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NPR News: 02-11-2024 10PM EST
NPR News: 02-11-2024 10PM EST
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Leaving aside the genuine concerns about the quality of democracy in Indonesia, there’s no denying that there’s still a tremendous quantity of it. On 14 February almost 205 million enrolled voters — half of them under 40 — will have the opportunity not just to elect a president to replace Joko Widodo (Jokowi), but to choose between candidates from 18 national parties (plus 6 local parties in the province of Aceh) competing for over 20,000 seats in national, provincial and municipal legislatures.
It’s the biggest single-day election in the world. Yet it has attracted only belated attention in the international media, partly because 2024 offers up a suite of elections that give a more cheerful picture of democratic deepening (such as Taiwan), or more dramatically illustrate the global trends of democratic decay (such as Pakistan, India or the United States).
Indonesia’s elections may not trigger major civil unrest, destabilise global financial markets or shift the terms of geopolitical competition. But as Liam Gammon highlights in this week’s lead article, they speak to significant political changes that have taken place in Indonesia under the leadership of Jokowi since 2014.
With polls showing a strong lead for Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto, ‘the question isn’t whether [Prabowo] will win, but how’. The endorsement of the popular incumbent president — signalled loud and clear by the appointment of one of his sons as Prabowo’s vice-presidential candidate — has seen a stampede of voter support to Prabowo, who now has a chance of winning the 50 per cent of votes needed to avoid a runoff against one of the two other candidates, former Jakarta governor Anies Baswedan and Central Java governor Ganjar Pranowo.
This, combined with the possibility that Prabowo’s Gerindra party will win the legislative elections held on the same day, means Prabowo has a chance to be sworn into office in October 2024 as Indonesia’s ‘most authoritative incoming president in the democratic era’.
Prabowo inherits a growing economy whose macroeconomic management by successive governments has been vindicated by steady upgrades in its sovereign credit ratings. But as experts are at pains to point out, by shirking reforms Indonesia is still missing out on the benefits from greater integration with global value chains, and the formal sector employment opportunities that come with that.
Debate about this issue has featured little through the election campaign. Prabowo’s opponents quickly found that even restrained criticisms of ‘Jokowinomics’ — channelling public investment in infrastructure through a strengthened SOE sector, using export bans to promote ‘downstreaming’ in value-added industries in the minerals sector, and expanding the social safety net — had little political payoff.
Indonesia is still awaiting a leader who can level with the electorate about the need for unfashionable reforms that will be needed to allow investors to deliver the jobs boom that all candidates are promising. These reforms include the regulatory changes, like creating a truly level playing field between state-owned and private enterprises, including foreign investors, or allowing easier immigration pathways for skilled foreign labour. Others are more to do with attitudes, including tolerating the bigger balance-of-payments gaps that will inevitably emerge via the import of finance, capital goods and other inputs crucial to manufacturing and infrastructure investments.
It would be a surprise if Prabowo turns out to be the politician who can sell these reforms to the public. He has moderated his rhetoric as part of his pose as the natural successor to President Jokowi, but if we take his back catalogue of statements on economics at face value, he appears stuck in a paradigm that frames foreign involvement in the economy principally in terms of the exploitation of Indonesia’s workers and natural resources.
Regardless of his heartfelt economic nationalism, Prabowo’s approach to economics will hopefully be guided by the demands of the Indonesian electorate. Their approval of a president depends much more on the tangible economic benefits of job creation, poverty reduction and price stability, not passing some economic ideological purity test.
Prabowo’s economic technocrats need to convince him, in the context of a still-underdeveloped tax base and limited domestic savings available to underwrite private and public investment, that alongside deepening Indonesia’s own capital markets, there is no alternative to inviting a bigger role for foreign investment in the economy if Indonesians’ expectations for growth, expanded public services and better employment prospects are to be met. ‘Politics’ is often blamed for getting in the way of economic reform in Indonesia, and it certainly does. But this ignores the way in which the pressures of electoral competition also incentivise responsible economic management.
Hopefully Prabowo does not fulfil the worst fears of his progressive critics, and leaves the fundamental competitiveness of Indonesia’s post-New Order democracy undisturbed.
- About the author: The EAF Editorial Board is located in the Crawford School of Public Policy, College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University.
- Source: This article was published by East Asia Forum
By Udayvir Ahuja
In the last two decades, the international community has shifted its attention towards one of the planet’s most remote and challenging environments—the Arctic. This renewed focus stems primarily from the ecological transformations occurring in the region, a direct consequence of climate change.
Studies estimate that the Arctic could witness its first ice-free summer as early as the 2030s. This anticipated change may potentially ease access to the region’s abundant natural resources, including oil and gas, rare earth metals, marine livestock, and other Arctic minerals such as copper, zinc, coal, etc.Simultaneously, it may also open up new maritime routes in the region. Amidst these developments, a critical question arises: Who or what governs the Arctic region?
A common narrative suggests that akin to its counterpart, the Antarctic, the Arctic is a Global Common—a resource domain not falling within the jurisdiction of any one particular country, to which all nations have access. If this were true, we could have been witnessing an unprecedented race among nations to establish dominion over the region, much like the one we are likely to witness in space in a few decades.
This, however, is not exactly the case. To understand why, we need to understand its geography.
Map source: Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies
As can be observed in the above map, the Arctic region consists primarily of three key components:
- The Arctic Ocean
- The land territories of the Arctic states
- The sea territories of the Arctic states
The Arctic Ocean, recognised as the world’s smallest and shallowest ocean, is surrounded by five countries—Canada, Denmark (Greenland), the United States (US), Russia, and Norway, as depicted in the map. The countries are often referred to as the Arctic coastal states.
UNCLOS
The distinct coloured areas surrounding each country in the above map represent their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). As per the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the EEZ constitutes the zone where the coastal country possesses certain rights, duties, and jurisdiction. This encompasses activities such as the exploration and exploitation of natural resources, power generation through wind and water, fishing, amongst others. Under Article 57 of the convention, this zone stretches up to 200 nautical miles from the baseline used to measure the breadth of the territorial sea. Beyond the 200 nautical miles from the coast of these states remains a triangle-shaped region, referred to as the Central Arctic Ocean (CAO) or simply the Arctic High Seas.
Under the UNCLOS, these high seas are indeed a global common, the common heritage of mankind. Accordingly, all countries have certain inherent rights in these high seas, covering resource exploration and exploitation, fishing, scientific investigation, the right of navigation, and more.
Considering their national interests, the Arctic coastal countries jointly declared in 2008 that the Law of the Seas would be the appropriate framework to govern the Arctic region. Adhering to international law in this case was advantageous to these countries as it allowed them to have control over a substantial area of the Arctic Ocean with minimal territorial conflicts. Since the Arctic region comprises the land territories of Arctic states, maritime zones of Arctic coastal states, and the high seas, the region could very well be dubbed as a “Quasi-Global Common”.
Governance: The Arctic Council
Due to the peculiar conditions, inhospitable nature, and general lack of state assets and capabilities in the region, the Arctic necessitated a novel governance structure. To this end, under the Ottawa Declaration of 1996, the Arctic Council was established as a high-level intergovernmental forum by the Arctic States—the five Arctic coastal states plus Sweden, Finland, and Iceland.
In addition to these permanent members, the council has six Permanent Participants (PP) groups which represent the indigenous people of the Arctic, such as the Aleut International Association, Russian Arctic Indigenous Peoples of the North, and Saami Council. Moreover, an observer status has been granted to 38 non-Arctic nations which have shown keen interest in the activities of the region.
The Council is not a rule-making body; rather, it serves as a forum for cooperation and coordination among the Arctic States on areas such as sustainable development, scientific research, the environment, as well as the rights of the indigenous people. Its mandate explicitly excludes matters pertaining to military security.
The Arctic Council has been more or less successful in fulfilling its mandate despite an array of unique challenges it faces in the region on account of the following factors:
- Research-based environmental focus: The Council’s emphasis on a research-based approach to environmental issues has played a crucial role. This focus helps in maintaining a regional and issue-based discourse, preventing the discussions from being overshadowed by great power rivalries.
- Leadership by small actors: The active role of small states, such as Norway, has been critical in mitigating confrontations between great powers. Small actors have provided leadership, facilitating a regional and issue-based discussion that avoids getting entangled in broader geopolitical rivalries. The fact that all states have an equal status in the council has been a big factor towards this.
- Consensus decision-making: The Arctic Council operates on a consensus basis, meaning decisions are made collectively. This approach, while limiting the range of issues initially addressed, has allowed the Council to build trust among its members, forming the basis for its de facto governance power.
- Respect for UNCLOS: The adherence to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) by all parties, even when not all members or observer nations have ratified the treaty, contributes to stability. The commitment of major states like the U.S. and China to abide by UNCLOS despite their reservations with the convention, enhances the Council’s effectiveness in governing the Arctic region.
Future of Arctic governance
Ever since its formation almost three decades ago, the landscape in which the Arctic Council was conceived has changed drastically. The environmental conditions of the world are not what they used to be 30 years ago, nor is the world order. Once considered remote, the region has become a focal point due to the economic opportunities and strategic importance amid climate change. This has led to stronger economic and geopolitical ties between the Arctic and the rest of the world, impacting regions far beyond the North.
While the Council has demonstrated resilience in addressing the enormous challenges, the current ecological and geopolitical shifts may warrant a thorough revaluation of its functions and authority. The need for reassessment is underscored by recent events, such as the 2022 instance where the Council unilaterally rejected cooperation with Russia, a pivotal member with significant stakes in the Arctic and holding the position of the Council’s Chair. This decision was driven by Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine, highlighting the potential vulnerability of the Council’s governance structure.
Against this backdrop, the Arctic Council’s role has never been more crucial, as it assumes a vital position in guiding both Arctic and non-Arctic nations, along with indigenous communities, through the multifaceted challenges accompanying the ongoing transformations in the region.
- About the author: Udayvir Ahuja is a Programme Coordinator with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation
- Source: This article was published at the Observer Research Foundation
Thailand will establish a humanitarian safe zone and deliver aid to displaced people living on its border with wartorn Myanmar, the Thai foreign minister said Friday, a move Bangkok hopes will achieve the larger goal of establishing dialogue between the Burmese junta, ethnic armed groups and the civilian government-in-exile.
The plan will serve some 20,000 people in three towns in Myanmar, Foreign Minister Panpree Phahitthanukorn said at a press conference in Mae Sot. Thailand plans to begin delivering food and medical supplies within a month, he said.
Fierce fighting during Myanmar’s civil war, sparked by a military coup in February 2021, has forced more than 2.6 million people across the country to flee their homes, according to United Nations estimates.
As of Jan. 29, roughly 190,000 of them are in Kayin and Kayah states, along the western border of Thailand, according to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, or UNHCR.
“It is good to have a chance to observe the area here in Mae Sot. It is suitable to be a base for humanitarian assistance, which will happen soon,” Panpree said Friday about the visit to the border. Thailand has not disclosed the exact location of the safe zone.
The Thai and Myanmar Red Cross Societies will implement the plan, monitored by the Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN.
It remains unclear if Myanmar’s junta has agreed with Thailand’s aid delivery plan. The Thai foreign ministry has also not engaged in dialogue with ethnic armed groups yet, Panpree said during the press conference.
Urging dialogue
Since the 2021 coup, the 10-member ASEAN has expressed disappointment that Myanmar has been unable to meet a five-point consensus, which included ending violence in the country, facilitating dialogue between all parties and humanitarian assistance by ASEAN.
Following the ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting on Jan. 29 in Laos, Thai Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Sihasak Phuangketkeow expressed hope that the aid would be seen as a non-political initiative.
Aid delivery is a good start to approaching the conflict, political analyst Panitan Wattanayagorn told Radio Free Asia (RFA) on Friday, but added that ASEAN members were concerned about political consequences.
“Once you deliver some of the assistance to one group, other groups that are fighting with that group could see it as an assistance for this group to fight against them,” he said.
“So this is a very sensitive and political issue anyway, although the Thais try to say it’s not a political issue. And this is what ASEAN members, many of them, are very concerned [about]. They didn’t know how and in what way this aid could be non-political.”
Thailand’s former administration was admonished by Indonesia’sminister of foreign affairs in 2023 for holding talks with the junta after the bloc began excluding high-level Myanmar officials from its meetings from the months following the coup.
RFA called ASEAN’s Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management for comment on their oversight of the project, but they did not respond by the time of publication.
Others working on border aid have called for expanded aid delivery, highlighting the immense need along bordering Kayah state as well.
“The people are starving over there,” Chalida Tajaroensuk, director of the People’s Empowerment Foundation. “The situation near Kayin state has simmered down so the government should consider expanding the relief aid delivery up north soon.”