Day: March 28, 2024

Sen. Bob Menendez decides not to delay May trial with appeal of judge’s ruling  WRIC ABC 8News

Georgia govt. honours players for historic Euro 2024 qualification  ESPN

Media: Armenian exports to Russia rise despite political tensions  Kyiv Independent

By C. Todd Lopez

The Defense Department relies heavily on space-based satellites for much of the work it does to defend the United States, and that reliance is expected to grow in coming years.

While space assets such as satellites will always be at risk from U.S. adversaries, the best way to ensure continued access to space capabilities is proliferation, Derek Tournear, director of the Space Development Agency, said.

“Proliferation is our biggest defense,” Tournear said while speaking Wednesday during a panel discussion sponsored by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, a nonpartisan policy research institute based in Arlington, Va. “That’s how we plan on really getting the resilience and the defense of our entire architecture.”

The SDA is responsible for orchestrating development and implementation of the Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture. The PWSA will include a mesh network of hundreds of satellites to provide space-based capabilities to the joint warfighter. 

The strength of that network of satellites, he said, is expected to come not from defensive capabilities that focus on individual satellites, but rather from the sheer number of satellites launched. Protecting individual satellites becomes less important, he said, when there are so many of them.

“That’s the way you have to look at it when you’re talking about proliferated constellations,” he said. “Each individual one you can’t really care about. You have to care about the health of the whole herd, the health of the whole architecture. And so, we have everything in place to make sure that we can maintain that resiliency and maintain … operations even if you start to lose [individual satellites].” 

Tournear also said that cybersecurity plays an important role in protecting the PWSA, however. 

“Obviously we have cyber protections in place to protect the entire architecture and the network, and we have a lot of the environmental sensing pieces that are in place to give us an idea of what’s going on,” he said. “We put GPS situational awareness sensors on our satellites for those kinds of things, to make sure that we can kind of sense the environment.”

The PWSA system will eventually include hundreds of satellites, delivered in tranches every two years, with each tranche providing more capability than the last.

The network of hundreds of optically connected satellites will deliver two primary capabilities to warfighters on the ground. The first is beyond line-of-sight targeting for ground and maritime time-sensitive targets, which includes mobile missiles and ships, for instance. The system will provide the ability to detect those targets, track them, calculate a fire control solution and deliver that solution down to a weapons platform so the target can be destroyed. The second capability is similar to the first, but for enemy missiles already in flight.

The PWSA involves seven layers, including a mesh network of hundreds of optically interconnected satellites in orbit that make up its transport layer. There will also be tracking, custody, deterrence, navigation, battle management and support layers.

The NATO-Ukraine Council met on Thursday (28 March 2024) following recent Russian airstrikes on Ukraine. Allies strongly condemned the escalation in Russian air strikes and reaffirmed their commitment to further strengthen Ukraine’s defences. 

The meeting was held at ambassadorial level and was convened at Ukraine’s request. Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoana chaired the Council and Ukrainian Defence Minister Rustem Umerov joined via video conference. The Deputy Secretary General said: “Russia’s continued attacks against Ukraine’s civilians and critical infrastructure demonstrate an urgent need for our continued support.”

Allies are providing unprecedented military, financial and humanitarian aid to Ukraine. France will soon send more Caesar howitzers and several Allies have joined Czechia’s initiative to procure 800,000 additional artillery shells. NATO is establishing the Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre in Bydgoscz, Poland where Ukrainian forces can train alongside Allied troops. In addition, under NATO’s Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP), the Alliance is supplying crucial non-lethal support.

Allies agreed at the Vilnius Summit in July 2023 to create the NATO-Ukraine Council. It serves as a forum for crisis consultations and decision-making between NATO and Ukraine.

By Prof. Ecaterina Matoi

Introduction

On March 22^nd, 2024, a terrorist attack on the outskirts of Moscow resulted in 133 deaths and more wounded at the moment of writing of these lines. It took place before the concert of rock band Piknik at Crocus Center, a band that had been banned in Ukraine (2016) after performing in Crimea.

The attack has been condemned by multiple officials around the world, including United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterrez, while the Russian Federal Security Service forces arrested 11 individuals, among which possibly Tajik nationals. Some of them were allegedly gunmen that shot people, while heading for the Ukrainian border. Following names were mentioned initially: Nasridinov Makhmadrasul, Ismonov Rivozhidin, Safolzoda Shokhinjonn and Nazarov Rustam (Morozov & Sudakov, 2024). A larger list of suspects was published by Anton (Gerashchenko, 2024) on Twitter/X: 1. Faizov Rivozhidin Zokirdzhonovich (20.05.2004), 2. Ismoilov Rivozhidin Islomovich (25.09.1972), 3. Faizov Muhammad-Sobir Zokirdzhonovich (20.05.2004), 4. Nasramailov Makhamadrasul Zarabidinovich Nasramailov (21.07.1986), 5. Safolzoda Shohinjon Abdugaforovich (28.07.2002), 6. Nazarov Rustam Isroilovich (02.01.1995).

While multiple media outlets propagate the so-called claim of Islamic State on the attack, an alleged increased activity of Center for Information and Psychological Operations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (TsIPsO) has also been reported in Russian mass-media, along with the claim that whoever carried out the attack, the “organizers” or “customers” may be different (Topwar.ru, 2024). This analysis explores various past and present regional developments in relation to the Crocus terrorist attack, given the complex and dynamic background of what essentially can be equated to an American-led revival of the Cold War in a more complex, contemporary form.

Brief review of the Cold War outcomes on the global stage

The complexity and implications of much denounced Cold War will not be analysed in this review, but certain elements may be relevant to the Crocus terrorist attack at least indirectly. This major confrontation of the 20^th century was considered to be bipolar, and it dominated the history of global affairs from this period. However, it must be emphasized that it was not the only significant political narrative, as many countries were still struggling for independence in a presumed post-colonial order that was supposed to bring more equity among nations. While many countries in the industrialized West were competing in terms of economic size, many African states were still lacking large-scale electricity sectors, Iran was undergoing the Islamic revolution and major wars like the ones from the Korean Peninsula, Vietnam or Afghanistan were already considered proxy wars between American-led Occident and an assertive USSR. Major characteristics of this confrontation that are considered relevant for this study are related to the scale of this confrontation, the fact that the two major poles attempted to rally behind them third party actors (for example Cuba as a contextual ally for the USSR or Mujahideen for the Americans), i.e., proxies, and replacement of the colonial struggle with an alleged ideological confrontation between “democracy” and “communism”.

USSR’s collapse in the early 1990s has been interpreted as winning the war, which was indeed acknowledged by all parties at that time. However, it is important to emphasize that this was not a victory comparable to normal war victories: the successor of USSR, i.e., Russian Federation, did not come under direct/indirect American influence, as in other cases, its currency was not changed as in Germany and Russians agreed to approve independence of territories under the condition that NATO and the Western Sphere will not expand eastwards. Moscow also maintained its rule over regions inhabited by other ethnic populations, or with religions other than Russian Orthodox Christianity, like for example the Republic of Tatarstan.

The democratic/liberal sphere however expanded its influence gradually in former USSR territories, as the world was supposedly entering a unipolar format. Russia maintained a regional influence, but was not able to retaliate to NATO and EU expansion in Eastern Europe during the first two decades after USSR’s disintegration. Furthermore, the promise of global peace remained desiderate, as the push of Western economic and military alliance resulted in other wars, the most prominent being the ones from Afghanistan and Iraq.

From a capitalist perspective, the other side of the democracy coin, it made sense to move towards the former USSR territories: the war was expensive and these regions could have benefited from a capital-driven development as well. The extent of Western expansion in Eastern Europe or Central Asia and associated dynamics shall not be discussed in detail, but it is a given: Western companies invest and seek strategic positioning in the new markets. Amid a sinuous relation between the US and Russian Federation, marked by strategic ambiguity and an apparent rapprochement, Europe and especially Germany benefited from cheap Russian energy among other commodities in what appeared to be a generally peaceful development. However, the first decades after USSR’s collapse were not entirely peaceful in and around Russian Federation, episodes like the Chechen War or invasion of Georgia being represented in the West as a Russian unsuccessful bid to become more democratic and respect what is generally called other nations’ sovereignty.

However, neither such episodes nor longer conflicts like Nagorno-Karabah dragged Russia into a conquest war. The 2014 Maidan coup, however, represented a real turning point that determined the Russian Federation to occupy Crimea. Justified as retaliation to Western expansion, this occupation may have been considered a strategic imperative for military defence of Russian territory as well. The move emboldened American-led NATO to push further eastwards based on at least two possible arguments: Russia occupied Ukrainian territory and it might become more anxious about Western expansion into former USSR territories, hence weak. Given the 1990s outcome, it would be rather improbable to consider that the Russian Federation can defend its stance in the region, and this assumption probably dominates nowadays decision-makers.

Hence, following major characteristics can be associated to the post-Cold War period for the purpose of this study: a Western alliance pushing eastwards, into former USSR territories based on the conviction that USSR lost the Cold War in a similar manner that other parties lost wars, frictions around West and South-West borders of the Russia Federation and a novel form of proxy confrontations characterized among others by the emergence of extremist organizations, employment of private military companies and an ever growing propaganda that competes even the original Cold War misrepresentations. It must be emphasized that the military confrontations with Russians take place mostly around its borders (Russian presence in Syria is considered relatively limited) although the scale and intensity of the wider multifaceted confrontation cannot be isolated geographically. From this perspective, France’s reaction to developments in the Coup Belt, and Russia’s success in replacing French influence from countries like Niger, that delivers vital uranium ore for France’s atomic-based energy supply system, represent an exemplary case of proxy political confrontation that has the potential to accentuate the military confrontation at Russian borders.

Extremist organizations, proxy wars around Russian Federation in the 21^st century

At present, the Russian Federation does not have a common border with Afghanistan anymore, but USSR’s past conflict with this country remains an important episode in the era of Cold War proxy wars. In article titled: “US created Taliban and abandoned Pakistan, says Hillary,” “Dawn” publication cited what Mrs. Clinton had mentioned related to this issue in 2009 (Dawn, 2009). The article cites following statement: “Let’s remember here… the people we are fighting today we funded them twenty years ago… and we did it because we were locked in a struggle with the Soviet Union.” Other assumptions that the US contributed at least to creating and/or funding/arming this movement are mentioned in an article that scholar Michael Rubin wrote on the topic. While mentioning opinions of other scholars (Jeffrey Sommers, David Gibbs, Robert Fisk, writer Mort Rosenblum), that allegedly claim “…Usama bin Ladin’s al-Qa’ida group and Afghanistan’s Taliban government were really creations of American policy run amok” (Rubin, 2002).

This article presumably aims to counter or weaken the assumptions of other scholars claiming that the US / Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) played a role in the Mujahideen victory against USSR, but it does not clearly contradict them: the article does not mention that CIA had nothing to do with this affair, but that the argument is “inaccurate”. Rubin states: “…the “blowback” argument—that Central Intelligence Agency policies of the 1980s are directly responsible for the rise of the Taliban—is inaccurate” (Rubin, 2002). The alleged countering of arguments is further marked by ambiguity: “In fact, neither bin Ladin nor Taliban spiritual leader Mullah Umar were direct products of the CIA” (Rubin, 2002), the ambiguous term here being “direct product”. Hence, this remarkable work appears to an accurate representation of facts, but it hardly contradicts directly the opinions that support the thesis of US involvement in Taliban’s victory over USSR.

Irrespective of the accuracy in describing the US role in the development of Taliban, either by former official Hillary Clinton or (various) scholars, two assumptions are unambiguously clear: the Mujahideen/Taliban became a legend in terms of fighting arrogant imperialism – both the Soviet and later the American ones, and this model appears to have spread, with or without a US role throughout the world. Two possible roles can be considered from this perspective: the direct or indirect support for rebel organizations or challenging such organizations and determining them to become stronger through actions like, for example, the Drone Wars from Yemen.

The fact that Afghan Mujahideen model worked against USSR expansionist tendencies can hardly be contested. The American failure to counter them with the help of Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance is a testimony to this historical fact. A 2010 article from The Guardian, revealing that a “…secret ‘black’ unit of special forces hunts down Taliban…” also states among others: “A huge cache of secret US military files today provides a devastating portrait of the failing war in Afghanistan, revealing how coalition forces have killed hundreds of civilians in unreported incidents, Taliban attacks have soared and NATO commanders fear neighbouring Pakistan and Iran are fuelling the insurgency” (Davies & Leigh, 2010).

At the moment of American and allied forces’ withdrawal from Afghanistan back in 2021, the relations between the US and Russian Federation were tense but not fully blocked: signs of fundamental disagreements after the rapprochement attempts in the 1990s appeared in the form of competition in Ukraine after 2008 Bucharest NATO summit and continued with decisions like the US withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty withdrawal in 2019. Amid this frenemy relation, the US negotiated with Russian Federation a possible relocation of its assets from Afghanistan in Central Asia before the 30^th August, 2021, withdrawal. The hope that allied forces will leave Afghanistan might have been appealing for Moscow, hence in July 2021 the Russians signalled a possible acceptance for Americans to use its former bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan for “limited security operations in Afghanistan” (Eurasianet, 2021). The US withdrawal from Afghanistan has had far-reaching implications for the region and certain countries. It was not a complete defeat as some observers attempted to portray it, as USSR’s disintegration was not a complete defeat for the Russians 3 decades before. Some of the implications shall be described in the following paragraphs, as the American and allied withdrawal implied the withdrawal of its Northern Alliance human and equipment assets from a new hostile Taliban-led environment.

Preparations for US withdrawal from Afghanistan began in early 2021 and a New York Times article listed a couple of measures like for example: Turkish troops present in Afghanistan after retreat, helping CIA to collect intelligence, maintenance of civilian contractors (16’000 out of which 6’000 Americans according to cited Pentagon numbers), possible repositioning of forces in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, deployment of surveillance drones and attack planes, long-range bombers, etc. (Schmitt & Cooper, 2021). In the same pre-withdrawal period, the American General Tod Wolters is cited when stating that NATO will continue to train Afghan Special Forces, probably in Europe (Tucker, 2021).

The American and European withdrawal from Afghan territory was accompanied by Afghan allies’ withdrawal shortly before 30^th of August as well. This confirms the existence of a relatively mobile force supported by and previously working for the interests of US and its allies in Afghanistan. Two August 2021 reports are relevant from this perspective: the Wall Street Journal announced on August 18^th, 2021 that “a large portion of the Afghan Air Force ended up in neighbouring Uzbekistan…”, with at least 46 (US-supplied) aircraft and helicopters crossing the border to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan (Cullison & Lubold, 2021), and the Times of Israel cited AFP and AP reports claiming that a US Military C-17 aircraft evacuated 823 Afghans to Qatar in the wake of Taliban takeover (AFP & AP / The Times of Israel, 2021). On September 21^st, a report from The Intercept claims that the son of Ahmad Shah (leader of Northern Alliance), Ahmad Massoud (a Tajik ethnic), fled to Tajikistan together with Amrullah Saleh (former Afghan vice-president and head of intelligence) in the aftermath of Taliban’s Panjshir Valley takeover (Cole & Klippenstein, 2021). The article mentions that Massoud hired Robert Stryk Washington-based lobbyist and Senator Lindsay Graham “embraced” Massoud and Saleh, as he is “keen on the U.S. returning to Afghanistan” (Cole & Klippenstein, 2021). Therefore, the initial assumption that Taliban victory has not been final and the US disposed/may dispose of a relatively mobile friendly political and military force in the region, i.e., in Tajikistan and other Central Asian countries, is confirmed by multiple factual reports.

With respect to the topic approached in this study, there are unofficial reports claiming that some of the Crocus attackers might be Tajik nationals. Furthermore, Russian media claims that as of March 2022, Ukrainian embassies, including that from Dushanbe, Tajikistan, was recruiting mercenaries (Topwar.ru, 2024). The same article also claims that the so-called IS/ISIS “…arose…with the direct participation (of) American intelligence agencies, primarily the CIA” (Topwar.ru, 2024).

Further unofficial allegations claiming that the US could have supported extremist organizations like ISIS-K were formulated by the investigative journalist Alex Rubinstein (based in Mexico City, previously working with Russia Today, Sputnik, Mint Press and The Grayzone) (Rubinstein, 2021). Other Russian-affiliated sources appear to claim that ISIS was a British proxy (Vestnik_RUS, 2024). Such allegations are not officially confirmed; hence they cannot be considered as a basis for this analysis. However, the possibility of Ukraine recruiting foreigners for its “International Legion for the Defense of Ukraine,” including from Central Asia, cannot be excluded. Likewise, Russian Federation’s recruitment of Central Asian mercenaries is discussed in detailed media reports (EUToday Correspondents, 2023).

The synergies that have the potential to connect the pro-West Afghan military and political mobile assets from neighbouring countries like Tajikistan are mainly the anti-Russian and anti-Taliban common stances, and the possible presence of Tajik nationals on the Ukrainian front. The American perspective on the Crocus terrorist attack appears to be an arrogant imperial one. The fact that Western intelligence agencies allegedly warned own citizens (on March the 7^th) and allegedly Russian authorities about possible attacks, is equated by the pro-Russian Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic with interception of communication and (precise) knowledge on the terrorist attacks preparations (TASS Russian News Agency, 2024). In a BBC article, the security correspondent Gordon Corera (based in London), suggests that the Russian authorities had been warned by Washington, stating: “There are always questions after any attack as to why it was not stopped or detected” (Corera, 2024). The article claims, in what appears to be a renewed propagandistic attack on the Russian administration, that the warning was “unusually specific.”

The argument is based on alleged Washington’s disclosure on: imminent possible attacks by extremists, targeting large gatherings in Moscow and the so-called Islamic State (IS). The article claims that the warnings have been allegedly dismissed by Moscow, and in a clear attack against newly re-elected President Putin, the order was to focus on the “special military operation” from Ukraine. Since further details were missing from the warning (like for example perpetrators or locations and precise content of exchanges), President Putin is cited mentioning that the Washington warnings “resemble outright blackmail and the intention to intimidate and destabilise our society” (Corera, 2024). Claims that Russian administration simply ignored warnings, or that President Putin has “particularly difficult issues,” are at least speculative.

They are in line with the pressure campaigns that Western spheres of influence exerted on the Russian administration in order to overthrow the establishment and potentially make gains in the difficult Ukrainian front. The difficulties of British and Americans related to Ukraine are not necessarily direct imperatives in the sense that the war chests are already empty, but the difficulty of this confrontation appears to increase. Hence, is there something the Russians or Americans could have done to prevent the Crocus terrorist attacks? Certainly yes, and certainly there was a Russian security breach/failure to safeguard its citizens. However, this double-edge sword can open various possibilities: either the pressure on President Putin’s administration will increase and an overthrow becomes more imminent, or the Russian Federation can claim higher legitimacy in attacking Ukrainian and foreign mercenary forces on the front. Either way, the chances for this situation to get worse before getting better increase.

Crocus terrorist attack as distraction from critical simultaneous developments

Should this alleged so-called Islamic State operation strengthen Western interests in Ukraine and Central Asia, it can potentially alleviate pressure from a tense Western environment. While the US remains an uncontested global superpower, with great influence in European affairs and global military presence, new developments like for example China’s accelerated economic and political rise appears to determine Washington to exhibit what can be perceived as signs of weakness. Among these, one can mention the now overwhelming use of financial sanctions with possible negative consequences on the stance of dollar around the globe, the authoritarian-like attempts to overtake Chinese strategic assets like TikTok American branch, a risky ban on Huawei, etc. On the other hand, pushes by various American representatives for Europeans to buy as many American weapons as possible, and get more involved in the Ukrainian tragic conflict, have the potential to compensate at least on short-term for the overall risks the US undergoes when challenging a claimed future multipolar world. However, amid an accelerated global warming process and an environmental risk, the world is arming itself and Europe aims to develop an indigenous military complex on short and middle term.

The US is also confronted with what can be perceived as an internal political crisis, marked by a fierce battle between the camp of Democrats and that of former President Donald Trump, unclear economic perspectives although the financial and economic data (definitions always in a modernization process – but as of September 2023 poverty rate in the US was reported at 12.4 % (Ney, 2023), while Russian Federation’s poverty rate was reported a poverty level dropping at 9.3 % in 2023 (Reuters, 2024). Although the definitions may influence numbers in both cases, and the results posted can be used as propaganda arguments, a possible deterioration in US social fabric cannot be completely overruled.

The US finds itself in a position difficult to defend vis-à-vis the developments in Gaza Strip: on one hand it claims loud and strong that it does a lot for the Gazans, waving a military pier near Gaza with the declared purpose of helping delivery aid, and at the same time it delivers significant quantities of weapons and munitions to Israel, pushes for Israel’s recognition by Saudi Arabia and sets further traps for the Palestinians through various manoeuvres like for example the United Nations Security Council Resolution proposal rejected by China, Russian Federation and Algeria on March 22, 2024 (Psaledakis & Brunnstrom, 2024). Further potentially risky adventures that expose a relatively new US facet include the Julian Assange affair, a business that easily allows US opponents to make their point on a possible American duality or double standard in treating matters.

Conclusion

The March 2024 attack on the Crocus City Hall represents a clear breach of Russian security. According to the Russians, it emerged amid a perceived blackmail from the Americans, but British flagship BBC published an article claiming that a main cause of the tragedy might have been the focus on the conflict from Ukraine. This study details the background of American-led presence in Afghanistan and Central Asia, weaponization of the Mujahideen against USSR as presented by cited sources, as well as subsequent weaponization of other ethnic minorities against the Taliban (like for example the Tajiks). It also determines that in August 2021, it was not only the Western troops that withdrew, but Afghan opponents of the Taliban also took refuge in Central Asian countries, while the US promising training of the “opposition” in Europe and potential support for the resistance against the Taliban.

The study also identifies possible synergies between the alleged attempt of Crocus City Hall perpetrators to flee to Ukraine: both Ukraine and the Russian Federation may have recruited Central Asian mercenaries to fight the other camp. The Crocus terrorist attack might have ruined Russia’s image on short term, but it can also legitimize a possibly stronger Russian aggression in Ukraine, as certain supporters of this archaic type of confrontation, that tragically killed hundreds of thousands of soldiers from both sides combined, are looking for options to sustain an idea they do not associate themselves with openly. Continuation of the push towards Russian Federation’s borders represents a more direct threat than Russian operations from Africa, for example, but the presumption that the American-led offensive will be successful as it was towards the end of the Cold War will require, at best, probably millions of deaths to be proven. And the casualties will probably hit mercenaries and allies before they hit the core war supporters, unless decision-makers find a modern way to overcome what Thucydides considered to be a trap repeating itself throughout history. 

• About the author: Prof. Ecaterina Matoi is Program Director at the Institute MEPEI from Bucharest, Romania. Her areas of expertise and interests are: National Security, Middle Eastern Studies, SSR in Post-Saddam Iraq, Disinformation, Cultures and civilizations; The Military in 20th Century Middle East Politics; Geopolitics of the Persian Gulf region and nuclear policies in MENA.
• Source: This article was published at IFIMES, and an earlier version of the text appeared with the MEPEI Institute. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect IFIMES official position.

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Editor’s Note: On Tuesday, six out of the eight judges of Islamabad High Court wrote a letter to the Supreme Judicial Council members complaining about interference of Pakistan army’s spy agency Inter Services Intelligence [ISI] in judicial affairs. 

The piece below which was published in Eurasia Review on December 1, 2019 addresses this very issue and is hence being republished [in original]. 

The cavalier manner in which the Government of Pakistan (GoP) proceeded to grant army chief Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa a three-year service extension was rightly struck down by the Supreme Court (SC) of Pakistan causing immense embarrassment to the government as well as the army.

The SC verdict has given detractors a handy stick to pommel Prime Minister Imran Khan and the PTI. But even though being no fan of his, I still feel that all the hue and cry being raised is unwarranted and that Khan and his advisors are unnecessarily being hauled over coals for having followed precedent rather than going by the law, just like governments in the past had been doing.

By stating in its order that “The learned Attorney-General (AG) has taken pains to explain that the answers to these questions (on grant of extension to the army chief) are based on practice being followed in the Pakistan Army but the said practice has not been codified under the law,” even the Supreme Court of Pakistan too has tacitly accepted that while what Khan did is illegal, but it isn’t something earth-shattering!

Yet, by advising the government to “Put your house in order” and giving it six months to promulgate legislation for service extension, CJP has minced no words in conveying that the judiciary would not accept any fait accompli.

This is not the first time that service extension to an army chief has been challenged in court. Readers would recollect that in 2010, the Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP) had granted a three-year service extension to Gen Parvez Kayani and though this decision was challenged in Islamabad High Court, it was dismissed as being “non maintainable.” Though this was a hasty judgment that went in favour of the army chief, yet it didn’t cause any ripples at home or across the world as people largely agree that Pakistan is rightly referred to as a nation that belongs to the army and not vice versa!

Fast forward to 2019 and we have a three-member bench headed by Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP) Asif Saeed Khosa admitting the petition submitted by Raiz Rahi challenging Gen Bajwa’s extension. The bench found merit in the complaint and when the plaintiff sought to withdraw his petition, the CJP rejected this request and instead took it up as a public interest litigation under Article 184. After deliberation the three-member bench noted that the “AG failed to point to any existing law” on the basis of which Gen Bajwa was given service extension.

By suspending the government’s notification granting service extension to Pakistan’s army chief (who is incidentally the country’s most powerful entity), the CJP has shown that he is not only full of spunk but also possesses exemplary professional integrity. His blunt but incisive observation that “There is no check on the activities that are going on in cantonment or under which law an action is being taken” aptly reflects the sorry state of affairs prevailing in Pakistan for which he deserves due appreciation. His actions may antagonize the military but it was necessary to this ‘hard’ decision in order to make it clear to one and all that that in a democracy, no one is above the law!

But the most assuring thing is Khosa’s rejoinder that “Now a constitutional institution is examining this matter” as it clearly conveys the message that henceforth only legal provisions and not precedent or “practice being followed in the Pakistan Army” would be acceptable to the judiciary. By giving the government six months to frame legislation for granting service extension to army chiefs, CJP has added the element of urgency to this issue.

How are Khosa’s observations received by the army is yet to be seen, but one thing that’s absolutely clear is that he doesn’t seem to be the type who will let Rawalpindi have its way as far as the judiciary is concerned.

Allegations of the army meddling with the judicial process in Pakistan are rampant and even though the army vehemently refutes it, one has to take these denials with a pinch of salt as evidence to the contrary is aplenty. In July last year, Justice Shaukat Aziz Siddiqui of the Islamabad High Court severely embarrassed Rawalpindi by revealing that Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) “personnel get benches (in courts) formed at will.” When Pakistan army insisted that this allegation was false and asked the Supreme Court to investigate the same, instead of doing so, Siddiqui was summarily sacked by the President on the recommendations of Supreme Judicial Council of Pakistan.

Needless to say, this kneejerk axing sent out a clear message to the judiciary that the army had ‘zero tolerance’ for any criticism of ISI. But just seven months later, in a landmark judgment issued on the Tehreek-e Labaik Pakistan (TLP) sit-in agitation case, Supreme Court Justice Qazi Faez Isa made a stinging reference to the Pakistan army by concluding that “The perception that ISI may be involved in or interferes with matters with which an intelligence agency should not be concerned with, including politics, therefore was not put to rest.”

Justice Isa’s misgivings weren’t misplaced because everyone knows that the agreement between the government and TLP to end this agitation was brokered by the army and Maj Gen Faiz Hameed of the ISI had signed this agreement in the capacity of ‘guarantor’. That’s why by stating that “The government of Pakistan through the Defense Ministry and respective chiefs of the army, the navy, and the air force are directed to initiate action against the personnel under their command who are found to have violated their oath (of not engaging in any kind of political activity),” Justice Isa has left nothing to imagination!

Therefore, even if it rubs Rawalpindi the wrong way, but for the overall good of Pakistan, Khosa’s endeavour to reassert the judiciary’s credibility by freeing it from interference from the army and intelligence agencies needs full public support!

Tailpiece- The army may have rejected charges levelled by Justice Shaukat Aziz Siddiqui regarding the ISI’s involvement in ‘fixing’ judicial benches and Justice Qazi Faez Isa’s observation of the ISI delving into politics. But what does Gen Bajwa have to say on Gen Pervez Musharraf’s own 2016 revelation about the army’s effective influence over the judiciary? After all, didn’t Gen Musharraf himself admit that “once he (Gen Rahil Sharif) got the government to relieve the pressure that they were exerting, the courts gave their judgment and allowed me to go abroad for treatment”?

In his March 24^th opinion piece for the Times, David Brooks agrees with a “broad consensus atop the Democratic Party” (is there room for such breadth on the peak of that lofty mountain?) saying that Israel has the right to defend its apartheid regime by killing, banishing or imprisoning not only Gaza’s entire military but its entire elected government (the West Bank’s elected government, as well, but for a 2007 Israel-assisted coup there reversing the election).

Brooks approves of this “consensus” among top Democratic party officials, but laments that it’s not the whole story, as those leaders, he feels, also believe the ongoing extirpation can and should be conducted more humanely.  How could it be conducted any differently than it is, he asks, when Gaza has tunnels?!?!

Brooks seems earnestly to believe that a military enemy’s retreat underground requires ever more frenzied massacres of civilian populations left on the vacated surface. In his opinion piece Brooks intones the ritual cliché that by burrowing as far as it possibly can from the Gazan population – in the sole direction a hyper-crowded bantustan affords, which is downwards – Gaza’s Hamas-party government has chosen to use the population as “human shields.” To Brooks, the Gazans trembling before an Israeli troop detachment are “in between” those troops and their underground foe in some odd, non-Euclidean geometry where triangles are straight lines. All of this, in short, can’t be flat-out ethnic cleansing for its own sake. Brooks echoes Israel’s claims that each humanitarian institution making Gaza livable had, before its inevitable destruction, a Hamas base directly beneath it, later undetectable amidst the rubble. One wonders, short of tunneling into the next life, how Gaza’s elected defenders could have put themselves at sufficient distance from their families and friends that Israeli and American genocide apologists would stop slaughtering those families, then trusting the quick verbal ritual of “human shields” to wash bloodsoaked hands and souls beige-pink again.

Brooks feels the tunnels are a monstrously wasteful overspend on Hamas’ part – his clichéd assertion that Gaza-under-apartheid has, of all nations, the least (and not the greatest!) need of military spending is of a piece with his “human shields” cliché, depending as both ideas must upon the desirability of Gazans simply, and unfussily, dying.  

But the horror of Gaza’s military and government existing at all depends as well on the media-frenzy myth that has sprung up around October 7^th.  Genocidal racists habitually summon up, then effortlessly believe, the most absurd such myths and this is no exception.  Does Palestine, alone among nations, deserve to exist without a military and without a government – that is, stateless, in pure enslavement – due to a special inhuman savagery of this one attack? 

On Oct 7 Hamas engaged in a sortie to kill Israeli soldiers and armed, combatant ex-military (nearly all adults in Israel are ex-military, trained precisely to fight alongside Israel’s troops at such moments) while taking noncombatants hostage to trade for the Gazan civilians Israel already held hostage in four figures, without trial or charge.  Hamas will have taken hundreds more hostage than the reported 250 who reached Gaza alive on Oct 7 – hundreds killed by IDF pilots whose Hellfire missile strikes would leave Gaza littered with melted cars packed full before their destruction, and rows of Israeli houses reduced to ashen rubble – Gazans, hostages and all – clearly not by the guns, grenades and RPGs with which Gaza’s soldiers were equipped but by Israel’s own tank shells and helicopter-fired missiles.  One pilot, invoking the infamous Israeli policy of killing hostages to prevent hostage exchanges, assured Ha’aretz that elimination of hostages was existing policy: “once you detect a hostage situation, this is Hannibal … What we saw here was a mass Hannibal. There were many openings in the fence, thousands of people on many different vehicles with hostages and without.”  Concertgoers at the rave, though caught between two military bases under attack, were roadblocked against escape by an IDF terrified of further Gazan infiltration, and many report that after they had fled their cars, an IDF uncertain of their identities appears, in defense of Israel’s shaken authority, to have begun picking them off from the air.

Many actually unarmed civilians, actually killed by Gaza, will have fallen to the “fog of war”  and many also, as with any military action, to the rage or callousness of individual soldiers, but not enough for their deaths to have been the sortie’s goal.  They will almost certainly have died in fewer numbers than Israel’s own, unanswered, civilian death toll counted over any two successive years of Gazan quiescence and in incommensurably smaller numbers than the civilian lives any modern U.S. intervention reaps within its first 24 hours.   Unlike Israel’s answering genocide, this wasn’t even “terror” – this military action had specific goals from which mass killing of civilians (hence any terror motive) were notably absent: from what Gaza had to accomplish with its action, there wouldn’t have been the time.  Pure fictions about beheadings, tortures, and sexual violence, though amplified by top Democrats including Pres. Biden himself, are unsupported by the identification of even a single victim, and clearly invented to justify the massive terror for which, David Brooks argues, those Dems show insufficient enthusiasm.  

Would the collateral damage in our own wars – not to mention Israel’s – justify the complete dismantling of the U.S.’ military and our elected government, top Dems and all, leaving our population completely defenseless and in an open air prison?  Because unless apartheid containment of certain populations – certain cultures, certain races – is justified, Gaza’s violence was clearly far, far more just  than any U.S. military engagement of the last seventy-five years; and its “collateral damage” comparably less blameful, even if ramped up to the horrific death tolls we – not to mention our Israeli client – customarily inflict.

Decades after the U.S.’ last plausibly ethical war, the genocide scholar Hannah Arendt warned us that “those who choose the lesser evil forget very quickly that they chose evil.”   In the 2024 election, no broad consensus will exist beneath the Democratic Party to support the genocidal fervor so devoid of mercy at its top. Despite Brooks’ assurance, no consensus likely exists among Dem leaders that their genocide is insufficiently humane: instead they seem to note with alarm that its cruelty has become an electoral liability for them, and an obstacle to fantasies of a restored unipolar dominance over a planet wracked with growing disgust for country and its leadership. Our Bidens and Clintons hope to squeeze through to victory through cosmetic gestures like the toothless demand for Netanyahu to cede his position to an even more bloodthirsty member of his own far-right government, and the Israeli-drafted plan for construction of a Genocide-Islandpier over which still-starving Palestinians can be forced onto exile ships if Egypt continues in refusing to dot the Sinai Desert with their refugee-tent cities. 

If top echelons of the Democratic or Republican parties minded starvation warfare, minded genocide, then our arms shipments to Israel would cease until Israel was one majority-Palestinian state with voting rights for all who had forgone fleeing to Europe or America with their apartheid-requisitioned wealth, and instead remained to share in the region’s poverty and precarity, performing the rightly arduous work of making neighborly amends. While few tools remain with which to denazify U.S. culture – at least, not from within the U.S. – some remain, and one of them consists of inching the Democrats towards basic humanity with not merely the threat, but the accomplished example, of resounding electoral defeats.  Our commitment, not just to ending the genocide in Palestine, but to sustaining and upholding Palestinian democracy and with it, Palestine’s elected government, requires that lesser concerns for our safety and comfort be put aside so that the beginnings of a punishment of genocide – falling sadly short, at first, of Hague tribunals – might take place even here, within the United States.

NPR News: 03-28-2024 6PM EDT

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