Iran Can Produce Uranium For A Nuke In ‘Just A Week,’ Says Expert ایران اینترنشنال
Day: January 18, 2024
What if there were some political tool that many US Presidents (going back to Grant, and all of them, including both leading major-party candidates this year) at least since Nixon, have wanted? What if they also agreed with Nixon that the result would be reduced political pork? Would such bipartisan agreement mean that the tool in question would advance what the Constitution called the “General Welfare”?
That tool is the line-item veto, which allows the President to “cancel specific parts of a bill (usually spending provisions) while signing into law the rest of the bill.” It sounds attractive, as it appears to target special-interest legislation at odds with both the Constitution and common sense. But when Presidents, who have demonstrated more interest in steering wasteful spending to their friends than in eliminating it, have made that same argument, the conclusion must be questioned. In fact, if we follow Thomas Sowell’s advice about “Thinking Beyond Stage One,” the opposite might very well be the case.
One impediment today is that when the Republican’s 1994 Contract With America, as part of its reform agenda, gave line-item veto powers to President Clinton who then used it 82 times, it was ruled an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers by the US Supreme Court.
With no chance, given our current political divide, of passing a Constitutional Amendment to enable a presidential line-item veto, why do those seeking to look like “good government” presidential material tout it? They would like to project the image of being the “adult in the room,” representing all Americans rather than advancing special interests against all other Americans’ interests.
The story might not be termed “draining the swamp” by everyone, but that Trumpian phrase does capture the imagery of imposing fiscal discipline on irresponsible legislators and regulators by reining in wasteful and abusive policies.
The central idea in that story is that the line-item veto would take away the ability of those in Congress to enforce their logrolling, favor-trading agreements. The President would be able to eliminate the legislative payoff to any party to a logrolling “contract.” Unable to count on receiving the special benefits a bill promised them because the President might choose to veto that part, the creators of such deals would be discouraged.
While that story sounds appealing to those who see our government legislating in many areas it should not, that is not the only, or necessarily the most likely, result. A presidential line-item veto could also be used to grow government even more.
While it could reduce congressional pork, it would increase presidential pork. The President would become the only ultimate enforcer of congressional fiscal negotiations, and so would have not only to be included in every logrolling agreement, but at its center. That would provide him with vastly increased legislative leverage, and that could just as easily grow government as shrink it.
Using the seeming “government shrinkage tool” of a line-item veto to expand government simply requires the President to threaten carefully targeted item vetoes, unless particular members of Congress voted for his desired legislation. He could make every individual item in every bill that benefited any recalcitrant legislator disappear at his sole discretion unless he was given what he wanted. And that would expand the government whenever what the President wanted was “more.”
The main story being told around the line-item veto focuses on congressional special interests. But Presidents have plenty of special interests, too, and those can involve far more zeroes than what those in Congress propose. They want to help swing constituencies to buy them over to their side (as with President Biden’s efforts to bribe those with college debts to his side of the aisle). They want to help large states that will be competitive in the Electoral College and they want as much of the cost as possible to be borne by those who will vote the other way. They want to help “at risk” candidates from their party and punish similarly situated opponents. They want more influence over their own party as well. And every President has personal spending priorities too, such as, say, building or tearing down a wall, or forcibly transforming energy production and use in America.
The power of a line-item veto to expand government has long been recognized. In 1996, on “This Week With David Brinkley,” Al Gore (echoed by other administration officials) said then-President Clinton would use the added bargaining power conferred by a line-item veto (not yet held unconstitutional) to restore benefits he didn’t want cut by the historic welfare reform bill that was being forced on him after two vetoes.
A line-item veto would not only tip power from Congress toward the President, it could all but eviscerate the power of congressional minorities when they are not of the same party as the President. When the President belongs to the congressional minority party, that party would have far more power over legislation. But if the President’s party had a congressional majority, a line-item veto could almost eliminate any minority-party power. The minority’s power to advance their agenda is to make legislative deals in exchange for support of strongly favored policies. But their part of any such deals could always be deleted by the President after the fact. And the minority would certainly not be able to mount a successful veto override in such a case.
A further issue is what would happen to the incentives of lame-duck presidents. Without the check of future electoral punishment in play for their re-election, a line-item veto would give lame ducks more power to impose their special interests on the country as they go out the door.
Given that forty-four states give their governors some form of line-item veto, while six do not, we can use the states as what Justice Louis Brandeis termed “laboratories of democracy” to inform our judgments about whether a line-item veto would actually contract the size of government. Burton Abrams and William Dougan did such a comparison, controlling for other variables, and found that a line-item veto did not reduce state spending.
So what would a presidential line-item veto give us, beyond more power to the executive branch, which has already grown to eclipse the legislative power designed by America’s founders? Would it give us better government? I think that the line-item veto follies over the years in Wisconsin, where governors have been able to delete words, numbers, and even sentences, are instructive on this point.
In 1973 Governor Patrick Lucey deleted the 2 from a $25 million appropriation, turning it into $5 million. In 1975, he removed the “not” from “not less than 50 percent,” reversing the legislators’ intent on a bill. In 1983, Governor Anthony Earl reworked a 121-word paragraph into a 22-word paragraph which shifted the venue of an appeals process. In 1993, Governor Tommy Thompson deleted budget numbers and substituted lower budget numbers. Such examples are more useful for a comedy routine about government failure and irrationality than for showing how a line-item veto allows government to better advance citizens’ well-being.
Supporting a line-item veto may appear to demonstrate a politician’s fiscal prudence bona fides. But it can, and may even be more likely to, indicate the opposite. Good government is not producible by such a rearrangement of the power Washington has arrogated to itself over Americans, despite having no authorization from our Constitution. In fact, given the large number of times “no” and “not” are used in that document, just imagine how someone’s line-item veto pen could dramatically transform our supposed “highest law of the land” by reducing its “negativity.” Look at, say, the first half of the Bill of Rights, from that perspective, and you will have a good guide to whether a line-item veto is a path to better government.
This article was published at AIER
By Ali Omar Forozish
A seismic shift is underway in the heart of the Middle East. The region is currently defined by the competition between three formidable powers — Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey. The situation is a kind of cold war with the three powers locked in a struggle for influence across the Middle East. This regional cold war is intricately tied to these countries’ historical claims of hegemony. Each nation, with a legacy as the center of Islam and a history of great empires, asserts its legitimacy to shape and rule the region.
Iran: an enduring pillar of hegemony in the Middle East
Iran’s claim to legitimacy is deeply rooted in a history that spans millennia. The land known today as Iran has been home to a succession of influential civilizations and empires, each leaving its mark on the country’s cultural and intellectual makeup. From the Elamites, who rival the Sumerians as one of the oldest civilizations in world history, to the Achaemenids, Parthians, Sassanids and Safavids, Iran’s rich history fosters a profound sense of pride and identity in its people. Iran has often been the seat of power for empires stretching across the Fertile Crescent and into Central Asia, a heritage which serves as a foundation for Iran’s claim to leadership.
Furthermore, Iran draws strength from its religious legitimacy as the epicenter of the Shia branch of Islam. Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution toppled the pro-Western monarchy and founded a theocratic republic. This revolution gave Iran religious authority as the hub of Shia Islam, which has many adherents in nations such as Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain and Yemen.
Beginning with the Islamic Revolution, Iran has exported its revolutionary ideology to fellow Shia communities. It has created a network of allied non-state military actors like Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and various groups in Iraq and Palestine, strategically extending its influence. The Quds Force, which was led by the late General Qasem Soleimani, plays a pivotal role incoordinating these proxy militias. This force solidified Iran’s ideological foothold beyond its borders.
In addition, Iran has been a major supporter of Hamas, the Palestinian armed group that controls Gaza. Hamas carried out a sudden attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, killing 1,200 people and capturing more than 200 hostages. Iran supplied Hamas with money, arms and training, as well as operational and strategic guidance for the operation.
Iran is also a substantial military power in its own right. The Islamic Republic maintains approximately 610,000 active-duty personnel, 350,000 reserve personnel and 150,000 paramilitary personnel. The military structure comprises two main branches: the regular armed forces, encompassing the army, navy and air force, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a parallel force directly accountable to the Supreme Leader. The IRGC possesses ground, naval and aerospace units, in addition to the Quds Force and the Basij, a volunteer militia.
Iran’s military arsenal includes a spectrum of ballistic and cruise missiles, with some boasting a range of up to 1,200 miles. Drones, submarines and cyber-warfare capabilities further enhance Iran’s military capabilities.
Notably, Iran adopts a strategic approach relying on asymmetric and unconventional warfare tactics, employing swarm tactics, proxy forces, and sabotage to counterbalance adversaries’ conventional superiority. Illustrating this strategy, Iran has recently employed missile and drone attacks to target US bases in Iraq, as well as targeting Israel-linked ships. Meanwhile, Iran’s proxy forces like Hamas and Hezbollah serve to harass and deter these adversaries.
Saudi Arabia: the conservative powerhouse
If Iran is the revolutionary force in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia is the conservative one.
Saudi Arabia is the cradle of Islam. It was here that the Prophet Muhammad was born and received his revelations in the 7th century CE. The two holiest sites in Islam, the Great Mosque of Mecca and the Prophet’s Mosque in Medina, are both in Saudi Arabia. For this reason, the Saudi monarch styles himself as “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.” This historical and religious connection grants the nation a profound moral legitimacy to exert influence over the Middle East.
The two mosques serve as focal points of the annual pilgrimage, known as hajj. Making the pilgrimage at least once in a lifetime is a religious duty for Muslims. By hosting millions of pilgrims yearly, Saudi Arabia strategically deploys its religious influence to further its political objectives and propagate its ideological stance.
During the formative period of Islamic civilization, Saudi Arabia was the center of the Caliphate. It served as the seat of the first four caliphs who governed the expanding Muslim empire from 632 to 661 CE. Following the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the last Islamic caliphate after World War I, Saudi Arabia again asserted itself as the heart of Islam, without laying claim to the title of caliph. Saudi Arabia championed Wahhabism — a strict and conservative interpretation of Sunni Islamic teachings. This ideology, considered by its adherents the pure and authentic form of Islam, underpins Saudi Arabia’s historical and religious claims.
Saudi Arabia also enjoys the support of a major non-Islamic power, the United States. The US has emerges as Saudi Arabia’s foremost partner, providing robust military support. The roots of this alliance trace back to 1945 when the nations signed a pivotal agreement granting the US access to Saudi oil in exchange for military and economic aid. This agreement, known as the Quincy Pact, was forged by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and King Abdulaziz Al Saud aboard the USS Quincy in the Suez Canal. It marked the beginning of a long-lasting and mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries.
Over the years, this strategic partnership has deepened, encompassing cooperation on counter-terrorism, regional security and energy. The United States has supported Saudi Arabia in various conflicts, such as the Iran–Iraq War, the Persian Gulf War and the ongoing Yemen Civil War, as well as in confronting the threats posed by al-Qaeda and ISIS.
As the primary arms supplier to Saudi Arabia, the United States furnishes military training, intelligence, and logistical support, aligning its interests with Saudi policies in the region. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the United States accounted for 79% of the total arms imports by Saudi Arabia from 2016 to 2020. This alliance positions Saudi Arabia as a key American ally and a counterbalance to Iran’s influence in the Middle East.
Turkey: Ottoman Heritage and a unique foreign policy
The third factor in the Middle East is Turkey, a powerhouse boasting the largest economy in the region and the second-largest population.
Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East is anchored in its Ottoman heritage. The Ottoman Empire, centered in Turkey, was the dominant Islamic power and caliphate — both the religious and political leader of the Muslim world until its dissolution in 1924, following Turkey’s defeat in World War I.
The Ottoman Empire ruled the Muslim world from North Africa to Iraq and extended deep into Europe. It was a diverse and multicultural society. This environment promoted coexistence among various ethnic and religious groups through a system of relative tolerance and autonomy.
Turkey’s historical legacy not only gives its people a sense of pride and identity but a perceived right to leadership and influence in the Middle East. Viewing itself as the rightful successor of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey sees itself as having a special responsibility and role within the region, encapsulated in its foreign policy vision of New Ottomanism, tempering Turkish nationalism with a pan-Islamic focus.
Like Iran, Turkey is a sizeable military power with a large population. Turkey boasts approximately 510,000 active-duty personnel, complemented by 380,000 reserve personnel and an additional 150,000 paramilitary personnel. Turkey is also a member of NATO, which affords the nation access to the collective defense and security mechanisms of the West.
Employing its hard power, Turkey has intervened militarily involvement in various countries, notably Syria, Libya and Iraq. In these theaters, Turkey has lent support to various factions in order to counter adversaries such as the Assad regime, the Haftar forces andKurdish militias. This military intervention serves as a tangible expression of Turkey’s commitment to shaping regional dynamics.
Turkey strategically deploys proxy forces to bolster its alliances and extend its influence. Entities like the Syrian National Army, the Government of National Accord in Libya and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt serve as instrumental proxies, trained and supported by Turkey to align with its strategic objectives.
The spirit of cold war unmistakanly pervades the current geopolitical landscape. The outcome of the struggle between Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey will shape the future of a new Middle East.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
- About the author: Ali Omar Forozish is currently a student of economics at Anadolu University. With a degree in modern politics, his work focuses significantly on liberal democracy, the end of history, feminism and political ideologies. As a political analyst and human rights activist, from 2017 to 2019, he worked exclusively with several socio-cultural associations in Afghanistan. Ali holds certifications from world-prestigious universities and the United Nations for numerous courses in political economy, European geopolitics, anti-corruption and sustainable development.
- Source: This article was published by Fair Observer
By Abhishek Kumar Singh
Amidst the ongoing conflicts between Ukraine-Russia and Israel-Hamas, the Korean Peninsula also faces a persistent crisis due to North Korea’s continual nuclear rhetoric. The recent artillery shells fired by Pyongyang near the sea border have created a furore in the region.
According to Seoul, Pyongyang fired over 350 rounds of artillery over the last weekend. The firing was a reaction to the military activities conducted by what was referred to as South Korea’s ‘military gangsters’ and the border-based drill exercises. Moreover, the launch of the Hwasong-18, an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) in December 2023, and the declaration of a nuclear attack ‘anytime’ has marked a significant development. Kim Jong-Un also reiterated the threat to nuke the United States (US) if provoked and asserted that the launch was due to military confrontation hysteria against the former.
The recent heightened threat is particularly concerning for South Korea. Even in 2022, over 70 missiles were fired by Pyongyang leading to an increased demand for developing nuclear weapons by the South Korean public. This piece explores Seoul’s complexities of grappling with a nuclear challenge, domestic pressure for greater autonomy, external threats, and the developing facets of international security.
Navigating Seoul’s nuclear dilemma
Seoul depended largely on Washington for its security, however, in the post-Cold War era, to gain economic benefits and counter Pyongyang’s rising threat, it started engaging with Beijing. Seoul’s accommodating foreign policy has not allowed it to strike a balance between its alliance and autonomy, making it tougher to navigate its foreign policy independently, especially its nuclear policy. In light of growing Pyongyang’s nuclear threat, Seoul has found itself in a web of geopolitical situations depicting its complex and multifaceted nuclear issue.
To independently navigate its foreign policy, Seoul has been actively involved in multiple diplomatic engagements such as establishing closer ties with the QUAD and being vocal against Beijing’s aggressions, and multilateral initiatives like the New Southern Policy, and Indo-Pacific Strategy. South Korean President Yoon Suk-Yeol also recently discussed the potential for South Korea to develop its nuclear weapons or reintroduce US tactical nuclear weapons to counter the exponential rise of North Korea’s nuclear threat.
Previously under Park Chung-Hee’s rule, Seoul had initiated developing nuclear weapons only to get curtailed by Washington. Although Yoon has rejected the call for immediate nuclearisation, his statements have reshaped and initiated the domestic discourse on the country’s nuclear ambitions. Thus, it is important to explore the intricacies of this situation, considering the continuous threat posed by Pyongyang, internal factors pushing Seoul towards a nuclear defense, and the external factors advising caution.
Domestic pressures: Security anxieties and a desire for autonomy
North Korea’s looming nuclear shadow: A looming nuclear threat on Seoul emerges as Pyongyang persists in its missile barrage and unwavering pursuit of nuclear weapons. Pyongyang’s invariable rhetoric of a nuclear attack was amplified after the former fired dozens of missiles toward Seoul in November 2022. One of the missiles landed in South Korean territory, the island of Ulleungdo, for the first time since the end of the Korean War (1950-53). These missile launches heightened tensions, prompting the South Korean government to issue an air-raid warning on the island. This had a significant impact on South Koreans with polls showing a noticeable increase in support for developing its indigenous nuclear defense.
A survey carried out by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies revealed that 64.3 percent of Koreans vouch for independently developing nuclear weapons. Additionally, a joint survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the Chey Institute for Advanced Studies indicates that over 70 percent of Koreans favour the idea of their state developing nuclear capabilities in response to rising nuclear threats. This sentiment is heightened by Pyongyang’s blitzkrieg of missile attacks on Seoul and its revamped nuclear strategy, reinforcing the perceived necessity for indigenous nuclear weapons.
Chinese belligerence: Beijing, as a longstanding supporter of Pyongyang, has heightened tensions by endorsing the Kim regime. This position is further exacerbated by China’s recent declaration of a renewed threat to invade Taiwan. In case of an invasion of Taiwan, China might leverage North Korea’s defense power to unlock an additional military front, creating a dual threat for both the US and South Korea. This particular strategy will discourage the US from getting involved in the Taiwan dispute. Furthermore, Beijing’s strong objection to the installment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in Seoul, followed by punitive economic coercions has greatly restricted Seoul’s ability to deter and shield its security and economy. As a result, the South Koreans are considering China as a significant threat in the coming hence, want nuclear weapons to tackle the dual threats.
Eroding trust in the US nuclear umbrella: The protracted dependence on the US nuclear umbrella has encountered challenges attributed to perceived inconsistencies in American commitment. Notably, the “America First” policies of the Trump administration, which included the proposal to withdraw up to 4,000 US troops from South Korea for financial reasons and an ambiguous stance on denuclearisation, have engendered apprehensions regarding the reliability of the nuclear umbrella. These developments have fuelled pro-nuclear sentiments within South Korea.
Despite the recently signed Washington Declaration, aimed at mitigating the nuclear threat by deploying nuclear-armed submarines in South Korea, it has not adequately addressed concerns among South Koreans regarding the US’s ability to fully and credibly commit to their security, thus sustaining a robust nuclear debate in the country. There is a genuine concern that the US will prioritise its cities and citizens’ safety over those of Koreans, prompting contemplation of developing indigenous nuclear capabilities. Furthermore, potential nuclear technology sharing between Russia and North Korea raises the possibility of South Korea seeking to revise alliance agreements to initiate a nuclear-powered submarine programme, referred to as an SSN programme. Gabriela Bernal, an independent DPRK watcher, suggests that if South Korea perceives abandonment by the US, there is a likelihood of future disregard for US wishes and a pursuit of the nuclear option to safeguard its security.
Technological prowess and nationalist aspirations: The momentum behind the proposal to develop nuclear weapons surged following the rejection by the US of President Yoon’s suggestions, either to redeploy US tactical nuclear weapons to the peninsula or for South Korea to acquire its independent nuclear capabilities. This has fuelled a growing sentiment of national pride and a desire for strategic autonomy, bolstering arguments in favour of an indigenous nuclear programme. Additionally, South Korea possessesadvanced scientific and technological capabilities crucial for potential nuclear weapons development, providing the country with greater control over its nuclear policies. However, the feasibility of South Korea emerging as a nuclear power in the current global context necessitates careful reconsideration, introducing uncertainties to the prospect of developing nuclear weapons at this juncture.
Traversing the tightrope: Finding a sustainable solution
The nuclear predicament in South Korea reflects the wider challenges of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Effectively addressing this requires South Korea to skillfully blend diplomatic efforts, regional collaboration, and a strong conventional defense, ensuring a secure future for both the nation and the broader region.
Revitalising the alliance can assuage South Korea’s security concerns through intensified security cooperation, joint military exercises, and a renewed commitment to extended deterrence, thus obviating the need for nuclear armament. In this vein, South Korea and the US recently finalised the establishment of guidelines for the planning and execution of a joint nuclear strategy by mid-2024. These guidelines encompass a broad spectrum of issues, including the sharing of sensitive nuclear information, the establishment of a pertinent security system, the formulation of consultation procedures for nuclear crises, the operation of a real-time leader-level communication channel, and plans for managing crises and reducing risks
Moreover, above bolstering Seoul’s defense potential, there is an important need for an increased focus on addressing nuclear threat denuclearisation through multilateral platforms like G20, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and diplomatic efforts such as increased trilateral cooperation between South Korea, Japan, and the US, and the proposed resumption of trilateral talks between China, South Korea, and Japan. In addition, Seoul’s quest for inclusion in the Quad umbrella to discuss denuclearisation talks will apply pressure on Pyongyang beyond international sanctions. Although complete denuclearisation is not guaranteed, these efforts have the potential to reduce rhetoric and promote discussions on denuclearization.
Although Yoon’s recent weighing on nuclear development and striving to broaden diplomatic ties portrays Seoul’s refined strategic approach. However, to navigate this impending situation, a subtle balance must be maintained between the US-Korea nuclear alliance, addressing domestic security concerns, and engagement in diplomatic initiatives. The support of the US is important but even if the current US administration embraces a traditional method and offers reassurances to Korea, policymakers must remain vigilant of the future US administrations’ different approaches post-US elections in 2024.
Seoul’s challenge lies in finding a refined and comprehensive method that ensures its security and contributes to broader regional stability. Furthermore, South Korea’s economy is export-driven and any attempt of developing nuclear weapons can cripple its economy as it will be highly vulnerable to international sanctions. Moreover, it will destabilise regional security, promote an arms race, jeopardise its global standing, and aim to become a middle power. Therefore, the stance on developing nuclear weapons, despite being the best solution, remains vague but the demand will continue to grow in the future.
- About the author: Abhishek Kumar Singh is a doctoral candidate in IR at Kookmin University Seoul.
- Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation
By Dr. Mohamed ELDoh
The Middle East has long been an epicenter of geopolitical tensions and upheaval, with its complex dynamics influencing global peace and stability. As we move into 2024, it is imperative for the international community to recognize and prepare for the possibility of an even more turbulent Middle East.
The ongoing conflict in Gaza has undoubtedly ignited a cascade of emerging regional tensions at multiple fronts that can further lead to a more unstable Middle East. The increasing tensions in the south of Lebanon; Yemen’s Houthi maritime attacks in the Red Sea; the increasing military confrontation between Iran and Pakistan; the intensifying fight in Sudan; the widening window of confrontation between Jordan’s air forces and drug smugglers in Syria; and increasing attacks on US forces in Iraq and Syria, along with simmering sectarian tensions in both countries – all of these developments reflect security challenges that can draw the whole region into an unprecedented conflict spiral that can have negative impacts beyond the Middle East.
The ongoing conflict between Hamas and Israel presents a precarious situation for regional stability. While the immediate focus of the international community remains on the dynamics between Hamas and Israel, it is equally important to consider the evolving implications of the conflict. It is especially clear by now that Hamas isn’t expecting a military victory; they aim for a “PR” victory.
This situation is already creating a complex web of alliances, rivalries, and geopolitical interests, which will inadvertently lead to a military escalation involving Iran sooner or later. Iran has been known to exploit regional conflicts to further its own agenda, and an escalated situation involving Hamas and Israel is providing the opportunity for Iran to flex its capabilities and assert its influence. In a previous article, I discussed why Iran is the beneficiary of the conflict in Gaza while also confirming that any bet on Iran’s position toward the actual war in Gaza is obviously irrelevant. This is because it’s the regional and even global threat from Iran extends much further than just the confrontation between Hamas and Israel; rather, it emanates from the various proxy confrontation nodes across the Middle East, such as Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Jordan. For just one example, consider the increasing clashes reported along the Syrian border over the past few weeks.
Captagon and Drug Smuggling
It has been reported that Jordan has recently conducted a successful airstrike over Syrian soil, targeting Iran-linked drug smugglers. Although Jordan has previously conducted airstrikes to counter drug smuggling from Syria as well as executing military campaigns across the Syrian border to counter smuggler attacks, the recent airstrike illustrates the extent of the threats posed by Iran-linked groups in Syria to Jordan and the wider region. This smuggling activity across the Jordanian-Syrian border intensified in December in terms of size and content (advanced weapons), as well as the direct participation of Iran-backed militant groups.
Over the past decade, Syria has garnered an international reputation for being among the world’s top producers and trafficking of captagon. Captagon, an illicit drug, has been a major security concern that poses significant risks to the Middle East region, particularly in Syria and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. In fact, Syria is believed to be producing up to 80% of the captagon pills worldwide. The issue has been critical for all Arab leaders to the extent that it has been somehow linked with reinstating Syria back in the Arab League. Yet this may prove difficult, as captagon production and trafficking is believed to have provided Syria a financial lifeline since its descent into civil war in 2011.
The uncontrolled production and trafficking of captagon have become a significant source of revenue for terrorist organizations operating in Syria. These groups exploit the conflict in Syria to manufacture and smuggle this highly profitable drug, providing them with substantial funds to sustain their operations, recruit fighters, and conduct acts of violence regionally. Given the rippling effect of the conflict in Gaza and the influence of Iran and its proxy groups in Syria and Lebanon, it is highly likely that captagon trafficking across the Jordanian border will increase, prompting Jordan to step up its military action against such groups in Syria.
Iran’s Regional Proxy Network Activates
Increased volatility and conflict in Syria could also stem from new attacks on US forces in the country. Since October 17th, Iran-backed militias have attacked US troops almost 130 times in Syria and Iraq, raising the possibility of a full-scale military confrontation. Given that these militias are actually terrorist organizations that Iran fully support, they constantly endanger the region’s security. Furthermore, with Iran’s support, Iraq has recently pledged to end the presence of US troops in Iraq, which would not only allow Iran to further increase its influence in Iraq for its political agenda but also potentially provide ISIS with the opportunity to ramp up its capabilities once again given that one of the main missions of the US-led coalition forces in Iraq is to counter the threat posed by ISIS to Iraq and the region.
While assessing the recent activity of Iran-backed groups in Syria and Iraq, Lebanon cannot be overlooked. Lebanon is one of the states that Iran has had tremendous influence in for decades and controls its most influential armed group in the South, Hezbollah. Since the eruption of the Hamas-Israel conflict in Gaza, the south of Lebanon has been a hotspot for another potential direct military confrontation for Israel. Regardless of the border tensions in the south of Lebanon that have been going on for the past two months, the country faces the existential risk of being drawn into complete turmoil should its Iran-backed armed militias in the south be pushed into a full-scale war with Israel by Iran.
In this respect, history shows that Iran has the tendency to support and push its proxy groups in the region into armed conflicts while restraining itself from direct confrontation. This has been evident lately from the ongoing incidents by the Houthis in Yemen and Hamas in Gaza. However, it is worth noting that in the case of the South of Lebanon, if a full-scale armed confrontation takes place between Iran-backed militias and Israel, it will have a far more devastating impact on the region than that of the war in Gaza. This is because Iran-backed militias in Lebanon are far more organized and more globally networked, speak nothing of better-armed, compared to Hamas in Gaza.
Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea
On a different front, the Houthis in Yemen, who have full Iranian support, have expanded their offensive strategy, and increased their level of aggression since the conflict in Gaza broke out. This included launching drones and ballistic missiles toward Israel as well as commercial vessels passing via Bab Al Mandab toward the Red Sea. Even though most of the missiles launched by the Houthis have been intercepted by US forces, their actions have posed a major threat to the shipping industry, given that almost 10% of global trade is transported via vessels passing through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. Shipping costs are already up by 300% due to the Houthi maritime attacks, which are likely to have negative economic implications on the final prices of goods transported worldwide.
In the same vein, Egypt’s Suez Canal revenues are down by almost 40% as a result of the Houthi’s threat in the Red Sea, thus providing Egypt with an unprecedented economic challenge given that the Suez Canal is one of the main sources of foreign currency for Egypt’s economy. The Houthis’ maritime attacks do not come as a surprise and they focus attention on a wider issue, namely that the Houthis’ armed capabilities do pose an undeniable and serious threat not only to maritime security but also to the safety of various GCC nations that Iran views as US regional allies. Therefore, there is a crucial need for an immediate and coordinated international response to combat the growing threat posed by the Houthis in the Red Sea and the region.
Joint US and UK forces have launched different strikes against the Houthis in an attempt to degrade Iran-backed militias ability to attack commercial vessels. Given the growing threat the Houthis pose to one of the most important global trade routes, such a US-led response was truly necessary. Furthermore, the Houthis armed capabilities, if not degraded, will sooner or later, under Iran’s influence, either be used to inflict more harm on commercial vessels in the Red Sea and/or target US strategic interests in the region, including targeting neighbouring Arab nations that are perceived by Iran as US allies. This has been evident from different attacks by the Houthis on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) over the past few years, including the recent killing of four Bahraini soldiers across the Saudi border as a result of an attack by the Houthis.
The speed with which the US-led response can achieve its objectives and diminish the Houthis capabilities will determine how armed escalations in the region will proceed. In this respect, as far as maritime threats are concerned, the Houthis are reported to possess different classes of anti-ship ballistic missiles, including Iran’s anti-ship versions of Fateh 313 and Raad 500, which have a range of 450 and 500 km, respectively. Therefore, it presents a formidable threat to the shipping industry and all transiting vessels via the Red Sea. Unless such armed capabilities are quickly eliminated, the world will experience a rise in the Houthis maritime attacks in response to US strikes. Furthermore, the Houthis will very likely resort again to attacking neighbouring GCC nations in an attempt to pressure such nations to not support the US efforts in countering the maritime threats posed by the Houthis. It has been only a couple of days since the US-led forces launched a strike against the Houthis, and yet the group has already carried out a military drill near the Saudi border.
On another front, Iraq’s Haraket Hezbollah Al-Nujaba stated that US interests “won’t be safe” after the strikes on the Houthis in Yemen, thus implying that all Iran-backed militias in the region present a growing challenge and imminent risk for the region’s stability and security, especially since many of these militias and insurgent groups resort to irregular warfare and terrorist tactics to achieve their objectives. All that being said, maritime safety in the Red Sea is also facing a growing threat from the other side, East Africa, where tensions are growing between Somalia and Ethiopia as a result of the latter’s recognition of the independence of Somaliland in return for developing a port and naval base. The issue is already moving toward a potential armed conflict that can breakthrough at any moment. Different countries, including the United States, Egypt, Turkey, and the Arab League nations, have condemned the Ethiopian deal with Somaliland. However, how Ethiopia and Somalia, a country that has a long history of piracy and incubated terrorism, react to one another will have major implications on maritime security.
While the task of addressing, countering, and eliminating all the evolving threats in the Middle East is an uneasy one, it is unavoidable to collectively address and counter these threats; otherwise, the risk of an unstable Middle East will persist. Although US forces are primarily responsible for addressing many of the threats posed by Iran-backed groups in the region, including those in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, more extensive defense and security cooperation is necessary. The developing military confrontation between a nuclear ambitious Iran and a nuclear armed Pakistan also adds a critical element to how the Middle East can be easily drawn into turmoil. US and regional Arab allies should further enhance strategic defense cooperation and regional capability development, which will contribute to effectively countering the emerging threats by Iran’s axis of resistance proxy groups. A unified, cohesive, and well-equipped military approach will deter Iranian aggression and reinforce stability in the region.
The views expressed in this article belong to the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com.
Much of international relations is pretense. The leaders of countries pretend to like each other, shaking hands with smiles and manufactured bonhomie. International treaties, which countries solemnly ratify, are often honored only in the breach.
Then there are borders, the cement that holds together the international order. Nation-states are the building blocks of that order, so the borders that separate them function as a mysterious force that keeps countries apart and yet allows them to come together in the United Nations and other global institutions.
Borders are essential to trade, transport, and tourism. They are hostile to migrants and refugees. And they also a collectively agreed-upon fiction. All borders are artificial, forged through war, colonialism, and domination.
Yet if borders suddenly had no meaning, powerful countries would invade their neighbors and seize the land they covet. Of course, some countries haven’t waited for the international order to collapse to make this happen.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was, among other things, a blatant violation of an international border. The October 7 raid by Hamas and the subsequent war unleashed by the Israeli army in Gaza both violated a border, which technically divides two entities, not two separate countries. Near the end of 2023, it even looked as though Venezuela were about to invade a part of Guyana that it has long considered its own territory.
It’s no surprise, then, that the recent election of Lai Ching-te as Taiwan’s new president has been greeted by some observers as a triggering event. This year, they say, Mainland China will finally follow through on its persistent threats and launch an all-out invasion of Taiwan. According to this scenario, Beijing has noted that while the Russian and Israeli aggressions have generated international outcry and even some serious global pushback, it’s nothing that either country can’t withstand.
In the lead up to Taiwan’s elections this month, tensions in fact have been mounting across the Taiwan Strait. Should Taiwan declare sovereign independence from the Mainland, effectively establishing a de jure border between the two, Beijing may well respond aggressively. “Many American officials believe that Beijing would indeed launch an invasion of the island should the Taiwanese declare their independence and that, in turn, could easily result in U.S. military intervention and a full-scale war,” writes military affairs analyst Michael Klare.
For the time being, however, the game of pretend continues. The international community treats Taiwan in many ways as a sovereign country but pretends that there is only “one China.” Although it continues to lose diplomatic support—Nauru just switched recognition to Beijing, which brings the total for Taipei down to a meager dozen—Taiwan continues to press for membership in global institutions as though it were a sovereign entity. And Beijing treats Taiwan as simply an unincorporated territory with delusions of grandeur.
The wars currently dominating the headlines were not exactly surprises. Russia gave plenty of notice of its intentions to intervene in Ukraine, and indeed had already absorbed the Crimean peninsula and parts of the Donbas back in 2014. Israel launched four significant attacks on Gaza in 2008, 2012, 2014 and 2021.
Mainland China, for its part, has emphasized that reunification is “inevitable” and that the two sides face a stark choice between war and peace. Military drills near Taiwan last year were designed, according to Beijing officials, to counter the “arrogance” of separatists, and numerous aircraft from the Mainland have violated the informal border that runs down the middle of the Taiwan Strait.
So, will the erosion of international norms and escalation of threats from Beijing necessarily lead to war with China in 2024?
The Recent Elections
In Taiwan’s flourishing democracy, two main parties have contested for power over the last few decades. The Kuomintang (KMT) prefers closer rapprochement with the Mainland while the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) edges more toward independence. With Lai Ching-te as its presidential candidate, the DPP just won an unprecedented third consecutive presidential term.
You’d think that the Mainland would have gotten used to the DPP at this point, after eight years in power. But for some reason, Beijing looks at Lai Ching-te differently.
A former doctor who became in rapid succession a legislator, mayor, and vice-president, Lai is now a political veteran. When he started out in politics, he was an ardent supporter of Taiwanese independence. But that changed as he rose through the ranks. He now says that he’s comfortable with the current status quo, by which he means his country’s de facto independence.
This is a pragmatic approach not only with respect to Beijing but domestic politics as well. Although the DPP won the presidential election this month, it lost its parliamentary majority. It now has one fewer seats than the KMT. Which means that a third party with 8 seats will hold a pivotal position in determining actual policies.
This third party, the relatively new center-left Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), takes a position somewhere between the DPP and the KMT on the question of sovereignty. Indeed, the party’s official color is turquoise, a pointed reference to the longstanding struggle between the forces of green (KMT) and blue (DPP). TPP leader and presidential candidate Ko Wen-je presented himselfduring the election campaign as “the only person who is acceptable to both China and the United States. This is currently my biggest advantage.”
Generally, Washington and Taipei see eye to eye. After all, the United States has long shipped arms to the island, with the latest package from August totaling $500 million. Between 1980 and 2010, Taiwan received over $25 billion in arms shipments.
At the same time, the United States has adhered to the “one China” policy, which Joe Biden reiterated just after the election when he said, “We do not support Taiwan independence.” At the same time, however, U.S. politicians have been traveling to Taiwan more often, with even Ed Markey (D-MA) leading a delegation there to warn Beijing of U.S. support for the island.
The lion’s share of the Pentagon’s budget is devoted to buying the big weapons systems—jets, carriers, space weapons—to counter a major rival like China. But that doesn’t mean that Washington wants a war with China. Quite the opposite, given military commitments to Ukraine, the increased demands from Israel, and now the attacks on the Houthis in and around the Red Sea.
But, of course, most wars are not planned in advance.
What Taiwan Wants
Taiwanese identity has changed dramatically in the last two decades. Back in 1992, only 17 percent of the population identifiedas Taiwanese, compared to 25 percent who called themselves Chinese. Another 46 percent said that they were both Chinese and Taiwanese.
Today, more than 62 percent of those surveyed say that they’re Taiwanese. And the number who call themselves Chinese has dropped all the way to 2.5 percent. A strong driver of this transformation is demographic, with the dying off of the generation that either came over from the Mainland with the Kuomintang forces or still harbored hopes of returning there at some point.
Despite this greater sense of a separate identity, Taiwan’s fate is still inextricably tied to the Mainland. Consider the economic interdependence of the two. As the Taiwan government itself likes to boast, the country invested over $200 billion into the Mainland between 1991 and 2022 while cross-strait trade in 2022 totaled $205 billion. The Mainland is actually Taiwan’s largest trade partner, responsible for 22 percent of total trade.
However, as with the decoupling taking place between the United States and China, cross-straits economic relations seem to be changing as well. Taiwanese investments in the Mainland dropped to a 20-year low in 2023, though this reflects more the rising costs of labor in China than any specifically political decision to invest elsewhere.
The Mainland remains dependent on one key Taiwanese export: semiconductors. Taiwan has practically cornered the market, particularly on the most advanced chips used for AI and quantum computing, where it controls 90 percent of the trade. U.S. controls on technology transfer to China have ensured that the Mainland, though it would prefer to achieve self-sufficiency in this regard, still needs to import these chips from Taiwan.
The Taiwanese, meanwhile, are well aware of the fate of Hong Kong. The residents of this entrepot, which reverted to China’s control in 1997, thought they would be able to run their own democratic institutions until at least 2047, according to provisions in the handover agreement. The crackdown on the Hong Kong protest movement in 2021, sending protesters to jail or to exile in places like Taiwan, called into question Beijing’s commitment to “one country, two systems.” The forced absorption of Hong Kong has strengthened the independence movement in Taiwan and, on top of the consolidation of a distinct Taiwanese identity, led to the three-term success of the DPP.
The current status quo, for Taiwan, has translated into a stable democracy, a vibrant civil society, a per-capita GDP comparable to South Korea and Japan, and a mutually prosperous arrangement with Beijing. On the negative side, Taiwan spends a lot on its military—2.6 percent of GDP with a record expenditure in 2023—and has to endure a steady diet of threats from Beijing.
Plus only a dozen other countries, most of them miniscule, treat Taiwan like an authentic nation. No seat in the UN, no membership in the World Bank, no participation in the World Health Organization: that’s the price Taiwan has to pay for this belittling status quo.
The Meaning of these Land Grabs
Although Beijing might dismiss the international outcry against Russia and Israel as relatively insignificant, it has paid close attention to how effectively Ukraine has fought back against Russian occupiers. Although Taiwan is tiny compared to Ukraine and China’s military is considerably more sophisticated than Russia’s, it would be no easy task for China to gobble up Taiwan.
Sending a sufficient force across the Taiwan Strait, for instance, would be extraordinarily difficult, particularly under a rain of missiles from Taiwan. The terrain makes landings difficult, and there are few routes from the east coast to the rest of the island. The preparations for such an amphibious assault would be relatively easy to monitor. Also, China hasn’t fought a war in many decades; who knows how its troops would fare under hostile conditions. The embarrassing retreat of the Russian army after it failed to seize Kyiv serves as a warning to hawks in Beijing.
But leaders sometimes do crazy things. And China has the option of threatening a devastating aerial assault, up to and including nuclear weapons, to force Taiwan to capitulate without a shot fired.
China’s ultimate calculation may come down to what’s happening around other border conflicts and whether the world is on the verge of a land grab free-for-all. In addition to what’s happening in Ukraine and Gaza, Saudi Arabia is eyeing territory in Yemen, Turkey continues to remain militarily active in northern Syria, and countries desperate to secure soil for growing food or boost their carbon credit accounts are engaged in numerous mercantile land grabs.
Climate change is also contributing to the general feeling that “the world is going to the dogs so I’m going to get what I can while I can.” As it disappears under the rising waves, land has become a more valuable commodity. Land hunger was behind the terrifying settler movements of the past—the westward expansion and dispossession of Native Americans in the United States, the colonial enterprises of the nineteenth century throughout the Global South, the Nazi attempt to create a larger lebensraumfor Germans. Today, the hunger remains, though the rationales have shifted to securing food supplies, sufficient “critical raw materials” for energy transitions, and carbon sinks to balance high levels of emissions in the home countries.
Taiwan faces a number of challenges that have nothing to do with the Mainland. Its population peaked in 2019, and it has the lowest fertility rate in the world. As an island, it is particularly vulnerable to sea-level rise, alongside increasing fresh-water scarcity as a result of changing monsoon patterns.
Cooperation with the Mainland and the international community on these issues is essential. The status quo—little engagement across the Taiwan Straits and low levels of Taiwanese participation in international institutions—has no future in a volatile world. But can Beijing suspend its territorial claims that currently exceed its grasp in favor of peace, justice, and mutual economic benefit?
Rationality says yes. Nationalism says no.
This article was published by FPIF
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NPR News: 01-18-2024 10PM EST
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