Day: March 25, 2024
The dictatorship of Ilham Aliyev should also go to the dustbin of history https://t.co/NFWdhAXxok
— Emin Bred (@emin_bred) March 25, 2024
Vladimir Putin’s Russia is like a kitchen grease fire: You either put the fire out now, or you wait and dramatically increase the risk of losing your entire house. pic.twitter.com/w0JxmxTG5Y
— Fred Hoffman, D.Sc. 🇺🇸 (@InfoAgeStrategy) March 25, 2024
Authoritarian thugs like Ilham Aliyev should be treated this way. His regime must fall. https://t.co/6WJdXFwa0y
— Emin Bred (@emin_bred) March 25, 2024
By Pavel Luzin
In recent weeks, Russian President Vladimir Putin has outlined the Kremlin’s negotiation proposal. He has proposed conducting strategic arms and space negotiations in exchange for pausing the fighting in Ukraine. The nuclear blackmail toward the United States and its allies is a part of this framework.
Other Russian officials and experts loyal to the Kremlin are playing good cop/bad cop in outlining these negotiations. The harsher officials insist on the capitulation of Ukraine, while the softer ones are promoting a so-called “Korean Scenario.” The latter describes a ceasefire–or at least decreasing the intensity of warfare–and keeping all the occupied territories in Russian hands.
One possible explanation for why the Kremlin is pushing the “Korean Scenario” is a consistent exhaustion of the arms storage bases that Russia inherited from the Soviet Union. This exhaustion is still in process, but Russia may lose its offensive potential by 2025 as these stores are used up (Kremlin.ru, February 20; Globalaffairs.ru, February 23;Kremlin.ru, February 29; Kremlin.ru, March 1; T.me/Medvedev_telegram, March 14).
Soviet-era arms storage bases are one of the primary sources that still allow the Russian armed forces to fight despite massive losses on the battlefield. Russia has been removing supplies of tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery from these storage bases since 2022. The arms produced in the 1940s–1960s—many of which were decommissioned many years or decades ago—have returned to the battlefield. The stored arms are also massively cannibalized for spare parts, which Russian arms factories and hundreds of field arms repair facilities utilize (The Moscow Times, August 7, 2023; TASS, November 22, 2023; Vedomosti, December 30, 2023; Interfax, January 31; TASS, February 20).
These storage bases are not endless despite Russia keeping thousands of tanks and howitzers after 1991. Moreover, Russia cannot replenish these arms and material. If Ukraine can maintain a high level of combat intensity and the mounting level of Russian losses continues in 2024, it will be much harder for the Russian army to maintain its military power for offensive operations in 2025. That means the conventional Russian military threat to states other than Ukraine will become much more limited.
Before this expected exhaustion, Russia’s military behavior may become even more erratic and volatile in the Ukrainian theater than in other areas, such as outer space (Kremlin.ru, March 1). Consequently, commitment from the West to send arms to Ukraine must be substantial and unquestionable for the defeat of the Russian aggression and the security of Europe and other countries.
There is an evident decrease in almost all categories of heavy weapon systems, based on comparing the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ (IISS) Military Balance—an annual assessment of military capabilities and defense economics—from 2021 to 2023 (see the table below) (IISS.org, accessed March 14). The numbers provided by the IISS are approximate. Moreover, if the number of any single type and model of weapon decreases, this does not mean that these arms have become operational or have been cannibalized already. They could have been delivered to factories or somewhere else. However, what is occurring is obvious: Russia is taking more and more arms from the storage bases, which is an irreversible process.
The existing number of stored arms is still enough for Russia to continue its aggression even though those arms have been taken from the storage bases into service, which can be returned to operational status faster. Nevertheless, Russia’s resources are not endless, and Russia could finally be defeated in the war in the foreseeable future. The main pre-condition here is continued and scaled military assistance to Ukraine.
Table: Russia’s arms in store according to the Military Balance of 2021–2023, units
| Type | Name | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
| Main battle tanks | T-72/T-72A/B | 7000 | 7000 | 5000 | 4000 |
| T-80B/BV/U | 3000 | 3000 | |||
| T-90 | 200 | 200 | |||
| T-55 | 2800 | 2800 | |||
| T-62M/MV | 2500 | 2500 | |||
| T-64A/B | 2000 | 2000 | |||
| Armored vehicles | BRDM-2 | 1000 | 1000 | 1000 | 100 |
| BMP-1 | 7000 | 7000 | 4000 | 2800 | |
| BMP-2 | 1500 | 1500 | |||
| MT-LB | 2000 | 2000 | 2000 | 1000 | |
| BTR-60/70 | 4000 | 4000 | 4000 | 1300 | |
| Self-propelled artillery | 2S1 Gvozdika | 2000 | 2000 | 2000 | 1800 |
| 2S3 Akatsiya | 1000 | 1000 | 1000 | 750 | |
| 2S5 Giatsint-S | 850 | 850 | 850 | 750 | |
| 2S19 Msta-S | 150 | 150 | 150 | 150 | |
| 2S7 Pion | 260 | 260 | 260 | 160 | |
| Towed howitzers | D-30 | 4400 | 4400 | 2500 | 2400 |
| M-30 (M-1938) | 3750 | 3750 | 2000 | 2000 | |
| M-46 | 650 | 650 | 350 | 350 | |
| 2A36 Giatsint-B | 1100 | 1100 | 600 | 550 | |
| 2A65 Msta-B | 600 | 600 | 400 | 250 | |
| D-20 | 1075 | 1075 | 750 | 700 | |
| D-10 (M-1943) | 700 | 700 | 500 | 500 | |
| M-1937 (ML-20) | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| B-4M | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 | |
| MLRS | BM-21 Grad | 2000 | 2000 | 2000 | 1500 |
| 9P138 | 420 | 420 | 420 | 200 | |
| BM-13 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | |
| 9P140 Uragan | 700 | 700 | 700 | 550 | |
| Mortars | 2S12 Sani | 1000 | 1000 | 500 | 500 |
| M-1938 (PM-38) | 900 | 900 | 450 | 450 | |
| M-160 | 300 | 300 | 150 | 150 | |
| 2S4 Tulpan | 390 | 390 | 200 | 160 | |
| Nona-S | 500 | 500 | 500 | 350 |
- About the author: Dr. Pavel Luzin is a visiting scholar at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He is also a regular contributor at The Jamestown Foundation, Riddle and the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He is a specialist in international relations and an expert on the Russian Armed Forces. Much of his research and writings focus on Russian foreign policy and defense, space policy and non-proliferation studies.
- Source: This article was published by The Jamestown Foundation’s Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 21 Issue: 40
By Manoj Joshi
The writing on the wall has been there for sometime. since the Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014, it has been clear that Europe needed to get its act together on its defence. Yet, the sense of urgency has only hit after the full-fledged Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
Now it has been magnified with the emergence of Donald Trump as the leading contender for the US presidential elections later this year. Trump’s disdain for NATO, the alliance which is committed to defending Europe, is well-known. He has long believed that it is “a drain on American resources by freeloaders.”
Trump created a political earthquake of sorts in early February when at a rally in South Carolina he recounted that the leader of a “big country” asked him whether he would defend an ally against the Russians even if they were delinquent in their payments by failing to spend 2 percent of their GDP on defence. “No, I would not protect you,” said Trump, “In fact, I would encourage them to do whatever the hell they want.”
Speaking to the conservative British GB News on Tuesday, Trump did say that he would “100 percent” keep US in NATO if he returned as President as long as the European countries pay their “fair share” adding tartly that “The United States should pay its fair share, not everybody else’s fair share. In any case, a pullout from NATO will not be easy for Trump. In December, Congress passed a bill to prevent a president from withdrawing from the alliance without the approval of Congress.
The most immediate impact of Trump’s thinking on Europe would be on Ukraine. In the past two years since the Russian invasion, NATO has played a key role in helping Ukraine defend itself. Trump claims he would have settled the war in 24 hours if he was president. Just what he means by this is not clear, but his other remarks suggest that he would push a deal in which Ukraine would have to surrender its eastern lands to Russia.
A Ukrainian collapse would have widespread repercussions in Europe and raise fears of possible Russian aggression against Baltic States like Estonia and Latvia, each of whose population comprises of nearly 25 percent ethnic Russians. It would, of course, undermine American security guarantees globally, especially in the Indo-Pacific.
Expanding European defence
Slowly but steadily now, the Europeans are making haste in revitalising their defence posture. As of now European NATO members spend about US$380 billion on defence, which is the same as Russia in PPP terms. But because this expenditure is distributed among many countries its impact is less. The challenge before the EU is not just spending the money, but doing so while ensuring a certain sense of equity among its 27 members and Norway who constitute their defence grouping.
Last week, the European Commission allocated €500 million under its Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) to enable the European defence industry to ramp up its ammunition production capacity to 2 million shells by the end of next year. This would effectively double the current capacity. The Commission has selected 31 different projects to boost European ammunition production.
There is little doubt that the ASAP has been motivated by the developments in Ukraine where the diversion of ammunition by the US to Israel last October has been a severe setback for the Ukrainians.
The Commission also addressed the issue of consolidating European defence industry which is scattered in various countries by encouraging European Defence Industry through Common Procurement (EDIRPA) work programme and the European Defence Fund (EDF). These programmes have a combined budget of €2 billion and they seek to reinforce the somewhat moribund defence technological and industrial base.
The EDIRPA with a total budget of €310 million will support common procurement in three areas—1) ammunition for small arms, artillery, mortars and rockets; 2) air and missile defence; and 3) platforms and replacement of legacy tanks, armoured vehicles, drones and support systems. It hopes to get proposals in these areas from member states by July this year. The EDIRPA is aimed at enhancing defence capabilities by encouraging EU members to commonly procure equipment for their armed forces.
To ensure European capabilities in defence technology, the EDF work programme has called for proposals for which it has allocated €1.1 billion which includes defence start ups operating through the EU Defence Innovation Scheme (EUDIS).
The EDF is the instrument through which the Commission is hoping to boost defence R&D and cooperation by promoting research between large and small companies throughout the EU and Norway. It has established a fund worth €8 billion for the 2021-2027 period to support collaborative R&D of new defence technologies among its members.
All these measures are being underwritten by the Commission’s European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) which seeks to ensure a longer term approach for industrial readiness. The first ever European Defence Industrial Strategy was approved at the beginning of March this year. It has outlined an ambitious set of actions to support the competitiveness and readiness of Europe’s defence industry.
As part of this, the Commission has approved its first operational measure, a European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) to start implementing concrete measures under the EDIS. Under this financial support will be made available to European defence industry. In addition, it would aim at strengthening the competitiveness and resilience of EU’s Defence Technological and Industrial Base. This would also provide for cooperation with Ukrainian recovery, reconstruction and modernisation. Its bottom-line aim would be to provide defence products on a steady and regular volume.
So overall, the EU is now taking a multi-pronged approach to strengthen its defence capabilities which involves, first and foremost, increasing defence spending. The second is establishing the EDF to handle future contingencies. Third is approaching joint procurement through initiatives like the EDIP to reduce duplication. In addition, the EU is seeking to enhance military cooperation among members and address the obvious gaps such as that in ammunition supplies and intelligence gathering.
Yet, the past weighs heavily on Europe. As of now they are €56 billion short in meeting their defence spending target, though the good news is that the shortfall has halved in the past decade. According to NATO officials, two-thirds of its members will meet the target of spending 2 percent of their GDP on defence this year, this is up from just three countries in 2014.
Even now, many of the bigger countries have not been able to hit the target of 2 percent of—Italy, Spain, Belgium—because of their fiscal situation. Even giants like Germany, have spent just 1.39 percent, some €14 billion less than needed to meet the benchmark. Last year, two thirds of the €1.2 trillion NATO defence spending was by the US, more than double of the €361 billion spent by the EU, United Kingdom and Norway combined.
It’s not that they are not trying. There have been countries like Poland, which has historical fears of Russia, and which has aimed tol spend 4 percent of its GDP in 2024 on defence. A recent report has noted that Ukraine is set to receive large shipments of ammunition because of the efforts of the Czech Republic which had managed to source nearly a million shells from various sources.
Recently, leaders of France, Germany, and Poland, known as the Weimar triangle met to display a sense of strength and unity in the face of the current gloomy situation in Ukraine. Among the more important decisions they took was to abandon the French suggestion that procurement of ammunition be limited to Europe alone, but be expanded to cover the world. France and Germany have to play a leadership role in Europe and they are spearheading joint military projects such as the Future Combat Air System and the Main Ground Combat System.
As of now, there is no doubt that a sudden withdrawal of American power would be devastating for Europe. There would be a range of issues from the geopolitical ones to the tactica ones thatl they need to handle.
But demonstrating to the world, to Russia as much as the United States, that they are capable of looking after their own defence would be a major deterrent against further Russian aggression.
Implications for India
What would be the implications for India? Nothing dramatic. A consolidation of EU defence industry would enable possible future collaboration on defence programmes.
Another aspect would be the situation that could arise in the event of a US withdrawal from NATO and a resultant Ukrainian collapse. Without doubt this would have global consequences with regard to the US as a reliable ally and partner with implications for not just its allies, but partner like India as well.
- About the author: Manoj Joshi is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
- Source: This article was published by Observer Research Foundation
Given fast-growing coastal populations, African youth should be the focus of climate adaptation efforts and the blue economy.
By David Willima and Dhesigen Naidoo
Africa is highly dependent on its fishing value chains, with fish providing 30% of animal protein in people’s diets. Research from WorldFish indicates that in a business-as-usual scenario, this industry will employ 21.6 million Africans and generate an income of US$3.3 billion by 2050. In the plausible high-growth scenario, the numbers jump to 50.8 million jobs and revenue of US$20.4 billion.
But all of this is under threat as climate change wreaks devastation on Africa’s fishing industry and coastal communities. As sea levels rise and climatic conditions such as acidification affect ocean health, the livelihoods of those who live along the shoreline are at stake.
Disaster risk reduction measures are needed fast to mitigate these impacts and their threat to human security. And by focusing on working-age youth to implement these measures, an imminent crisis can become an opportunity to mitigate climate disaster and generate a demographic dividend.
Climate change is forcing coastal communities to deal with hotter oceans and rising sea levels – both of which could have catastrophic consequences if not curbed. Sea temperatures have surged almost 1oC above the 1971-2000 average. The effects of warmer waters are apparent with high-energy storms like Cyclone Freddy, which devastated Southern Africa, and Storm Daniel, which ravaged Derna in Libya.
Climate change is wreaking devastation on Africa’s fishing industry and coastal communities
Water levels have risen globally by 21-24 cm compared to 1880. In the latest scenarios, if the temperature increase is restricted to 1.5oC, the sea level rise in 2100 will be 28-55 cm. Further delays to ending the use of fossil fuels might land us in a +4.4oC world by 2100 – with a sea level rise of 63-101 cm.
Such levels would compromise most of Africa’s coastal towns and cities, with devastating effects on island states like Mauritius, the Comoros and Seychelles. Apart from drowning out coastal settlements and developments, saltwater intrusion on freshwater resources would drastically reduce water security and compromise coastal crops and livestock farming. This is already happening on the island of Nyangai off the coast of Sierra Leone. High-value infrastructure would also be threatened in more developed cities, with severe development impacts.
Africa’s population will grow by 27% this decade. It will be higher in coastal cities, with the seven largest – Lagos, Luanda, Dar es Salaam, Alexandria, Abidjan, Cape Town and Casablanca – growing by 40% in the same period. These increases are being fuelled by the economic importance of coastal cities.
At the same time, the continent’s blue economy, including ports, fisheries, tourism and other coastal activities, is expected to grow significantly. World Bank estimates suggest an expansion from US$296 billion in 2018 to US$405 billion by 2030. African governments recognise this potential – the continent’s Blue Economy Strategy and Great Blue Wall initiative were actively reinforced at an African Union meeting in June last year.
In Africa’s seven largest coastal cities, the population will grow by 40% this decade
Africa’s growing population is young, with 40% aged 15 or less in 2022, and an average age of 20. This demographic trend is crucial in understanding the disproportionate impact of climate change on the youth.
As coastal cities experience rapid population growth, young people’s vulnerability to climate change intensifies, especially those dependent on agriculture and fishing. Climate change will severely jeopardise their employment opportunities, with a loss of livelihoods leading to multi-generational poverty.
Crime rates could rise as people search for alternative sources of income, and climate-induced displacement and economic hardship will create fertile ground for radicalisation and violent extremism, adding to insecurity in coastal communities.
Forced mobility is another potential problem. Rising sea levels and environmental degradation will compel young people to migrate further into and outside the continent, often facing perilous journeys and uncertain futures.
Africa’s coastal resources hold tremendous potential for development driven by its youthful population
Intersectional factors such as age, gender and socio-economic status exacerbate risks for marginalised youth. Young women in the blue economy often encounter additional obstacles in accessing education or employment, compounding their vulnerability to the impacts of climate change and their ability to adapt. Examining these intersectingchallenges is essential to address the unique needs of marginalised youth in coastal Africa and to scale up indigenous, innovative adaptation measures.
Studies show that the emergence of piracy in Somalia was multifaceted, driven not just by poverty and the lure of fast money, but by a resistance to foreign fleets exploiting marine resources. Climate change will exacerbate such pressures. In Somalia’s case, the ocean economy is pivotal to the country’s stability. However significant reductions in fisheries due to climate change and natural ecosystem variability threaten food security and income generation in a region already facing insecurity.
Africa’s coastal resources hold tremendous potential for sustainable development driven by the continent’s youthful population. A focus on tackling the climate crisis could present an opportunity for young people to take the lead in building resilient coastal communities for the future.
About the authors:
- David Willima Research Officer, Maritime
- Dhesigen Naidoo Senior Research Associate, Climate
Source: This article was published by ISS Today