Armenia, Europol to enhance partnership ARMENPRESS
Day: January 24, 2024
In less than three years, the erosion in the US hegemony that began cascading with the defeat in Afghanistan in August 2021 spread to Eurasia, followed by the massive eruption in West Asia by the end of 2023. As 2024 begins, we hear distant drums in the Far East, as North Korea’s supreme leader Kim Jong Un instinctively senses a rare alignment of positive factors appearing in the existential conflicts in Eurasia and West Asia and capitalises on it with a strategic shift to challenge what Pyongyang calls a US-led ‘Asian version of NATO’.
The Korean Central News Agency reported on a statement from the country’s Foreign Ministry that North Korea “warmly welcomes President Putin to visit Pyongyang and is ready to greet the Korean people’s closest friend with the greatest sincerity.”
Kim, an astute practitioner of geopolitics, aims to create synergy through a strategic fusion that actually dates back to Joseph Stalin who purposefully sought to entangle the US in a military conflict on the Korean Peninsula and forestall the outbreak of a third world war.
Stalin’s calculation was that a US, exhausted from the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, “would be incapable of a third world war in the near future.” Indeed, he was proven right.
Stalin wrote a highly confidential letter to then Czechoslovak President Klement Gottwald on 27 August 1950 to explain his decision-making, which found its way from the ex-Soviet archives in 2005, to appear in the original Russian in the historical journal Novaya I Noveishaya Istoriia.
Apparently, Stalin went along secretly with Kim Il Sung’s plan, during the North Korean leader’s secret trip to Moscow in April 1950, not because he miscalculated that the US would not get involved in the war (as western historians estimated) but precisely because he wanted the US to become entangled in a limited conflict in Asia.
Stalin was reassuring Gottwald, a nervous ally, about the international situation and Moscow’s decision to withdraw from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in January 1950 and the rationale for the Soviet absence from the UNSC in July 1950 when it discussed the Korean issue as well as the Soviet abstention and failure to exercise its veto against the US resolution seeking deployment of a UN force in Korea.
Stalin wrote that “it is clear that the United States of America is presently distracted from Europe in the Far East. Does it not give us an advantage in the global balance of power? It undoubtedly does.”
Put differently, Europe was the main priority in the Soviet Union’s international strategy, and the Korean War was seen as an opportunity to strengthen socialism in Europe while diverting American interests and resources from that continent.
What distinguishes great powers like Russia is the sheer profundity of their historical consciousness to co-relate time past with time present and to comprehend that the germane seeds of time future are largely to be found embedded in time past. After all, time cannot be treated in abstraction but as the vital ground of human reality. That must be one reason why there is such agonising speculation in the US today regarding the recent surge in Russia-DPRK ties.
The White House’s senior director for arms control Pranay Vaddi said last Thursday that the nature of the security threat posed by North Korea could change “drastically” in the coming decade as a result of its unprecedented cooperation with Russia. “What we’re seeing between Russia and North Korea is an unprecedented level of cooperation in the military sphere,” Vaddi told Washington’s Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank. He added, “And I say ‘unprecedented’ very deliberately — We have never seen this before.”
Vaddi said it was necessary to pay close attention not just to nuclear-armed North Korea’s help for Russia war in Ukraine, primarily in the form of missile systems, but “what could be going in the other direction as well.”
He asked, “How could that improve North Korea’s capabilities? And what does that mean for our own extended deterrence posture in the region with both Korea and Japan?” The US has got Russia’s message alright.
Vaddi’s remarks that were anything but off-the-cuff, followed the 5-day official visit by the DPRK Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui to Moscow during which Putin, in a rare gesture, received the visiting dignitary at the Kremlin. The Russian readout taunted the Americans by cryptically characterising Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s talks with Choe as “a meaningful exchange of opinions on topical matters dealing with developing bilateral ties with a focus on “practical matters” and “further improve the contractual legal framework.” Readouts seldom go that far in transparency.
Anyway, the point of reference was the implementation of “agreements” between Putin and Kim during their meeting in September at the Vostochny Space Launch Centre (Russian spaceport above the 51st parallel North in the Amur Oblast in the Russian Far East).
Commenting on minister Choe’s meeting with Putin, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov asserted that North Korea “is our very important partner, and we are focused on the further development of our relations in all areas, including in sensitive areas.”
In essence, as a Reuters report took note, “Moscow says it will develop ties with whatever countries it wants… Russia has gone out of its way to publicise the renaissance of its relationship, including military ties, with North Korea…. For Putin,.. courting Kim allows him to needle Washington and its Asian allies.”
Indeed, Kim is keen to play his role as well. In the past week alone, North Korea conducted a test of its underwater nuclear weapons system and Kim announced that unification with South Korea is no longer possible. Kim said the North “did not want war, but we also have no intention of avoiding it.”
Without doubt, Russia has chosen to double down on its alliance with North Korea. And Kim expressed his interest in deepening ties with Moscow in a highly public manner by making a personal visit to Russia in September. The timing of that trip was bold given recent moves by the US to strengthen trilateral deterrence efforts against the North with South Korea and Japan.
A de facto trilateral ‘bloc’ with Russia and China in opposition to the US–South Korea–Japan trilateral alliance is in the making. DPRK’s support for Russia in Ukraine would serve China’s interests by containing US power. And North Korea gains immeasurably in strategic depth, thanks to the support by two veto-holding UN Security Council members.
A press release by the foreign ministry in Pyongyang following minister Choe’s talks in Moscow said “The DPRK side highly appreciated the important mission and role of the powerful Russian Federation in maintaining the strategic stability and balance of the world and expressed expectation that the Russian Federation would continue to adhere to independent policies and lines in all fields in the future, too, and thus make a great contribution to international peace and security and the establishment of an equal and fair international order.”
Tass played up the press release, carving no less than 3 wholesome reports out of it. In effect, a new geopolitical vector is appearing in the Far East, which, unlike Ukraine or Gaza, is also a nuclear flashpoint. Geopolitics is moving North Korea’s way, finally — a country that seven years ago was already harbouring dreams of sinking a US nuclear-powered aircraft carrier “with a single strike”. The point is, that fantasy remains untested.
In politics, the underdog often starts the fight — and occasionally the upper dog deserves to win, but seldom does. Hamas, the Houthis, Kim — it’s always fun to surprise people. For, it puts less pressure on them, as they’re only a winning mindset away from battles that could transform an underdog into a champion and achiever. Putin’s journey to Pyongyang will be carefully watched by the Biden administration.
Andrey Sushentsov, a prominent Russian pundit, wrote recently, “Our confrontation with the Americans will last for a long time, although we will see certain pauses… Russia’s task will be to create a network of relationships with like-minded states, which may even eventually include some from the West. The US strategy is to forcibly extinguish points of strategic autonomy, which Washington succeeded in doing in Western Europe in the first phase of the Ukraine crisis, but that move was one of the last successes in this regard.
At any rate, an eastern front is opening in the US-Russia confrontation, supplementing the western and southern fronts in Eurasia and West Asia respectively.
This article was published by Indian Punchline
By Suzanne Vares-Lum and Charles E. Morrison
While conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine overshadow world events at the onset of 2024, in the longer term the Indo-Pacific region remains by far the most important part of the world for global peace and prosperity. With more than 40 countries and 60 percent of world population, the Indo-Pacific is still the epicenter of global growth, and no other region offers more opportunities, as well as challenges, for the United States.
Of the region’s many issues in this coming year, three stand out for us. The first is what 2024 might tell us about the direction of the world’s second-most powerful country, China. It appears to have reached an important crossroads, facing significant economic and political headwinds. The Chinese economy failed to rebound vigorously from the pandemic; consumer and investment confidence is anemic; and young people are having trouble finding rewarding jobs. Global public opinion surveys, meanwhile, show increasing international anxiety over China’s more aggressive foreign policy and security policies.
All these forces may have influenced Xi Jinping to seek more stable relations with the U.S. in his November meeting with President Biden, but the question is how much this is a tactical move rather than being part of a sustained strategy. An early test may be Beijing’s response to the Taiwan presidential election on January 13.
China regards Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party as being bent on formal independence. If the DPP candidate, current Vice President Lai Ching-te, wins as widely anticipated, Xi may be tempted to increase provocations leading up to Lai’s inauguration in May as a way to cow the new leader. However, this move would not only strengthen resentment toward the mainland in Taiwan but increase tensions with the United States and further alarm potential investors, dealing yet another blow to the Chinese economy.
The second key issue is the global future of democracy and its essential building block, a free and trustworthy press. More than 50 countries around the world have elections scheduled in 2024, a new record. Meanwhile here at home, fundamental issues of American policy hang in the balance of our own presidential election in November.
A primary concern amid so much potential global political change is the explosion of disinformation enhanced by artificial intelligence’s ability to reinforce biases.
This is especially troubling with research suggesting an ongoing erosion of faith in democratic institutions and media worldwide. The East-West Center has long tracked such issues through our diverse journalism programs, and we’ll be exploring them further at our biennial International Media Conference on “The Future of Facts” this summer in Manila, a regional hot spot at the intersection of democracy and media.
Finally, there is the pressing challenge of climate change, which is especially acute for the Pacific Islands—not just because of sea level rise, an existential threat to low-lying atolls, but also more frequent violent storms, prolonged droughts, and ocean acidification. For island communities at risk, this past month’s UN climate summit in Dubai was a mixed blessing. The goal of transitioning away from fossil fuels was formally recognized, and developed countries pledged increased support for adaptation efforts in smaller and less wealthy states. But so far, major emitters have not made the policy changes needed to contain temperature rise to the goal of 1.5 degrees centigrade.
We deeply believe that Hawai‘i has a special responsibility in the Pacific, with similar heritage and challenges coupled with a state economy that is more than double that of all developing Pacific Islands economies combined. Hawai‘i institutions can help provide needed analysis on how climate change will affect the island environments and economies, assist in developing climate adaptation strategies, and train local experts.
Whatever else is happening in the world, the United States certainly cannot afford to take its eye off the Indo-Pacific region. As Star-Advertiser reporter (and EWC media program alum) Kevin Knodell wrote his recent article “Hawaii Playing a Part in the Pacific Century,” the East-West Center and other locally based educational and policy institutions will continue to play a vital role as bridges to the region and standard bearers of Hawai‘i’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific.
About the authors:
- Suzanne Vares-Lum, East-West Center President
- Charles E. Morrison, former EWC President, current Senior Fellow
Source: This article was published by East-West Center
By Jerry L. Mothershead, Zygmunt F. Dembek, Todd A. Hann, Christopher G. Owens, and Aiguo Wu
In late 2016, 21 American and Canadian diplomatic personnel stationed in Havana, Cuba, experienced unusual and unexplained health problems. Although symptoms varied among those affected, the onset of illness was generally described as starting with hearing strange grating noises and feeling pressure in the ears coming from a specific direction and lasting less than 30 seconds. Other people nearby did not report any symptoms.
Although most of those affected recovered with no residual symptoms, some had prolonged effects including hearing loss, memory loss, and nausea, and at least one individual now requires hearing aids. The etiology of the illnesses was undetermined, but speculation at the time centered on the possibility that these health effects resulted from a directed attack by means of either sonic or radio frequency energy. While not accusing the Cuban government of intentionally causing these “attacks”—intentionality even today remains unproved—both the U.S. and Canadian governments reduced embassy staffing to essential personnel only.
The constellation of symptoms has been referred to as “Havana syndrome” because of the location of the original events, but subsequent attacks on U.S. personnel have been reported in locations around the world, including Austria, Australia, Colombia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Poland, Russia, Serbia, Taiwan, and Uzbekistan. Also characterized as “anomalous health incidents” (AHI), at least two cases were identified in the United States—one involving a White House official while walking near her home in Northern Virginia, and one near the Ellipse in the District of Columbia, adjacent to the White House. Dozens more cases were reported among U.S. personnel in Vienna and Hungary in early 2021, and several cases were also reported in Vietnam, India, Germany, and in London. Hundreds more such events had been reported as of late 2022. After rigorous review, some of the reported illnesses were determined not to fit the defined criteria for this syndrome. Those cases remaining were almost exclusively among U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of Defense (DOD), and Department of State personnel and their family members, some of whom have left government service due to health complications attributed to the syndrome.1
Havana syndrome cases have been investigated by the CIA, the State Department Medical Branch, the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and DOD, among others.2 For various reasons, there has been less than total information-sharing across the agencies involved. Physical health evaluations of those affected were performed at several locations and by means of different modalities, and there was little standardization across investigatory bodies.
Backstory: Once Upon a Time in Moscow
Microwaves were targeted against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow from 1953 until early 1976. Lilienfeld et al. conducted a biostatistical epidemiological study, published in 1978, which revealed that microwaves were directed at the upper half of the U.S. Embassy’s Chancery Building from 1953 to 1975 at a dose of 5 μW/cm2 for 9 hours a day. From June 1975 to February 1976, another area of the building received triple that dose (15 μW/cm2) for 18 hours daily. More than 1,800 employees at this Embassy were exposed to these microwaves. Lilienfeld et al. compared these exposed employees to a comparison group of more than 2,500 employees at other Eastern European posts, including in Belgrade, Budapest, Leningrad, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw, and Zagreb. That study concluded that no notable difference in mortality was observed between these two groups.3 A subsequent analysis by Lilienfeld noted the difficulties of such prospective studies, including poor study participation and small sample size.4 More recent analysis has supported Lilienfeld’s initial conclusions, while acknowledging that others have offered alternative interpretations for the findings.5
A 1976 study (now declassified) of State Department employees who worked in the Moscow embassy compared their hematological test results with those of a similar group in Washington, DC.6 Differences between the two groups were noted for most blood cell components examined and were statistically significant, with important changes over time having occurred in the Moscow group. However, this information has never appeared in the peer-reviewed medical literature, and it is unknown if these two sets of samples taken in different locations were analyzed by the same or different laboratories or by means of the same standardized analytical methods.7
The International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) has since categorized radiofrequency electromagnetic fields as a possible carcinogen (Group 2B),8 and some have suggested that this designation is not restrictive enough.9 The cancer risks from such exposures may include gliomas, but the risk is unproved.10 Power densities measured at the Moscow embassy at that time were of the same order of magnitude as expected from living near a cellular device base station.11
These incidents from 40 to 70 years ago with subsequent investigations yielded overall inconclusive findings, just like the current incidents suspected of precipitating Havana syndrome. Experimental evidence at the time indicated that intense microwave doses could cause malignancies, neurological effects, and cataracts. Given the lack of evidence of increased cancer, neurological disorders, or loss of vision, Lilienfeld stated in 1978, “There is no convincing evidence to implicate the exposure of these people to microwave radiation and the onset of adverse health effects.”12 Furthermore, the rise in white blood cell count found in the hematological tests and the subjects’ complaints of headaches, memory problems, and sleep loss were attributed to common infectious diseases and psychosomatic effects of the adverse publicity at the time. Lilienfeld recommended that “this recent group of 400 people” who had worked at the embassy during the period of most intense radiation “be followed and examined every two years for the next 10 years.” His recommendation does not appear to have been followed.
Havana Syndrome Defined
In 2017, the State Department requested that CDC evaluate all information related to the initial cases in Havana. In response, a team of experts reviewed available medical records of individuals who had been affected while in Cuba or shortly after departure and who were subsequently evaluated at the University of Pennsylvania Medical Center or the University of Miami. As part of its final report, CDC developed a case definition for this subset of the universe of persons affected.13
A presumptive case included any individual who had developed a biphasic constellation of symptoms, with at least one of the following symptoms appearing while in Cuba or within 2 weeks of leaving Cuba, with no other explanation: head pressure, disorientation, nausea, headache, vestibular (balance and coordination) disturbances, auditory symptoms, and vision changes; the second phase had to have occurred weeks to months after the original symptoms and included vestibular disturbances and/or cognitive deficits (memory, concentration). A possible case included any individual who had developed one or more first-phase symptoms but had not subsequently developed second-phase symptoms.
An elite advisory group of science consultants advising the U.S. Government known as JASON was also contracted to determine the cause and nature of Havana syndrome.14 The JASON team concluded that the sounds recorded in Havana “are mechanical or biological in origin, rather than electronic. The most likely source is the Indies short-tailed cricket, Anurogryllis celerinictus.” Furthermore, “The recorded audio signal is, with high confidence, not produced by the nonlinear detection of high-power radiofrequency or ultrasound pulses. . . . We judge as highly unlikely the notion that pulsed RF [radio frequency] mimics acoustic signals in both the brain (via the Frey effect) and in electronics (through RF interference/pickup).” JASON therefore attributed 8 of the original 21 cases of the syndrome to hearing cricket noises.15 Needless to say, this explanation was not well received by some, particularly when those affected had chronic health outcomes because of their experiences.
The National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine (NAS) was also commissioned by the State Department to review the cases, their clinical features and management, epidemiologic investigations, and the scientific evidence in support of possible causes. This review was challenging because of incompleteness of records or withholding of information because of national security issues. Nonetheless, the NAS committee developed a report. NAS agreed with CDC’s description of a biphasic course of illness.16 The most distinctive clinical aspects of the illnesses were the nature of the onset and the initial features: the sudden onset of a perceived loud sound, a sensation of intense pressure or vibration in the head, and pain in the ear or more diffusely in the head. Chronic symptoms, if present, suggested problems with vestibular processing and cognition as well as insomnia and headache. However, no consistent picture of brain injury emerged from laboratory-based tests of vestibular function.
Although not performed on all personnel, complete physical and health evaluations including toxicology screenings, other blood tests, and neuroimaging studies (magnetic resonance imaging [MRI]) were performed on some personnel from the initial affected group with presumptive Havana syndrome.17Specifically, MRI studies were performed at the University of Pennsylvania Medical Center on 40 personnel and the results were compared with those of a demographically similar control group.18 The studies identified no gross abnormalities or significant differences between the affected population and controls. Subsequent findings by the University of Pennsylvania team found that, compared with a healthy control group, the diplomatic personnel who had reported injury had experienced brain trauma. Advanced MRI scans (specifically, resting-state functional MRI, multimodal MRI, and diffusion MRI) revealed “differences in whole brain white matter volume, regional gray and white matter volume, cerebellar microstructural integrity, and functional connectivity in the auditory and visuospatial subnetworks but not in the executive control subnetwork” (executive brain functions are mental skills that include working memory, flexible thinking, and self-control). To add to this information, a study of 24 Canadian diplomats and their families affected by the syndrome documented brain white matter injury significantly correlated with clinical symptoms.19 Finally, a recently published prospective study of 45 U.S. diplomats injured during work assignment in Cuba found that their exposure resulted in prolonged illness with cognitive impairment and other clinical manifestations.20
In summary, the preponderance of documented symptoms, diagnostic evaluations, and laboratory studies indicates that injuries were suffered by those complaining of symptoms described, and these injuries are most consistent with what might be seen with a persistent concussion, but without evidence of physical trauma.
Mechanism of Injury
The NAS committee also explored potential causes for the injuries described and test results. These potential causes included poisoning, especially with organophosphate or other insecticides; infectious agents, such as Zika virus; and psychosocial conditions. No medical condition like Havana syndrome has previously been described in the literature. There was no evidence of chemicals or infectious agents in environmental samples collected months after the incidence of illness and no evidence of previous psychological issues with any of those evaluated. However, it was considered that some of the complaints that accompanied the chronic issues plaguing those affected could have a psychological component.
Scientific literature notes an auditory effect of microwaves or ultrasonic energy, called the Frey effect. Beginning in 1961, with the original description by Frey, numerous articles have been published concerning the neural effect of microwave energy.21 The NAS committee concluded that directed pulsed RF energy (defined as 30 KHz to 300 GHz, including microwave radiation of 300 MHz to 300 GHz) appears to be the most plausible mechanism for Havana syndrome symptoms, especially in those with the distinct early manifestations. But the chronic symptoms reported in the affected individuals are the sort often seen in patients after head trauma or chemical exposure or because of infectious diseases or stress in a hostile environment. Finally, there is no documented evidence in the open-source literature of a weaponized RF emitter used against any affected individual, although it is understood that several countries, including Russia, have researched directed-energy weapons in recent years.22
James Giordano, chief of the Neuroethics Studies Program at Georgetown University, stated that “the most likely culprit . . . would be some form of electromagnetic-pulse generation and/or hypersonic generation that would then utilize the architecture of the skull to . . . induce the constellation of signs and symptoms we’re seeing in these patients.”23 Microwave energy in the low-gigawatt range could evoke disruptions in neurological networks of the brain that could lead to functional disruption and durable impairment of cognition and behavior. Additionally, a laser component could be used for aiming or combined with electromagnetic or sonic energy to increase effectiveness against targeted individuals. Research in the use of directed energies for commercial and military applications has been conducted by Russia and China, and the United States has engaged in research on ranged acoustic, ultrasonic devices, and scalable microwave devices.24
There is no accepted therapy to alleviate the symptoms of the Frey effect. One odd research paper indicates that a researcher self-medicated himself for purported symptoms caused by the Frey effect by use of the adrenergic vasoconstrictor naphazoline nitrate,25 most used as a decongestant.26 Another case study of a single Havana syndrome patient suggested that a 5-day multimodal program of neurological exercises provided in 10 one-hour treatment sessions improved that patient’s symptom severity score by >36 percent and their stability score by about 125 percent, but left stability “still severely compromised.”27
The Future?
On October 8, 2021, the Helping American Victims Afflicted by Neurological Attacks (HAVANA) Act was signed into law by President Joe Biden. Public Law 117-46 authorizes “payment to personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency who incur qualifying injuries to the brain [and] payment to personnel of the Department of State who incur similar injuries.” As of August 2022, initial payments of up to $187,300 have been authorized for those State Department employees affected by AHI/Havana syndrome.28
Although this law admirably addresses potential compensation to U.S. Government personnel affected by Havana syndrome, a definitive determination of the cause of this syndrome remains elusive 6 years after its first occurrence. As noted, cases have continued during recent years. Hostile governments have previously subjected American Embassy buildings to microwave radiation, demonstrating a willingness to subject U.S. personnel to surreptitious energy sources that may cause deleterious health effects. Until there is consensus as to the precise cause of and methods to prevent or treat Havana syndrome, it will likely remain an enigma and health concern for diplomatic, intelligence, and military personnel globally.
We have progressed considerably from attributing AHI/Havana syndrome to noises caused by indigenous crickets. Yet the problems of identifying its origin and possible perpetrator(s) remain unsolved. Until answers are found, it remains undetermined if foreign actors have developed an ingenious method for hampering our overseas diplomatic missions, or if perhaps foreign postings in and of themselves contribute to the cause. Clarity on the cause of and treatments for the syndrome is now a U.S. Government priority. As Secretary of State Antony Blinken has stated, “We will get to the bottom of this, and meanwhile we will do everything we can to care for our people.”29
About the authors: Commander Jerry L. Mothershead, USN (Ret.), MD, is an Emergency Medicine Physician at Applied Research Associates. Colonel Zygmunt F. Dembek, USAR (Ret.), Ph.D., is a Senior Scientist at the Battelle Memorial Institute. Todd A. Hann is Chief of the Technical Reachback Division at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). Colonel Christopher G. Owens, USA (Ret.), is Program Manager at Applied Research Associates. Dr. Aiguo Wu, MD, Ph.D., is Medical Team Lead for DTRA Technical Reachback.
Source: This article was published in Joint Force Quarterly 108, which is published by the National Defense University.
Notes
1 Byron Tau, “Havana Syndrome: What We Know,” Wall Street Journal, February 22, 2022.
2 JASON, Acoustic Signals and Physiological Effects on U.S. Diplomats in Cuba (McLean, VA: The MITRE Corporation, November 29, 2018), available at <https://irp.fas.org/agency/dod/jason/havana.pdf>.
3 Abraham M. Lilienfeld et al., Evaluation of Health Studies of Foreign Service and Other Employees from Selected Eastern European Posts (Washington, DC: Office of Medical Services, 1978).
4 Abraham M. Lilienfeld, “Practical Limitations of Epidemiologic Methods,” Environmental Health Perspectives 52 (1982), 3–8, available at <https://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/doi/pdf/10.1289/ehp.83523>.
5 J. Mark Elwood, “Microwaves in the Cold War: The Moscow Embassy Study and Its Interpretation. Review of a Retrospective Cohort Study,” Environmental Health 11 (2012), available at <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3509929/>.
6 James A. Tonascia and Susan Tonascia, “Hematology Study,” October 7, 1976. Report declassified under the Freedom of Information Act.
7 John R. Goldsmith, “Epidemiological Studies of Radio-Frequency Radiation: Current Status and Areas of Concern,” The Science of the Total Environment180, no. 1 (February 2, 1986), 3–8.
8 “IARC Classifies Radiofrequency Electromagnetic Fields as Possibly Carcinogenic to Humans,” World Health Organization, International Agency for Research on Cancer, May 31, 2011, available at <https://www.iarc.who.int/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/pr208_E.pdf>.
9 Anthony B. Miller et al., “Cancer Epidemiology Update, Following the 2011 IARC Evaluation of Radiofrequency Electromagnetic Fields,” Environmental Research 167 (2018), 673–683.
10 Wei-Jia Zhi, Li-Feng Wang, and Xiang-Jun Hu, “Recent Advances in the Effects of Microwave Radiation on Brains,” Military Medical Research 4, no. 29 (2017), available at <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40779-017-0139-0>.
11 Jose A. Martinez, “The ‘Moscow Signal’ Epidemiological Study, 40 Years On,” Reviews on Environmental. Health 34, no. 1 (2019), 13–24.
12 Thomas O’Toole, “Moscow Microwaves: No Harm Seen,” Washington Post, November 21, 1978, available at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1978/11/21/moscow-microwaves-no-harm-seen/7a4b045f-e2ff-401e-a1f5-34e748d4cf13/>.
13 Cuba Unexplained Events Investigation—Final Report (Atlanta: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, December 13, 2019), available at <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/documents/cdc-report-havana-syndrome-medical-mystery-remains-unresolved/CDC%20%2320200983DOS255%20Final%20Report.pdf>.
14 Ann Finkbeiner, The Jasons: The Secret History of Science’s Postwar Elite (New York: Penguin Books, 2007), 4; Jack Hitt, “The Real Story Behind the Havana Embassy Mystery,” Vanity Fair, available at <https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2019/01/the-real-story-behind-the-havana-embassy-mystery>.
15 Dan Vergano, “A Declassified State Department Report Says Microwaves Didn’t Cause ‘Havana Syndrome,’” BuzzFeed News, September 30, 2021, available at <https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/danvergano/havana-syndrome-jason-crickets>.
16 David A. Relman and Julie A. Pavlin, eds., An Assessment of Illness in U.S. Government Employees and Their Families at Overseas Embassies(Washington, DC: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2020).
17 Randel L. Swanson et al., “Neurological Manifestations Among U.S. Government Personnel Reporting Directional Audible and Sensory Phenomena in Havana, Cuba,” Journal of the American Medical Association 319, no. 11 (March 20, 2018), 1125–1133, available at <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5885885/?report=classic>.
18 Ragini Verma et al., “Neuroimaging Findings in U.S. Government Personnel with Possible Exposure to Directional Phenomena in Havana, Cuba,” Journal of the American Medical Association 322, no. 4 (July 23, 2019), 336–347, available at <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6652163/>.
19 Guillermo Aristi et al., “Symptoms Reported by Canadians Posted in Havana Are Linked with Reduced White Matter Fibre Density,” Brain Communications 4, no. 2 (March 7, 2022), available at <https://academic.oup.com/braincomms/article/4/2/fcac053/6543087?login=false>.
20 Judith Green-McKenzie et al., “Clinical and Psychological Factors Associated with Return to Work Among United States Diplomats Who Sustained a Work-Related Injury While on Assignment in Havana, Cuba,” Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine 64, no. 3 (March 1, 2022).
21 See, for example, Robert Skopec, “The Frey Effect of Microwave Sonic Weapons,” Drug Designing & Intellectual Properties International Journal(September 10, 2018), available at <https://lupinepublishers.com/drug-designing-journal/pdf/DDIPIJ.MS.ID.000137.pdf>.
22 Samuel Bendett et al., Advanced Military Technology in Russia: Capabilities and Implications (London: Chatham House, September 2021), available at <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-09/2021-09-23-advanced-military-technology-in-russia-bendett-et-al.pdf>.
23 Steve Dorsey, “Pentagon Turns Focus to Cuba Health ‘Attacks’ Amid New Findings on American Victims,” CBS News, September 12, 2018, available at <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/pentagon-turns-focus-to-cuba-attacks/>.
24 James Giordano, “Nation Must Come Together to Tackle Havana Syndrome,” National Defense, October 15, 2021, available at <https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2021/10/15/nation-must-come-together-to-tackle-havana-syndrome>.
25 National Center for Biotechnology Information, National Institutes of Health, “Compound Summary for CID 82332, Naphazoline Nitrate,” available at <https://pubchem.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/compound/Naphazoline-nitrate>.
26 Robert Skopec, “Naphazoline Nitrate Treat the Frey Effect of Microwave and Other Sonic Weapon’s Damages in Human’s Internal, Endogenous Organs,” Annals of Biomedical Science and Engineering 3 (2019), 1–9, available at <https://doi.org/10.29328/journal.abse.1001004>.
27 Matthew M. Antonucci et al., “Treating Havana Syndrome: Cognition, Balance, and Graded Symptom Checklist Score Following Neurological Rehabilitation,” paper presented at the International Symposium on Clinical Neuroscience, May 24–26, 2019, available at <https://www.frontiersin.org/10.3389%2Fconf.fneur.2019.62.00076/event_abstract>.
28 “Implementation of HAVANA Act of 2021,” Department of State, 22 CFR, pt. 135, Federal Register 87, no. 125, June 30, 2022, 38981, available at <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/06/30/2022-13887/implementation-of-havana-act-of-2021>.
29 Paul D. Shinkman, “Blinken Pledges to Solve Mystery of ‘Havana Syndrome’ but Stops Short of Calling the Incidents ‘Attacks,’” U.S. News & World Report, November 5, 2021, available at <https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/articles/2021-11-05/blinken-pledges-to-solve-mystery-of-havana-syndrome-but-stops-short-of-calling-the-incidents-attacks>.
By Walter Landgraf
(FPRI) — The start of a new year is typically considered a time to “start fresh” with new goals. In that spirit, the European Union has decided to get a head start on pursuing an enduring one—European integration. On Dec. 14, the European Council, the body comprising the heads of state of the EU member states, announced it would begin membership negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova at an unspecified point in the future. Meanwhile, Georgia was granted vague membership “candidacy status,” a lesser designation, reflecting dissatisfaction with what Brussels perceives as the Georgian Dream-led government’s authoritarian tendencies and pro-Russia foreign policy orientation.
The European Union’s latest enlargement decision has been heralded by the publics of the three countries and Western observers alike as a crucial “step forward” toward joining the coveted club. Indeed, many citizens of EU eastern partner countries associate the bloc with higher quality of life and more economic opportunities, among other things. To many Ukrainians, Moldovans, and Georgians, gaining EU membership is also a matter of receiving psychological validation of “Western,” and specifically “European,” identity. Yet, there are reasons to believe that each of the aspirant members’ journeys will be fraught with obstacles in the coming years. It is concerning that the Dec. 14 move was only made possible through creative circumvention of a rule requiring unanimous agreement on such decisions. Moreover, the Union’s publicly articulated enlargement aspirations are at odds with both geopolitical realities and the historical precedent of European integration—in both their EU and NATO manifestations.
The geopolitical competition for influence over Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia will increasingly attract US attention and resources in the coming years as the ongoing conflicts continue to disrupt reform processes, domestic political transformation, and economic development. The set of western-defined rules and norms the three aspiring countries must adopt to qualify for EU and NATO membership will likely exacerbate regional instability as well as tension with Russia.
Territorial Divisions
First, the most glaring issue is that all three countries have unresolved territorial divisions. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, both Georgia and Moldova were born as independent states without full control over their internationally recognized territory. Within de jure Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia emerged as unrecognized statelets, gaining de facto independence in the early 1990s as a result of successful civil wars against Tbilisi. By NATO’s April 2008 decisionthat Georgia would eventually become an alliance member, the two breakaway regions had been “de facto states” for over a decade, relying on Russian protection to ensure their survival. After Russia invaded Georgia in August 2008, the Kremlin recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states, followed by a handful of friendly countries. Since then, Moscow has worked to integrate the territories into the political, military, and economic structures of the Russian Federation. At present, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have existed outside of Tbilisi’s control for thirty years.
Similar circumstances pervade the current geopolitical condition of Moldova. The Soviet collapse caused already existing tensions between Moldovans and Transnistrians to escalate, culminating in a 1991 to 1992 war that resulted in the birth of Transnistria as a de facto state. Russia’s assistance for Transnistria during the war was overt as Moscow sent the Fourteenth Army to fight on the separatists’ side in 1992. Thereafter, Russia’s approach toward the region has been vague. It has not recognized Transnistria’s independence—nor has any UN member state—though it provides practical support in several ways, such as paying pensions to Russian passport holders. Unlike Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Transnistria lacks a shared border with Russia, making formal annexation tricky. This has not stopped Russian officials from toying with the idea of opening another front in the Ukraine war from the region. Regarding NATO, Chisinau’s relations with the alliance are far less institutionalized than Georgia’s. While Moldova has been a longtime NATO partner, military neutrality is enshrined in its constitution.
Meanwhile, the situation in Ukraine is fundamentally different. There is active combat on the ground and little prospect for an end to the hot phase of the conflict anytime soon. Unlike Georgia and Moldova, newly independent Ukraine emerged from the wreckage of the Soviet Union as a state without territorial fragmentation. Yet, significant ethno-territorial polarization existed. Historically, Ukrainians in the center and west wanted stronger ties with the West and supported EU and NATO membership while those in the south and east preferred closer association with Russia and opposed joining these organizations. The struggles over Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation, from maintaining neutrality to actively seeking to join the European Union and NATO, reflect the country’s regional ethno-linguistic differences, its unique geographic position, and competing views of national history and identity.
Like Georgia, Ukraine was promised future NATO membership in 2008. Until Russia’s invasion in 2022, the country had been unable to maintain a pro-membership stance across changes in government. In 2010, President Viktor Yanukovych withdrew from pursuing NATO membership and instead sought better relations with Russia. Yanukovych fled Ukraine in 2014 following massive protests of his abrupt suspension of an EU association deal. In the ensuing political chaos, Russia carried out a stealthy invasion of Crimea and fomented war in southeastern Ukraine. In March 2014, Crimea was formally annexed into the Russian Federation, leaving Ukraine a territorially fragmented state. Russia’s full-scale assault since February 2022 has only deepened the country’s territorial divisions.
That Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova are each divided countries do not necessarily preclude their EU membership. The accession of Cyprus in 2004 provides historical precedent for integrating a state with unresolved territorial divisions.
In 1974, the ruling military junta in Athens installed a nationalist government favoring the union, or “enosis,” of Cyprus and Greece. This ambition stoked fears of group domination within the ethnic Turkish Cypriot minority on the island. In response, Turkey invaded Cyprus, claiming a duty to protect ethnic kin living abroad. The ensuing war resulted in thousands of deaths, mostly on the Greek Cypriot side, and large-scale population displacement. The conflict left Greek Cypriots as the administrators of internationally recognized Cyprus. Meanwhile, the Turkish Cypriot side emerged as a de facto state whose borders were drawn by war. This was unlike Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which were defined administrative units within Soviet Georgia, while Transnistria constituted the western part of the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic inside Soviet Ukraine. In 1983, the Turkish Cypriot authorities announced the independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Turkey recognized it but the UN Security Council declared it illegitimate. In the following years, the security situation on the island settled into equilibrium—active fighting had stopped but no final peace settlement could be made.
The European Union entered accession negotiations with Cyprus in 1998. The move was driven by the prospect that embedding the entire island within the Union could help spur a permanent settlement between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot sides, if not reunification altogether. Cyprus joined the European Union in 2004 as a de facto divided country, but the whole island is de jure EU territory. Thus, the northern part of the island lies within the European Union but enjoys none of the benefits of club membership until and unless reunification takes place.
At present, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus endures in limbo between two incomplete integration projects. On one side, Turkey provides substantial diplomatic and material support to the authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, without which the de facto state’s continued existence might be in jeopardy. On the other side is the European Union, which is still an attractive institutional destination for aspiring countries amidst signs of so-called enlargement fatigue among some long-standing EU members in recent years.
While Cyprus does serve as precedent for incorporating a divided country into the European Union, the prospect of possible EU (and NATO) accession for Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, respectively, is profoundly different. Regarding the former case, the two main external state actors—Greece and Turkey—were anchored to European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. Greece joined the European Union in 1981 while Turkey has been in the membership pipeline, albeit intermittently since talks began in 2005. Both countries are also part of NATO and the Council of Europe. Belonging to such institutions helps to promote cooperation through improved information flow, increased transparency, and predictable patterns of behavior. This is despite the well-known historic rivalry between Greece and Turkey. No such guardrails exist with the situations in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. Instead, the three countries are attempting to break free from Russia’s orbit and formally join “the West,” as signified by membership in its institutions. At the same time, Moscow uses force—or the threat thereof—to maintain some semblance of influence in a region it once dominated.
Security Guarantees
A second and related issue pertains to national security. EU membership may not bring what Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia yearn for—a security guarantee against Russia. While the European Union does in fact have a mutual defense clause, as defined in Article 42.7 of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, it is ambiguous, relatively untested, and not underwritten by US power. Only NATO membership would bring the type of security guarantee that each country seeks.
The EU mutual defense provision commits all members to “provide assistance in response” to an act of armed aggression on the territory of an EU member state, though it does not require taking military action. Members are instead free to decide what kind of assistance to provide, ranging for example from diplomatic backing or humanitarian aid to direct military support. The French government invoked the provision after the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, marking the only time it has been used. The French defense minister later admitted the decision was motivated by a desire to promote pan-European solidarity and respond to domestic criticism over ongoing French unilateral military action in Africa. France opted to call on the newfound EU mechanism instead of NATO’s long standing Article V collective defense pledge. This might have been meant to assert European autonomy and an enduring French concern against US dominance in Europe’s security affairs.
In the wake of Russia’s full-scale assault on Ukraine, acute national security concerns have led Finland and Sweden, both formally militarily neutral states and EU members since 1995, to pursue joining NATO to obtain a security guarantee. That the two countries opted for NATO membership when they already enjoyed the protection of Article 42.7 shows that faith in the EU mutual defense clause is flimsy.
Regarding NATO, Article V was enshrined in the alliance’s founding charter in 1949 and is like its EU counterpart in many ways. It compels each ally to respond to an armed attack against one of them “as it deems necessary, including the use of force,” while geographically limited to NATO territory. Thus, Argentina’s 1982 invasion of the Falklands Islands, a British overseas territory, did not trigger a collective NATO response. In fact, Article V has been invoked only once, in response to the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. Nevertheless, the George W. Bush administration made it clear that US military operations would use an ad hoc coalition of willing partners in the initial invasion of Afghanistan, outside of NATO’s military command structure. By 2003, however, all NATO allies would contribute to the US-led war in Afghanistan, including Iceland, which has no standing military. Alliance decisions are thus inevitably entangled with political calculations.
In both cases, the security guarantee gained through EU or NATO membership grants enormous discretion to individual members in forming a collective response to external aggression against a fellow member state. Triggering a mutual defense clause does not in fact commit treaty allies to respond militarily to such situations, much less to putting “boots on the ground.” That Ukraine is at war and territorially divided suggests that the European Union’s decision to begin membership talks is mostly symbolic—an expression of geopolitical ambition—which clashes with the current realities of Western policies toward Kyiv. The political consensus among the major power centers in the West—Washington and Brussels among them—is that Ukraine is ineligible for either EU or NATO membership so long as the war with Russia continues.
Out of Order
A final difficulty with the European Union considering membership for Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia is that it overlooks the development of European integration since the end of the Cold War.
Nearly every state that has attained both EU and NATO membership over the past three decades has joined the latter organization first. This is because NATO’s admission requirements are easier to meet than the European Union’s. While NATO does require certain political and military standards for members (e.g., civilian control of the military) it does not compare to the accumulated legislation, legal acts, and court decisions constituting EU law that must be adopted by EU members.
Even before the Cold War ended, the new democratic governments in Central and Eastern Europe began signaling their desire to “return to Europe” through membership in Western institutions, including the European Union and NATO. The leaders of the Visegrád Group (i.e., Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) soon learned, however, that obtaining EU membership would take decades, as it required difficult adaptation to EU standards. Moreover, the failed coup by Soviet hardliners in 1991, outbreak of war in Bosnia in 1992, and conflicts in the South Caucasus and Moldova showed that the transitions to democracy and self-determination in former communist lands would not all be peaceful.
Membership in NATO became understood as an easier and quicker route to gain validation and recognition from one of the West’s premier institutions, while obtaining the crucial security guarantee backed by the United States. Accordingly, almost every state that has joined both the European Union and NATO after the Cold War has joined NATO first. Finland’s accession to NATO in 2023, already a longtime EU member, broke this precedent. Sweden may very well do the same, with NATO potentially announcing its accession at the Washington summit in July if not sooner. This is the historical and geopolitical context of the European Union’s potential integration of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia.
Next Steps
The December 2023 decision about incorporating the three countries into the European Union as full members was meant to show that Brussels is serious about carrying on with the European integration project. For this vision to be achieved, two obstacles must be overcome.
First, the three aspiring countries must internalize the deep economic and political reforms that they have so far only partly implemented, to varying degrees. This process will likely take many years, especially for embattled Ukraine, which is reforming while fighting an active war. In all three cases, having unresolved territorial divisions inevitably complicates things as the de facto authorities in the lost territories, which are aligned with Russia, shun EU-mandated reforms.
The second hurdle has to do with the European Union itself. Decisions to invite new members require consensus, which in turn depends on establishing and maintaining political cohesion. The recent discord over whether and how to continue providing economic and military aid to Ukraine suggests that EU unanimity on expanding membership, potentially a more costly undertaking, may be brittle. Moving forward, one possible solution could be to shift from consensus-based decision-making to qualified-majority voting, whereby powerful members like Germany and France hold more sway. Smaller countries, however, would undoubtedly take issue with such radical change, believing that veto power helps preserve their autonomy.
The European Union has set itself an ambitious enlargement goal, which has signaled a desire to create an expanded European order under the leadership of Brussels. Yet, such an order has never existed in the history of Europe. With there being little chance of achieving EU membership anytime soon, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia could instead seek new bilateral or multilateral commitments in the interim, short of full membership. Nevertheless, if there were ever a time for wishful thinking it would be at the beginning of a new year.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a non-partisan organization that seeks to publish well-argued, policy-oriented articles on American foreign policy and national security priorities.
- About the author: Lieutenant Colonel Walter “Rick” Landgraf is a U.S.Army officer, the Managing Editor for the Texas National Security Review, and a Fellow in the Eurasia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.
- Source: This article was published by FPRI
Baseball star Shohei Ohtani, a rare hitter-pitcher, could have signed with the New York Yankees or Toronto Blue Jays but opted for a record-breaking $700 million contract with the Los Angeles Dodgers. Fans might think Ohtani’s choice to stay in California would delight state officials, but that is not the case.
To give his team more flexibility with other players, Ohtani deferred all but $2 million of his annual $70 million salary. That fell afoul of California’s State Controller Malia Cohen.
“The current tax system allows for unlimited deferrals for those fortunate enough to be in the highest tax brackets, creating a significant imbalance in the tax structure,” Cohen contends.
“The absence of reasonable caps on deferral for the wealthiest individuals exacerbates income inequality and hinders the fair distribution of taxes. I would urge Congress to take immediate and decisive action to rectify this imbalance.”
Cohen is right that there is a “significant imbalance” in the tax structure. In California’s punitive system, those in the highest bracket pay 13.30 percent. California also imposes an 8.84 corporate income tax rate, and a 7.25 state sales tax rate.
The Controller wants to get her hands on as much of Ohtani’s money as possible so the state can “distribute” the revenue in a way she regards as “fair.” As fans should know, the state’s pillage people have other means of extraction.
Under the “jock tax,” California shakes down athletes for their “duty days” in California during the season. In 2016, when the Super Bowl was played in Santa Clara, the state raked in $1 million for a single day and the extended duty days costPayton Manning more than his entire Super Bowl winnings.
Athletes, business owners and workers alike seek relief in states such as Florida, which imposes no income tax. That ongoing exodus also disturbs state officials.
Oakland Democrat Rob Bonta was the prime mover of AB 2088, the California Wealth Tax, which would have slapped a 0.4 percent tax on the portion of a taxpayer’s net worth that exceeded $30 million. AB 2088 would have taxed former Californians 90 percent of their in-state levy in the first year after they left the stateand 80 percent in the second year, phasing out over a decade.
The Yale law alum Bonta, now state Attorney General, believed it was legal to keep taxing non-residents for ten years. Consider also the case of Gilbert Hyatt, inventor of the first single-chip microprocessor back in 1990. Hyatt decamped to Nevada, which does not levy income tax. California’s Franchise Tax Board claimed the inventor lied about his residency and socked him with a bill of $13.3 million in back taxes and penalties.Hyatt sued the FTB for harassment, fraud, and invasion of privacy. The battle continued until 2019, when a court ruling left Hyatt with a 1991 tax bill of $1.9 million, including interest. The ruling failed to send any new tax revenue to California and revealed that over 26 years the FTB spent $25 million in pursuit of the inventor.
Gilbert Hyatt earned his money by inventing a useful product that people wanted to buy. The same principle applies to athletes such as Shohei Ohtani, whose hitting and pitching skills are such that people will pay to see him.
Ohtani earns approximately $40 million from endorsement deals in America and Japan. That comes on top of his $30 million salary, and makes it possible for him to defer all but $2 million of his salary in the 10-year deal with the Dodgers.
Shohei Ohtani is a model of free choice. California is a model of government greed.
This article was also published in The Orange County Register