Day: February 13, 2024
Categories
Dangerous sun spots detected
“Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure nineteen [pounds] nineteen [shillings] and six [pence], result happiness. Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure twenty pounds ought and six, result misery.” —Mr. Micawber (fictional character in David Copperfield by Charles Dickens)
Twenty pounds sterling would be pocket change in today’s global economy ($1 equals £0.78), but when Charles Dickens was writing David Copperfield, a typical London laborer earned 20 shillings (£1) per week. The cost of living was, of course, considerably lower in 19th-century England than it is nowadays, amounting to about 19 shillings per week, according to some estimates. So if Dickens’ impecunious Mr. Micawber worked a then-standard 10 hours per day, six days per week year-round and was unmarried, childless, and abstemious, his annual income might have been £52, allowing him to live reasonably comfortably and debt-free. At £20, though, any extraordinary expenses would have plunged him into dire financial straits.
The U.S. national debt (the federal budget deficits that have been accumulating since the early 1960s) now is north of $34 trillion, a sum unimaginable to Wilkins Micawber, to the founders of our constitutional republic, and to most people living today. And that number does not include the unfunded future liabilities of Social Security, Medicare, and other so-called entitlement programs.
Until the 1960s, a balanced-budget norm constrained Washington’s fiscal policymaking: Public revenues and expenditures remained largely on par, except during wartime. Borrowing was necessary to finance acquisitions of munitions and other war materials along with paying the men and women responsible for carrying out military operations, because, as Adam Smith recognized, it would be too perilous to wait for new tax revenue to flow into the Treasury.
Even so, policies to retire public debts incurred during wartime (for example, by establishing “sinking funds”) were accepted widely. That norm held from the Revolutionary War to the end of World War II, more or less. Even President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the architect of profligate New Deal spending initiatives, campaigned for his first White House term on a platform calling for a balanced federal budget.
Of course, a third method of financing wars and responding to other “emergencies,” other than taxing and borrowing, is available only to the federal government: resorting to the currency printing press (“quantitative easing”). Expanding the money supply to “pay” for current public spending—as the Lincoln administration did by issuing “greenbacks” during the 1861–1865 War of Secession and the last two presidents did during the COVID-19 pandemic—predictably causes price inflation, sometimes disguised temporarily by wage and price controls, as happened during World War II.
The balanced-budget norm was broken for good by President John F. Kennedy under the influence of Keynesian macroeconomics. (See James Buchanan and Richard Wagner’s Democracy in Deficit.) Federal budget deficits have been business as usual in Washington, D.C., ever since. They were worsened by the twin tragedies of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Vietnam War and Great Society, global financial crises, and more recent “shocks,” during which little pretense to fiscal responsibility has been evident among politicians, policymakers, and most macroeconomists. Like Mr. Micawber, twice imprisoned for failure to pay his debts, our elites apparently remain hopeful that “something will turn up.”
It is obvious that chronic budget deficits are explained by excessive public spending, not inadequate revenue. So-called modern monetary theory teaches that the government can borrow and spend without limit; if too much liquidity is injected into the economy, the theory says that it can be soaked up by raising taxes, which would amount to political suicide in an era, like today’s, in which GDP growth is anemic.
For that reason, I am wary of proposed constitutional amendments that force Washington to balance its budget rather than reform fiscal policymaking simply to constrain the growth of spending. One problem with today’s budgetary processes is that neither the president nor any congressional committee is responsible for “bridging” the gap between the revenue and spending sides of the federal budget, as most state governors are required to do.
Federal outlays these days are determined first, and then, as afterthoughts, “ways and means” of financing that spending are determined separately. Since raising taxes is politically costly, borrowing (which implies higher future tax bills but creates the illusion that government is less burdensome than it is) becomes the easiest way out.
Political expedience aside, as Adam Smith wrote, “if [an empire or commonwealth] cannot raise its revenue in proportion to its expense, it ought, at least, to accommodate its expense to its revenue.”
This article was also published in The American Spectator
“Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure nineteen [pounds] nineteen [shillings] and six [pence], result happiness. Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure twenty pounds ought and six, result misery.” —Mr. Micawber (fictional character in David Copperfield by Charles Dickens)
Twenty pounds sterling would be pocket change in today’s global economy ($1 equals £0.78), but when Charles Dickens was writing David Copperfield, a typical London laborer earned 20 shillings (£1) per week. The cost of living was, of course, considerably lower in 19th-century England than it is nowadays, amounting to about 19 shillings per week, according to some estimates. So if Dickens’ impecunious Mr. Micawber worked a then-standard 10 hours per day, six days per week year-round and was unmarried, childless, and abstemious, his annual income might have been £52, allowing him to live reasonably comfortably and debt-free. At £20, though, any extraordinary expenses would have plunged him into dire financial straits.
The U.S. national debt (the federal budget deficits that have been accumulating since the early 1960s) now is north of $34 trillion, a sum unimaginable to Wilkins Micawber, to the founders of our constitutional republic, and to most people living today. And that number does not include the unfunded future liabilities of Social Security, Medicare, and other so-called entitlement programs.
Until the 1960s, a balanced-budget norm constrained Washington’s fiscal policymaking: Public revenues and expenditures remained largely on par, except during wartime. Borrowing was necessary to finance acquisitions of munitions and other war materials along with paying the men and women responsible for carrying out military operations, because, as Adam Smith recognized, it would be too perilous to wait for new tax revenue to flow into the Treasury.
Even so, policies to retire public debts incurred during wartime (for example, by establishing “sinking funds”) were accepted widely. That norm held from the Revolutionary War to the end of World War II, more or less. Even President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the architect of profligate New Deal spending initiatives, campaigned for his first White House term on a platform calling for a balanced federal budget.
Of course, a third method of financing wars and responding to other “emergencies,” other than taxing and borrowing, is available only to the federal government: resorting to the currency printing press (“quantitative easing”). Expanding the money supply to “pay” for current public spending—as the Lincoln administration did by issuing “greenbacks” during the 1861–1865 War of Secession and the last two presidents did during the COVID-19 pandemic—predictably causes price inflation, sometimes disguised temporarily by wage and price controls, as happened during World War II.
The balanced-budget norm was broken for good by President John F. Kennedy under the influence of Keynesian macroeconomics. (See James Buchanan and Richard Wagner’s Democracy in Deficit.) Federal budget deficits have been business as usual in Washington, D.C., ever since. They were worsened by the twin tragedies of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Vietnam War and Great Society, global financial crises, and more recent “shocks,” during which little pretense to fiscal responsibility has been evident among politicians, policymakers, and most macroeconomists. Like Mr. Micawber, twice imprisoned for failure to pay his debts, our elites apparently remain hopeful that “something will turn up.”
It is obvious that chronic budget deficits are explained by excessive public spending, not inadequate revenue. So-called modern monetary theory teaches that the government can borrow and spend without limit; if too much liquidity is injected into the economy, the theory says that it can be soaked up by raising taxes, which would amount to political suicide in an era, like today’s, in which GDP growth is anemic.
For that reason, I am wary of proposed constitutional amendments that force Washington to balance its budget rather than reform fiscal policymaking simply to constrain the growth of spending. One problem with today’s budgetary processes is that neither the president nor any congressional committee is responsible for “bridging” the gap between the revenue and spending sides of the federal budget, as most state governors are required to do.
Federal outlays these days are determined first, and then, as afterthoughts, “ways and means” of financing that spending are determined separately. Since raising taxes is politically costly, borrowing (which implies higher future tax bills but creates the illusion that government is less burdensome than it is) becomes the easiest way out.
Political expedience aside, as Adam Smith wrote, “if [an empire or commonwealth] cannot raise its revenue in proportion to its expense, it ought, at least, to accommodate its expense to its revenue.”
This article was also published in The American Spectator
As polls closed following Pakistan’s parliamentary election on February 8, major media networks began election-night coverage with prominent TV anchors and pundits discussing voter turnout and the timeline for expected results.
When it came time to offer his analysis, one of Pakistan’s most popular TV hosts, Hamid Mir, launched an unexpected tirade against the entire electoral process. He refused to call the proceedings of the day an “election,” railed against the suspension of mobile services (which caused massive disruption to voters as they cast their ballots), and questioned the relevance of discussing voter turnout when the outcome of the election was predetermined.
This was a stunning moment on live television at a time when Pakistan’s military and intelligence apparatus had systematically suppressed all forms of dissent. Somebody had dared to vocalize what millions of Pakistanis in the country and in the diaspora already knew about the deeply flawed electoral process.
Mir was perhaps referring to pre-election rigging against Pakistan’s most popular political party, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), led by former Prime Minister Imran Khan. However, as the night wore on, the military and intelligence establishment in collaboration with the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) tried to pull off the greatest post-electoral heist in Pakistan’s recent history.
As soon as the media began reporting that PTI-backed candidates were defeating former prime minister Nawaz Sharif (favored by the military) and other leading candidates in his party, the ECP abruptly withheld and delayed the announcement of results in key constituencies. Several hours later, Pakistanis woke up to an entirely new reality. PTI candidates who had been winning by wide margins and had documentation to prove it, found themselves defeated according to the ECP. Despite “losing” dozens of seats in the process, which they are currently challenging in the courts, PTI-backed candidates still won the highest number of seats in parliament.
Put simply, PTI supporters in Pakistan staged nothing short of a civilian coup against the Pakistani military.
Rather than continue to support the discredited military establishment bent on subverting the will of the people, the Biden administration would do well to support the democratic aspirations of millions of Pakistanis.
Pre-Election Rigging
As the date for parliamentary elections approached, the PTI was stripped of its electoral symbol, and party candidates were forced to contest as independents. The party chairman and former Prime Minister Imran Khan was convicted on three separate counts and sentenced to a total of 31 years. PTI candidates and their families were targeted, harassed, and assaulted, and many were forced to campaign in hiding.
Voter suppression was rife. People did not know until very late where they would vote, and at times voters within a single family were assigned polling stations hundreds of miles apart. The day before the election, citing security concerns, the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) announced that polls would close early, further restricting voter access.
And yet, despite massive pre-poll rigging and voter intimidation, supporters of the PTI came out in droves. Tens of millions exercised their electoral rights and delivered a stunning upset.
Rather than continue to support the military at the expense of democratic processes in Pakistan, the U.S. government would do well to understand the implications of this unprecedented moment in Pakistan’s history.
The Pakistani election demonstrated that despite long periods of direct and indirect military rule in the country, the people of Pakistan continue to have faith in the democratic process. It made clear that the Pakistani military and its intelligence agencies can no longer manipulate electoral processes and outcomes in the face of overwhelming people power. It revealed that the military’s attempts to control the narrative by muzzling the media and targeting journalists no longer work with a population that is technologically adept and social-media savvy. It showed that the military’s iron grip is slipping.
Once a venerated institution in Pakistan, the military is now viewed with contempt by millions of Pakistanis in the country and in the diaspora, who blame it for Imran Khan’s ouster. They are now increasingly aware of the insidious role the military leadership played in various chapters of Pakistan’s history: its genocidal actions in 1971 against the Bengalis of East Pakistan, its cultivation of militant groups to advance domestic and foreign policy objectives, its involvement in the enforced disappearances of Pakistani citizens, its collaboration with the CIA in the so-called War on Terror, and its repeated violations of Pakistan’s constitution.
U.S.-Pakistan Relations
It is no longer sustainable for the U.S. government to continue its support of the Pakistani military and risk its long-term relationship with a population of 240 million, two-thirds of which is under 30.
Successive U.S. administrations have relied on the Pakistani military to advance their strategic interests and actively worked to undermine “aggressively neutral” civilian leaders like Imran Khan, who tried to craft independent foreign policies.
It is why the Biden administration remained conspicuously silent in the face of brutal state repression against Imran Khan’s supporters following his ouster two years ago. This indifference continued in the run-up to the election even after widespread reports of pre-poll rigging.
Disillusioned by the administration’s lack of support, many in the Pakistani-American community turned to their elected representatives to garner bipartisan support for House Resolution 901, which called for free and fair elections in Pakistan. They managed to get more than 70 members of Congress to co-sponsor the resolution.
Since the election, and at the behest of Pakistani-American constituents, many of these representatives tweeted their alarm at the massive rigging that took place on election day. Some called on Pakistani authorities to respect the will of the people, while others called for an investigation into the election amid charges of widespread fraud.
This is a critical moment in Pakistan’s history and for U.S.-Pakistan relations. Amid growing anti-Americanism in the nuclear-armed country, the Biden administration has an opportunity to reset its relations with the people of Pakistan. As is being urged by some members of Congress, the administration should stand in solidarity with the Pakistani people and publicly refuse to recognize the results of Pakistan’s election until all irregularities are resolved. Anything short of that will imperil stability in the country as well as in the region. It will also make a mockery of Biden’s rhetoric regarding democratic principles and the rule of law.
This articl was published by FPIF
Edi Rama’s justification for the migrant deal with Rome – that Albanians owe Italy a historic ‘debt’ to Italy – is based on a misreading of history.
By Fabio Bego
The protocols signed by Albanian PM Edi Rama and Italy’s Giorgia Meloni last November by which the government in Tirana will allow Italy to build camps for migrants on Albanian territory have generated various negative reactions. The affair contains several politically dangerous and morally low features that deserve attention. One is the rationale provided by Rama to justify the agreement. According to him, the main reason for giving away national territory is an alleged “debt” that Albanians have towards Italy for the way it welcomed them in the early-1990s. Archival documents show that Italy’s “welcome” was a short-lived policy that served contingent state interests.
Migration to Italy starts in the 1980s
After relations with China ended in the late-1970s, communist Albania opened up to Western European states such as Italy. The countries were pushed to collaborate for opposite reasons. For the Albanians it was a matter of economic necessity. For Italy it was a means to expand its influence in the Balkans. Archival data shows that over 2,000 Italians travelled to Albania in 1983 as tourists, journalists, businessmen, professionals and diplomats. Italians and other Western Europeans were spotted in Tirana, Durres and other touristic localities. Back then, as today, mobility regimes were asymmetrical. It was easier for Italians to go to Albania than the other way around.
The first Albanians to reach Italy in large numbers came from Kosovo. In April 1984, the right-wing newspaper Il Tempo reported that Italian authorities had granted asylum to many migrants from Eastern Europe, the majority of whom, 444, came from Albania. The Albanian Foreign Minister Reis Malile belied the information, affirming that they did not come from Albania but from Kosovo, where they were persecuted. They declared being born in Albania because they feared being sent back, given the good relations between Rome and Belgrade. Similar events were recorded in November 1988, when 43 Kosovars hosted in the refugee camp of Capua declared Albanian origins.
Unlike Yugoslav citizens, Albanians could not obtain visas unless they had strong family or professional reasons. Crossing the border illegally was dangerous because the state reacted with ferocity. However, with the death of Albanian dictator Enver Hoxha in April 1985, people became more daring. On December 12, 1985, six members of the Popa family, four women and two men, eluded controls and entered the Italian embassy, where they asked for political asylum. The event provoked a diplomatic crisis. The Albanian authorities declared that the Popa were former fascist and Nazi collaborators and demanded that Italy give them up. The Italians refused. Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti cited the protection of “human rights” as the main reason for the refusal.
The situation remained tense for months, as Albania’s authorities did not allow the Popa to go to Italy. The cars of Italian diplomats were searched and stalked for the fear that the Popa could escape. Some Italian politicians wanted a firmer attitude from their government. Exponents of the neo-fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano, MSI, which is now branded “Fratelli d’Italia”, wanted to break diplomatic relations with Albania because it did not allow the Popa to migrate to Italy. The Popa lived in the embassy for almost five years. They were finally authorized to expatriate in May 1990. This inspired many Albanians to enter foreign embassies in July 1990.
The Popa family brought the question human rights in Albania under the spotlight in Italy. In 1987, Italian associations sent petitions to Tirana demanding the release political prisoners and the introduction of other freedoms. This political atmosphere might have encouraged others to seek refuge in the neighbouring state. In August 1988, a lyrical singer who studied at the Conservatory of Turin informed the embassy that she had decided to stay in Italy because she wanted to marry an Italian. At the end of September 1988, Elvira Gjezi, who later became known with her penname Elvira Dones, disappeared from her hotel in Milan. She was there to attend a film fair with colleagues from movie production company Kinostudio.
The migratory trends in the Adriatic have seldom been a one-way process: people from different places were attempting to enter into Albania. For Instance, in August 1982, a 15 years old boy from Morocco hid inside an Albanian ship in the harbour of Nador and landed in Durrës. In the late 1980s, a few Italians wanted to move to Albania for political reasons. Albanian authorities found these requests awkward and rejected them.
In the late-1980s, workers at the harbour of Durrës opened the path for the boat migration of the 1990s. In February and March 1987, two sailors of the ships Teuta and Korabi landed in the harbour of Ravenna and ran away. The Tirana government asked the Italians to send them back. The Italians ignored the request. Later they informed the Albanian government that the sailors had migrated to the US. On 20 December 1988, workers at the harbour of Ravenna found a man hidden inside the Albanian ship 6 Shkurti. He had a passport with him. The workers denounced the crew of the ship because they forced the man to return on board after he had landed. The police asked the man what happened. The man was probably threatened by the ship crew and replied that he had accidentally fallen below deck because he was drunk. Italian authorities allowed the ship to return with the man on board.
On 6 January 1989, nine persons hijacked the boat Dukati and headed towards the Italian coast. The plan was carried out by captain Enver Meta and the sailor Bardhyl Vogli. The hijackers sequestered seven members of the crew who did not want to migrate and kept them in captivity for the whole trip. After arriving in Brindisi, they applied for political asylum. The Albanian government tried to persuade the Italian authorities to deliver the fugitives, portraying them as terrorists, drug dealers and mobsters. However, only one of them had a criminal record and it was not related to terrorism or drugs. Italian authorities arrested the captain and the sailor for sequestering the boat and for the kidnapping. The other six were hosted at the Caritas.
The captain, Enver Meta, exposed the poor social conditions and the lack of political freedoms in Albania to local media. On January 20, 1989, Meta and Vogli were absolved by court of Brindisi and transferred to a refugee camp. The judges argued that Albania’s lack of political freedoms was a known fact, and the country did not adhere to international agreements for the protection of human rights. The tribunal affirmed that Meta and Vogli had escaped from a situation that harmed their individual rights, such as the freedom to expatriate, freedom of thought and freedom of religion. The lawyer hired by the Albanian state suspected that the sentence was a “political decision”.
Policy on Albanian migrants hardens after dictatorship falls
In July 1990, over 800 Albanians entered the Italian embassy in Tirana. They were all transferred to Italy. In December 1990, the Albanian dictatorship formally fell. Between February and March 1991, over 20.000 persons reached the Italian coasts with boats that they’d squatted in the harbour of Durres. By then, the attitude of Rome towards Albanians migrants started to change.
In March 1991, over 18.000 Albanians applied for asylum, but only 672 were accepted. In June 1991, the spokesman of the Italian foreign ministry affirmed that Albania had undertaken important steps towards democratisation and respect for human rights. The change to the political setting justified more restrictive policies towards Albanian migrants. However, this evaluation did not consider the actual situation on the ground. Albania was then challenged by the worst political and economic crisis since World War II. The state could not protect “human rights”. Legal migration was almost impossible for most Albanians as they did not fit the requirements that were necessary to obtain visas.
The “welcome” to Albanians started in the late-1980s, with a few scattered cases of persons who went to Italy and who in many cases migrated to the US or elsewhere. This phase lasted until February-March 1991, when large numbers of Albanians went to Italy by boat. Albanians who tried to migrate in the subsequent months, such as those who travelled on the ship Vlora, were not welcomed. Most of the passengers were brought to the old Bari stadium where they were kept without access to water, food and toilets. Whereas the police tried to keep them inside the stadium, according to some sources, common people organized “hunting” campaigns (caccia all’albanese) to catch those who ran away. The Italian state took the “painful” decision to repatriate all persons that came on the Vlora.
Opposition figures criticized the government for the way it treated Albanian migrants. Bianca Gelli, of the Communist Party, sent a report to the UN in order to expose their “inhumane treatment”. Pino Rauti, of the MSI, was disturbed by the images of Albanians in the stadium because it made him think of his experience as prisoner in a concentration camp. In the first years of transition, Albanians were seen as victims of communism and had the sympathy of far-right politicians with nostalgic feelings such as Rauti. Mirko Tremaglia, another MSI exponent, made a proposal with neo-colonial undertones. He mentioned a plan of investment in North Africa and Albania conceived by his party in order to prevent migration. This goals of this plan sound similar to the recent initiative of PM Meloni, the Piano Mattei. Evoking Rome’s colonial past, Tremaglia affirmed that Italy had strong bonds with Albania before communism. He suggested that Italy should have obtained a mandate for the management of the aid in Albania because events in Somalia – another Italian former colony– showed that local governments could not be trusted.
Events in Bari set the tone for the treatment of Albanians in 1990s Italy. The emergence of corruption scandals in 1992 wiped out many Italian politicians who dealt with Albania in the first years of transition. However, the situation of Albanian migrants did not improve. The new governments, whether left or right-wing, continued to apply stringent migratory policies and Albanians were forced to cross the sea with illegal means putting their lives in extreme danger. The press and the police increased surveillance on them and used Albanians as scapegoats. Albanians worked and still work for lower wages and often without contributions. In many cases, the state did not protect them from greedy employers and traffickers because it refused to give them papers.
A myth designed to present Italy as ‘saviour’
The narrative of the “welcoming” is meant to boost the old myth of Italy as the “saviour” of Albanians. This myth serves to make Albanians feel guilty and indebted towards the Italian state and at the same time to conceal and forget the exploitation that the majority of them were subject to.
No one should feel indebted to Italy or listen to what demagogical leaders such as Rama and Meloni have to say about Albanian-Italian relations. It’s Italy that should feel indebted towards Albanians, given the human and material costs of imperialist politics and wars that it carried out in Albania. The camps and the expansionist framework of Italy’s foreign policy risk poisoning relations between Albanians and Italians. Beside reflecting the racist attitude of the Italian far-right towards Albanians and other migrants, they evoke the concentration camps that Italy built during World War II in Albania. I think Albanians and Italians should oppose their construction.
- Fabio Bego is a scholar of nationalism, socialism and colonial ideologies.
- The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of BIRN.
By Paul Ainscough
Formerly regarded as one of Latin America’s safest countries, the recent uptick in violence has seen Ecuador descend into a maelstrom. These developments would be no surprise to those who have monitored Ecuador’s declining situation over recent years.
Statistics reveal an unprecedented increase in the murder rate from 6.9 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants in 2019 to 26.7 in 2022. Mirroring the events of past decades elsewhere in Latin America, the proliferation of violence across Ecuador is the result of transnational drug cartels. With it being half a century since the initiation of the War on Drugs, and with no apparent end in sight, has the broader campaign against the cartels become a forever war?
Recent Events
Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa was elected in October 2023. The campaign was overshadowed by an unprecedented level of political violence in which presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio was assassinated 11 days before voting began. Since assuming office, Noboa has taken a hard-line approach to tackling the cartels, which included the decision to move drug kingpins to maximum security facilities. Demonstrating the need for such a policy, on the 7th of January, notorious drug lord and leader of the Los Choneros cartel Jose Adolfo Macias Villamar (also known as “Fito”) escaped from La Regional prison. Serving a 34-year sentence for drug trafficking, extortion and murder, Macias was due to be moved to a maximum-security prison just days later.
This is not the first time Macias has broken out of prison, having previously escaped from La Roca in 2013 before being recaptured. Latin America has a history of drug kingpins escaping incarceration, with Joaquin ‘El Chapo’ Guzman and Pablo Escobar being other notable examples. One day after Macias’ most recent disappearance, Fabricio Colón Pico, the leader of the rival gang Los Lobos, escaped from another prison along with 31 other inmates. Chaos ensued in prisons across Ecuador, resulting in over 200 guards and administrative staff being takenhostage in at least 7 prisons. Then, on the 9th of January, 13 armed men grabbed the world’s attention when they stormed the set of TC TV station in Guayaquil during a live broadcast.
With Ecuador in turmoil, President Noboa declared a 60-day countrywide state of “internal armed conflict,” designated over 20 narco-gangs as terrorist groups and ordered the military to neutralize them. He reaffirmed his stance in an Instagram message, promising to “bring back peace to all Ecuadorians.” Since then, security forces have secured the safe release of all but one of the prison hostages and arrested the 13 assailants following the TC TV incident. However, the cartel’s preparedness to weaponize terror was demonstrated again on Wednesday the 18th of January, when the investigating prosecutor for the TC TV attack was shot dead in Guayaquil. Noboa’s war against the cartels will be a challenging and lengthy undertaking, with retaliatory violence a given and success by no means guaranteed.
History
The illicit drug trade gained prominence in Latin America in the 1960s and 70s, namely in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. Domestic concerns soon arose in the United States (US) as a result of increasing drug consumption, the association between narcotics and the counterculture movement, and the narrative that conflated drugs with crime. In a press conference on the 17th of June 1971, President Nixon responded by proclaiming the start of the War on Drugs.
Despite this declaration of war, throughout the 1980s, the Colombian Medellin and Cali cartels enjoyed a period of sustained growth and began to expand their cocaine production and distribution networks. Large quantities of cocaine subsequently flooded into US and international markets. Competition between rival gangs led to turf wars characterized by assassinations, bombings, and kidnappings. Violence swept across Latin America and domestic drug use surged in destination countries. The Reagan administration then amplified the War on Drugs by adopting a multi-pronged approach aimed at curbing substance abuse and tackling drug traffickers. Nancy Reagan’s “Just Say No” campaign sought to discourage drug use by promoting personal responsibility and resisting peer pressure. Stricter penalties were implemented for drug offences, Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) funding was increased, and assistance was given to Latin American countries.
Over half a century since the War on Drugs started, its efforts have largely failed. This is made even more apparent when you consider the idealistic objectives set out by the international community. At the 1998 United Nations General Assembly, policymakers boldly outlined the target of a “drug-free world” by 2008. By overly prioritizing punitive measures and overlooking root causes, the War on Drugs maintained a steady course towards failure.
For instance, despite successfully dismantling the major Colombian cartels in the 1990s, relentless international demand led to the emergence of new criminal organizations. The most prominent examples are the Mexican Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation Cartels. Demonstrating greater versatility compared with their predecessors, these groups are renowned for trafficking cocaine, methamphetamine, heroin, and cannabis.
To consolidate their dominance and expand operations, sophisticated transnational networks were established across numerous countries. Ecuador’s incorporation into this network partly stemmed from the viability of overland transport facilitated by its shared borders with Colombia and Peru, the world’s two greatest cocaine producers. As the world’s largest exporter of bananas, Ecuador’s ports are also ideal for hiding cocaine in huge shipping containers. Ecuador’s lack of infrastructure for dealing with the cartels, which is the result of their historic absence from the country, could also have made it an attractive prospect to drug traffickers.
Moving Forward
Transnational cartels represent an extremely complex problem for policymakers. To stand any chance of success, there is a need for a cohesive and integrated multilateral strategy. However, the regional cooperation necessary for such action is currently lacking. With the cartel’s operating across much of Latin America, the long list of countries involved makes it challenging to present a united front. This is illustrated by the liberal approach adopted by Colombian President Gustavo Petro, whose administration has overhauled drug policy and reduced the eradication of coca plantations. With Colombian cocaine production rising to a record 1,738 tonnes in 2023, Petro’s approach has worried policymakers in Washington.
There is also a risk of corruption undermining cooperative efforts. A prominent example of this has been the damaging legacy of former Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa, who is currently imprisoned on corruption charges. Correa struck a peace agreement with the cartels, expelled a US anti-narcotics base, and ended cooperation with the DEA.
Notwithstanding the above difficulties, a transnational threat necessitates a transnational response and authorities should not be dissuaded. The absence of an overarching strategy stands to benefit the cartels.
Tactically speaking, emphasis should be given to the root causes of the illicit drugs market including the economic principles of supply and demand. As supplying narcotics requires resources such as coca farms and manpower, policies targeted at these areas have a higher likelihood of a lasting impact.
There is also a need to integrate the realities revealed by research and learn necessary lessons from past policy mistakes. For instance, despite being popular amongst the electorate, numerous studies have proven that using military assets to reduce the supply of narcotics is “ineffective and conducive to the intensification of violence.” Removing one cartel simply creates a power vacuum that is soon filled by another. A more pragmatic method would be to address the prevalent socioeconomic problems of poverty and unemployment that drive cartel recruitment. With 43.5% of Mexico’s population living in poverty in 2022, drug cartels have capitalized on people’s desperation by targeting vulnerable individuals. Cartels collectively employ a staggering 175,000 people in Mexico, making them the fifth largest employer in the country. Unfortunately, the endemic nature of Latin America’s socioeconomic issues renders the challenge of resolving them a formidable one. Nevertheless, it would be pertinent for policymakers to recognize that investing in people’s opportunities has a higher probability of working in the long term.
The demand dimension in consumer countries is also an important consideration in the fight against cartels. By reducing the market for illicit drugs, these groups will suffer from revenue losses and the reduced capacity to fund terror campaigns. However, achieving this will require a major domestic drug policy rethink. Punitive enforcement-led policies involving criminalization and mass incarceration can no longer be justified. Despite a lack of evidence to support a causal relationship between criminalizing drug consumption and reducing availability or use, the notion of a deterrence effect continues to underpin the strategies of many governments.
The political risks of being associated as weak on drugs could explain why only a handful of developed countries have looked to alternatives to criminalizing drugs. This is unfortunate as numerous studies have proven the utility of reallocating resources towards strategies such as education, rehabilitation, and support. Public attitudes are an important variable in this political equation, accentuating the need to spread awareness of the facts surrounding what works and what does not.
Concluding Remarks
The ongoing war against the cartels exhibits several of the traits of a “forever war.” However, policymakers should not be fatalistic. Parallels between deteriorating events in Ecuador and those of past decades in other parts of Latin America highlight the need for a renewed approach in the countries impacted by the War on Drugs. This article has identified several changes that could be implemented to weaken the cartels, illustrating that there is a potential way forward. Nevertheless, on balance, it is difficult to be optimistic about the prospects of progressive policies coming to fruition and permanently removing the cartels. Overcoming an unconventional enemy demands progress on several fronts. This is made difficult by political hurdles and the preoccupation of key players such as the US with other more pressing geopolitical developments. Regrettably, in all probability, the cartels are here to stay.
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