Day: November 8, 2023
The population of Kazakhstan will exceed 20 million people for the first time, and more than 70 percent of its residents will be ethnic Kazakhs sometime in November (Kazakhstan Today, November 1). Coinciding with this welcome boom are developments that threaten the stability of the country and could be exploited by outside powers.
Some see the changes in the composition of the Kazakh nation as leading to conditions for a series of revolts akin to the Arab Spring. Such dangers also include the decline of the ethnic Russian population in Kazakhstan and rising nationalism among Kazakhs, expressed in verbal attacks on Moscow and fears that Russia may try to seize the northern portion of Kazakhstan. Growing regionalist and tribal divisions within Kazakhstan and a rising tide of nationalism among the non-Russian, non-Kazakh population have hurt the domestic security situation. The ongoing debate among Kazakhs over whether their country should assimilate non-Kazakhs or promote a multinational civic nation could enflame societal tensions.
These developments are a point of pride for many Kazakhs, but they also undergird growing fears from some analysts of the region. Kazakh commentator Adil Urmanov says that Kazakhstan’s rapid population growth and increasing urbanization may lead the country on the same demographic path that triggered the protests and revolutions of the Arab Spring. He argues that the combination of these two trends is creating a critical mass of unemployed or underemployed young people in Kazakhstan’s cities, just as it did across the Arab world a decade ago. Unless Astana addresses these challenges, Urmanov suggests, Kazakhstan could dissolve into chaos (Caravan.kz, October 30). Other Kazakh commentators have echoed his fears (Qmonitor, September 27), but up to now, this apocalyptic vision has not attracted much attention outside of Kazakhstan.
The ignorance of the outside world to the developing conditions in Kazakhstan could lead to serious destabilization. The other five demographic changes taking place in the country and the political responses of its people, government, and neighbors undergird this possibility. First among these is the declining population of ethnic Russians in the country. From a plurality in the mid-1980s to fewer than 16 percent now, this is the result of Russian flight and the vast differences in birthrates between the aging Russian population and the much younger, Muslim Kazakh community. That has led to a hollowing out of the northern portions of the country where ethnic Russians had traditionally dominated, as Astana has been unable to attract enough ethnic Kazakhs to fill this void (Central Asian Bureau for Analytical Reporting, April 13; see EDM, October 17; Voenno-Politicheskaya Analitika, November 4).
Second, the decline in the percentage of ethnic Russians has contributed to a new assertiveness among the Kazakhs. The political leadership is confident that it can become more independent of Moscow. Some in the population seem increasingly ready to attack the remaining ethnic Russians by means of notorious “language patrols” that shame residents into speaking only Kazakh or engage in witch hunts against supposed Russian secessionists (see EDM, December 2, 2021). This trend has been reinforced by a sharp decline in the number of ethnic Kazakhs living in Russia (QMonitor, February 2). The decline in the population of ethnic Russian has not lessened Kazakh fears that Moscow may try to seize the areas in the north previously dominated by Russians. Instead, such fears have grown in the wake of Vladimir Putin’s expanded invasion of Ukraine and are now shared by more than a third of Kazakhstan’s population, though officials in Astana dismiss the reality of such a threat (Demoscope, May 17; Novaya gazeta, July 13).
Third, as the share of ethnic Kazakhs in the population has grown, divisions within this group appear to have increased along regional or tribal lines. Kazakhstan is an enormous country, and some regions have numerous complaints about the central government. Regional leaders increasingly reflect the views of their respective populations rather than those of Astana (Qmonitor, August 25). At the same time, the historical tribal confederations of the past have unexpectedly become more significant. For hundreds of years, Kazakhs have been divided into three great tribal confederations known as zhus. Almost every ethnic Kazakh knows whether they are a member of the Older, Lesser, or Middle zhus. Major government jobs are often handed out on the basis of those identities. The previous divide in Kazakhstan between ethnic Russians and ethnic Kazakhs overshadowed these historical identities. Now, government officials and the population are increasingly hearkening back to their roots, something that some say is undermining the unity of the nation (Fond ctrategicheskoi kul’tury, March 13).
Fourth, the non-Russian, non-Kazakh populations have become increasingly important in domestic matters. These groups now number almost as many as the ethnic Russians and have become increasingly assertive and even violent, forcing outside observers to more seriously consider their influence (Window on Eurasia, February 11; see EDM, October 17). Many observers had hoped that the clashes among these groups several years ago would be a wake-up call for Astana, but that has not happened. Some now predict that more violent clashes are likely to occur in the future (Window on Eurasia, February 18, 2020; QMonitor, February 8).
Fifth, all these demographic developments have intensified a debate over whether Kazakhstan should seek to assimilate the remaining minorities or promote a multi-ethnic civil society. Most ethnic nationalists in Kazakhstan favor the former, while most of the political class backs the latter (QMonitor, July 24). President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has straddled this divide. In recent months, Tokayev said that he aims to ensure that everyone in Kazakhstan speaks Kazakh, something Russians generally oppose. He has also insisted that everyone should avoid identifying as a member of a particular ethnic group and instead embrace Kazakhstanets, a term designating a citizen of Kazakhstan. Kazakh leaders began to push this term in the 1970s. Russians, other ethnic groups, and many ethnic Kazakhs have not objected to its use (Telegram.me/Qazstat, April 30; BIZNES Online, April 30; Fergana, May 1).
Demography is only destiny over the long term. The culmination of these developments, however, suggest that changes in Kazakhstan’s population could become quite significant, particularly if they come together and are exploited by Russia or another outside power. If that happens, these developments could transform not only Kazakhstan but the wider geopolitics of Central Asia.
This article was published by The Jamestown Foundation
By Daniella Peled
(IWPR) — The Israel-Gaza conflict has seen a vast flow of disinformation spread via social and traditional media. Eliot Higgins, founder and creative director of pioneering OSINT collective Bellingcat, tells IWPR managing editor Daniella Peled how the “grotesque” online discourse was amplifying trauma and perpetuating a cycle of violence.
What are the particular challenges Bellingcat is facing working on the Israel-Gaza war?
After decades of conflict people already have their established opinions, and it’s made it very difficult to have any kind of online discourse that isn’t fueled by entrenched positions on either side. That, combined with Elon Musk’s alterations to Twitter, has created an environment that’s ripe for disinformation and the spread of misinformation
It’s honestly the worst I’ve ever seen in any situation I’ve experienced, by a significant factor. Not only do people have very strident views on what’s happening, they also want answers really, really quickly. This puts more pressure on those doing OSINT when in fact some incidents can take a very long time to investigate, even if it’s possible; sometimes it’s just impossible to be completely sure.
But people want clear, definitive answers, and when they don’t get them they seek out those who will provide them – generally based on political opinions rather than evidence.
The explosion at the al-Ahli hospital in Gaza has been one of the most highly contested events of the war. What has your work involved and what are the implications of the findings?
We’re currently reviewing all the OSINT evidence – videos, photographs, geo-locating – to do basic analysis to exclude certain scenarios.
For example, examining the crater at the impact site showed that was not something caused by a large bomb. So the initial claims that this was an airstrike don’t match the available evidence. That’s not to say Israel didn’t do it; that’s just to say that specific scenario can be excluded.
Usually when you have a crater of the type that we’re seeing, quite small with shrapnel emanating from it, it’s an indication of a surface-to-surface munition or maybe a quite small air launched munition – a rocket, missile or mortar. But what complicates things is usually you can get a direction of fire from these craters and can figure out where the fire is coming from. If it is a misfired rocket, we can’t assume the trajectory is stable or draw assumptions about the launch site. We also not seeing any munition debris being recovered from the site, which makes it very difficult to assign responsibility.
There were statements from various sources in Gaza, first that a warhead had been recovered from the site, which in itself is quite unusual because those usually explode in these circumstances, or that the entire munition completely disintegrated, which is very unlikely.
We’re trying to use the footage filmed on the night and the following day to see any signs of that debris. But for the moment we’ve not found anything.
Also, this munition landed close to a group of people camped out on a grassy area. They had a large amount of personal belongings that were cleared away the following day. It could be some of this was picked up, people thinking it was part of the building that had been blown up, mixed in with other stuff. But we don’t know because we didn’t see that process or have any evidence about what was happening on the ground.
We’ve seen reporting in The New York Times about a video claiming to show a Palestinian rocket launch, which they’ve identified as being launched from Israel itself. But it seems to have nothing to do with the attack on the hospital.
It’s a very complicated situation; I think ultimately it’s going to be very difficult to give 100 per cent certain answers on exactly what happened with that attack.
What work have you been doing on the October 7 kibbutz attacks?
The most basic thing we can do is verify where and when these videos were filmed. It’s key to examining the facts and trying to remove the politics and the emotion from the situation, even though that can be very hard to do in such distressing circumstances. There are always going to be voices who claim that this stuff is fake.
Sometimes Bellingcat’s work is building verified data and analysis that other organisations can then look at and build on with their own work. It’s improving the quality of information to give clarity to not just general audiences, but organisations using it for their own work.
I have to say the discourse I’ve been seeing online has been quite grotesque for a number of reasons. One was this picture presented by Israel of a burnt corpse of a child, and then a Twitter user ran it through a kind of AI detection website, and it came out as an AI generated picture. That was used to dismiss this and more broadly to dismiss all Israeli evidence, by people who didn’t want to believe it. But we tested this website and it has a very high error rate, so it’s not a valid technique to analyse this kind of imagery.
The way in which people use the blood of innocents like that to gain clicks, likes, followers and subscribers is really disgusting.
I’ve seen a lot of misattributed images from other conflicts, for example people using images from Syria to say, ‘this is what Israel is doing to Gaza’. I also find that disgusting, especially when it’s often done by people who denied Assad’s war crimes in Syria, and are now using those same war crimes to blame Israel for war crimes in Gaza? I find it absolutely appalling and offensive.
What kind of role might OSINT play in any future justice processes around this conflict?
We’ve developed a process over the last four years specifically intended to use OSINT in legal processes. It’s very intensive in terms of resources, so we’re focusing on Ukraine at the moment. There’s a project which I’m running for the last 18 months where we’re creating case files using open source evidence and analysis.
It would be possible to do that with this conflict, but where would that be used? With Ukraine, you’ve got international courts that can use this evidence. That is not so clear with the conflict between Israel and Hamas. But part of the reason we’re developing this process is to train organisations how to do this so that it can be used to move towards accountability. There’s been a lot of progress in the last two years in how you use OSINT evidence for legal accountability. While it’s not intended to replace traditional investigation, it can do a lot to complement those processes.
What is the psychological impact on those scrutinising this sort of content?
At Bellingcat we’ve got a really good awareness of this because we’ve been doing this work for a very long time. We understand the impact of vicarious trauma from seeing traumatic imagery.
As professional human rights researchers and journalists, there’s an understanding of that and the impact that has on you. But social media users who don’t really think about those risks are being traumatised.
I saw recent Tik Tok spats where someone posted a video on the situation and said at the end that people should take time off, log off, stop watching that kind of content, which is good advice.
But the response to that was quite angry. “How dare you tell us not to be a witness to what is happening?” That is a reflection of a trauma response from people who feel powerless and see witnessing as a way of taking power, saying, ‘I didn’t turn away’. But the way they’re handling that trauma can be very, very damaging in the long term. It creates people who have increasingly extreme points of view. It draws them into communities that just reinforce anger and that hatred.
Unfortunately, social media is very good at amplifying that effect. It’s really some of the worst that I’ve seen around any conflict. Everyone is expected to have an opinion on Israel and Palestine and take one side or the other in this very unproductive way, and that allows the cycle of violence to repeat, rather than trying to address the issues and deal with the real human cost.
By Giorgi Lomsadze
(Eurasianet) — After much suspense and speculation, Europe’s doors opened slightly wider for Georgia on November 8 when the European Union laid out its plan for making itself a bigger place in the future.
Georgia was recommended for membership candidate status – a move that many hope will help sharpen the nation’s blurred focus on EU integration and democracy-building.
“First of all, this is a truly remarkable day for Georgia,” said Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission on November 8, said as she fielded questions after presenting a broad outline for the bloc’s potential enlargement.
“This is a really huge step for Georgia, and it also emphasizes the impressive and very unequivocal position of the majority of the population of Georgia to become members of the EU,” said the head of the EU’s executive arm.
Although Georgia was a bit of a sideshow at the announcement where Ukraine was the primary focus, the Commission’s recommendation is indeed of huge consequence for a country where EU membership is seen as a solution to many economic, democratic and security woes.
EU member states are yet to sign off on the recommendation – that decision will come in December – but the mood is already celebratory in Georgia. “It’s a great honor for me to congratulate you all on this historic decision,” said Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili. “This is, of course, a historic day for Georgia.”
Georgia’s rivaling political figures and groups – the prime minister, president, the ruling party, the opposition and civil society – all claimed the credit for the accomplishment, indicating that this historic day is not going to fix the nation’s fierce domestic divisions, which Brussels in fact sees as an obstacle on Georgia’s path toward European integration.
For all the celebrations, Georgia still remains behind Ukraine and Moldova in the European waiting room. In its recommendation for enlargement, the European Commission proposed opening accession talks with the two fellow ex-Soviet nations, while Georgia was recommended for the membership status – a signpost Ukraine and Moldova passed last year.
Georgia was declined the status then, even though the three nations were previously bundled together as prospective members. The Georgian government’s decision to take a cautious stance toward Russia and even allow economic rapprochement with Moscow in the middle of Russia’s war on Ukraine were widely blamed for the flop.
In its recommendation, the European Commission noted that Georgia is at odds with the European Union’s common policy of economic isolation of Russia over Ukraine. The European Commission specifically said that Georgia needs to align itself with the trajectory of the EU’s external relations to make progress toward membership.
Apart from the issues with foreign policy, the ruling Georgian Dream party has also been engaged in Euroskeptic rhetoric, spreading conspiracy theories involving the EU and U.S. and earlier this year it tried to pass a highly controversial law which European diplomats said was incompatible with EU norms and practices. All of this spurred accusations of Georgian Dream deliberately sabotaging the country’s bid for EU membership and driving the nation into Moscow’s embrace.
The domestic situation in Georgia made the decision a difficult needle for the EU to thread: granting candidate status could be seen as rewarding Georgian Dream for its slide into illiberalism while denying it could demoralize Georgian society and perhaps sour it on the whole Euro-integration project.
EU member Hungary, which itself has been drifting away from democracy for a decade or so, might have been lobbying for Georgia’s bid within the union, according to RFE/RL’s Richard Jozwiak.
“Budapest may try to bargain, only approving Kyiv’s bid if other countries sign off on Georgia – which has developed strong ties with Hungary – getting candidate status,” Jozwiak wrote on November 6.
The Hungarian and Georgian governments have indeed buddied up to each other over their shared vision of Europe that foregrounds not liberalism and democracy but Christianity and “traditional values.”
In any case, today Georgian Dream felt vindicated, saying that it has worked hard to meet EU-set requirements to qualify for the candidate status. Georgian Dream detractors say that credit for the success belongs to the Georgian people, as large crowds came out into the streets of Tbilisi when Georgian society felt that its European future and democratic freedoms were under threat.
The European Commission today used diplomatic language, underscoring the role of the Georgian people, but also commending the Georgian government for recent progress toward meeting some of the democratization goals set by the EU. The remaining problematic areas include the rule of law, fair elections and independence of the judiciary.
EU ambassador to Georgia, Pawel Herczynski, emphasized that the candidate status comes with conditions. “Addressing these steps will be crucial to move to the next stage,” Herczynski said. “This is the nature of the enlargement process: constant reform so the country can be ready to take its place as a full member of the European Union.”
Some critics of the Georgian government are worried that Georgian Dream can still botch the progress toward membership if it decides that the EU-prescribed reforms – better elections and a more inclusive political process – amount to a threat to the party’s hold on power or if Moscow steps up pressure on Georgia. But, overall, optimism and celebratory mood is prevailing today, and worries are left for tomorrow.
Late in the evening, President Salome Zourabichvili hosted in front of her residence a large gathering attended by foreign diplomats and dignitaries. Congratulating the crowd, she said, “this is our response to Russia and to Russian occupation.”
Giorgi Lomsadze is a journalist based in Tbilisi, and author of Tamada Tales.