Day: November 22, 2023

С 2024 года столичный школьный транспорт получит право передвигаться по автобусной полосе. Как заявил мэр Тбилиси Каха Каладзе, из-за проблемы заторов, с учетом необходимости быстрого и безопасного передвижения школьников в часы пик, было принято решение «при определенных условиях» разрешить движение школьного транспорта категорий М2 и М3 в автобусной полосе. В каких случаях будет разрешено передвигаться […]

Georgian PM: Tbilisi hotel launch marks “new paragraph” in …  Agenda.ge

By C. Todd Lopez

A U.S. military  AC-130J Ghostrider attacked an Iran-backed militant group after the group used a ballistic missile to attack U.S. and coalition forces on Al-Asad Airbase, Iraq, the deputy pentagon press secretary said Tuesday. 

The ballistic missile attack resulted in non-serious injuries to U.S. and coalition forces, as well as minor damage to infrastructure on the installation, said Sabrina Singh during a briefing at the Pentagon. 

“Immediately following the attack, a U.S. military AC-130 aircraft in the area conducted a self-defense strike against an Iranian-backed militia vehicle and a number of Iranian-backed militia personnel involved in this attack,” she said. “This self-defense strike resulted in some hostile fatalities.” 

Singh said the AC-130 gunship was able to mount a response so quickly because it was already in the air at the time of the missile attack. 

“We were able to identify the point of origin of these attacks because an AC-130 was up already in the area and therefore was able to respond,” Singh said. “They were able to take action because they saw the militants. They were able to keep an eye on the movement of these militants as they moved into their vehicles and that’s why they were able to respond.” 

Since Oct. 17, U.S. forces have been attacked 66 times in both Iraq and Syria, said Singh. She also said this is the first time a ballistic missile similar to the one used in this attack has been employed. 

Since the start of those attacks in October, the U.S. has mounted three other strikes, Singh said. But those strikes were pre-planned and targeted specific facilities and infrastructure known to be used by militias affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. This most recent U.S. response was different in that it was unplanned. 

“These groups have targeted our forces [in] both Iraq and Syria,” Singh said. “We feel right now that we’ve taken appropriate action to decimate some of their facilities and some of their weapons … We always reserve the right to respond at a time and place of our choosing.”

By Finn Andreen

Even though support for the free market has become stronger in the last decades, libertarianism can still only be considered a fringe movement. Most people still believe that many social problems are due to “market failure” and therefore require state intervention to be “solved.” Despite the obvious flaws of modern socialism—with its unlikely combination of a redistributive welfare state and globalist crony capitalism—and despite libertarianism’s robust philosophical and empirical foundations, the liberalism of Ludwig von Mises is still far from enjoying the majority support that it so amply deserves.

There are many reasons for this. Of course, media bias and public education prevent the dissemination of the ideas of freedom in society and limit the understanding of the free market. However, an often overlooked, yet equally important, reason is a general disregard for causality. When the real and underlying causes for social and economic problems are unknown or misunderstood, the public’s support for wrong-headed statist solutions to these problems is not surprising.

The Importance of Causes

The importance of causes to human inquiry has been grasped since early antiquity, crystalizing with Aristotle and his theory of causality. Following in this tradition, Herbert Spencer considered the discovery of causal laws the essence of science; those who disregard the importance of the identification of causes, whatever the subject matter, are liable to draw erroneous conclusions.

In the Twilight of the Idols, Friedrich Nietzsche chastised modern society for still making errors of causality; namely, “the error of false causality,” “the error of imaginary causes,” and “the error of the confusion of cause and effect.” Unfortunately, these errors are made frequently in all areas of economic and political life.

In the realm of international relations, for instance, a disregard for contemporary history has led to an ignorance of the real causes of serious political events. Today’s conflicts could arguably have been avoided if their many and deep causes had been soberly and objectively considered by decision-makers. When George Santayana said that “those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it” and when George Orwell wrote in his masterpiece 1984 that mastering the past is the key to mastering the present, both had in mind the crucial importance of knowing the actual causes of political events.

Nietzsche considered the error of the confusion of cause and effect to be the most dangerous one; he called it the “intrinsic perversion of reason.” This was not an exaggeration, considering the impact of this all-too-common reversal of causality. For example, this error happens when the state is absolved of the nefarious consequences of its previous actions, thereby empowering the state to legitimize policies that “solve” problems for which the state was itself originally responsible.

Examples: Recessions, Inflation, and Unemployment

As an example, it is possible to mention the boom-and-bust cycles of the typical state capitalist economy. The original cause for this cycle is the state, through its monopolistic monetary policy. As Murray Rothbard wrote, “The business cycle is generated by government: specifically, by bank credit expansion promoted and fueled by governmental expansion of bank reserves.”

Yet, during hard times—because this original cause of recessions is not generally recognized—the state itself is looked to by society to “save” the economy through measures such as bailouts or interest rate reductions (which mostly benefit big banks and strategic industries). This in turn sets the stage for the next artificial boom, and the cycle continues.

The problem of high inflation and high unemployment may be seen in the same way. Price inflation is caused by the state when it increases the money supply to pay for its chronic budget deficits, with the added benefit of reducing the relative size of its enormous debt. Yet, when prices increase in the economy because of such actions, then the state itself is expected to come to the rescue—for instance, by artificially imposing price controls or hiking interest rates, thus slowing economic activity—to the further detriment of society.

High unemployment is also a phenomenon caused by the state, of course, when it imposes rigid labor laws and high taxation on companies, when it redistributes “generous” unemployment benefits, and when it allows uneducated immigration for which there is no demand from the private sector. Yet, when unemployment becomes “too” high because of these actions, then the state itself is expected to solve the problem—for instance, by providing tax incentives to companies for hiring low-skilled workers or by hiring more civil servants.

The Fallacy of “Market Failure”

It seems counterintuitive to believe that an agent responsible for social problems should also be the one to solve those problems. The only reason this flawed logic continues to be accepted is because of errors of causality. The real causes for economic problems are not well understood by the general public and are often confused with its consequences. In economics, this disregard for causal connections has probably wrecked as much damage upon societies as the international conflicts mentioned earlier by giving free rein to those who see few limits to the state’s regulation of economic and social life.

The same reasoning is applicable to an aspect that is usually blamed on the free market: “externalities,” or the “external” costs that third parties sometimes bear. The extreme case of this is the concept of the “tragedy of the commons,” which is often used to justify the many globalist “green” initiatives to “fight” climate change. Quite apart from whether there are apocalyptic grounds to support such extreme social top-down policies, the libertarian view is that the real cause of many “externalities” is generally that private property rights have not been adequately defined.

Since causality is disregarded, social and economic problems such as those mentioned earlier are generally attributed to “market failure,” thereby reducing the credibility of libertarianism among the general public. Indeed, libertarianism is usually rejected by the majority as a political and economic system because social problems are attributed erroneously to an incapability of the free market to provide solutions. There is rarely any perception that the real causes of these problems are statist interventions in the free market in the first place.

Libertarians have always recognized the importance of causality, as per the title of Mises’s magnum opus Human Action. Carl Menger, the founder of the Austrian School of Economics, explicitly mentioned that he had “devoted special attention to the investigation of the causal connections” as an important means of gaining insight into economic processes. Importantly, this was not only the position of the Austrian School at the time because “the search for these causal laws of reality was very much an international enterprise among economists in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and up to World War I.” However, for several reasons, this focus on causal connections in economic research was then lost.

As this article has tried to show, it is essential for causality in both economics and politics to be better understood by the general public. This is key to rein in the authoritarian inroads from governments that are taking place in all areas of life. A better understanding of causal connections would lead to an increase in the popularity of libertarianism by demonstrating that the market only fails when it is constantly disrupted by state intervention.

Source: This article was published by the Mises Institute

By Rena Sasaki

In a report on the Indo-Pacific Tilt, the UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee stated that there would be greater technology and security benefits if Japan joined its Strand B, or Pillar 2, cooperation in the development of advanced military technologies and increased interoperability between AUKUS members’ armed forces.

The committee’s report calls for the United Kingdom to propose to Australia and the United States that Japan, along with South Korea, participate in an AUKUS technical defence cooperation agreement focused solely on Strand B activities.

Strand B designates cooperation in advanced technology areas, including undersea capabilities, quantum technologies, artificial intelligence, advanced cyber, hypersonic weapons, electronic warfare, innovation and information sharing. These advanced capabilities are critical in reinforcing the integrated deterrence capabilities of the United States’ Indo-Pacific allies, including Japan.

Since Japan already has a defence cooperation framework for joint research and development with the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, there is a foundation for AUKUS–Japan cooperation. But cooperation based on the current frameworks is project-based, with an emphasis on basic technologies rather than a list of priority capabilities, unlike AUKUS. For example, most of the joint research with the United States involves technologies directly related to equipment, such as next-generation amphibious technology and modular hybrid electric drive vehicle systems. Based on this background, Japan could considerably benefit from participating in AUKUS Pillar 2.

The Japanese government stated in the National Defense Strategy 2022 that leveraging cutting-edge technologies for defence has become critical. Japan, which has high technological capabilities, needs to cooperate with its allies and mobilise their technological capabilities to prepare for a long-term race for technological leadership. Because advantages in critical and emerging technologies covered by Pillar 2 of AUKUS will directly translate into military advantages, having access to these technologies will deter potential adversaries in the Indo-Pacific.

Given Japan’s declining economic power, its future science and technology investment will likely also decline. Japan can acquire critical and emerging technologies more efficiently by closely collaborating with allies and partners. Cooperation through an expanded AUKUS Pillar 2 agreement would allow its members to complement each other’s capability gaps and leverage economies of scale.

Most importantly, it will promote the internationalisation of Japan’s defence industry. For a long time, the Japanese defence industry’s only client was the Japanese Ministry of Defense and Self-Defense Forces. But they are undergoing major changes, relaxing the restrictions on defence equipment transfer and promoting exports. Strengthening ties between the defence industries of Japan and AUKUS members is a good opportunity to improve the Japanese industry’s competitiveness. In Japan, investment in critical and emerging technologies has been driven by civilian usage. In 2020, defence-related procurement from domestic manufacturers made up less than 1 percent of Japan’s total industrial production value.

The Japanese defence industry must become more internationally oriented. Although joint research and development takes time, the expanded AUKUS group can create an opportunity for the Japanese defence manufacturers to learn the marketing and sales know-how of defence equipment from AUKUS partners.

But before it can join AUKUS, there are challenges Japan needs to overcome.

The most critical issue is the lack of an adequate security clearance system. The Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets, the only existing law on information security in Japan, limits the scope of information that can be classified as state secrets to four areas: diplomacy, defence, prevention of espionage, and prevention of terrorism. It does not cover information in economic and technological fields, and without a security clearance system in these areas, Japanese manufacturers will struggle to access classified information in joint developments. Japan needs a security clearance system before it joins AUKUS.

Additionally, Japan is striving to become a major arms exporter like the United States and the United Kingdom, so there are concerns about potential conflicts of interest. The heart of AUKUS is reminiscent of Japan’s efforts to sell its conventionally-powered submarines in 2015. But considering the lead time to acquire effective deterrence capabilities in the critical theatre of the Indo-Pacific, this is not the time for commercial clashes. Japan should accept the division of labour within the extended AUKUS framework.

Given the military-oriented nature of AUKUS, Japan joining AUKUS would signal to China that it is part of the ‘integrated deterrence’ network the United States promotes. Considering that China, Japan, and South Korea are working together to revitalise the dialogue channel through the Japan–China–South Korea trilateral summit, policymakers in Tokyo may feel that the timing is inappropriate.

But the security environment in East Asia is more dire than ever, and technology implementation takes years, especially the critical and emerging technologies that define future victories. The United States has also expressed a positive attitude toward the expansion of AUKUS’ Pillar 2 membership. Japan cannot afford to delay their efforts to strengthen their defence industrial base with these technologies. Now is the time to accelerate discussions on Japan’s participation in AUKUS.

About the author: Rena Sasaki is a PhD student at School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University and a Fellow of the Pacific Forum’s Next Generation Young Leaders Program.

Source: This article was published by East Asia Forum

By Andrew McGregor

The deadly October 7 Hamas operation was designed to use shock and terror to force a change in the status and future of Gaza’s Palestinian population. In this regard, the operation has been successful—life in Gaza will never be the same. According to Israeli authorities, part of these changes will include the disappearance of Hamas as a political and military entity.

During a meeting at the Israeli Air Force operations headquarters, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said of the planned Israeli Defense Force (IDF) land offensive into Gaza: “This has to be the last maneuver in Gaza, for the simple reason that after it, there will not be a Hamas” (Arutz Sheva, [Beit El] October 22). National Security Council chief Tzachi Hanegbi has pledged Israel will “wipe [Hamas] from the face of the earth” (Times of Israel, October 14).

What then will a post-Hamas Gaza look like if the IDF succeeds? To follow are eight possible directions for Gaza’s future, which may involve one or more of these scenarios in combination:

Scenario 1: Return of the Palestinian Authority

After Hamas’s violent expulsion of Fatah from Gaza in 2007 and the subsequent dissolution of the Palestinian Unity government, Gaza and the West Bank have had little official interaction. This means the Palestinian Authority (PA) government in the West Bank (dominated by the Fatah Party of President Mahmud Abbas) has little presence or influence in isolated Gaza.

The credibility of the PA, should it return to Gaza, could only suffer by following behind Israeli troops, unless some sort of intermediate administration was established. Even afterwards, it would be difficult to avoid being characterized as Israel’s puppet. If Gazans are allowed to remain, Israel will certainly intensify rather than relax its control of the enclave, which will be sealed even tighter to prevent the supply of money or weapons to any resistance factions in Gaza. Moreover, the PA may not be eager to rush back into Gaza, especially if it remains politically unsettled.

Scenario 2: Islamist Extremist Groups Grow in Influence

Israel’s plan to destroy Hamas (and presumably the Gaza-based Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement and other minor Islamist militias) will leave a dangerous power vacuum in an already deeply traumatized region. This void is unlikely to be filled by any group or movement sympathetic to Israel. Palestinian anger may well encourage the growth of greater extremism. This could possibly manifest itself in new forms or in the rise in popularity in Gaza of more familiar groups, vis-à-vis al-Qaeda or Islamic State.

Scenario 3: Israeli Occupation

If, as expected, the IDF occupies all of Gaza, it will be the third such operation since the 2005 evacuation of Israeli troops and settlers. Returning Gaza to Israeli military occupation 18 years after disengagement is an idea with virtually no support in Israel or anywhere else. Israel is eager to escape an attack-response cycle that is expensive in economic terms, militarily demanding, and politically damaging.

Scenario 4: Return to Egyptian Control

Currently, Egypt has as little to do with Gaza as is possible and frequently closes its single border crossing with the enclave. Despite this, Egypt has a long history of being the dominant power in Gaza, going back as far as Pharaonic times, through the Muslim Ayyubid dynasty to the era of the medieval Mamluks before it passed into Ottoman control in the 16th century. Gaza was absorbed into Gamal Abd al-Nasser’s United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1959, and was ruled by an Egyptian governor until 1967. Before then, Egypt held Gaza with the Egyptian Army’s 8th Division, which was formed from Palestinian conscripts and Egyptian officers. Israel seized Gaza and Sinai from Egypt in the 1967 Six-Day War. While the Sinai Peninsula was eventually returned to Egypt, Gaza was not, and it remained under Israeli military occupation until 2005.

Officially, Egypt continues to advocate for an independent Palestinian state based on the borders that existed prior to the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Pro-Palestinian rallies have been organized under the aegis of President al-Sisi’s Mustaqbal Watan (Future of the Homeland) party and directed by officials believed to be undercover police. Unsanctioned protests of support in Cairo’s Tahrir Square and at al-Azhar mosque, however, have been met with beatings and mass arrests (MENA [Cairo], October 23; Al Jazeera, October 21). It is clear that Egypt’s response to the war in Gaza will be formed in government meeting rooms, not on the street.

Hamas can expect no help from Egypt, because of the group’s close connections to Egypt’s banned Muslim Brotherhood. In Cairo’s view, many Gazans are infected with Islamic extremist ideology, and are suspected of collaborating with Islamist fighters in the Sinai who continue to be engaged in a 12-year-old insurgency. Egypt already hosts 9 million refugees, mostly from Middle Eastern or African countries. There is no desire in Cairo to resume Egypt’s historical control of Gaza or its 2.2 million people. Such an occupation would bring Egypt into direct contact with Israeli security forces in an unstable tinderbox. Five decades of peace with Israel have benefitted Egypt, which contends with many other challenges that will not be improved by confrontations with the state. Nonetheless, as a major leader of the Arab world, President al-Sisi asserts that in Gaza “the existing reaction exceeds the right of self-defense on the part of Israel, and is turning into collective punishment” (al-Hurra [Cairo], October 16).

Cairo is also concerned that the Gaza conflict is taking international attention away from the still-raging conflict in neighboring Sudan (Ahram [Cairo], October 22; see TM, April 28). Nine thousand people have been killed in Sudan since April, while Egypt has reluctantly received over 300,000 Sudanese refugees. Cairo is hard-pressed to handle refugee pressures on both its southern and northern borders and is looking for greater international intervention to bring an end to the six-month old war in Sudan.

Scenario 5: Depopulation of Gaza

Israel is using a combination of airstrikes and warnings to compel Gazans to move to the southern part of the enclave, close to the Egyptian border. This has led to fears that Israel may seek to drive the entire population of Gaza across the border into Egyptian Sinai. Consistent with this, on October 18, President al-Sisi remarked that beyond Israel’s “direct military action” against Hamas, there was “an attempt to push the civilian population to seek refuge” in Egypt (Daily News Egypt, October 18). In a meeting with the British PM, al-Sisi declared: “We must not allow a civilian exodus from Gaza to Sinai because it would be a very dangerous matter…” The Egyptian president further warned that the consequences of failing to contain a growing spiral of violence “go beyond the right to defend oneself” (Ahram Online [Cairo], October 20). Desperate to avoid this wave of Gazan refugees, al-Sisi suggested they could instead be funnelled into Israel’s sparsely populated Negev Desert (Egypt Independent, October 18; Middle East Monitor, October 19).

Western suggestions that Egypt take in over a million Gazan refugees have angered the Egyptian government, with one senior official reportedly telling a European envoy: “You want us to take one million people? Well, I am going to send them to Europe. You care about human rights so much—well, you take them” (Middle East Monitor, October 19).

PA leader Mahmud Abbas also fears the permanent displacement of the Gazans, suggesting this would constitute “a second Nakba,” referring to the 1948 expulsion of some 750,000 Palestinians from lands that would form the state of Israel (Al Jazeera, October 13). Ariel Kallner, a Knesset member from Israel’s ruling Likud Party, issued a call for another expulsion: “Right now, one goal: Nakba! A Nakba that will overshadow the Nakba of 48!” (al-Arabiya, October 8). Another Likud member, Revital Gotliv, has called for the use of nuclear weapons to destroy Gaza and render it uninhabitable: “It’s time to kiss doomsday!” (Middle East Eye, October 22; Middle East Monitor, October 10). These remarks were echoed by Heritage Minister Amichai Eliyahu of the Otzma Yehudit Party (a Likud coalition partner), who suggested that a nuclear strike on Gaza was “one of the options” (though he later claimed he was speaking “metaphorically”) (Jerusalem Post, November 6). He further suggested that Gazans could “go to Ireland” (Dublin has been critical of the Israeli offensive in Gaza) (Times of Israel, November 5). Such calls for the depopulation of Gaza and the permanent dislocation of its people do not encourage evacuation from targeted areas nor cooperation with the IDF. [1]

A leaked document from Israel’s Intelligence Ministry (described as a “concept paper”) suggested “large-scale migration from war zones … is a natural and sought-after outcome…” Among the countries mentioned as possible destinations for a mass exodus of Gazans are Greece, Spain, and Canada. The latter, however, is singled out as a prime choice due to its “permissive immigration policy” (+972 Magazine [Tel Aviv], October 30).

Scenario 6: Establishment of a UN Mandate

One possible direction for a post-Hamas Gaza involves the revival of mandated territories, such as were common in the Middle East and Africa in the interval between the first and second world wars. Gaza itself was under the British Mandate for Palestine from 1923 to 1948. Under the auspices of the League of Nations, these mandates typically involved the transfer of former European colonies or parts of the Ottoman Empire to the control of other European nations with an eye toward guiding these territories into a state of self-determination and independence. In practice, the mandates simply maintained colonial status under new masters who were in no hurry to establish self-governance.

Assuming such a mandate is approved by the UN Security Council, which is not necessarily likely, a return of Gaza to European control under a UN mandate is simply a non-starter. Broad international participation would be required, including a massive operation involving peacekeepers, reconstruction assistance, medical and development aid, and infrastructure repair. It would be difficult to secure support for such a program from all the badly-divided members of the permanent UN Security Council. With the UN already overstretched and underfunded (especially with regard to humanitarian aid), approval of a UN mandate would only be the first step in a long and difficult process. Yisrael Beitenu Party leader Avigdor Liberman (a former defense minister, foreign minister, and deputy prime minister) has suggested that the UN forgo providing any aid to Gaza in favor of sending assistance to Libya, Sudan, and Syria instead (Jerusalem Post, October 18).

Scenario 7: Arab League Occupation

It has been suggested that some Arab nations friendly to Israel (specifically Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates) could be handed a mandate over a disarmed Gaza (Israel Hayom, October 16). Israel would determine “how the international force can operate, what weapons it is allowed to have, and anything else that effects the Jewish state’s security needs,” effectively making such a force little more than an Israeli proxy (Israel Hayom, October 19). However, there is no lineup of Arab nations ready and willing to assume responsibility for struggling Gazans living in ruins.

Some of these formerly friendly Arab states may also be growing less friendly by the day. For example, nine nations, including at least seven that might be called friendly to Israel, issued a statement on October 26 assailing Israel’s conduct of the conflict: “The right to self-defense by the United Nations Charter does not justify blatant violations of humanitarian and international law.” They further rejected any attempt “to displace the Palestinian people from their land in any way, considering it a serious violation of international humanitarian law and tantamount to a war crime” (Asharq al-Awsat, October 26). [2] The Arab League, which has no joint military mechanism, has not yet expressed any interest in assuming control of Gaza.

Scenario 8: Survival/Revival of Hamas

In a policy born of anger rather than feasibility, Israel has set itself the impossible task of eliminating every trace of Hamas, which has both political and armed wings. Short of killing or expelling every resident of Gaza, this will prove impossible. Part of the problem is the success Hamas has had in eliminating internal threats to its rule, leaving Gazans with few political alternatives. With deep roots in Gaza, there is a strong chance that Hamas will survive the current round of fighting, even if it does so in a slightly different form or under a different name.

Conclusion

Israel has regarded Gaza as an independent Palestinian state since its withdrawal in 2005 and is thus likely to repudiate responsibility for the territory when military operations are complete. As two veteran Israeli intelligence authorities recently stated: “It needs to be clear that neither Gaza reconstruction nor care for the health, sanitation, or displacement of residents is Israel’s responsibility” (Times of Israel, October 21). Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant likewise insists that the final phase of Israel’s ongoing assault on Gaza will involve “the removal of Israel’s responsibility for day-to-day life in the Gaza Strip” (Times of Israel, October 20).

There will inevitably be calls from so-called “progressive” factions in the West to allow mass migration of Gazans to Western nations, which could receive support from some Israeli leaders anxious to be done with the Palestinians. There are, however, already demands from Republican presidential hopefuls and others to ban Palestinian entry to the United States (Times of Israel, October 19).

With so many variables in play, one thing about the future of Gaza is still clear—the people who will not have a say in it are the Gazan people themselves.

About the author: Andrew McGregor is Director of Aberfoyle International Security, a Toronto-based agency specializing in security issues related to the Islamic world. He received a Ph.D. from the University of Toronto’s Dept. of Near and Middle Eastern Civilizations in 2000 and is a former Research Associate of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. In October 2007 he took over as managing editor of the Jamestown Foundation’s Global Terrorism Analysis publications. He is the author of an archaeological history of Darfur published by Cambridge University in 2001 and publishes frequently on international security issues. His latest book is A Military History of Modern Egypt, published by Praeger Security International in 2006. Dr. McGregor provides commentary on military and security issues for newspapers (including the New York Times and Financial Times), as well as making frequent appearances on radio (BBC, CBC Radio, VOA, Radio Canada International) and television (CBC Newsworld, CTV Newsnet, and others).

Source: This article was published by The Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor Volume: 21 Issue: 22

Notes:

[1] Israeli government documents from 1948 were declassified in 2021 and confirm long-standing reports of massacres and forcible evictions, as well as the shocked responses of some Israeli cabinet members to the violence. The documents were examined in a report by Israeli daily Haaretz and the Akevot Institute for Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Research and entitled “Classified Docs Reveal Massacres of Palestinians in ’48 – and What Israeli Leaders Knew” (Haaretz, December 9, 2021).

[2] The document was signed by the foreign ministers of Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, and Morocco.