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South Caucasus News

Moscow Calls Yerevan’s Recent Overtures to Ukraine ‘Anti-Russian’


YEREVAN (Azatutyun.am)—Russia accused Armenia on Thursday of continuing to ruin Russian-Armenian relations when it reacted to a senior Armenian official’s participation in multilateral peace talks initiated by Ukraine.

The Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Maria Zakharova, also charged that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government is behind what she described as the “Russophobic” content of Armenian pro-government media.

Armen Grigoryan, the secretary of Armenia’s Security Council, was among representatives of more than 60 countries who gathered in Malta last week to discuss Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s plan to end the war with Russia. Grigorian also met with Zelenskiy’s chief of staff, Andriy Yermak, on the sidelines of the two-day meeting condemned by Russia as a “blatantly anti-Russian event.”

Zakharova said Moscow views Grigoryan’s trip to Malta as a “demonstrative anti-Russian gesture of official Yerevan.” She linked it to Pashinyan’s October 6 conversation with Zelenskiy, which took place during a European summit in Spain, and his wife Anna Hakobian’s September visit to Kyiv.

“In Yerevan, I think, they should be aware that this is a demonstrative flirtation with those who aggressively oppose our country,” Zakharova told a news briefing. “It is regrettable that the current leadership of the republic is purposefully and persistently destroying our allied relations, which not so long ago it itself called the most important factor in the stability and prosperity of Armenia.”

Tensions between the two longtime allies rose further following Azerbaijan’s September 19-20 military offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh that forced its ethnic Armenian population to flee to Armenia. Pashinyan accused Russian peacekeepers of failing to protect the Karabakh Armenians against the “ethnic cleansing.”

In an October 17 speech at the European Parliament, Pashinyan also alleged that Moscow is using the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to try to oust him from power. A Russian official responded by the telling the official TASS news agency that the Armenian premier is “following in Zelenskiy’s footsteps” and helping the West “turn Armenia into another Ukraine.”

The Armenian Foreign Ministry handed the Russian ambassador in Yerevan a protest note on October 24 one day after Russia’s leading state broadcaster, Channel One, derided and lambasted Pashinyan during an hour-long program. For its part, the Russian Foreign Ministry summoned the Armenian charge d’affaires the following day to condemn what it called anti-Russian propaganda spread by Armenian Public Television and other pro-government media outlets.

Zakharova claimed that what those outlets have been disseminating is “not just insults but undisguised Russophobia.”

“We do understand who is behind the funding of these [media] resources,” she said. “If they think over there that we don’t know who pays for it all, we know.”


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South Caucasus News

Authorities Foil Terror Plot in Armenia; 5 Suspects Arrested


Armenia’s National Security services have arrested five suspects in connection with an alleged terror plot aimed at overthrowing the government, a statement issued on Thursday said.

In its statement, the NSS said that a team was plotting “terrorism” activities that involved, among other acts, setting off explosives in government facilities.

The NSS found that this year, the five individuals, and several others whose identities have yet to be determined, plotted to detonate a bomb and “other acts that would endanger the public” in Armenia.

The group allegedly also planned to break into a government building and other institutions “in an attempt to disrupt the activities of Armenian authorities.”

The NSS said it thwarted the alleged plot with Thursday’s arrest of the five suspects.

During several search operations, investigators recovered firearms, ammunition, one remote explosive device, a rocket launcher device, a drone with two gas cylinders that were fitted with attachments, two sharp weapons, a container full of ammunition, bulletproof vests, military uniforms, targeting devices, handcuffs, communication devices, video surveillance equipment, computers, mobile phones, computers, mobile phones, unused phone cards, solar batteries, notebooks and documents detailing the plans to carryout the alleged plot.

The NSS revealed that the alleged culprits had code named the operation, “Northern Leaf Drop.” As part of the plot, investigators said, Telegram social media channels were to be established in Ukraine and Moldova under the screen name of “National Salvation Front,” with the aim of engaging followers a day before the alleged operation.

The NSS said that the suspects also had made plans to relocate their families to Georgia.

Investigators also said that the suspects had drawn meticulous plans of the building they allegedly were to occupy, with arrows and symbols pinpointing various aspects to the building, as well as a timeline of the operation. The plot also included the engagement of others through leafleting and other means of outreach.

The NSS said the investigation is ongoing.


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This Week in ACC Volleyball – The ACC


This Week in ACC Volleyball  The ACC

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Georgia Tech #ProJackets Football Report – Football — Georgia … – Georgia Tech


Georgia Tech #ProJackets Football Report – Football — Georgia …  Georgia Tech

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South Caucasus News

Authorities Foil Terror Plot in Armenia; 5 Suspects Arrested – Asbarez.com – Asbarez Armenian News


Authorities Foil Terror Plot in Armenia; 5 Suspects Arrested – Asbarez.com  Asbarez Armenian News

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How Will Azerbaijan’s Zangezur ‘Corridor’ Through Armenia Reshape the Region? – Foreign Policy


How Will Azerbaijan’s Zangezur ‘Corridor’ Through Armenia Reshape the Region?  Foreign Policy

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Why Supporting The People Of Iran Is Key To Achieving Peace In The Middle East – OpEd


Why Supporting The People Of Iran Is Key To Achieving Peace In The Middle East – OpEd

The criminal clerical regime ruling Iran is pleased with ongoing war in the Middle East and the killing of innocent civilians. The mullahs see this humanitarian disaster as a barrier against the uprising of the Iranian people and as a means of ensuring their own survival. On the other hand, this regime seeks to overshadow the internal crises of its bankrupt regime, the explosive conditions of society, and the protests of the people.

In contrast, the resistance in Iran strives to draw attention to Iranian regime’s role in spreading war and mayhem in the region and its precarious position in the face of the Iranian people, who are poised to overthrow the regime.

In this regard, on Friday, October 26, a session convened in the U.S. Senate titled “Iran Policy – Confronting the Threats Posed by the Regime during the People’s Uprising for Freedom.” The objective and message of this session focused on addressing the root causes of war and crises in the Middle East, namely the clerical regime.

The speakers clearly expressed the regime’s objective of warmongering in the region. They also emphasized the fact that supporting the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) and the Iranian Resistance is the only viable solution and proper response to the conditions created by the clerical dictatorship.

Senator Robert Menendez stated in his remarks, “Iran’s regime is nothing more than a brutal autocracy led by ayatollahs who are willing to kidnap, torture, and even murder innocent civilians in order to keep a stranglehold on their power.

“The regime in Tehran is an existential threat to safety and security in the region, then the second fundamental truth is that the nation of Iran is yearning and rising for freedom.

“The all-inclusive, secular, democratic rule of law Iran that Madam Rajavi speaks of is what we all should be aspiring for and trying to make happen.”

Senator Jeanne Shaheen said, “The threat from Tehran has never been clearer or the stakes higher.

“Tehran is not interested in peace. The regime in Iran is only interested in self-preservation, which is why it seeks to oppress its own people and sow discord abroad. These regimes distract from the crimes committed against their own people by instigating terrorism and war elsewhere. Like Iranians fighting against the brutality and oppression of the regime in Tehran, the people of Ukraine are fighting for their very existence. And there is a connection here, and I think we’ve got to call this out.”

Ambassador Sam Brownback said, “The current regime in Tehran is a terrorist-backing, terrorist-loving government, and that is not who the Iranian people are…we must back those forces inside Iran who want a new, democratically elected government.

“My message is really for the U.S. government. Our only path forward to peace in the Middle East is regime change in Tehran, done by the people of Iran with the full backing of the West.”

General Wesley Clark, former presidential candidate (2004) and former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO in Europe (2000), said, “The current regime in Tehran is a terrorist-backing, terrorist-loving government, and that is not who the Iranian people are.

“My message is really for the U.S. government. Our only path forward to peace in the Middle East is regime change in Tehran, done by the people of Iran with the full backing of the West. The choice is that stark. The winning side is freedom, and we must back those willing to fight for it.”

Linda Chavez, former White House Director of Public Relations, said, “There are people who are fighting that in Iran. I think it’s important to understand that until we are able to get broader acceptance and acknowledgment of the kind of things … that Madam Rajavi is doing, that the NCRI is doing around the world to try to get support for the people of Iran so that they, too, can rise up.

“We should be giving support to those people who are taking to the streets in Iran.”

Mrs. Maryam Rajavi, the president-elect of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), who connected to the meeting online, drew attention to the Iranian regime’s role in igniting chaos across the Middle East, stating, “The message is to focus on the root cause of the war and crisis in the Middle East, which is the Iranian regime. The message is DO NOT overlook the primary source of warmongering in the region!

“The mullahs need to provoke wars in the region to prevent their overthrow. Khamenei has repeatedly said that if we do not fight in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza, we must fight in the cities of Iran.

“Every concession given to the regime will fuel more wars.

“Another conclusion is that no solution in the Middle East will succeed unless the head of the snake in Tehran is targeted. This can be only done by siding with the struggle of the Iranian people and their organized Resistance to overthrow the regime.”

This article was published by PMOI/MEK


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Iran Proxies Test US Limits – OpEd


Iran Proxies Test US Limits – OpEd

By Dave Patterson

Even media outlets considered measured in their reporting on the Biden administration cannot account for its weak response to Iranian proxy militias attacking US military bases in the Middle East. When Hamas terrorists invaded Israel in a murderous rampage, President Biden talked tough and sent two carrier strike groups to the eastern Mediterranean. In defiant response, Iran-sponsored militants executed drone and rocket strikes on US outposts in Iraq and Syria.

Iran Proxies Attack US Bases

The United States has exercised restraint in its retaliation against Iran-backed militias in Iraq and Syria, which pummeled US bases nearly 20 times with drones and rockets in the aftermath of the Oct. 7 Hamas massacre. In response, “US F-15 and F-16 jets dropped guided bombs on nine ammunition and storage bunkers in Deir al-Zour in the early hours of Wednesday [Oct. 25], military officials said,” David Gritten reported for BBC News. “The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that the jets targeted warehouses in Ayyash, about 10km (6 miles) north of Deir al-Zour city, and a camp belonging to the Fatemiyoun Brigade, a militia made up largely of Shia Muslim Afghan fighters.”

Iran-backed militants carried out three more drone attacks on US outposts after the bombings, indicating Iran and its proxies were not intimidated by the show of force. In an assessment of the Biden administration’s approach to deterring Iran from sponsoring assaults on US personnel and facilities, The Wall Street Journal explained:

“The Pentagon says the US hit two facilities in eastern Syria that are used by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). But pinprick bombing of weapons and ammo lockers aren’t proportionate to the enemy attacks. Iran’s proxies have lobbed rockets or drones at US positions at least 19 times since Oct. 17 … The restrained US response is intended as a warning, and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin implied more could follow if the militias keep it up.”

Well, Iran’s puppet militias did “keep it up.” Austin claimed that the “narrowly tailored strikes in self-defense were intended solely to protect and defend US personnel in Iraq and Syria. They are separate and distinct from the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas, and do not constitute a shift in our approach to the Israel-Hamas conflict.” The increase in the number of attacks by Iranian-backed proxies speaks loudly that Austin is wrong. Nor is there anything “separate and distinct” about these raids and the Israel-Hamas war.

US Sends Mixed Signals

No doubt our allies and friends are confused by the mixed signals sent by a Defense Department official in a briefing to the Pentagon press corps:

“Our strikes were carefully targeted to defend and protect US forces from the ongoing threats posed by Iran-backed militia groups. These groups, with ties to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, have been responsible for the attacks on US installations and personnel. But let’s be clear: Iran is responsible.”

So why isn’t the United States holding Iran accountable? In a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing in March, Sen. Tom Cotton (R-AR) addressed Austin: “Iran has launched 83 attacks against Americans since Joe Biden took office. We’ve responded with strikes only four times. What kind of message does this send when we wait to respond until an American is killed.”

Adding the airborne hits by Iran-supported terrorist militias up until March to those of Oct. 16-27 equals 102 attacks on US military facilities. The United States has responded five times. So far the US carrier strike groups in the eastern Mediterranean are a static display of power. Until Iran directly feels the weight of US military might, Tehran will continue to use proxies to attack Americans.

The views expressed are those of the author and not of any other affiliation.

About the author: National Security Correspondent at LibertyNation.Com. Dave is a retired U.S. Air Force Pilot with over 180 combat missions in Vietnam. He is the former Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller and has served in executive positions in the private sector aerospace and defense industry. In addition to Liberty Nation, Dave’s articles have appeared in The Federalist and DefenseOne.com.

Source: This article was published by Liberty Nation


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Malaysia: How Far Will PAS Deviate From The Ulama Leadership Model, And Why Does It Matter? – Analysis


Malaysia: How Far Will PAS Deviate From The Ulama Leadership Model, And Why Does It Matter? – Analysis

By Azmil Tayeb

Ever since the Ulama (religious scholars) leadership took control of the party in the 1980s, the Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party (PAS) has always chosen an Ulama to be Chief Minister in states it has won. When PAS regained Kelantan in 1990, its candidate for the Chief Minister post was the late Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat, an Ulama trained in Egypt and Pakistan.

Nine years later, when PAS wrested the Terengganu state government from Barisan Nasional (BN), its choice for Chief Minister was Hadi Awang, a Middle East-trained Ulama and the current president of PAS. Two Chief Ministers that succeeded Nik Aziz – Ahmad Yakob and Muhammad Nussuruddin Daud – also had Islamic studies background. In 2008, riding high on the reformist wave of the then-Pakatan Rakyat coalition, PAS managed to capture the state government of Kedah and subsequently appointed the late Azizan Abdul Razak, an Ulama with educational training in the Middle East and the UK, as Chief Minister. While PAS’s leadership may reflect a broad cross-section of society, the Ulama still remain at the heart of the party.

The practice of appointing Ulama as Chief Minister changed in 2018 when PAS won the Terengganu state government. The party’s choice for the post was Ahmad Samsuri Mokhtar, an aerospace engineer and a university lecturer with a PhD from the University of Leeds. The appointment was unprecedented since Hadi Awang, the former Chief Minister, still loomed large in the picture. But then it was not much of a surprise as Samsuri was then political secretary to Hadi Awang, which meant his elevation to the Chief Minister post had the full blessing of his former boss. What made the appointment of Samsuri intriguing is that it took place in the wake of the purging of the professional (Erdogan) faction in the party in 2015, which later splintered off and formed a new Islamic party, Amanah. In the aftermath, the Ulama leadership consolidated its hold over the party, leading one to think that there was no room for pragmatists and professionals in PAS. The selection of Samsuri as the Chief Minister of Terengganu proved that to not necessarily be the case.

The ascendancy of Muhammad Sanusi Md Nor in Kedah, and in national politics for that matter, continues to signal a shift from the Ulama leadership. Sanusi took over the Chief Minister post in May 2020 after the state fell to Perikatan Nasional when several PH state assemblypersons switched their allegiance and triggered the change of government. Sanusi happened to be the opposition leader in the state assembly at the time, which made him the new Chief Minister by default. Known for his populist everyday man appeal and shoot-from-the-hip public statements, Sanusi was neither an Ulama nor a professional.[1] A Social Science graduate from the Universiti Sains Malaysia in Penang, his CV seems to straddle both private business and public service. Not even a year into his tenure, there was already talk of replacing him with Takiyuddin Hassan, PAS’s secretary general, due to uneasiness over his abrasive, confrontational style.[2] Sanusi soon proved to be politically cunning and not easy to dislodge from the post of Chief Minister. And so, his appointment as the Chief Minister following PN’s stellar performance in the recent state elections was a foregone conclusion, a testament to his popularity, not just in Kedah but also in the rest of Malaysia.   

At the moment, there are two types of non-Ulama leaders on display: the professional Samsuri-led state government in Terengganu and the populist Sanusi-led state government in Kedah. PAS seems to have realised that for it to stay relevant, it needs to revamp its image, particularly to appeal to newly enfranchised young Malays and affluent urban Malays. It has to move away from the pejorative label “parti lebai” and try a new strategy to market itself.[3] Hence in recent state elections, PAS promised that states under its control would be governed by both professionals and Ulama, particularly Kelantan, where the economic development has been lagging behind Terengganu and Kedah.[4]

CHOOSING LEADERS WITHIN PAS

As an ideologically-driven party, all candidates for political positions at the state and federal levels have to be vetted and approved by the party’s main authority, Majlis Syura Ulama (Council of Ulama Leadership). Majlis Syura Ulama was established in the early 1980s for the Ulama leadership to cement its takeover of the party from the Malay nationalists. It consists of no more than 17 Ulama drawn from various components of the party: four from the Central Working Committee, four from the Dewan Ulama PAS Pusat (Central PAS Ulama Assembly), two from the youth wing, two from the women’s wing, and five from the Majlis Syura Ulama itself. The head of the Majlis Syura Ulama is called “mursyidul am” (spiritual leader) and is the highest authority in the party, alongside the party president who oversees day-to-day governing affairs.

The selection process begins when the party at the state level submits to the Majlis Syura Ulama its slate of candidates for elections and leadership posts such as the Chief Minister and state Exco members.[5] This is to ensure that candidates not only pass the requisite financial and background checks but are also closely vetted for their unwavering ideological commitment. Since the 2015 mass purge of the “Erdogan faction,” PAS has hardened ideologically, with the remaining conservative faction pulling the party further to the right. There was no more room in PAS for ideological differences. By the 2018 general elections, they had completely consolidated their control over the party, and this paid off handsomely. Contesting as a third force, PAS performed beyond expectations by winning 18 seats, creating its own “green wave” in Kedah, Kelantan, and Terengganu.[6] One key takeaway from PAS’s achievement in the 2018 general election is that the party knows it can be both religiously dogmatic and electorally viable. There is no need for it to compromise its ideology to be politically relevant, the way it did when it was part of Barisan Alternatif and Pakatan Rakyat. PAS’s electoral performance has only gone from strength to strength since 2018. As part of the PN coalition, PAS won 49 seats in the 2022 general elections, making it the party with most seats among all parties in the parliament. An estimated 54 percent of Malays voted for PN, proving the saliency of its hardline political stance to champion the special position of Malays and Islam.[7]    

THE LEADERSHIP IN PN-GOVERNED STATES

At the same time, PAS also realises that it needs rejuvenation. The danger of being in power for a long time, as is the case of the PAS state government in Kelantan where the party has governed continuously for 33 years, is that it breeds complacency and voter fatigue. This is particularly so in Kelantan which has not been able to generate much economic development and employment. There is actual worry that by being Ulama-centric alone would not to sustain the party into the future. Instead, PAS needs to put forward fresh candidates with non-religious backgrounds, namely professionals, an exercise one PAS activist terms fiqh taghyir (interpreting the shariah precepts in the context of change).[8] In Kelantan, 23 out of 45 PN candidates who contested in the state election were new, of which eight came from a professional background, unprecedented in the land known as Serambi Mekah (Verandah of Mecca).[9]

PN was downright dominant in its strongholds in the recent state elections. It won 33 out of 36 seats in Kedah, 43 out of 45 seats in Kelantan, and 32 out of 32 seats in Terengganu. The sweeping results meant that these are effectively one-party states and PN can appoint any state leadership lineup it chooses without having to compromise with others. It is also an opportunity for PN to walk its election campaign talk of wanting to inject more professionalism in the states that it governs. The current composition of state exco in these three states is a good indicator of whether PN is ready to veer away from Ulama leadership and embrace more professionals into its leadership ranks.

Figure 1: Composition of state exco in PN-governed states[10]

From Figure 1 above, we can observe that Ulama plays an outsize role in the stewardship of Kelantan and Terengganu, where they make up nearly half of the present state exco lineup. Despite its campaign rhetoric, PAS is still not ready to part with Ulama leadership in these two states. The populations of Kelantan and Terengganu are homogenously Malays (more than 95 percent), predominantly rural, and hold deeply conservative Islamic values. These factors might explain why the Ulama wield substantive socio-political cachet and feature prominently in the state leadership, notwithstanding the presence of professionals within its ranks including the Chief Minister post. However, in Kedah, both Ulama and professionals are not a big part of the state exco lineup, which is dominated by technocrats and businesspersons. Unlike Kelantan and Terengganu, Kedah’s population is slightly more diverse, with Malays comprising 76 percent of the overall state population. Kedah also has the comparative edge of being close to Penang, a wealthy state with a strong industrial base that provides employment for many Kedah residents and spillover economic development, namely the Kulim Hitech Park abutting the Penang-Kedah border. As such, business acumen and policy-making experience seem to be the state exco’s prerequisites in Kedah and might explain why the composition of state exco in Kedah varies from the ones in Kelantan and Terengganu.

Perlis is unchartered territory for PAS as it had long been the unbreachable bastion of UMNO in the north. PAS never had political success in Perlis until the 2022 general elections. The defection of UMNO Perlis’s warlord Shahidan Kassim to PN and the overwhelming vote transfer from UMNO to PN finally allowed PAS to capture Perlis for the first time. While its seven-member state Exco is dominated by PAS (five members) with Bersatu making up the rest, Exco members with professional and business backgrounds comprise the majority of the state leadership. This is possibly due to the need to sustain the support of UMNO members who voted for PN; UMNO’s legacy still looms large in the state.

CHARTING A NEW LEADERSHIP PATH?

It is clear that while PAS acknowledges the urgency to reshape the party’s image when it comes to aptitude and relevance in confronting modern challenges, the efforts should not be undertaken at the expense of sidelining the Ulama leadership’s authority and diluting the party’s core ideology. The current state government in Terengganu showcases the governing equilibrium between maintaining Ulama’s imprimatur and incorporating professionalism. Kelantan, meanwhile, despite the pre-state election promise to recruit more professionals, has failed to seize the opportunity, and the Ulama continue to play a prominent role in the state leadership. It is in Kedah that we can see a discernible divergence from the traditional Ulama leadership.

The Sanusi-led state government in Kedah raises two questions about the shift in leadership practice within PAS: First, will we be seeing more non-Ulama leaders promoted within PAS and entrusted with important positions such as helming the state government, and second, What type of government can we expect from these non-Ulama leaders?[11]

As with any conservative political party, change happens at a glacial pace with PAS. It knows that it must adapt to the demands of present-day politics, namely the ambition to expand beyond its northern and northeastern bastions, and its need to do so without significantly diluting its ideology. In the 2022 general elections and the 2023 state elections, PAS, by way of PN, managed to carve inroads into urban and semi-urban areas in Selangor and Penang. Urban and semi-urban supporters of PAS expect their elected representatives to not only have a solid religious foundation but also a firm grasp on policy-making processes and bread-and-butter issues faced by the public. It is no longer enough for a PAS leader to simply say Islam is the solution but not ground it in concrete, empirically-informed policies. It is the reason why we will see more professionals and technocrats rise through party ranks. The pre-state election Debat Ekonomi (Debate on Economy) between Rafizi Ramli, the current Minister of Economy and Mohd Syahir Che Sulaiman, the PAS MP for Bachok in Kelantan, is an example of PAS’s effort to project a professional image to society at-large.[12] The debate was broadcasted live nationwide and provided a rare platform for PAS to show the general public that the party is capable of offering more than just religious homilies to modern-day economic challenges.[13]    

It then begs the question what type of government we can expect when it is led by non-Ulama leaders? The current state governments in Kedah and Terengganu offer more than mere glimpses of what the non-Ulama leadership brings to the table. On one hand, it is economically pragmatic since both states have a much stronger and vibrant economic base than Kelantan. Professionals and technocrats, due to their background and experience, are better suited to deal with investors and businesses in their respective states. PAS’s Islamist ideology does not subscribe to any particular economic orthodoxy, which allows these non-Ulama leaders to pursue their own economic prerogatives without running afoul of the party.[14] On the other hand, the non-Ulama leaders are no different than the Ulama leaders when it comes to enacting PAS’s hardline stance on morality issues. Kedah under Sanusi’s administration has moved to ban all gaming and lottery outlets in the state while the professional-led government of Terengganu has introduced amendments to the state’s shariah laws that criminalise out-of-wedlock pregnancy, women who dress like men (pengkid), preparation to commit sodomy, black magic and sorcery, among others.[15] Terengganu state government has also recently barred Muslim girls from gymnastics because of the sport’s tight-fitting clothes.[16] Simply put, economic pragmatism does not equate religious moderation.

Hadi Awang, the current president of PAS, who is in the twilight of his leadership in the party, can rest assured that PAS will remain faithful to its hardline ideological course long after he is gone. Besides the two aforementioned leaders who used to be his protégés – Ahmad Samsuri Mokhtar and Mohd Syahir Che Sulaiman – Hadi Awang’s son, Muhammad Khalil Abdul Hadi, and his son-in-law, Zaharuddin Muhammad, 46 and 47 years old respectively, are also prominent party leaders. Muhammad Khalil is the state assemblyperson for Batu Buruk in Terengganu and the state Exco member for communication, Islamic propagation (dakwah), and strengthening of syariah. He recently completed his PhD at the Universiti Sultan Zainal Abidin (UniSZA) in Terengganu with the thesis title “Hak berpolitik orang bukan Islam di Malaysia menurut Siyasah Syar’iyyah” (Non-Muslims political rights in Malaysia according to syariah politics).[17] Zaharuddin Muhammad is a Middle East-trained ustaz (religious teacher) who used to be a member of Majlis Syura Ulama PAS and the Deputy Director of PAS’s Research Centre. Since the passing of the former mursyidul am, Nik Aziz Nik Mat, in 2015, Hadi Awang has molded the party to his dogmatic ethnoreligious worldview and with his people now forming the next line of leadership, there is no reason to see PAS moderating its ideological stance any time soon.[18]

Common ideological commitment remains the holding centre, as the Ulama share the mantle of party leadership with professionals and technocrats. PAS leaders and members, regardless of backgrounds, are well drilled in the party’s core ideology, which is the struggle to Islamise the state and society in Malaysia.[19] Many have joined PAS during their formative years, wended through its educational network, campus organisations, study circles (usrah) and various party indoctrination activities, and have fully internalised PAS’s values. When it comes to ideological commitment, there is no qualitative difference between Ulama and non-Ulama leaders. No one in the party doubt the devotion of non-Ulama leaders such as Samsuri and Sanusi to the cause, who can don their Western garb – in the case of Sanusi, even go shirtless in public – not having to pepper their speech with references from the Quran and hadith, and still be taken seriously as leaders of an Islamic party. It is this type of leaders, a composite of non-Ulama background and party dogma, that we will be seeing more from PAS in the near future.

APPENDIX: List of PAS’s Chief Ministers and Their Background

About the author: Azmil Tayeb is Visiting Senior Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He is also Associate Professor at the School of Social Sciences, Universiti Sains Malaysia.

Source: This article was published by ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute

ENDNOTES

For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.


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Too Much, Too Fast? Somalia Joins East African Community – Analysis


Too Much, Too Fast? Somalia Joins East African Community – Analysis

By Halkano Wario and Rahel Hassen

Somalia is poised to become the East African Community’s (EAC) eighth member state at the economic bloc’s December summit. This follows negotiations in August between the EAC and Somalia, hosted by the Kenyan government.

With the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) joining in March last year, both memberships represent the EAC’s expansion across East Africa and the Great Lakes Region. The EAC also envisages Ethiopia and Djibouti becoming members. This potential growth could increase the bloc’s population to over 800 million – an immense boost to the EAC’s internal market.

Expansion would also increase the EAC’s competitiveness regarding foreign direct investments by offering an attractive trade area. Once Somalia’s security and governance challenges are addressed, the country’s inclusion could add immense economic benefits to the region.

Somalia’s inclusion brings over 3,000 km of coastline – the longest in Africa – into the EAC

Due to the EAC Customs Union, Somalia’s accession to the bloc will be economically beneficial for the country and its immediate neighbours. Gains include a reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers, and integration into future infrastructure projects that boost trade and reduce transport costs by linking EAC partner states. Somalia’s inclusion will also bring over 3 000 km of coastline – the longest in Africa – into the bloc, giving access to the Arabian Peninsula and boosting trade. 

Entrepreneurs in Somalia will have greater opportunities for investment, easing some of the social and economic pressures that have come with its isolation. Since the collapse of the Mohamed Siad Barre regime in 1991, cross-border trade with neighbouring countries has decreased due to insecurity caused initially by civil war and later by al-Shabaab’s terrorist attacks.

Although there are many benefits to joining the EAC, the depth of Somalia’s security problems raises critical questions about the bloc’s readiness and capacity to ensure peace, security and regional stability. Article 3 of the EAC Treaty stipulates thecriteria for admitting new countries. They must adhere to principles of good governance, democracy, the rule of law, human rights and social justice. 

Somalia scores low on these requirements due to decades of civil war and violent extremism. Accusations of corruption, and low levels of human rights and justice due to the breakdown of government institutions and the inability to conduct national elections, complicate its democratic credentials. 

But all is not lost. The past few years have seen promising developments around establishing a functional administration and renewing the fight against terrorism. Although not defeated, al-Shabaab is retreating from some of its key territories.

The EAC’s proactive approach could help solve Somalia’s precarious security situation

EAC citizens are exempt from visa requirements and travel freely within the region. The prospect of Somalia-based insurgents moving into member countries, an unregulated influx of economic migrants, and smuggling of contraband and arms could make some EAC states jittery about allowing Somalia into the fold.

The recent launch of national identity cards in Somalia is timeous. The card could help facilitate free and fair elections in the country and potentially allow unfettered movement of citizens in the bloc. Identity cards could also help control economic crimes, money laundering and terror financing, and increase tax revenue collection. 

Dr Hassan Khannenje, a Horn of Africa expert, told ISS Today that: ‘Somalia will be one of the least prepared countries [and] may not meet its obligations to the community when some member states are free-riding, especially when it comes to financial commitments.’ South Sudan and Burundi are yet to disburse US$27.4 million and US$7.44 million respectively, as their annual contributions that were due by the end of 2022. 

Without reconciliation talks between Somalia and Somaliland and the resolution of the simmering Las Anod border conflict, Khannenje foresees a diplomatic impasse because some EAC members have a diplomatic presence in both capitals, Hargeisa and Mogadishu.

The EAC must adopt measures that ensure East Africa optimises the benefits of Somalia’s entry

Another question is whether the EAC can help manage Somalia’s security challenges and maintain regional stability. With the planned withdrawal of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and a reinvigorated counter-insurgency by the Somali National Army and clan militia, talks are gaining traction on the post-ATMIS security infrastructure. 

The EAC’s approach and capacity on security issues was seen with its deployment of regional forces to the DRC just a few months after the Great Lakes country joined the bloc. The critical question is, would Somalia expect similar support? Some EAC partner states are ATMIS troop contributing countries, so such an arrangement would require careful negotiations given the increased threat al-Shabaab poses to Somalia joining the bloc.

The EAC’s proactive approach could help solve Somalia’s precarious security situation. On the political front, the bloc’s intervention through appointed dignitaries could enable Somalia’s Federal Government to engage in dialogue, popularise its offers for amnesty for al-Shabaab fighters, and enable grass-roots dialogue in conflict-affected communities.

It is crucial for the EAC to adopt measures that ensure East Africa optimises the benefits of Somalia’s entry. Potential problems must be addressed with foresight once the December EAC summit approves the newest member’s entry.

About the authors: Halkano Wario, Regional Organised Crime Observatory Coordinator – East Africa, ENACT and Rahel Hassen, Project Manager and Senior Researcher, East Africa, ISS Nairobi

Source: This article was published by ISS Today