Month: February 2024

Inal Ardzinba, the de-facto top diplomat of Russia-occupied Abkhazia, threatened the “timely and adequate response” against the United Nations Development Program at a meeting with its program manager, Vardon Hoca (Hoxha), if the UN agency does not officially refute “the goals of a USAID-funded project” by March 7 at 6:00 p.m., the media reported on February 29.

He also demanded the publication of the list of Abkhaz information resources funded by UNDP, as well as the objectives and volume of their funding.

Ardzinba reportedly protested to Hoca “the publication on the official website of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) of information indicating the goals and objectives” of funding of UNDP by the USAID, which, as the de facto authorities say, include “de-occupation of Abkhazia” and “countering the harmful influence of the Kremlin”.

According to Ardzinba, such a publication damages UNDP’s reputation as a UN agency and “contradicts the purposes of the UN Charter.”

In addition, Ardzinba reportedly drew the UNDP program manager’s attention to “specific facts of UNDP funding of Abkhaz information resources that attempt to destabilize public opinion.”

In November last year the de-facto authorities said they would ban the international organizations which recognize the occupation from entering Abkhazia. Soon in December 2023, in response to concerns about “non-transparent activities and perceived misinformation”, Ardzinba, announced a new approach to dealing with international NGOs and UN agencies and declared USAID Regional Director Persona Non-Grata. According to Ardzinba’s statement, the decision was in particular prompted by ‘discrepancies found in project questionnaires’, notably the ones from the UN Development Programme’s Partnership for Sustainability, which is funded by USAID.

Also Read:

• 27/01/2024 – EU Special Representative Denied Entry into Occupied Abkhazia

On February 29, the employees of the occupied Gali police department, David Kvekveskiri was arrested in Zugdidi, in connection with the brutal murder of Georgian citizen Temur (Vitali) Karbaia, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia confirmed to Civil.ge. Kvekveskiri was detained on charges related to the illegal purchase and storage of firearms, according to Article 236 of the Criminal Code.

According to Ekho Kavkaza, which cites the de-facto Abkhaz prosecutor’s office, on December 6, 2023, Kvekveskiri detained Temur Karbaia and conducted an illegal body search. When Karbaia allegedly began using obscene language, Kvekveskiri reportedly beat him. Zarakua and Abshilava, employees of the occupied Gali police department, then joined in and physically assaulted Karbaia. Both of the perpetrators were arrested on February 10.

The beating caused bodily harm to Karbaia in the form of blunt trauma to the chest on the left with a fracture of four ribs, bruising on the upper and lower eyelids of the right eye. He was taken to a temporary detention center until his release on December 7. Karbaia passed away on December 9 at Sokhumi hospital, where he had been transferred from Gali hospital the day before “due to poor health.”

The three were reportedly arrested in December in occupied Gali region in connection with the murder, but later released according to local Georgian media.

On February 29, the Speaker of the Georgian Parliament, Shalva Papuashvili calls on EU to “distance itself from the slanderous allegations of MEPs”, in response to amendments initiated by MEP Anna Fotyga to two European Parliament resolutions adopted on February 28 to include the issue of the pardon of former President Mikheil Saakashvili.

According to the amendments, the European Parliament “reiterates its calls to release former president Mikheil Saakashvili on humanitarian grounds and encourages President Salome Zurabishvili to use her constitutional right to pardon him, which would contribute to reducing the political polarization in the country.” In addition, MEP Fotyga emphasized that “Mikheil Saakashvili is a personal enemy and prisoner of Putin” and that the EP “cannot allow for him to perish in prison.”

Papuashvili writes on social media that “a huge gap of misunderstanding about Mikheil Saakashvili between his foreign patrons and the Georgian people continues to harm our foreign relations”. He notes that “while Saakashvili’s lobbyists hail Georgian ex-President’s ‘deeds’”, the same person is a “widely despised authoritarian figure” for Georgian public. Therefore, Western pro-Saakashvili statements create a “cognitive dissonance” and raise “suspicions about as to whether hailed ‘Western values’ are a mere ruse for promoting certain geopolitical objectives.”

The Speaker underlines that the issue of Putin-Saakashvili confrontation “may represent an appealing idea” for EP, but this is a “misperception” and in reality, Saakashvili is the leader during whose rule 20% of Georgia was occupied. Papuashvili notes that “Saakashvili’s foreign friends and protectors” stayed loyal to him “despite mass human rights violations”, meanwhile vilifying “Georgian Dream’s impressive democratic record” for over a decade.

Papuashvili stresses that United National Movement, the largest opposition party in Georgia, has lost all the elections since 2012 and “even struggles to clear the electoral barrier for this year’s elections and is quickly becoming a marginal, fringe political group in Georgian politics”, which he notes is “a good indication of what people think of the UNM’s chieftain”. The Parliament’s Speaker calls out Saakashvili supporters for “having completely lost touch with reality.”

Concluding the statement, Papuashvili writes: “The time has come for the European Union to officially distance itself from the slanderous allegations of MEPs. Our question to the EU is whether they share common values with Georgian people or MEPs’ particularistic interests guide them. We believe what matters is our common cause of Georgia’s European and Euro-Atlantic integration. We should look to the future.”

Also Read:

• 10/07/2023 – Speaker Papuashvili: Some East European Governments Skeptical Because Their Political Partners in Georgia are in Opposition, not in Government

Russia has failed to live up to its promises of a swift takeover of Ukraine. As the war enters its second year, it’s clear that Russia’s battlefield results do not match Vladimir Putin’s ambitions, further fueling Moscow’s desperate attempt to gain the upper hand in the information war. 2023 was the year of the Kremlin’s intricate social media campaigns and expanded global information operations, all aimed at weakening Western support for Ukraine and creating public discontent within the country.

The study, “Undermining Ukraine: How Russia widened its global information operations in 2023,” conducted by the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), examines Russian media campaigns against Ukraine around the world. According to the study, throughout 2023, Russia relied on its rich toolbox for conducting information operations, including the use of coordinated inauthentic networks on social media platforms, exploiting regional grievances with the West, hacking, and forging documents, among other tactics. The report highlights that the greatest intensification of efforts has been registered in the propaganda spread on social media, especially on TikTok.

Regarding Georgia, the report says that the Georgian Dream-led government expanded its ties with Russia both  politically and economically  after the invasion in February 2022, exploiting popular fears of the war spreading to Georgia, to further cement the government’s pro-Russian stance.

The Kremlin’s information war hasn’t been limited to the West and the South Caucasus. Over the past year, Russia has actively used information operations to undermine Ukraine in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East.

The Tools of Modern Warfare

In 2023, the largest Russian-based covert operation was identified on TikTok. In one of the cases, 12,800 different accounts were created with the specific aim of spreading disinformation about the alleged corruption scandal involving Oleksii Reznikov, the former Ukrainian Defense Minister. These videos were later distributed on Telegram and X (formerly Twitter).

The social media of Ukrainian and Western NGOs were often under attack. Their pages would receive a suspicious phishing message sent from an account named “Meta Service”, and as the administrators of the accounts followed the instructions to solve the problem, they would lose control over the page.

To further blur the lines between falsehood and reality, the Russian hackers hacked into the websites of popular Ukrainian online media channels and uploaded news stories about forged official Ukrainian government documents showing corruption deals made by high-ranking officials. These articles were quickly deleted, and the Russian propaganda channels spread the screenshots, claiming that the Ukrainian media had been forced to “cover up” the story. This tactic was used mainly to provide “examples” of how Ukraine is selling on the black market the weapons donated by the West.

In 2023, “Operation Doppelganger” was in full swing. As part of this campaign, almost identical websites to most reputable media outlets were created to spread pro-Kremlin news. At the same time, according to the report, Russia successfully exploited “useful idiots” in the West – “intellectuals and influencers who downplay Russia’s regional ambitions while blaming the West and NATO expansion for causing the war” (the list include: Viktor Orban in Hungary, Marine Le Pen in France, and Sahra Wagenknecht in Germany).

Pro-Russian Sentiments in Georgia

Regarding Georgia, the report reads that Georgian Dream-led government has strengthened ties with Russia, using fears of war and “second front” rhetoric to undermine support for Ukraine and advance its own agenda. Over the past year, Georgia has increased trade with Moscow, particularly in gas, and resumed direct flights with Russia, sparking EU and Ukrainian criticism and domestic protests. The Georgian government has also shied away from broader sanctions against Russia, citing the risk of economic collapse.

Meanwhile, Georgian Dream has stepped up its anti-Western rhetoric and initiated restricting laws against civil society and the media. The Government has even accused USAID of fomenting revolution. Russian and Azerbaijani media amplified these claims, accusing the U.S. of orchestrating revolutions abroad.

Case Studies

The report includes case studies providing concrete examples of how Russia and its proxies adjust their information operations according to their interests and targeted countries.

In Poland, false claims targeted Ukrainian refugees, blaming them for the Legionella bacteria outbreak that reportedly killed at least five people in the southeastern Polish city of Rzeszów. In addition, the disinformation falsely portrayed Polish intentions as hostile to Ukraine, including allegations of plans to annex Ukrainian territory. Fabricated content about Wagner fighters near the Polish border was disseminated to instill fear. Russian spy groups were exposed in Poland, leading to arrests on charges of espionage and sabotage.

In Moldova, Russia has used several tactics to increase civil unrest amid the country’s progress toward EU accession. For example, the Kremlin has circulated statements calling Moldova a “NATO testing ground” and pointing to forged documents purporting to show that the Moldovan government has plans for military intervention in the breakaway region of Transdniestria.

In Armenia, after the Nogorno-Karabakh war in September 2023 and Russia’s failure to help, relations between the countries have been strained. Armenia has even ratified the Rome Statute, which obliges it to arrest Putin if he sets foot on Armenian soil. The Kremlin’s propaganda machine blames Pashinyan’s government for the loss of territory and ethnic cleansing of Armenians, calling the Prime Minister a “Western puppet.” Economically, however, Armenia has become more dependent on Russia.

In Azerbaijan, the government’s policy of non-recognition of breakaway regions played a role in the somewhat strained relations with Russia after it recognized the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk. After the Nagorno-Karabakh war, however, pro-Kremlin sentiments increased, with Azerbaijani media spreading the Russian narrative that the West wanted to turn Armenia into a “Ukraine of the Caucasus.”

Russian Influence in Latin America, Africa and Middle East

In Latin America, Russian state media outlets RT and Sputnik serve as key communication platforms to advance Russian narratives and interests. Ambassadors also play an important role in promoting Kremlin’s interests by skillfully exploiting the general distrust of the West in these parts of the world and manipulating the issue of colonialism.

In Africa, Russia continues its efforts to engage with African leaders, with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visiting several countries and Putin hosting the Russia-Africa Summit. The Wagner Group maintains regional ties despite the death of co-founder Yevgeny Prigozhin.

Similarly, in the Middle East and North Africa, Russia is using the social media presence of its diplomatic missions to promote preferred narratives about the war in Ukraine. Fake accounts are spreading images of Russian officials and Putin holding or reading the Quran in an effort to win over the Arab world. At the same time, posts have circulated in Arabic claiming that Ukraine’s President ties with ISIS.

What can be expected?

The report emphasizes that Russian information and influence operations, both within Ukraine and abroad, are expected to evolve, exploiting new societal divisions and employing novel tactics. With 2024 being an election year in many countries, Russia may attempt to interfere to sway support towards its allies or away from pro-Ukrainian international actors. In the Western countries, Russia may covertly promote the notion that aid to Ukraine harms their citizens.

“Given the extent of Russia’s operations and its apparent desire to move global opinion against Ukraine, as detailed in this report, governments around the world—especially those espousing democratic values—need to consider the potential impact of their decisions around Ukraine as also ultimately being global. More assistance and aid to Ukraine will bolster global democracy, while a reduction in the same will undermine not just Ukraine but democracy as a whole,” – concludes the report.

Also Read:

• 22/02/2023 – Report | Atlantic Council: Russia’s Information Warfare Against Ukraine Spans Many Fronts

On February 28, Konstatin Pilia, the head of the local occupation administration of the ethnic Georgian-majority Gali district of Abkhazia, met Aslan Bzhania, head of the occupation executive, and shared his concerns about more people leaving Gali.

Pilia said the outflow began in 2015 due to “difficulties related to documentation.” An estimated 30,000 ethnic Georgians from Gali were deprived of political rights after the Kremlin-backed authorities stripped them of Abkhaz “citizenship” in 2014 and 2017 for fear of ethnic Georgians influencing the election outcome. Pilia argued that even though the exodus had accelerated because of the “lack of prospects for obtaining [Abkhazia] citizenship.”

Pilia cited the 2011 “census,” according to which there are about 30,000 ethnic Georgians in Gali, but currently, the employed population stands at 17,000 people, there are 5,863 pensioners who receive a pension under a “residence permit,” and 344 get pensions as “citizens of Abkhazia.” The census conducted under the occupation regime is widely considered unreliable both methodologically and as people have incentives to hide data.

Pilia said 137 children were born in Gali in 2023, but only 59 received birth certificates because most parents don’t have proper documentation. He added that the children who are left without documents have no prospect of obtaining them in the future. [Parents likely hold Georgian passports, and children were also likely registered in Georgia proper – Civil Georgia]. People who decide to leave for such reasons are difficult to identify, as they usually don’t cancel their residence registration. “People just leave,” said Pilia.

Local occupation administration reports that about 5,000 people living in Gali have only one document, the so-called “Form No. 9” (an ersatz ID normally issued as a temporary document in case proper identification documents are lost). 1,130 people have “Abkhazia Passports,” and 21,500 have so-called “residence certificates.”

Pilia also referred to 2022 regulatory changes that say that ethnic Georgians in the Gali district could obtain “Abkhazia Passports” by “restoring Abkhaz ethnicity,” i.e. by denying their Georgian identity, including by changing their last names. Pilia mentioned that these so-called laws haven’t come into force. The exiled Georgians had strongly objected to this “law,” calling it an  “unacceptable experiment on the Georgian population.”

Also Read:

• 21/03/2023 – New Law Targets Gali Georgians to ‘Restore Abkhaz Ethnicity’
• 02/03/2021 – Draft Bill Targets Gali Georgians to “Restore Abkhaz Ethnicity”
• 03/09/2021 – Abkhaz District Head Talks Gali Passportization
• 13/04/2021 – Q&A | How Can Gali Residents be Heard?
• 25/04/2017 – Sokhumi Begins Issuing Residence Permits to Ethnic Georgians
• 24/09/2013 – Abkhaz Decision on Passports Leaves Many Georgians in Gali Worried