NPR News: 01-16-2024 9PM EST
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Day: January 16, 2024
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NPR News: 01-16-2024 8PM EST
Darial Valley. Photography by https://t.co/Pyx4rXmD2O photography pic.twitter.com/dpNrBA9rRM
— Notes from Georgia/South Caucasus (Hälbig, Ralph) (@SouthCaucasus) January 17, 2024
The Supreme Court hears a pair of cases that could upend federal regulations designed to protect us.
At risk is the Biden administration’s entire climate agenda. Also, the power of the government to approve and regulate drugs. Its power to stop employers from threatening the health and safety of workers. The safety and quality of the food we eat, the water we drink, and the air we breathe.
The Supreme Court seems to have no problem regulating women’s bodies. But when it comes to regulating big business, it may be ready to end 40 years of established law.
Let me explain.
The Supreme Court will hear a challenge to something known as the “Chevron doctrine,” established by the court’s ruling in the 1984 case Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council.
The Chevron case held that whenever a law is unclear, the federal agencies charged with implementing it should be able to interpret it — not the federal courts.
This makes sense, because unlike courts, federal agencies are staffed with scientists, researchers, and engineers — actual experts in the fields they’re regulating.
I spent five years at the Federal Trade Commission, supervising a team of economists and policy analysts who advised commissioners on how best to protect consumers and attack monopolies.
But now, a pair of Supreme Court cases challenging the Chevron doctrine could strip federal agencies of this key role of interpreting and implementing our nation’s laws — and shift this power to the courts.
But here’s the problem, and it’s a huge one. If judges become the sole interpreters of the nation’s laws, a single right-wing judge, carefully selected by corporate plaintiffs, could invalidate all the regulations of a federal agency charged with protecting the public.
No wonder big banks, fossil fuel companies, and pharmaceutical giants, who hate the power of federal agencies to limit their profits, have been trying for years to end the Chevron doctrine. And no wonder the two cases the Supreme Court will hear tomorrow have been selected and bankrolled by the Koch network to accomplish just this.
They think they have the votes on the Supreme Court to do it.
If agencies are stripped of their power to regulate, the big losers will be the American public. We need real experts tackling today’s complicated problems, not right-wing judges selected by corporate plaintiffs.
It’s important to see the potential fall of the Chevron doctrine for what it is: a power grab by corporate interests, allowing them to shop for judges who will strip agencies of their power to protect the public.
The right-wing strategy underlying tomorrow’s oral arguments is also consistent with the so-called “unitary executive theory,” which conservatives have been pushing since Reagan.
That theory aims to centralize control over implementing all laws in the president, rather than independent agencies. Under this theory, even Congress cannot vest the power to make certain decisions in an agency rather than the president. Subscribe
Trump and his lackeys want to consolidate all power in a president who will be able to do whatever he pleases. That’s part of their plan to give all power to Trump.
Shortly before the 2020 election, then-President Trump issued an executive order that sought to strip civil service protections from tens of thousands of career federal employees by reclassifying them as “Schedule F,” which would allow a president to fire or reassign them at will. President Biden rescinded this order before it was legally tested.
In his current campaign for the presidency, Trump promises to issue this order and substitute political appointees for the civil service.
When he was president, Trump also considered issuing an executive order requiring independent agencies that Congress insulated from presidential supervision — such as the Federal Trade Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and even the Federal Reserve — to submit any new regulations to the White House for approval before issuing them.
Were he to become president again, you can bet he’ll do this.
Since Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration, regulatory agencies have protected the public from corporate harms. The only reason to end these protections is to give corporate America even higher profits by shifting the risks of harms to individual people.
Watch your wallets.
This article was published at Robert Reich’s Substack
By Trisha Ray
Data centres are the linchpin of a nation’s technological progress, serving as the nerve centers that power the information age. The need for robust and reliable data centre infrastructure cuts across the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), serving as an essential foundation for e-government, innovation and entrepreneurship, decent work, and economic growth.
It comes as no surprise then that data sovereignty has gained traction over the past decade, particularly in the Global South. However, climate change threatens the very infrastructure that underpins the digital future, and its impact on data centres is a multifaceted challenge, with rising temperatures, extreme weather events, and changing environmental conditions posing significant threats to their reliability and sustainability, even as developing countries begin rolling out ambitious strategies and incentives to attract data centres.
The clouds that don’t bring rain
Walking through a data centre the size of an apartment complex in India’s largest data centre hub, two things stood out: First, our global information flows, even the ephemeral “cloud”, rely on physical infrastructure that stores, processes and moves data. Second, these rows upon rows of servers run hot.
The ideal operating temperature range for data centres, according to the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) is 65°F to 80°F (18°C to 27°C approx.). Data centres also need to be climate controlled around other factors like relative humidity. It follows then that data centres guzzle up massive amounts of energy and water. A 2020 article remarks on the rapid growth in data centre workloads: in the span of just eight years (2010-18), data centrw IP traffic had grown tenfold, accounting for 1 percent of global electricity consumption—more than the total electricity consumption of Thailand.
Although energy intensity improved in that period, this growth accounted for a 25 percent spike in global energy use. Furthermore, keeping data centres cool guzzles up water and energy, which in turn places stress on regions that will become increasingly drought-prone and water-scarce as climate change intensifies. Now, it appears that even with better energy efficiency, there just is not enough power to whet the world’s appetite for data centre capacity. CBRE’s Global Data Center Trends 2023 report notes record-low vacancy rates in data centres, driven by the rapid growth in AI, streaming, self-driving cars, and other new and emerging technology applications.
Currently, North America accounts for the majority of the world’s data centre capacity,[1] but projectionsindicate that the Asia Pacific data centre market is expected to grow 12.2 percent between 2020-24, with Southeast Asia alone growing at 12.9 percent. This is followed by Europe, the Middle East and Africa (EMEA) at 11.1 percent and North America at 6.4 percent.
Data sovereignty built in copper
Data sovereignty regulations are spurring some of the growth in data centre demand in the Asia Pacific region, especially outside established data hubs like Singapore and Tokyo. This includes data localisation mandates—some sectoral (Reserve Bank of India’s circular DPSS.CO.OD.No 2785/06.08.005/2017-18) and some pertaining specific sub-categories of sensitive data (such as telecom service provider data under Vietnam’s Cybersecurity Law).
National data centre policies focus on a few common pillars: the robustness and reliability of e-government services; security and trust in government collection of data; and building capacity and shared resources to bolster innovation and spur economic growth. Many developing countries have implemented or are deliberating data centre plans, either as standalone policies or as part of the larger incentive packages for digital infrastructure.
| Country | Data Center Policies and Strategies |
| India | Meghraj: Cloud Computing Initiative; Data Center Policy 2020 |
| Vietnam | National Data Center Project |
| China | Eastern Data, Western Computing Plan (东数西算)2020 Implementation plan for the computing power hub of the national integrated big data center collaborative innovation system (2021) Three-year action plan for the development of new data centers (2021 – 2023) |
| Brazil | Draft Strategy for Public Policy Implementation to Attract Data Centers |
| South Africa | Draft National Data and Cloud Policy |
| Malaysia | Digital Ecosystem Acceleration Scheme (DESAC) 2022 |
| Morocco | National Strategy for Digital Development 2023 |
| Türkiye | Regulation Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communication Sector |
While some strategies mention the need for a steady supply of electricity and water for data centres, with proposals to offer competitive subsidies, few delve into strategies to combat potential resource stress, and how rapid climate change will impact the operating environment.
Figure 1: Current and proposed data center clusters in China.
Source: China Briefing2023 was the hottest year on record, marked by a series of extreme weather events that have left their imprint on the global economy. Flooding in China led to a 2-5 percent drop in the country’s grain production. Meanwhile, South America had one of its worst droughts on record, with Montevideo, the capital of Uruguay, running out of potable water.
China’s Eastern Data, Western Computing Plan aims to build energy-efficient data centre clusters catering to demand-rich Eastern regions. China’s data centre clusters, including the proposed new ones, are located along its rivers. Many of these data clusters, based on flood projections by the Chinese Academy of Sciences, expected to face severe flooding if global temperatures continue on the track to increasing by 1.5°C -2°C in the coming decade.
Figure 2: Flood risk in China [Probability of severe (a–b), moderate (c–d) and mild (e–f) floods for 1.5 ∘C (a, c, e) and 2 ∘C (b, d, f) of global warming under the RCP8.5 scenario. Source]
According to the UN, developing countries in the Global South are also some of the most vulnerable to drought. India’s drought-prone regions, for instance, have increased by 57 percent since 1997. Much of the country’s data centre infrastructure is in drought-prone or flood-risk areas like Mumbai, New Delhi, Bangalore, Pune, and Chennai.
Much of the data centre infrastructure set to come online in the coming decades in many Global South countries will, therefore, be operating in resource-constrained areas, and areas at risk of severe flooding, heat, and drought.
Recommendations
Data strategies recognise that jurisdiction, while important, is not the only prerequisite for data sovereignty. Accordingly, many developing economies complement regulation with support for data centre infrastructure. Yet, these policies and strategies are hyper-focused on current demand. The politics of data sovereignty must encounter the reality of future climate change.
Given the obstacles looming on the horizon, research into greener data centres is one small part of the required response. Will hubs have enough water to sustain the demand for data centres and the basic needs of the people living there? Many data centres keep relative humidity and temperatures at more conservative levels than recommended by the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) for example, and adjustments to these parameters can, according to a study by Meta, make data centres 80 percent more water efficient. Microsoft ran a two-year experimentoperating a data centre underwater, with promising results. Both sets of solutions have their hiccups: gains in efficiency can only go do far in offsetting sheer demand for data centres, and underwater data centres present unique challenges for maintenance and vulnerability to disruptions, either natural or orchestrated by unfriendly state and non-state actors.
There is also an opportunity to weave sustainability considerations into the ongoing global conversation on digital public infrastructure. DPI could help with the first pillar of national data centre policies mentioned in the previous section, the robustness and reliability of e-government services, by reducing data redundancy. For instance, the Indian G20 presidency launched a Global Digital Public Infrastructure Repository, an open resource to help G20 members and observers sustainably build and deploy their own DPIs. With Brazil’s presidency, under the motto “Building a Just World and a Sustainable Planet”, the G20 can link DPI, sustainability, and data sovereignty.
Finally, companies and governments must invest in data centre capacity outside of “traditional” data centre hubs, to distribute the risks arising from environmental factors. National government incentives such as subsidies may be one lever to attract data centres to non-traditional hubs. This exercise must be complemented by projections of water demand and extreme weather events to make these new hubs sustainable.
Climate change will have profound implications for nascent initiatives to bolster data sovereignty, given its impact on data centres that are vital for a country’s digital development. It is critical, therefore, for data centre strategies to account for the effects of an operating environment that will be very different in the coming decades.
- About the author: Trisha Ray is a Resident Fellow with the GeoTech Center at the Atlantic Council
- Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation
[1] Northern Virginia is the single largest data center market in the world.
By Gayane Markosyan
Armenia’s strained relations with Russia, its traditional strategic ally, may have an impact beyond political and security alliance, affecting the country’s energy security as Moscow supplies most of Yerevan’s gas needs.
Armenia is officially considered a self-sufficient country in terms of its volume of electricity, generating up to 98 per cent of its needs in-country. Experts, however, warn that the reality is more complex.
“Our self-sufficiency depends on the countries from which we import the gas and the uranium that operate our thermal and nuclear power plants. And when our government officials speak about our self-sufficiency, why do they forget to say how we maintain it?” energy expert Armen Manvelyan told IWPR, noting that in fact over 70 per cent of Armenia’s electricity depended on Russia.
According to Armenia’s statistical committee, in 2021 thermal power produced 42.9 per cent of the country’s electricity, while 25.4 per cent was provided by nuclear plants with uranium imported from Russia. Internal resources produce about 31.6 per cent of Armenia’s electricity: 27.9 per cent from hydropower and 3.7 percent from solar power plants.
In addition, Armenia imports natural gas and oil for most of its energy needs, predominantly from Russia. According to data from the Ministry of Territorial Administration, Russia supplies 87.5 per cent of Armenia’s gas needs via pipeline through Georgia, while Iran covers 12.5 per cent through a barter agreement under which it exports electricity in exchange.
Armenia also trades electricity with Georgia, though volumes are low since the countries’ networks are not synchronised. Energy interconnections with Azerbaijan and Turkey are inactive for political reasons.
In an interview on November 15, Iran’s newly appointed ambassador to Armenia, Mehdi Sobhani, hinted that Tehran might help Yerevan reduce its energy dependence on Russia. Since 2009 Armenia has provided Iran with electricity in return for natural gas supplies; the arrangement was due to end in 2026, but in August the two countries agreed to extend and expand it until at least 2030. Russia, however, could turn the tap off as gas giant Gazprom owns the pipeline bringing the gas from Iran to Armenia.
According to the Statistical Committee of Armenia, in 2021 natural gas accounted for 76.2 per cent of imported energy resources and oil products for 21.9 per cent.
Armen Manvelyan, an energy expert, noted that amid the strained relations with Russia in the wake of the situation in Nagorny Karabakh, this dependency was problematic.
“Armenia is not in the best energy situation right now,” he continued. “Yes, the nuclear power plant is working, thermal power plants are working, but their activities depend on the energy resources supplied from Russia. And if their prices increase, Armenia may face serious problems.”
While a spike in prices is not imminent, the widening rift between Yerevan and Moscow meant that it cannot be ruled out.
“Until now, the existing favourable tariffs were determined by the quality of political relations between the two countries,” Manvelyan said. “If you have good political relations, you get a good price. When you start to spoil your political relations, the situation may become dicey and prices may increase.”
Other experts are more optimistic.
“I think that the problems associated with the dependence on Russian gas are not as acute and existing issues can be mitigated by diversifying the country’s energy system, for example developing further nuclear and solar energy,” Avetisyan told IWPR, adding that supplies from Russia and Iran were mutually beneficial.
“In the case of Iran, this is done within the Gas for Electricity scheme, while in case of Russia, we buy the gas, we do not receive it as a gift.”
Manvelyan noted that rates were certainly lower for Yerevan.
“Armenia pays Russian gas at a low price, 175 dollars per 1,000 cubic metre while Azerbaijan sells gas to its ally Turkey at 290 dollars,” he said, adding that Armenia was short of options in terms of friendly neighbours and should hence “make every effort to ensure good relations with Russia”.
“An increase in gas prices will trigger a chain reaction across the country’s economy as prices of our goods will increase, affecting our export opportunities because our products will become uncompetitive,” he concluded.
OPENING THE ENERGY MARKET
To increase its self-sufficiency, the Armenian government has embarked on a path to liberalise the energy market as a way to boost its electricity export capacity and diversify sources.
“We support the government of Armenia in implementing reforms in the energy sector. We are working with the Armenian government in three main areas – liberalisation of the electricity market, diversification of energy supplies and development of interstate trade with Georgia,” said Abgar Budagyan, chief of party at Tetra Tech, which implements USAID’s energy programme in Armenia.
For Prime MInister Nikol Pashinyan, the gradual liberalisation of the electricity market which started in 2022 has opened up new opportunities and created favourable conditions for interstate trade.
“We are developing production capacities, carrying out large-scale reconstruction of substations and power lines, and building Armenia-Iran and Armenia-Georgia high-voltage lines, which contribute to the formation of the North-South Electricity Corridor and create new opportunities for increasing exports, imports, transit or seasonal power exchange. Thus, Armenia can become a kind of regional electricity hub,” he said in June.
The open market means that consumers can choose an electricity supplier, depending on the offered tariffs. It also means that the Electric Networks of Armenia (ENA) no longer has the monopoly over the electricity supply, although new suppliers still have to use ENA’s distribution network, meaning that the company remains the only guaranteed distributor.
“Since the introduction of the new market model, the Commission approved the licence for 14 suppliers and seven wholesalers are already operating,” Sergey Aghinyan, a member of the Public Services Regulatory Commission, told IWPR.
According to official statistics, in the first six months of 2023, 13.1 per cent of consumers chose new electricity suppliers, up from 5.3 per cent in the whole of 2022. The government forecast the share to reach 23 per cent in 2024.
Experts and officials noted that the reform contributed to the development of interstate imports and exports.
“In 2022, Armenia exported 365 million kWh to Georgia; in 2012-2021 the amount remained constant at 242 million. This happened mainly because of market liberalisation,” Vardanyan said. Iran remained the main recipient of Armenia’s electricity, with 1178.3 million kWh of electricity supplied in 2022.
But experts remain divided over the benefits of liberalisation. Avetisyan’s assessment one year on is positive as it is “an important process that provides opportunities for free competition for existing market players not only within the country, but also abroad”.
Manvelyan maintained that authorities should have strengthened state control rather than open the market.
“Energy is one of the few industries that should be very seriously controlled by the state, it is the only one in the position to build large systems and high-voltage networks,” he said. “If Armenia were a large country, we could also talk about the private sector, but this is not the case of our country.”
- About the author: Gayane Markosyan is a Yerevan-based investigative journalist whose work focuses on gender, legal and economic issues.
- Source: This publication was published by IWPR and prepared under the “Amplify, Verify, Engage (AVE) Project”implemented with the financial support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway.