the national parliament in April 2019 with 24 of the 350 seats (52 in the November 2019 election and 33 in the 2023 general election), and hopes to harvest support.

The Popular Party (PP) governs 12 of Spain’s regions and in four of them –Aragón, Castille and León, Extremadura and Valencia, where farming plays a significant role– the agriculture post is held by VOX. The PP, like the Socialist-led national government, supports the United Nations’ 2030 Agenda for sustainable development, but not VOX.

Both the main parties are also in favour of free-trade agreements, such as the proposed deal between the EU and Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay), for which a political agreement was signed in 2019 after two decades of talks, but has yet to happen. President Emmanuel Macron, with one eye on June’s European elections, threw the signing of the deal last December under the tractor, because it did not offer enough environmental guarantees and the perceived downsides for French farmers.

The EU has made concessions and the protests have died down, but change is inevitable in a costly sector of declining relevance and a need for more environmentally sustainable policies.

• About the author: William Chislett (Oxford, 1951) is Emeritus Senior Research Fellow at the Elcano Royal Institute. He covered Spain’s transition to democracy for The Times of London between 1975 and 1978. He was then based in Mexico City for the Financial Times between 1978 and 1984. He returned to Madrid on a permanent basis in 1986 and since then, among other things, has written 20 books on various countries.
• Source: This article was published by Elcano Royal Institute

By Ellen Lord and Dan Patt

Introduction: A Call to Action

In an era of strategic competition among technologically advanced powers, software will shape the nature of deterrence and define national security advantages. Software is now ubiquitous, with powerful implications for economic productivity, governance, cybersecurity, and the character of modern warfare. From the systems that power our weapons platforms and command and control (C2) networks to the tools that enable our intelligence analysts and logisticians, software is now integral to every aspect of national defense. As the United States finds itself engaged in a long-term strategic competition with the People’s Republic of China, America’s success hinges on the US military’s ability to rapidly adopt and adapt technology in response to evolving threats and opportunities. The Department of Defense (DoD) needs to harness the power of software to quickly assemble, effectively deploy, and continually update its military capabilities. If it fails to do so, America risks ceding the military advantage to its adversaries.

The central theme of this policy memo is the critical importance of software adaptability in enabling the DoD to outpace and outmaneuver its competitors. We argue that the ability to rapidly develop, deploy, and update software is not merely an enabler of military capabilities, but an emerging foundation of military advantage itself in the digital age. Adaptability is not an inherent feature of software; all too often we are victims of stale, outdated software that stands in the way of our desired outcomes. The DoD needs to carefully cultivate its ability to deploy, update, and integrate software and software-defined systems.

Despite the clear imperative for getting software right, the DoD faces a range of challenges and roadblocks that hinder its ability to achieve this vision. In particular, the DoD needs to remove the bureaucratic bottlenecks of its mishandled Authority to Operate (ATO) process, shore up a lack of in-house technical expertise, facilitate easier access to data and interfaces, and reform inflexible resourcing processes that were built for an earlier era. These challenges are not merely technical in nature. Rather, they reflect deeper structural and cultural barriers that the US needs to address head-on to compete effectively with its adversaries.

This memo will explore the urgency of “getting software right” for the DoD.¹The memo draws on insights from our testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Cyber, IT, and Innovation and our extensive interactions with the technology and broader defense communities.² We will identify the key roadblocks in the current system, highlight promising developments and best practices, and offer actionable recommendations for policymakers, DoD leadership, and industry partners to drive the necessary reforms.

The stakes could not be higher. If the DoD fails to prioritize adaptability in its software delivery and unleash the latent forces of innovation, the department could stumble into conflict equipped with brittle systems and be unable to respond effectively to sprawling and advanced threats. To fall short now would not be just a bureaucratic debacle. It would pose an imminent threat to the US military’s ability to deter, fight, and win.

The Imperative for Adaptability

The military dimensions of long-term competition between the US and China depend on the DoD’s evolution: its advancement through continuous move-counter-move cycles. America’s success hinges on its ability to adopt and adapt technology rapidly in response to evolving opportunities and threats. Nearly every US system, both military and commercial, is powered by software. Therefore, an upper hand in strategic competition necessitates getting software right.

It is essential to understand the dual nature of software: fluid and frozen. During development, software is fluid— like wet potter’s clay, it can be molded and adapted quickly by programmers adding new features, fixing bugs, and optimizing performance. However, once software is compiled and deployed, it becomes brittle and frozen—inflexible and only able to run on specific hardware configurations, severed from its source code and development environment.

Regrettably, the Department of Defense’s mainline approach to software development and acquisition largely treats software as a frozen, finished product. This mindset is exemplified by the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program. The F-35 program remains mostly locked in a “waterfall” development cycle for its core operational software.³ This is a consequence of early program decisions that sought performance from a highly integrated system. The process of planning, testing, and delivering a new software block can take years, as evidenced by the lengthy progression from Block 3 to 3B to Tech Refresh 3 and Block 4.⁴ While the newer blocks’ capabilities may be impressive, the drawn-out process to achieve such capabilities severely hinders the US military’s ability to adapt to emerging threats or seize fleeting opportunities to gain a tactical advantage. This is software done wrong—brittle and frozen, causing the DoD to field an unadaptable force.

Once a conflict begins, adaptability and scaling drive outcomes. The Pentagon needs to seize the current moment to prepare. For an example of how conflict drives adaptation, consider that the lifecycle of a radio in Ukraine is only about three months. By then, radios typically need to be reprogrammed or swapped out as the Russians have optimized their electronic warfare against them. A new weapons system reaches peak efficiency about two weeks before countermeasures emerge. 

For an example of a superior weapons system handicapped by unadaptable software, consider that Excalibur precision artillery rounds initially had a 70 percent efficiency rate when Ukraine first used them. After six weeks, Excalibur’s efficiency declined to only 6 percent as the Russians adapted their electronic warfare to counter the system.⁵ This shows how quickly adversaries can adjust to new technologies.

This lack of adaptability is not an inherent property of software; rather, it is a consequence of how we choose to manage software. Ukrainian units with organic programming capability that can rapidly adapt their unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) software have about 50 percent efficiency, while units reliant on longer supply chains where feedback must be flowed back to an original manufacturer to make changes struggle to hit 20 percent efficiency. Keeping software in a pliant, fluid state is the only way to maintain tactical innovation.

Encouragingly, a handful of leaders inside the DoD are pioneering the kinds of practices the US needs. We can learn from their success. To exploit the fluid nature of software and unlock its potential for rapid adaptation, the department needs to embrace a fundamentally different approach.

This approach should be guided by five key principles:

1. lower the barriers to entry to get software and updates on operational systems and networks,
2. create a culture of doers by encouraging organic technical talent in the department and giving talented staff autonomy and flexible resourcing,
3. allow access to the department’s vast troves of data by exposing system interfaces,
4. use contracts and agreements to invite a diverse community of partners and industry experts to participate in progress, and
5. adopt resourcing reforms that accommodate the continual nature of software development.

By removing bureaucratic barriers, the DoD can foster a culture of innovation and agility, and possibly unleash a new industrial base.

Challenges and Roadblocks

While the imperative for software adaptability is clear, the Department of Defense faces a range of challenges and roadblocks that hinder its ability to achieve this vision. These obstacles span the lifecycle of software development, from initial deployment to ongoing testing and acquisition, and are deeply rooted in the DoD’s organizational culture, processes, and workforce. Years after the Defense Innovation Board (DIB) made key recommendations to the department in its software acquisition and practices (SWAP) study, implementation remains slow and incomplete.⁶Top-level department policy documents remain dreadfully out of date, not accommodating incremental refinement approaches.⁷

Software differs fundamentally from hardware systems in that the boundaries between development, acquisition, and operational usage are often blurred. In a hardware procurement scenario, such as purchasing body armor, the processes of specification, purchasing, and testing are generally distinct from the actual use of the items in the field. This separates the decision-makers involved with development from those involved with managing operational risk to missions or forces. In contrast, a software feature can be developed and immediately deployed to enable new functionality, and the decision to accept or forgo an update beyond a proven baseline must be weighed against the potential risks and rewards of mission success or failure.

This unique characteristic of software also complicates resourcing, as there is often no clear distinction between operations and maintenance (O&M) activities and research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) activities. This paradigm similarly challenges classical approaches to test, evaluation, and risk management. As a result, the consideration and management of operational risk become closely intertwined with feature development.

Unfortunately, DoD planners frequently overlook this crucial aspect, as there are strong incentives to adopt a compliance-first mindset. Acquisition personnel tend either to focus on meeting requirements as in a traditional hardware system without considering the potential missed opportunities to immediately impact mission outcomes; or to resist continuous software updates under the guise of maintaining security compliance. While security and risk management are undeniably paramount, a narrow focus on compliance can lead to a false sense of security and hinder the adaptability that is essential for mission success in a rapidly evolving threat landscape.

Roadblock 1: Granting Software Authority to Operate

The commercial software industry once treated software delivery much like a hardware product, placing disks in boxes on store shelves. Software was tested, shipped, and sold, with functionality and features frozen in time. Over time, consumers have grown accustomed to over-the-air updates, frequent patches, and app store delivery models. Even hardware products like cars and appliances are increasingly built to accept updates. While not all software in the Department of Defense needs constant updating, the mechanisms for update delivery will vary, and the risks for national security software differ significantly from those of a mobile app, the government can still learn much from the commercial technology industry. In particular, the shift to over-the-air updates was enabled by large-scale automation in testing, continuous integration and continuous delivery (CI/CD) pipelines, and an increasing focus on security throughout the development process.

Automated testing and in situ analytics have been game-changers in the commercial software industry. Likewise, CI/CD pipelines have played a crucial role in enabling rapid software delivery. These pipelines automate the process of building, testing, and deploying software, ensuring that every change goes through a rigorous validation process before being released to users. Moreover, like some forward-leaning defense organizations, risk-sensitive software developers are beginning to embrace a shift-left approach to security, where security considerations are integrated throughout the development lifecycle rather than being an afterthought. This includes practices like threat modeling, secure coding guidelines, and regular security audits, which all help to identify and mitigate potential security risks early on.

The process by which the Department of Defense decides whether software is safe to deploy and use on a system or network is called the Authority to Operate (ATO) process. Unfortunately, the mainline implementation of ATOs still treats software as though it were a boxed product. Though the ATO process was intended to ensure the security and reliability of software systems, it has instead become a bureaucratic bottleneck that slows down the deployment of new capabilities, stifles innovation, and aggravates security problems.⁸ Currently, the process often involves lengthy reviews and documentation requirements that can take months or even years to complete, by which time the software may be outdated or no longer meet evolving mission needs.

Moreover, the ATO process has unintentionally created a new form of vendor lock-in, wherein companies that have successfully navigated the arduous process can use their ATO as a barrier to entry against competitors. This lock-in effect stifles competition and hinders the DoD’s ability to tap into the latest innovations from across the commercial sector. Smaller, more agile companies with cutting-edge software solutions may be deterred from working with the DoD altogether due to the time and resource demands of the ATO process. Perhaps most shockingly, the DoD lacks ATO reciprocity within and between programs, services, and agencies, hindering the sharing of software platforms and rapid integration of capabilities,⁹ which means that long timelines are not a one-time obstacle—they repeat as software is deployed onto one system after another.

Forward-leaning pioneers have created continuous ATO (cATO) processes and incorporated technology tools like CI/CD pipelines and continuous monitoring to improve overall risk posture.¹⁰ Instead of focusing on one snapshot in time of software, cATOs focus on the process that delivers software. cATOs enable real-time, risk-based decision-making, significantly reducing deployment timelines for new and updated software capabilities. By implementing a DoD-wide cATO framework and establishing mechanisms for ATO reciprocity, the DoD can streamline the authorization process and facilitate the sharing of software platforms and components across the enterprise. But moving in this direction would require a cultural shift within the DoD: the department would need to emphasize risk management over risk elimination and move from a mindset of compliance to one that looks to mission outcomes and operational security.

Roadblock 2: Resourcing

Another major roadblock to software adaptability is the DoD’s struggle to allocate resources effectively and respond quickly to evolving software needs.¹¹ The department’s budgeting and acquisition processes are still largely geared toward traditional hardware programs with rigid requirements and long lead times. This mismatch makes it difficult for software development teams to secure the funding and support they need to iterate rapidly and deliver capabilities in a timely manner. As a result, promising software initiatives may languish or fail to scale, while legacy systems continue to consume a disproportionate share of DoD resources.

The inability to use a single appropriation to fund software improvements creates significant management challenges for business system upgrades, as illustrated by the case of the Defense Enterprise Accounting and Management System (DEAMS).¹² When DEAMS had technical issues that needed a software patch, financial managers and attorneys had to spend considerable time determining which parts of the patch represented a capability upgrade (RDT&E funded) versus basic sustainment (O&M funded) even though this distinction is meaningless to the software developer. The funding realignment process delayed execution and put added pressure on the program because O&M funds were nearing expiration.

The fiscal year (FY) 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and appropriations bills established a new Budget Activity 8 (BA-8) appropriation for software. The DIB SWAP study recommended this new appropriation to provide the DoD greater flexibility in funding software development, deployment, and sustainment. However, the BA-8 pilot has faced implementation hurdles and has not expanded beyond the original eight programs. Key personnel who championed the initiative have departed, and the program never delivered rigorous metrics regarding its implementation and effectiveness to appropriators, hindering its wider adoption.

The recent report from the congressionally directed Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Reform offers a simpler and more comprehensive approach to address these resourcing challenges.¹³ The commission recommends transforming the budget structure by allocating funding first to programs and then delegating the management of funds across funding categories (RDT&E, O&M, procurement, etc.) to individual program managers (PMs), while still ensuring strong accountability. This approach would provide PMs with the flexibility to allocate resources based on the specific needs of their software programs, enabling faster responses to evolving requirements and technologies. However, the implementation of this systemic solution will require cooperation between the executive and legislative branches and may not happen quickly.

Roadblock 3: Talent Gaps

A severe talent deficit within the DoD’s software workforce compounds these challenges. The department struggles to attract and retain top digital talent because it competes with the private sector for a limited pool of skilled professionals.¹⁴ Government hiring processes can be slow and cumbersome, often taking six to eight months to onboard a highly qualified candidate, even when agency leaders are fully supportive. Also, the DoD’s bureaucratic culture and rigid career paths may strip away the job autonomy needed to recruit and retain talented technical leaders into important roles. This talent gap leaves the DoD without the in-house expertise it needs to manage software programs effectively, make informed technical decisions, and drive innovation.

Moreover, acquisition personnel receive insufficient training on the software acquisition pathway, the diverse means of contracting, commercial practices in software, the differences in requirements between software and hardware, and the nature of ATOs and who should be responsible for them. This knowledge gap further hinders the DoD’s ability to effectively acquire and manage software programs.

Roadblock 4: Data

Finally, there are persistent misconceptions and knowledge gaps within the DoD around key software concepts such as data rights, interface rights, and the appropriate role of industry in the software innovation process. These misunderstandings can lead to suboptimal contracting strategies, intellectual property disputes, and a lack of effective collaboration between government and industry stakeholders. For example, the DoD may mistakenly pursue a strategy of seeking to own all software source code, rather than focusing on owning the right application programming interfaces (APIs) and other interfaces to ensure interoperability and avoid vendor lock-in.¹⁵

There is also increasing attention on the coming impact of artificial intelligence (AI). Many expect that AI will increase overall economic productivity, enhance the efficiency of the defense workforce, and directly deliver military capability advantages. But it is important to remember that the DoD can only realize the promise of AI under the right conditions. The first condition is the aforementioned ability to deploy software updates quickly and securely, because data structures and AI-enabled tools depend on frequent updates to remain relevant and accurate. We cannot lead in AI if we do not get software right.

The second condition is increased access to data. To train mission-oriented models effectively, software developers need both one-time and ongoing access to libraries of mission-relevant data. This access can be granted in a secure manner that is consistent with today’s government security standards. Providing a readily available corpus of relevant data is a necessary condition to create a vibrant ecosystem of software providers. It is also a key incentive for private capital, founders, and employees to enter the defense market. Even as the DoD ensures that industry can hold intellectual property rights to software and algorithms, decision-makers need to make sure that system interfaces and the data that flows across them can support mission needs. With increasing emphasis on joint operations, the department needs to break down its data and system silos between disparate services and program offices.

Addressing these challenges and roadblocks will require a concerted effort from DoD leadership, policymakers, and industry partners. It will involve streamlining bureaucratic processes, updating acquisition strategies, investing in workforce development, and fostering a culture of experimentation, doing, and calculated risk-taking. While daunting, these reforms are essential if the DoD is to harness the full potential of software for adaptive military advantage in an era of strategic competition.

Promising Developments and Best Practices

Amid the roadblocks the Department of Defense faces in its pursuit of software adaptability, there are also reasons for optimism. In recent years, the DoD has taken important steps to improve its software acquisition and development practices, and pockets of excellence have emerged across the services that offer valuable lessons and models for success. Legislation or process alone cannot drive exceptional outcomes; it is important to recognize the creativity and ingenuity of the department’s leaders and seek to amplify and replicate their success.

Conventional acquisition processes emphasize trying to get up-front predictions right: requirements, system specifications, schedules, and cost estimates. Decades ago, in commercial development, problems with estimation were well acknowledged because software development is inherently non-routine work;¹⁶ it is instead a matter of ongoing creative problem-solving. But modern development methods have offered new ways to solve these problems. Acquisition officials now use a suite of tools and tactics to replace monolithic estimation that includes prototyping, breaking work down into small tasks, and setting intermediate milestones.

Officials are also better able to monitor progress thanks to milestones, burndown charts, and even agile management tasks.¹⁷ But technology alone does not guarantee good outcomes and even good programs can fall victim to hype-driven quick-fixes—using Kubernetes, getting on the cloud, consolidating to one software factory, pursuing agile development, or simply hiring Silicon Valley, for example. Each of these is a great tool, but none are one-size-fits-all solutions.¹⁸ To navigate the complexity of software acquisition to fulfill specific program requirements, officials need judgment and organic technical talent.

One of the most significant developments has been the establishment of the Adaptive Acquisition Framework (AAF).¹⁹ The AAF represents a major shift in the DoD’s approach to acquisition, moving away from a one-size-fits-all model toward a more flexible, tailored approach that recognizes the unique characteristics of individual acquisition programs. The framework includes a dedicated software acquisition pathway as outlined in DoD Instruction 5000.87 and promoted by the FY2020 NDAA and the DIB SWAP study,²⁰which emphasizes the use of modern development practices, including DevSecOps,²¹ and encourages greater collaboration between government and industry.

The AAF is a crucial step in the right direction, but its impact will depend on how effectively it is implemented across the DoD. To date, the adoption of the framework has been uneven, with some organizations moving quickly to embrace its principles and others lagging. Only about 50 efforts across the department are using it to date,²² and it is often viewed as unconventional or high-risk. It will be important for DoD leadership to continue to prioritize and incentivize the use of the AAF, and provide organizations the necessary resources, education, and support to enable its success.

Encouragingly, there are pockets of excellence within the DoD where forward-leaning leaders are already putting these principles into practice. The Navy’s Program Executive Office for Digital and Enterprise Services (PEO Digital) is restructuring its portfolio to deliver on modern metrics like adaptability, resilience, time lost, and cost per user. The program created a World Class Alignment Metrics (WAM) framework,²³ an industry best practice for better evaluating information technology (IT) investment and performance by connecting data to mission outcomes. The WAM framework translates technical and business metrics into outcomes important to the mission, enabling decision-makers at every level to make better-informed IT investment decisions that enhance customer experience and operational resilience, ultimately improving overall warfighting readiness. WAM also previews an alternative oversight mechanism. Instead of leaning only on milestone delivery status, metrics like WAM’s can shape investments and make sure that appropriated funds are delivering the mission outcomes we need.

The Navy’s PEO for Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO IWS) is similarly leading the way. The office has already stood up a software factory,²⁴ and it is working on a cATO process, opening up systems interfaces, implementing Modular Open Systems Architecture (MOSA) acquisition models,²⁵ using digital twins to enable federated software development, and pioneering a portfolio management approach across its more than 140 constituent programs. PEO IWS is the poster child for resourcing flexibility. As the PPBE commission’s recommendations around appropriation categories and portfolio management highlight, such flexibility is essential to create adaptability in combat capability.²⁶ Bit by bit, the Navy is moving closer to something like an app store model for deployment. For example, Project Overmatch and the Naval Command and Control Systems Program Office (PMW 150) oversaw the first ever over-the-air installation of a software element of a major acquisition program to a US Navy ship in FY2023, followed weeks later by the first over-the-air update.²⁷ While PMW 150’s progress looks humble to begin with, there is reason to believe these developments can be scaled significantly.

In the Air Force, the original Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) got off to a rough start, focusing more on demonstrations than solving the underlying problems associated with building and evolving modern battle networks.²⁸ But in recent years, the ABMS Cross-Functional Team has demonstrated a modern approach to requirements for adaptable capability. The program has well-vetted top-level needs and continuous measurements for assessing progress, but is careful not to over-specify solutions.

On the execution side, the PEO for Command, Control, Communications, and Battle Management (PEO C3BM) is pioneering a more adaptable way to build out complex battle networks and decision aids.²⁹ It has invested in accredited digital infrastructure and takes a modular approach. For example, it is deploying Tactical Operation Center-Light (TOC-L) kits as a basic building block for C2 infrastructure. The program’s goal is to deploy simple, proven technologies first, starting from a foundational level, then iterate and scale up to more complex capabilities over time, allowing systems to adapt more quickly to operational needs.³⁰ PEO C3BM’s approach takes inspiration from a systems theory principle called Gall’s Law.³¹ This principle suggests that complex systems that work invariably evolve from simpler systems that worked.

It is important for oversight bodies in Congress, the services, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to not simply hold programs accountable for fulfilling initial predictions, but to assess whether programs demonstrate effective learning and adaptation. The Air Force’s Kessel Run, with its software factory, was an early pioneer that delivered remarkable accomplishments.³² But it also fell victim to marketing hype, including with an early choice of development platform. To its credit, Kessel Run recognized this architectural misstep and course corrected. In another instance, the insights of highly talented technical personnel that Kessel Run brought in on a rotational tour of duty helped save the effort millions of dollars by identifying and averting a key architectural error. As Kessel Run shows, the path to success for software programs rarely follows an initial plan, but rather requires continuous learning, identification of issues, and adaptation as needed. Overseers should look for this type of demonstrated learning and responsiveness and hold it up as a positive example. Such a mindset mirrors the safety culture found in Air Force flight debriefings or civil aviation, where the focus is on honestly surfacing problems and learning from them rather than assigning blame.³³

The Army, whose reform efforts are led by its deputy assistant secretary for strategy and acquisition reform, has just marked a significant shift in how it approaches software development and deployment. This is indicated by the force’s sweeping new policy, Enabling Modern Software Development and Acquisition Practices.³⁴ The policy’s most important aspect may be that—like the Air Force’s ABMS effort— it seeks to change how requirements are written. The policy shifts software acquisitions to broad Capability Needs Statements (CNSs) and Software-Initial Capabilities Documents (SW-ICDs), which allow for iterative refinement as software development progresses. It also shifts more resource allocation authority to individual program managers and recognizes the need for continuous improvement and development throughout a system’s lifecycle, including during sustainment. Finally, the policy seeks to broadly scale these practices and set new norms across a wide range of software development efforts, as it is applicable to “all [software development] efforts executed across the Army.”

Inside the OSD, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for acquisition integration and interoperability (AI2) in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (OUSD (A&S)) is leading by example, demonstrating how to quickly implement the software acquisition pathway for joint programs, using the AAF for evolving requirements alongside development, and facilitating faster delivery of capabilities to warfighters.³⁵ This effort broke records by completing a draft SW-ICD in weeks and securing Joint Capabilities Board validation just a few weeks later. This is not only a model for software development, but for joint capability acquisition in general.

The Department of Defense is taking the data and data access problem increasingly seriously. It recently stood up the new role of chief digital and artificial intelligence officer (CDAO) as a principal staff assistant. This office is new but has the potential to break down data silos, ensure that system interfaces are exposed and made broadly available across program offices, and enable a broad community of government and industry partners to integrate data and build powerful applications—including those using artificial intelligence—on these robust assets. By building on Advana’s success in exposing data broadly, ³⁶ The CDAO can develop data repositories or libraries with the right safeguards to substantially increase the speed with which companies can develop data analysis software and improve such products’ abilities to produce accurate, meaningful analysis to inform mission decisions.³⁷

Congress directed the CDAO to “develop and report on an actionable plan for the deputy secretary to reform the technologies, policies, and processes used to support accreditation and authority to operate decisions to enable rapid deployment into operational environments of newly developed government, contractor, and commercial data management, artificial intelligence, and digital solutions software.”³⁸ This direction is well placed, as the office of the CDAO is home to the most prolific authorizing official (AO) in the Department of Defense. The CDAO’s AO has already completed more than 2,000 authorizations, with a typical timeline of 6 weeks instead of a typical 12-month cycle.³⁹ By contrast, some AOs at the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) are limited to approving only 12 systems a year. The department already has innovative, effective personnel driving positive changes. The DoD needs to figure out how to amplify their efforts, hold them up as models, and train others to follow their path.

These successful leaders and teams demonstrate that, even within the constraints of the current system, the DoD can achieve significant improvements in capability adaptability by keeping software fluid and allowing software developers to refine capability based on operational feedback. By embracing modern development practices, fostering close collaboration with industry, managing risk continuously, and empowering software teams to iterate rapidly, these organizations have been able to deliver real value to the warfighter at a pace that would have been unthinkable just a few years ago.

Looking ahead, it will be important for the DoD to build on these successes and scale them across the defense enterprise. This will require continued leadership and investment in software innovation and a willingness to experiment with new models and approaches. It will also require a concerted effort to capture and share best practices across the DoD so that more organizations can replicate and adapt successful models to meet the unique needs of their mission areas.

By learning from these promising developments and best practices, the DoD can begin to chart a path toward a more adaptable, software-driven future. While the challenges are significant, the potential benefits—increased agility, responsiveness, and operational effectiveness—are too great to ignore.

Key Recommendations

To overcome software adaptability’s challenges and build on its promising developments, the Department of Defense needs to take bold action across several key areas. The following recommendations are designed to accelerate the DoD’s progress and address the most pressing needs and opportunities for reform.

a. Enable personnel to rapidly deploy and update software.

The DoD should prioritize efforts to streamline the software deployment process and enable more rapid updating of software capabilities in the field. A key part of this effort will be to reform the ATO process. The DoD should move ATOs from a static, compliance-based model to a continuous, risk-based approach. This will require close collaboration between software development teams, cybersecurity experts, and operational commanders to ensure that software is deployed quickly and securely while also meeting mission needs. In particular, the department should make the following changes, which are within existing law:

Encourage accountability for authorizing officials around ATO approvals. The DoD’s chief information officer (CIO) can and should collect data cataloging all active AOs across the department, their approval throughput rates and timelines, and the portions of their ATOs that are continuous by design and have modern risk management features.

Establish a DoD-wide cATO framework. The DoD should broadly implement cATO frameworks and guidance to continuously manage risk. The department should leverage automation, standardize security controls and practices, and—combined with the training below—reduce deployment timelines significantly for new and updated software capabilities.

Establish an ATO accelerator program. The DoD should fund a project wherein the most prolific AOs in the department develop a curriculum to educate other AOs on high-throughput, risk-centric, agile best practices in the authorization ecosystem.

Champion ATO reciprocity within and between DoD programs, services, and agencies. This would enable the sharing and reuse of software platforms, components, and infrastructure across systems and networks. This would facilitate rapid integration of capabilities across platforms and military services. The department should move to a default yesposture for reciprocity and fund the development of a reciprocity playbook that establishes norms and standards.

b. Attract and empower top technical talent and foster a culture of doers.

To drive software innovation and adaptability, the DoD needs to attract and retain top technical talent from across industry and academia. While the DoD can outsource coding, it cannot outsource all the thinking or technical competence needed to structure a successful acquisition and development process. This will require a multifaceted approach that includes reforming the hiring process, ensuring that talented hires have autonomy in their roles, creating more flexible career paths, and providing employees with opportunities for continuous learning and development.

The Department of Defense has demonstrated that it can compete to hire great talent. In particular, the tour of duty approach, which the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Kessel Run have used to bring in industry talent on a temporary basis, has proven highly effective for sourcing personnel to contribute to specific projects. The limited term of the appointment motivates these temporary hires to make an impact before the clock runs out and pushes them toward action and accountability. Additionally, the fluidity between private and public sectors brings in fresh perspectives and cutting-edge familiarity with commercial trends.

The DoD needs to foster a culture of doers by encouraging accountability and pride in outcomes at the individual level. Below are three strategies to help do so:

Expand existing authorities that enable a tour of duty program. The DoD should widely adopt term appointments like highly qualified expert (HQE) positions and hold human resources (HR) organizations accountable for quick hiring. Organizations should be empowered to temporarily convert some permanent billets to term positions using tools like DARPA’s 10 U.S.C. § 1109 “direct hire authority” to encourage personnel rotation.⁴⁰

Overhaul performance evaluation. HR departments across the DoD should reform evaluation and promotion criteria for digital and technical roles to reward rapid delivery, user impact, experimentation, and continuous improvement rather than solely compliance with bureaucratic processes. The department should also create fast-track promotion opportunities for high performers.⁴¹ Moreover, the DoD should explore ways to streamline its hiring processes and reduce time-to-hire from months to weeks. This may require the department to comprehensively review the current process, eliminating unnecessary steps and leveraging automation where possible. But by creating a more agile and responsive hiring system, the DoD can better compete with the private sector for top talent.

Invest in training and development for acquisition professionals. Training innovation needs to keep pace with software innovation. The DoD should ensure its officers have the skills to implement the full spectrum of acquisition approaches and rapidly acquire software. The Defense Acquisition University (DAU) and other training organizations should expand their programs to emphasize procuring nontraditional and emerging technologies. Training programs should also utilize case studies and experiential learning to demonstrate how procuring software differs from procuring hardware and how working with small businesses differs from contracting with large defense primes.

c. Prioritize APIs and data accessibility.

The DoD should prioritize exposing the APIs and interfaces of its existing systems and, in accordance with the law, require that developers of new systems publish their APIs and interfaces as well. This would facilitate greater software adaptability, enable the composition of new tactics and operational concepts, unlock the power of data, and accelerate the development of AI capabilities. The DoD can no longer treat software like a hardware deliverable; it needs to embrace the fact that each component is part of a larger ecosystem of interacting elements. Greater accessibility would unleash a new industrial base to create the foundation for innovation in AI and machine learning applications. Specifically, the DoD should:

Establish clear guidance and best practices for API development and management. This effort should focus on exposing interfaces in machine-readable form and widely distributing them. The department should then propagate this guidance to PEOs, PMs, and contracting officers.

Publish comprehensive data catalogs that document key DoD data sources, data types, schemas, and APIs. The department should make these catalogs available to qualified users across the DoD, industry, and research community via platforms like Advana.

Broadly educate the acquisition and contracting workforce on MOSA.⁴² MOSA sets standards for interface definition and API delivery, and many acquisitions professionals and contracting officers would benefit from a greater understanding of it. The DoD should also update contract deliverables to move away from the boxed software model of delivery.

Stand up one or more centralized repositories for key interfaces, associated documentation, and reference implementations. Section 804 of the FY2021 NDAA explicitly called for the creation of these “interface repositories.” Yet they still have not been implemented.

Work with industry partners to ensure that critical interfaces are well-documented, secure, and scalable to enable continuous evolution and integration. The single best method for doing this is to create and share reference applications that use interfaces and link them together with other data, creating clear and unambiguous linkage between data types.

d. Embrace a diverse, software-centric industrial base.

The DoD needs to work to foster a more diverse, software-centric industrial base that can support its needs for adaptable, innovative software capabilities. America’s future industrial base needs will not be met by adding one more prime contractor. Washington needs to tap into a diverse base of hundreds or thousands of companies that have specialized capabilities that can be brought to bear.

There are cases where the DoD can and should meet its needs directly with commercial software solutions. When the department can clearly frame a need with a service level agreement (SLA), it should leverage readily available commercial offerings using the software as a service (SaaS) model. An SLA is a contract between a service provider and a customer that specifies the level of service expected, usually in terms of quality, availability, and responsiveness.⁴³ For example, a contract for a weather data feed could stipulate 99.9 percent uptime of 90 percent global temperature coverage, among other things.

Where needs are still too uncertain to accommodate such a framing, the DoD should not over-specify a requirement. The department should instead work with its industrial partners to gradually understand the intersection between technical feasibility and mission needs and develop high-value solutions. While some use cases may merit special consideration, the DoD should generally prioritize maintaining access to interfaces (to ensure interoperability) and avoiding vendor lock-in over seeking to own all software source code. This approach allows for a more collaborative relationship with industry partners, where requirements can be iteratively refined based on feedback and technological advancements.

These changes are already within the scope of existing law, but they require that the department commits to a sustained effort to drive change and position itself to harness the full potential of software for adaptive military advantage.

e. Adopt recommended resourcing reforms.

Finally, the DoD needs to strengthen available tools and establish new acquisition and budgetary tools that shorten the cycle time to develop and approve software projects, with automated reporting and review to enhance oversight.

The final report from the PPBE commission makes multiple recommendations that would support faster software fielding. These recommendations, if implemented, will have a broader impact than just software. The commission’s report recognizes the need for resourcing speed and agility given the reality of ever-increasing geopolitical threats and the acceleration of emerging technologies.

These PPBE recommendations acknowledge that PEOs and PMs need the agility to insert new technology and move modest amounts of funds in the year of a program’s execution. In addition, they recognize that PEOs and PMs would benefit from the ability to roll over small budget excesses into the following year. The recommendations also acknowledge that the misalignment of funding to appropriation category often delays program execution. Specifically, the commission recommends allowing procurement, RDT&E, or O&M funding to be used for the full cycle of software development, acquisition, and sustainment. Currently, costs and schedules are preset to hardware-centered regulations and processes that are mismatched to the speed of delivery needed for relevant software.

Conclusion

The United States stands at a critical juncture in its pursuit of military superiority in an era of strategic competition. While America still possesses the world’s most formidable military, Washington’s current approach to software development and acquisition threatens to undermine that advantage. 

Policymakers hold the map to a better way forward. The Department of Defense already has a handful of forward-leaning trailblazers who have succeeded amid organizations and processes built for a bygone era. But the US military need not be the victim of an industrial-age approach to digital-age capabilities. DoD leaders can learn from these trailblazers’ successes, amplify their efforts, and scale their models across the department.

The stakes could not be higher. If Washington fails to transform its approach to software, it risks ceding the advantage to its adversaries and losing the ability to compete effectively in the long-term strategic competition ahead. But if the DoD embraces the power and fluidity of software, empowers its workforce, and builds the technical and institutional foundations for adaptability, the US has the opportunity to out-innovate, out-adopt, out-scale, and out-compete would-be aggressors for decades to come.

About the authors:

• Ellen Lord, Senior Fellow, Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory
• Dan Patt, Senior Fellow, Center for Defense Concepts and Technology

Source: This article was published by the Hudson Institute

Appendix: Abbreviation List

AAF: Adaptive Acquisition Framework
ABMS: Advanced Battle Management System
AI: Artificial intelligence
AI2: Acquisition integration and interoperability
AO: Authorizing official
API: Application programming interface
ATO: Authority to Operate
BA-8: Budget Activity 8
C2: Command and control
cATO: Continuous Authority to Operate
CDAO: Chief digital and artificial intelligence officer
CI/CD: Continuous integration and continuous delivery
CIO: Chief information officer
CNS: Capability Needs Statement
DARPA: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DAU: Defense Acquisition University
DEAMS: Defense Enterprise Accounting and Management System
DIB: Defense Innovation Board
DISA: Defense Information Systems Agency
DoD: Department of Defense
FY: Fiscal year
HQE: Highly qualified expert
HR: Human resources
IT: Information technology
MOSA: Modular Open Systems Architecture
NDAA: National Defense Authorization Act
O&M: Operations and maintenance
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense
OUSD (A&S): Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment
PEO: Program Executive Office
PM: Program manager
PPBE: Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
RDT&E: Research, development, test, and evaluation
SaaS: Software as a service
SLA: Service level agreement
SWAP: Software acquisition and practices
SW-ICD: Software-Initial Capabilities Documents
TOC-L: Tactical Operation Center-Light
UAV: Unmanned aerial vehicle
US: United States
WAM: World Class Alignment Metrics

In a rare show of strength, last week the Indian Navy simultaneously deployed 11 of its 16 conventional submarines. The submarines were reportedly deployed at various locations in the Indian Ocean. The Indian Navy has not undertaken such a heavy simultaneous deployment in about three decades.

While this is a milestone, there is also the reality of the shrinking Indian submarine fleet. Without timely replenishment, India could end up with a submarine fleet similar to that of Pakistan, although Pakistan is the only South Asian navy that operates a submarine with air-independent propulsion (AIP).

Reflecting on the deployment and India’s failing submarine strength, an Indian naval official who spoke to the media anonymously said that he had “not seen such a high simultaneous deployment. This was basically because we did not have that many submarines in operations, and the fleet strength was hit by several undergoing refits or repairs.”

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Military Balance 2024 report, India has 16 operational submarines, which include five Kalvari-class (French Scorpene), four Shishumar-class (German Type-209), and seven Sindhugosh-class (Russian Kilo) submarines in operation. Another Kalvari-class submarine is to be commissioned into the navy soon; this will bring the overall number to 17.

However, the real question is “operational availability,” as another naval source told an Indian media outlet. According to this official, given that the Kalvari class is brand new, “their availability ratio is much higher.” The German-origin Shishumar submarines also appear to be high on reliability and performance, making their operational availability quite good. They are likely to be around for another decade and a half.

As for the Russian Kilo-class submarines, they are considered “very good but their availability ratio is down.” Given that the Russian Kilos became operational in the 1980s, with multiple repairs and upgrades already undertaken, they are close to decommissioning. The INS Sindhudhvaj, which was in service for 35 years, was decommissioned in 2022, while a second Russian submarine was refurbished and handed over to Myanmar in 2020, and a third (a new one actually) was lost in 2013 in an accident. The German submarines have also seen their service life extended through the medium refit life certification (MRLC) process, but they may outlast their Russian counterparts in the Indian Navy.

The Indian Navy’s pitch for another six advanced submarines is facing considerable delays, to the tune of ten years. It is unlikely that the first of these will be delivered by 2030.

Meanwhile, Germany is pushing for an intergovernmental deal to supply new submarines to India. As of February, both Germany and Spain are competing for the $5 billion-plus deal with India. Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) of Germany and Navantia, Spain’s state-owned firm, are in the final race, having met the different criteria set out by the Indian Navy for six P-75I submarines. Navantia has partnered with an Indian firm, Larsen & Toubro, while TKMS has tied up with the Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL). Under the Navantia-L&T agreement, Navantia will design the P-75I submarines, and L&T will construct the submarines. These submarines will be designed on the basis of Spain’s S-80 class, which was launched in 2021. Germany has made a proposal for a government-to-government deal to sell the six submarines to India.

Indian official sources who have spoken to the Indian media say that the next submarines that will be inducted should have a well-established AIP module that will allow the submarine to stay submerged for two weeks. Going by the latest reports, both bids have been evaluated and some preliminary assessment has been made. Reportedly, Navantia has proven its capability and has agreed to a complete technology transfer. Navantia’s AIP module is also considered to be more efficient. And given that Navantia is a state-owned entity, governmental guarantees have greater reassurance value.

While India’s underwater combat capabilities are one issue, there is also the issue with the overall numbers for the Indian Navy. India has ambitious plans to have a much larger and capable fleet by 2050, but there are several constraints, including budgetary limitations and scaling issues. Based on India’s strategic requirements and vast coastline, India aims to have a fleet of around 155-160 warships, including submarines, aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates, and other vessels, by 2030. This is in line with India’s broader maritime strategy to augment its naval capabilities and ensure maritime security in the Indian Ocean region (IOR). However, one official source who spoke on condition of anonymity said, “The figures are dynamic. But the aim now is to have at least 175 warships — if not 200 — by 2035 for credible strategic reach, mobility and flexibility in the IOR and beyond. There will have to be a concomitant increase in the number of fighters, aircraft, helicopters and drones.”

China’s growing maritime power has pushed India to become more serious about its naval strength, but the speed of indigenous production and acquisition has not kept up with the Indian Navy’s goals. Gaining access to stealth technology, financial latitude, and the lack of serial production capabilities have all been slowing down the Indian acquisition process and contributing to the depleting size of the Indian naval fleet.

---

• About the author: Dr Rajeswari (Raji) Pillai Rajagopalan is the Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology (CSST) at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.  Dr Rajagopalan was the Technical Advisor to the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) (July 2018-July 2019).  She was also a Non-Resident Indo-Pacific Fellow at the Perth USAsia Centre from April-December 2020.  As a senior Asia defence writer for The Diplomat, she writes a weekly column on Asian strategic issues
• Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation and originally appeared in The Diplomat.

Thursday’s announcement by the US Census Bureau that it will, for the first time, include a limited category for Americans from the Middle East or North Africa is clearly a political and desperate ploy by President Joe Biden to counter the growing opposition to his reelection bid among Arab and Muslim voters.

Under the banner #AbandonBiden, Arab and Muslim Americans are refusing to vote for Biden during the Democratic primary elections, instead selecting “uncommitted” or writing in “Gaza Strip” as a way to protest the Biden administration’s funding and arming of Israel’s post-Oct. 7 military assault on the Gaza Strip, which has taken more than 32,000 lives.

The US Census Bureau announcement follows the pattern of Biden responding in partial and fractured ways in an attempt to satisfy Arab and Muslim voters and get them to return to the fold. I do not think it will work.

Census forms will, from the next survey in 2030, mention four of the 22 Arab countries by name: Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Egypt. But the new MENA banner will also cover Israel and Iran.

All other Arab Americans, including the two largest Arab populations in America (Palestinians and Jordanians) and the fastest-growing population (Yemenis), will be required to continue to write their nationalities on a separate blank line.

Arabs have been allowed to write in their nationalities for years, but only a small segment of the community has done so, due to them feeling politically excluded.

Instead of pushing for an “Arab” category, many Arab American groups opted to compromise, hoping that the “MENA” section would list all 22 Arab nationalities. But that is not the case and many leaders have told Arab News they are disappointed.

Inclusion in the census is critical to countering the stereotypes in America that have fueled racism and held the community back on almost every level. Once identified in the census, ethnic and national groups can qualify for federal funding to promote their identities and culture. Such a move would also allow the funding of advertising to strengthen the weak Arab American news media.

More importantly, once identified in the census, national groups like Palestinians would receive political continuity protections, meaning that the political powers would be prohibited from redrawing congressional districts to divide large, cohesive Arab populations.

Several years ago, Democrats in Illinois did just that, dividing the 3rd Congressional District, which had one of the country’s largest concentrations of Palestinian American voters. This district elected pro-Palestinian champion Marie Newman to Congress in November 2020. A year later, Democrats seeking to silence Newman’s pro-Palestine voice redrew the district, diluting the Palestinian American voter strength.

Newman attempted to win the 6th Congressional District in 2022 but was defeated in the Democratic primary by Sean Casten, who Arab American leaders have described as “unresponsive” to the community’s needs and concerns. Casten opposed calls for a Gaza ceasefire resolution and has accepted pro-Israel political action committee contributions to his campaign fund.

By limiting the MENA listing to only four Arab nationalities while also including Israel and Iran, the US Census Bureau is attempting to make everyone happy. It will not work.

Similarly, instead of supporting the adoption of a humanitarian ceasefire resolution in the UN Security Council, Biden’s ambassador to the organization Linda Thomas-Greenfield abstained on last week’s vote, allowing it to pass with a weak mandate. On three previous occasions, Thomas-Greenfield vetoed similar resolutions to satisfy the pro-Israel community in the US, which has a much stronger voice than Arab Americans.

Biden’s half measures will only further aggravate the Arab American community’s opposition to his reelection. Activists have repeatedly told me that “four years of negative rhetoric” under Donald Trump, who will face off with Biden in November, is far more appealing than four months of Biden’s funding and arming of Israel’s carnage in the Gaza Strip.

Trump insulted Arabs and Muslims with his words and restrictive policies. But Biden’s policies have failed to prevent thousands of deaths and helped to create even greater uncertainty for Palestinian statehood.

Biden should find the courage to do what is right. Arab Americans have been calling for inclusion in the census since the early 1980s. They have been actively engaged in every aspect of American society, not just in politics, and have defended America by serving in all the country’s conflicts since the Civil War.

Arab Americans are fully American and, one day, they will be treated as such and be given the same rights and benefits as all other Americans, as well as a more engaged place in US politics. But that will not happen by accepting half measures or Biden’s breadcrumbs.

The #AbandonBiden movement is ensuring that our voices will be heard in the upcoming presidential election, telling Democrats — the political party that has long claimed to be more supportive of Arabs than the Republicans — that Arab Americans cannot be taken for granted.

The #AbandonBiden group is not advocating for Trump’s reelection. They plan to gather in the fall to consider alternative candidates to endorse. But Democrats like Biden cannot claim to support Arab American interests while offering diluted rights to the community. They need to be shown the power of the Arab American vote.

One day, Arabs in America will be formally identified as what they are: Arab. This will not be achieved through incomplete gestures or diluted references that seek to satisfy other powerful political lobbying groups.

We have earned and we deserve respect.

Iran: The Christians celebrating Easter in secret  BBC

USC hosts lecture on fate of Armenian language  Daily Trojan Online