Day: February 14, 2024

Late 2023 and early 2024 have been marked by multiple crises in Abkhazia that have given rise to indignation and discontent among the population. These events are either directly or indirectly linked to Russia and reflect its tightening grip on the occupied region. To get a better picture, we took a closer look at the events that have shaped life in Abkhazia in recent months.

Crossing point troubles

Travelers crossing to Russia and back, to the the occupied region have been detained and interrogated by Russian FSB guards at the Abkhaz section of the Georgian-Russian border. This caused an outcry among the local population, especially after several well-known local journalists and public figures known for criticizing local de-facto authorities were detained.  

The ‘friendly conversations’ can last up to several hours. Russian border guards ask questions about attitudes towards Russia, developments in Abkhazia, including the transfer of Bichvinta (Pitsunda) to Russian ownership, and the detained persons’ views on Aslan Bzhania (‘president’) and Inal Ardzinba (‘foreign minister’). The opposition figures said the campaign to put pressure on the local population is organized by the de-facto leadership of Abkhazia. The interviewees suggest that there are certain blacklists of persons that the Abkhaz de facto authorities provide to the FSB guards.

Transfer of Bichvinta Residence to Russia

On December 27, the Abkhazian so-called parliament voted to transfer state property in Bichvinta (Pitsunda) into Russian ownership. The de-facto authorities moved the ratification of the “agreement” to an earlier date than planned and convened at nighttime to avoid large protests in the street. The issue had been highly controversial and sparked protests in the Abkhaz society, who claimed that the move was an encroachment on the “sovereignty” of Abkhazia. There has been criticism of de-facto leader Bzhania, who has been the main proponent of the deal.

According to the new agreement signed in January 2022, the “Pitsunda facility” is transferred free of charge into the ownership of the Russian Federation, while the land plot of over 180 hectares and a section of the water area are leased for 49 years with payment of 1 ruble per year for each plot. Moscow has the right to carry out capital construction on the leased land and to use the facilities “for state events with the participation of persons subject to state protection and recreation”.

Apartment Law

Even though, until now, Russians have not had the right to buy residential property, apartments are still being sold to them in Abkhazia – illegally, through various grey schemes. If adopted, the “law on apartments” will simplify the process. In mostly rural Abkhazia, under the so-called “law”, the apartments (essentially ordinary flats) will not be considered residential property but commercial property and, accordingly, will be subject to sale.

The law has been getting new traction lately, with the de-facto leader of the region, Aslan Bzhania, lobbying for it. The de-facto authorities have tried to seduce the local population, promising that this will allow Abkhazia to attract significant investments into the local economy, create new jobs, and significantly increase budget revenues.

Opponents argue that while not granting citizenship, there are loopholes for apartment owners to obtain an Abkhazian passport if they remain permanently in the occupied region, which could upset the demographic balance. Concerns include that housing prices will soar beyond the reach of the local population, that Abkhaz construction companies won’t be able to compete with Russian firms, which could benefit from tax breaks, and that the sale of apartments will negatively impact small and medium-sized hospitality businesses. There are also concerns that widespread corruption will incentivize using valuable land, including nature reserves, for housing.

Fuel Shortages

After the Kremlin-controlled oil company, Rosneft got the exclusive right to export oil products to Abkhazia in December 2023, the occupied region has been experiencing a shortage of petrol and other oil products. Even though the text of the decision is “for official use only,” the Abkhaz official in charge of the economy, Kristina Ozgan, said Rosneft and its subsidiaries now have the exclusive right to import the oil products.

Fuel companies in occupied Abkhazia refused to sign exclusive contracts with Rosneft. Since December 21, 2023, the quantities of fuel already purchased and declared prior to the Russian government’s decision have been stopped at the Abkhaz section of the Russian-Georgan border in Psou, thus aggravating the crisis. Although they were eventually allowed into the region, the situation has not improved significantly. “The essence of these restrictions, as we know, is a single supplier with exclusive rights, which we don’t agree with,” said the so-called president of the republic’s fuel association, Artur Ashuba.

Electricity Outages

Occupied Abkhazia has faced problems with its electricity supply and was plunged into an energy crisis at the end of 2023, when Russia refused to supply electricity to Abkhazia “on a humanitarian basis” (i.e. free of charge) during the autumn-winter period. Abkhazia had to pay RUR 700 million by the end of 2023. Rolling blackouts have become an everyday occurrence in Abkhazia this winter. Abkhazia has been experiencing an electricity shortage for years, partly due to increased consumption, exacerbated by the rehabilitation of the Inguri HPP, and as many consumers simply don’t pay their electricity bills. The Georgian government does not charge Abkhazia for electricity from the Enguri HPP. However, the water level in the Jvari reservoir of the Inguri hydroelectric power station, jointly operated by Georgia and Abkhazia, is low and cannot s meet the growing needs of the occupied region.

Ozgan’s secret visit to the other side of Enguri demonstrated the seriousness of the crisis. She reportedly talked with the Georgian management of the Enguri HPP and requested additional electricity. Tbilisi reportedly refused to increase the supply quotas.

Sokhumi Airport Reconstruction Plans

In the summer of 2023, the so-called parliament of Abkhazia ratified the agreement between Moscow and Sokhumi on the implementation of the investment project for the reconstruction and resumption of operations at Sokhumi Airport. 

Reportedly, the Russian investor financing the project will receive unprecedented privileges and benefits, including exemption from property and profit taxes during the payback period of up to 25 years.

Russian Naval Base in Ochamchire

The de-facto leader of occupied Abkhazia, Aslan Bzhania, announced in October last year, Russia’s intention to establish a naval base near Ochamchire, a coastal town some 35 kilometers from Anaklia, a key maritime location controlled by the central Georgian government on the Black Sea coast.

These reports were confirmed by Ukrainian intelligence, which confirmed the Russian navy’s plan to move their warships from the Bay of Sevastopol in the Crimean Peninsula to the occupied Georgian region of Abkhazia.

Ukrainian President Volodymir Zelenskyy, speaking at the Second Parliamentary Summit of the Crimean Platform last year, said it was a sign of the success of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. He also promised to reach the Russian warships wherever they went. This is probably more than the de-facto authorities bargained for when agreeing to accommodate Russia’s grand infrastructure plans.

Growing Self-Isolation

In November 2023, Sokhumi’s top diplomat, Inal Ardzinba, announced that international non-governmental organizations that consider Abkhazia to be occupied will soon be banned from Abkhazia by an upcoming “presidential decree.” He named USAID as one such organization, expressing discontent that its official website states that its projects are aimed at “countering the harmful influence of the Kremlin” and “restoring the territorial integrity of Georgia.

This was followed by Ardzinba’s announcement in December 2023 of the “new approaches” targeting USAID and its regional director, John Pennel, who was declared non-grata in the occupied region. The announced measures included the cessation of new projects with full or partial USAID funding and the prohibition of projects aimed at establishing contacts between Abkhazian residents and citizens of Georgia, etc.

Many of the local NGOs expressed dissatisfaction with the decision, saying that it would undermine the process of building relations with various international organizations and further isolate the region.

Denial of Entry for EU Special Representative

On January, 26 EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus and Crisis in Georgia said his request to visit Abkhazia scheduled for the end of January had been rejected, this being the second rejection in the last six months. Toivo Klaar said, “Abkhazia’s relative openness should not become a casualty of Russia’s war against Ukraine. He cited various humanitarian projects supported by the EU in the occupied region, in areas such as education, small business support, and health care, Klaar and noted that closing the space to international engagement, and thus the assistance, “will only exacerbate” the challenges faced by the local population.

“Foreign Agents” Law Back on the Table

On 7 February, while Abkhazia’s de facto leader Bzhania was on an extended visit to Moscow to meet with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov and other Russian officials, a so-called draft law “On non-profit organizations and individuals acting as foreign agents” was submitted to Abkhazia’s de-facto legislature. According to the document, both non-profit organizations and individuals can be recognized as foreign agents if they receive foreign funding, except for funding from Russia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Nauru, and Syria, which recognize the “independence” of Abkhazia.

Attempts to introduce the law have been underway since 2022 and have been accompanied by opposition from local civil society organizations. Back then, an appeal against the law by the Abkhazian public was published, signed by hundreds of people, and addressed to the leaders of the occupation regime’s de facto executive and legislative branches.

Fears are expressed among the local population that the adoption of such a law, even in the most “mild” version, will inevitably lead to the vilification and eventual liquidation of the local “non-governmental” sector, with some expressing concern that “opposition politicians will be the next targets.”

Draft “agreement” on police cooperation

The Kremlin needs all the “friends” it can gather, and it needs their unequivocal loyalty reaffirmed in circumstances where it is isolated and sanctioned. It will not hesitate to pressure those it can (the smaller and weaker) into compliance.

In the social media of the occupied region, there have been reports of an alleged draft cooperation “agreement” between the Russian Federal Service of National Guard Troops of the Russian Federation (Rosgvardiya) and the so-called Ministry of Internal Affairs of Abkhazia. The reports were followed by statements expressing the concerns that the true intention behind the agreement is to suppress possible protest rallies in response to the questionable policies of the de-facto authorities, in particular, the so-called “law on foreign agents.” The Abkhaz opposition called on the de facto Interior Minister Robert Kiut to “abandon the very idea of signing an agreement with Rosgvardiya.”

Following concerted protests by the opposition and non-governmental organizations, as well as a meeting between them and the leadership of the so-called interior ministry, Kiut was compelled to promise on February 11 that the inter-agency agreement would not be finalized.

What to expect?

The current developments point to the limbo in which Abkhazia finds itself – tied in a dead knot with the pariah state of Russia – and reveal a slow, gradual, and consistent breakdown that will become more evident with time.

This Russian encroachment is expected to progressively grow, spurred on by the changing geopolitical environment. Abkhazia has taken on new relevance and importance for the Kremlin against the backdrop of Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine. Moscow needs new routes to receive goods against the backdrop of international sanctions that appear to be long-term in nature. With this in mind, the Kremlin is keen to develop its foothold in the occupied region while squeezing the international players out of it.

The precision strikes by Ukrainian drones against Russian military vessels revealed an unexpectedly poor performance by the Russian navy. As a result, Russia is forced to look for alternative ports for its military vessels and announced the construction of a permanent military base in occupied Ochamchire. 

It is likely that Moscow’s suffocating embrace will lead to more and more discontent and protests in the occupied region. The more “the screws are tightened” in Russia, the more this will inevitably affect the mood in Abkhazia. This is likely to lead to further protests and tensions in Abkhazian society. The possibility of an “agreement” with the Kremlin’s pretorians – Rosgvardia – bodes ill for the potential protesters.

Given Russia’s increasing pressure and assertiveness in carrying out its plans for the occupied region, it seems that it will use whatever leverage it can. And, as is often the case, provocations and attempts to play up the “Georgian threat” will be used to distract the local population.

Russia has traditionally resorted to the “Abkhaz card” in the run-up to elections in Georgia, too. To what extent and exactly how this will be played by Russia in coming months, in the run-up of the 2024 Parliamentary elections, remains to be seen. It seems that Russia is content – for now – with the official Tbilisi’s “pragmatic” policy and with the existing status quo. It therefore, may even add an allusion to carrots, to further maintain the status quo, to its more traditional toolkit of sticks.

The recent death of a young individual from an apparent drug overdose has reignited concerns about the state’s drug policies, with some calling for its softening and others for its toughening. Whether it’s from a policy, health, social or religious perspective, everyone agrees there is an “overdose” of challenges the country faces when it comes to drugs.

The death caused the discussions on TV programs and social networks about the inadequateness of the state drug policy and prompted Christian orthodox cleric’s outdoor service near the biggest Tbilisi nightclub on February 9, to pray to save “strayed” young souls. However, as always, debates and discussions continued until the fresh news pushed the topic out of the public discourse and TV screens, most likely until the next tragedy.

Bassiani Statement

Rumors circulated for several days at the end of January regarding another overdose death of a young individual before the prominent Bassiani night club, where incident allegedly took place clarified the details of the tragic death of a 19-year old woman in its statement about the fatal incident. According to Bassiani, a young woman visited the club on Sunday, January 27 event, at 7:30 a.m. local time. At 10:40 a.m. “for reasons not yet identified,” she became unwell. Bassiani stated that the woman received immediate first aid from qualified personnel on-site, and within approximately 10-12 minutes, she was transported to the hospital, where she later passed away. The club did not specify the cause of the young woman’s death.

Amid accusations that blamed club culture for the incident and alleged another similar occurrence, Bassiani club expressed lament over what they labeled as a “discreditation campaign” against the club. They vehemently denied rumors of another drug overdose incident within the club premises. The club urged the individuals behind this campaign to halt what they referred to as “shameless manipulation of the tragedy.” The club stressed that a similar campaign in the past had resulted in a police raid in 2018, which led to unrest and protest rallies.

Emphasizing its commitment to providing a safe environment, Bassiani club highlighted its employment of over 50 staff members with appropriate first aid qualifications. The club attributed the challenges to the harsh drug policy of the state, asserting that Georgia’s current approach “is not geared towards solving the problem but rather becomes the source of the problem itself, and at times, regrettably, the cause of tragedies.” Urging a shift in focus, the club management called upon those who “demonize and discredit club culture” to redirect their attention towards reminding the state of its responsibility. The club emphasized the need for the state to wield its primary lever for systemic change in order to reduce harm and develop a compassionate and humane drug policy.

Drug-related Statistics: Navigating in Hazy Reality

“Of course, this is a very bad fact. It’s not the first [such incident], and it’s one of those [incidents] that has become public, but unfortunately such facts are not rare. There are about 30 to 40 such cases of [drug] overdose deaths every year. It’s a global problem, believe me…” – said Vakhtang Gomelauri, Minister of Internal Affairs, confirming the death of the young woman. He did not specify the drug overdose statistics, which remains an open question.

Gomelauri also pointed out that Georgia is a transit country, so “unfortunately [drugs] come in” and “we [the state] cannot cover 100%” [of the border].”

The Minister acknowledged the need for changing the state policy, although he refrained from offering a definitive vision of how this should be executed. He appeared ambiguous regarding his inclination towards either tightening or softening the drug policy, emphasizing instead the requirement for a comprehensive approach. He stated, “I could suggest that yes, we should tighten it, although in numerous instances, this tightening proves ineffective… The approach must be multifaceted.”

Meanwhile, MIA crime statistics for 2023 reveal a 20.53 percent increase in the detection of drug-related crimes by law enforcement officers compared to 2022. The MIA attributes this rise to “the effective legal policy implemented by the police against the illegal distribution of narcotics and the active fight against drug-related crimes.” It remains unclear to what extent this increase is a result of increased narcotics consumption versus the purported “effective work” of law enforcement agencies.

The Opposing views

Drug-related issues may not attract as much attention as other contentious topics on Georgia’s political battlegrounds. Nevertheless, some political leaders have addressed the issue.

Zurab Girchi Japaridze, leader of the libertarian “Girchi-More Freedom” party, accused the Government of deliberately neglecting to address the root cause: “As long as people have to buy drugs on the black market and are chased by the police, there will be victims,” Japaridze said in his statement. He added that under the current system, people still manage to get the drugs, albeit without knowledge of their quality and chemical composition. “As long as the objective of drug policy is to control people, extort money from them and use them to mobilize votes for elections, this reality will not change,” – he said, blaming the system in general, including the MIA and the Georgian Orthodox Church, for opposing the liberalization of the existing policy. Regarding the tragic death, Japaridze contended that it was caused by the fact that the “system forced her to buy something she did not know.” He said he believed that “if that happened in daylight,” such an incident could have been averted.

Ana Dolidze, leader of the relatively left-wing “For the People” party, said that “Georgia is flooded with drugs”. However, Dolidze believes the drugs are “freely accessible,” including through social media platforms such as Telegram. Thus, she blamed the government for not having enough and effective control of the issue. Moreover, Dolidze claimed that the Government cooperates with dealers, because otherwise, she states, the drugs would not have been accessible in the country. She suggested the ruling authorities should strengthen the border control mechanisms to better control and monitor the flaw of illegal substances. 

Giorgi Gakharia, former Prime Minister and current leader of the “For Georgia” political party, who gained notoriety as the architect behind the highly publicized police raid on the Bassiani club in 2018 during his tenure as Minister of Interior, asserts that the country has “neither repressive nor liberal drug policy.” According to him, Georgia does not have any drug policy at all. Despite this, Gakharia staunchly argued that “club drugs do not exist; drugs are drugs, and they are as deadly as any other,” – a statement that apparently indicating apparent consistency in his stance on the matter.

Prayers for “strayed” youth

Following the tragic death of the 19-year-old girl, the rector of Tbilisi Vake Cathedral, Shalva Kekelia, along with hundreds of parishioners, congregated near the Bassiani club on Friday night, February 9th. They conducted a service and voiced criticism not only of the drug policy but also the clubs themselves. Addressing the public, Kekelia expressed his hope that “the Government, the opposition, the journalists, the NGOs will contemplate this issue” and urged the youth, who have “strayed from the right path,” to self-reflect and “come back [from the clubs].”

Social Justice Center Recommendations

The Social Justice Center (SJC), a local watchdog, issued a statement regarding an alleged overdose death case, in which it identifies existing problems and calls on the government to take specific steps.

The SJC urged the state to establish an Early Warning System (EWS) to monitor the drug market and detect dangerous substances. It emphasized the importance of improving accessibility to Naloxone, which can reverse opioid overdose and is available without a prescription since 2022, but remains scarce in pharmacies. The watchdog also called for strengthening drug prevention education in schools and obtaining reliable statistics, especially concerning annual overdose deaths, currently unavailable in Georgia. Additionally, it advocated for a proactive information campaign to raise awareness about the risks of psychoactive substances.

SCJ noted that the state must undertake a fundamental reform of drug policy, “which will prioritize supporting individual health protection and implementing preventive actions instead of punitive measures.”

No Sign of Novel Approach

Reports of alleged drug black markets in clubs often lead to police raids. Individuals charged with using club drugs for personal consumption may face lengthy prison sentences. Despite differing views on potential solutions, the issue remains notably absent from broader political discussions, even amidst the onset of an election year, while drug use continues to rise annually.

Also Read:

• 23/11/2023 – Drug Arrest of Young Man Reignites Criticism of Georgia’s Drug Policy

On February 13, the 117th Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) meeting was held in Ergneti. The meeting was co-facilitated by the Acting Head of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM), Tibor Kozma, and the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the South Caucasus, Viorel Moşanu. 

Among other issues the planned “appointment” as the occupied Akhalgori district “prosecutor” of Davit Gurtsiev, sentenced in the torture murder case of Archil Tatunashvili, was also raised.

EUMM Statement

The co-facilitators called on participants to ensure security and stability along the occupation line, as well as the freedom of movement, and fully reopen the crossing points, including for regular traffic. “Discussions also covered the security situation in Chorchana-Tsnelisi area, as well as the topic of UAVs.”

Reflecting on security incidents and relevant developments since the last IPRM meeting, the co-facilitators also stressed the importance of prioritizing the security of conflict-affected communities for all parties to the IPRM.

The co-facilitators called for an end to the detentions and for the release of the remaining detainees. The participants praised the hotline operated by the EUMM and thanked the co-facilitators for the timely exchange of information in the event of crises and incidents.

According to the statement, Ambassador Moşanu, now representing the 2024 OSCE Chairpersonship of Malta, pointed to the “good practice” of accompanying technical meetings, in particular on water irrigation issues. “He voiced his hope to sustain established efforts and initiatives.”

SSSG Statement

The State Security Service of Georgia (SSSG) said its representatives “strongly demanded the punishment of those guilty of killing of Tamaz Ginturi, a Georgia citizen [committed] by the Russian occupation forces near the village of Kirbali.”

The SSSG raised the issue of of the release of all persons in illegal detention, and “strongly condemned” the illegal acts of “borderiziation” carried out between the IPRM meetings. The participants of the meeting discussed the humanitarian problems faced by the local population living along the occupation line and the possibilities to solve them.

Gurtsiev’s Planned “Appointment”

The SSSG raised the issue of the possible “appointment” of Davit Gurtsiev, sentenced by the Mtskheta District Court in 2020 to life imprisonment for the torture murder of Georgian citizen Archil Tatunashvili, as a “prosecutor” in the occupied Akhalgori district.

According to Irakli Antadze, Deputy Head of the Information-analytical Department of the Georgian State Security Service, the SSSG underlined that Gurtsiev is wanted on the Interpol Red Notice and his “appointment” will be a “serious risk for the security environment”. “We hope that they will show common sense and that the security of the local indigenous population will not be endangered in any way.”

Meanwhile, Tamara Mearakishvili, an ethnic Georgian civic activist in the occupied Akhalgori district, announced a hunger strike on February 11 to protest the possible “appointment” of Gurtsiev, who “has been terrorizing the population of our district for 15 years.” Mearakishvili says will not stop the hunger strike until the “prosecutor-general” of the occupied Tskhinvali region explains the reason for Gurtsiev’s “appointment.”

Statement by Tskhinvali representative

Representatives of the de-facto authorities in the occupied Tskhinvali region once again raised the issue of the “illegal” Georgian police post on the territory of the village of Tsnelisi/Uista.

Egor Kochiev representing the de-facto authorities, said the situation has been calm at the occupation line since December 13 last year. According to him, the number of “border violations” as well as “the incidents related to the flight of unmanned aerial vehicles and the presence of the Georgian police has decreased.”

The participants agreed to convene the next regular IPRM meeting on 20 March 2024.

Also Read:

• 14/12/2023 – 116th Ergneti IPRM Meeting
• 06/11/2023 – Technical Meeting in Ergneti Following the Killing of Georgian Citizen by Russian Occupying Forces
• 13/09/2023 – 114th Ergneti IPRM Meeting
• 03/07/2023 – 113th IPRM Meeting Took Place in Ergneti