Day: October 22, 2023
By Sauradeep Bag
Cryptocurrency’s role in the ever-evolving arena of geopolitics is a narrative imbued with intricate complexities. Especially given the state of flux and turmoil in the current world order, this narrative often evokes concern and not optimism. The Russia-Ukraine conflict brought focus on the intricate relationship between cryptocurrency and global affairs, a connection far from straightforward.
A similar trend is now emerging in the Israel-Palestine conflict. The ongoing and intensifying Israel-Palestinian conflict poses vital questions: What are the financial mechanisms behind such contentious actions? And how deeply are cryptocurrencies involved in such an intricate puzzle?
Digital coins on the battlefield
The war in Ukraine saw cryptocurrency playing a central role. Over US$ 212 million in crypto donations have flowed into pro-Ukrainian efforts, including US $80 million directly to the Ukrainian government. These funds have supported various war-related needs, from protective gear to medical supplies, thanks to the rapid and decentralised nature of cryptocurrencies.
Similarly, unravelling the funding sources behind recent attacks by Hamas in Gaza has brought the role of cryptocurrency into the spotlight. Investigations have shed light on the substantial inflow of cryptocurrencies to groups active in the Israel-Palestinian conflict, including Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah. These revelations have raised questions about the extent to which cryptocurrency is aiding these groups in their operations.
An extensive analysis unveiled that the Palestinian Islamic Jihad received an astounding US$ 93 million in cryptocurrency between August 2021 and June of this year. Meanwhile, Hamas managed to secure US$ 41 million in cryptocurrency funding between August 2021 and June 2023.
In January 2019, Hamas, through its military arm, the Al-Qassam Brigades (AQB), began using cryptocurrency for fundraising. They launched a social media campaign to support their militant activities. Initially, Bitcoin donations were modest, totalling only a few thousand dollars over a few months. They shared Bitcoin-related infographics and a donation address on social media, rapidly receiving about US$ 900 within a day, although the source of these funds remained unverified. Most donations were small, with a few larger contributions. They posted an additional Bitcoin address, accumulating over US$ 2,500 worth of Bitcoin in less than a week.
The move towards crypto assets may have been driven by the group’s search for alternative fundraising avenues, particularly in response to previous counter-terrorism financing measures targeting their use of traditional banking and money remittance sectors. Hamas heavily relied on social media for outreach, particularly after their television station almost ceased broadcasts in December 2018 following Israeli Defense Forces airstrikes and financial crises. The cost-effectiveness of using social media for Bitcoin crowdfunding was a significant advantage.
In the summer of 2021, amid escalating conflict with Israel, AQB witnessed a significant surge in crypto donations, accumulating more than US$ 73,000 in Bitcoin donations in a matter of days. By July 2021, AQB’s wallets held over US$ 7.7 million worth of crypto assets, including Bitcoin, the Tether stablecoin, and other cryptocurrencies like Ether, Tron, and Dogecoin.
However, Israel identified 84 crypto wallets controlled by AQB, leading to orders for the seizure of the funds held within them. Subsequently, in April 2023, Hamas announced its decision to halt crypto donations, recognising the vulnerability of using cryptocurrencies to fund their activities, as the transparency of the blockchain allowed for tracking illicit funds, facilitating the successful freezing of assets held by terrorist groups.
Around the same time, crypto transactions received by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), another US-designated terrorist organisation in the region, also dwindled. This suggested that groups involved in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict had abandoned cryptocurrency as a fundraising tool, realising the risk associated with its use.
The AQB also saw millions of dollars in cryptocurrency transfers, including Bitcoin, the stablecoin tether, and even Dogecoin. Despite the economic isolation experienced by Gaza under Hamas rule, funding for these groups has come from multiple sources, including private donors in the Gulf region, with Iran being one of the prominent financial backers, providing an estimated US$ 100 million annually. Qatar and Türkiyé have also supported Hamas financially, further illustrating the multifaceted nature of these groups’ funding mechanisms.
The adoption of cryptocurrency by such organisations adds a layer of complexity to the challenge of terrorism financing, necessitating ongoing efforts to address this evolving landscape. More often than not, such transactions have a confusingly circuitous route.
Following the money trail to India
Intriguingly, an Indian crypto heist in 2022 unravelled a startling connection to Hamas. In its initial stages, the case revolved around the questionable transfer of cryptocurrencies—Bitcoins, Ethereum, and Bitcoin Cash—valued at approximately INR 30 lakhs, all originating from a cryptocurrency wallet in India.
As investigators ventured down the cryptocurrency rabbit hole, unexpected revelations unfolded. The trail led to wallets linked with the AQB. Intriguingly, some of these wallets had previously fallen under the scrutiny of Israel’s National Bureau for Counter-Terror Financing, leaving no stone unturned.
In a swift response, Israel acted decisively, freezing the cryptocurrency accounts tied to Hamas and channelling the funds toward the state treasury. Notably, while cryptocurrencies had been a favoured fundraising channel for Hamas, the group, under increasing scrutiny, recently decided to halt accepting Bitcoin donations.
Double-edged sword
The intersection of cryptocurrencies and global conflicts has illuminated the dual nature of this innovative financial landscape. On one hand, the Ukraine conflict showcased the remarkable agility of crypto in enabling rapid emergency fundraisingand promoting the potential of decentralised finance, non-fungible tokens, and decentralised autonomous organisations. However, this bright side is marred by the shadows cast by pro-Russian entities accepting crypto for potentially heinous purposes.
The Israel-Palestine conflict is multifaceted, with deep-seated issues related to nationality, politics, territory, culture, and religion. As the world confronts these intricacies, the ongoing tug-of-war between security and innovation continues to advance.
About the author: Sauradeep Bag is an Associate Fellow at Observer Research Foundation
Source: The article was published by Observer Research Foundation
By Andrews Atta-Asamoah
The toppling of King Farouk in 1952 by the Egyptian army marked the beginning of military intervention to gain political power in Africa. Since then, there have been 100 successful coups in 35 countries. So, while the recent increase in coups is worrying, the phenomenon isn’t new.
Coups in Africa have not happened consistently over time, with surges connected to the state of governance in individual states. The triggers, actors and consequences vary from one overthrow to the next, and each surge has resulted in a tightening of regional and continental responses. These actions have often contained the threat until another wave builds.
As Africa reels from its third surge, intergovernmental bodies like the African Union (AU) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) rely on responses developed after previous waves. But how have coups evolved since 1952, and do policies need to evolve to prevent them?
There have been three major waves of coups in post-independence Africa. The first, between the 1960s and 1970s, saw the overthrow of liberation leaders whose political visions conflicted with the interests of major colonial powers. This was compounded by leaders’ failure to meet the aspirations of citizens. Given the Cold War superpower rivalry and the emergence of one-party states and dictatorships, a cocktail of issues inspired senior military officers to lead coups.
There is an undercurrent of tensions originating from the politicisation of the army and nepotism in its ranks
The takeovers were generally bloody and led to the death of 12 African leaders, extra-judicial killings and widespread human rights abuses, particularly in West Africa. Some coups were praised for truncating one-party statism and life-long presidencies. The first wave resulted in the earliest reordering of Africa’s post-independence political landscape.
The second wave from 1990 to 2001 followed the failure of 1980s African leaders, mostly military, to embrace democracy and meet citizens’ needs. Although similar in motivation to the first wave, these overthrows were led largely by mid-level military officers promising to address economic mismanagement.
Unlike before, these coups accounted for only 14% of leader deaths and featured fewer human rights abuses. Nevertheless, they threatened many African leaders as well as the democracy unfolding on the continent.
In response, regional and continental norms were tightened, resulting in the Algiers decision on unconstitutional changes of government and the 2000 Lomé Declaration. The former banned coup makers from attending Organisation of African Unity summits, and the latter took a zero-tolerance stance against coups. These measures, coupled with the spread of democracy, significantly reduced coup numbers, ending the second wave.
Unlike before, recent overthrows have been largely bloodless ‘smart coups’ carried out with restraint
Since 2021, the third wave – in Sudan, Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Niger and Gabon – has differed from those in previous decades. Motivations included the manipulation of national constitutions for presidential term extensions, rigged elections, deteriorating security and a rising anti-colonial sentiment.
These issues have manifested differently across countries. The putschists in Niger were motivated by ‘the continuous deterioration of the security situation and bad social and economic management.’ In Guinea, the junta slammed Alpha Condé for ‘mismanagement, corruption and bad governance.’ While some coups, like those in Guinea and Gabon, were framed as attempts to restore democracy, the drivers are more complex and varied.
The Guinea, Niger and Gabon takeovers were all led by elite presidential guards, not the army. This feature of modern coups is linked to their occurrence in Francophone Africa, where presidential guards are often better armed and trained than the regular army. Their proximity to the president enables an overthrow, after which they lobby for the army’s involvement.
In Niger, expectations that soldiers would quell the coup faded when Army Chief of Staff Abdou Sidikou Issa announced the army’s support for the ousting of then-president Mohamed Bazoum. This reflects a dangerous undercurrent of tensions originating from the politicisation of the military and nepotism in its ranks.
Common primary drivers are governance deficits and political elites’ failure to meet citizen expectations
Unlike previous waves, recent overthrows have been largely bloodless ‘smart coups’ carried out with restraint. Deposed leaders have often been held for varied periods before being released due to international pressure. In Niger, the army’s fear of endangering the president’s life limited its role in quashing the coup, according to Sidikou Issa.
While the international dimension of previous coups centred around the hidden hands of external powers, recent takeovers have had an undertone of anti-imperialist sentiment, mostly against France. In Mali, this resulted in the expulsion of French troops and similar agitations in Niger. At the same time, foreign military elements – such as the Wagner Group – were used to secure the country after coups in Mali and Burkina Faso, with similar expectations in Niger.
Coup makers have resisted regional and continental norms against unconstitutional changes in government and, in Niger, have shunned engagements with ECOWAS. The ‘coup alliance’ between Gabon, Niger and Burkina Faso is also important. After the Niger putsch, Burkina Faso, Guinea and Mali pledged support for the junta and threatened retaliation against proposed military intervention by ECOWAS.
While these dynamics distinguish contemporary coups from their predecessors, common primary drivers are governance deficits and political elites’ failure to deliver on their citizens’ expectations. So, although the third wave includes coups of a different kind, they are essentially different shades of the same threat.
The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) should advocate a comprehensive review of existing frameworks to counter military overthrows and other unconstitutional changes in government. First would be the Lomé Declaration, then the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.
A multifaceted approach is needed that tackles the immediate challenges posed by coups and the underlying governance issues that fuel them. The PSC’s inconsistencies and selective application of continental norms in managing coups should be addressed, as these undermine the AU’s moral authority in responding to events.
Establishing the PSC sanctions committee is a priority that would demonstrate political will against coups. This would also strengthen the AU’s efforts to monitor suspended countries.
About the author: Andrews Atta-Asamoah, Head, Africa Peace and Security Governance, ISS Addis Ababa
Source: This article was published by ISS Today and was first published in ISS’ PSC Report.
By Fernando Chiocca
Since I recognized almost twenty years ago that no person or institution has the right to initiate aggression, now is the first time I can tell a normie what my political stance is without them having no clue what I am talking about. Now I can say that I am an anarchocapitalist without causing much surprise, as a large part of the public now has some idea of what this term means.
This is thanks to the fascinating electoral success of Javier Milei, an anarchocapitalist who has a chance of becoming the next president of Argentina in tomorrow’s presidential election. Milei has five mastiff dogs that he calls “four-legged children” and named one of them Murray, in honor of the economist Murray Rothbard, a great inspiration of his. Rothbard, a dean of the Austrian school of economics, is also the father of modern libertarianism, which he called anarchocapitalism. We anarchocapitalists are aware that any form of state is criminal, and any and all services it provides can and must be provided by the free market. Rothbard provided the ethical and economic justifications for anarchocapitalism, refuting all myths used to legitimize the existence of the state.
Nevertheless, in addition to providing the framework of anarchocapitalism, Rothbard also laid out a strategydescribing how only someone like Milei could break down the barriers of respectable (social democratic) political discourse imposed on us by the Marxist Left and reemerge a libertarian Right political force. Rothbard refers to the old American Right, which in the first half of the twentieth century was opposed to the socialist programs implemented in the US and its foreign wars and was “for a restoration of the liberty of the old republic, of a government strictly limited to the defense of the rights of private property.” It was not a revolutionary Right. In fact, the revolution had already happened with the New Deal, and the revolution had been a socialist one. In the same way, Peronism was a socialist revolution that in eighty years transformed Argentina, which was a free country and one of the richest in the world, into a poor country. This means that a conservative stance serves to preserve socialism, while socialism continues to advance when socialists are in power. Therefore, as libertarian novelist Garet Garrett said, “The revolution was, and therefore nothing less than a counterrevolution is needed to take the country back. Behold then, not a ‘conservative,’ but a radical Right.” Agustín Laje, author, political scientist, and ally of Milei who has strived to understand and explain the new global Right, agrees:
This New Right has a revolutionary ethos, as opposed to a left that is beginning to embrace a conservative ethos. I know this might sound odd, but in what sense do I say it? If we take “conservative” as that which wants to preserve a status quo, the left is the one who today want to preserve a status quo in Argentina, while the right is trying to destroy this status quo.
Rothbard notes that while Marxists made it clear that their strategy would center on the proletariat as the group that would bring about social change, the Right got to decide “who are the major bad guys, the unwashed masses or the power elite?” He concluded that the fight should be against the ruling elite, because the masses, however untrustworthy they may be, are too busy trying to raise their families and living their lives and don’t have much time to devote to politics. Meanwhile “the bureaucrats, politicians, and special-interest groups dependent on political rule . . . make money out of politics, and so they are intensely interested and lobby and are active 24 hours a day.” Rothbard adds a distinction pointed out by John C. Calhoun, who observed that society is divided between two classes: those paying taxes and those receiving taxes. Milei focused his speech on this real class struggle, inciting the masses against their exploiters in the power elite, which he appropriately calls the political caste.
Given this, Rothbard raises this question: “If the ruling elite is taxing, looting, and exploiting the public, why does the public put up with this for a single moment? Why does it take them so long to withdraw their consent?” The masses are kept in this lethargic state of voluntary submission as the political caste co-opts “the intellectual and media elites, who are able to bamboozle the masses into consenting to their rule.” To resolve this dilemma, Rothbard identifies two wrong strategies and recommends the right one.
The first wrong is the so-called Hayekian strategy, which consists of converting the main philosophers to the correct ideas that would then convert academics, journalists, and politicians until the masses were converted to support freedom. Besides taking a lot of time, the crucial flaw in this strategy is that the media and academics do not place truth above their personal interests; therefore, this strategy is doomed.
The second improper strategy is the so-called Fabian strategy, used successfully by the socialists of the Fabian Society. It consists of creating think tanks to try to influence the centers of power. The fatal error is that what works to increase the state does not work to reduce it. Obviously, ruling elites will welcome socialist ideas that will increase their power and reject libertarian ideas that will diminish it. That said, Rothbard explains what the winning strategy is:
And so the proper strategy for the right wing must be what we can call “right-wing populism”: exciting, dynamic, tough, and confrontational, rousing and inspiring not only the exploited masses, but the often-shell-shocked right-wing intellectual cadre as well. And in this era where the intellectual and media elites are all establishment liberal-conservatives, all in a deep sense one variety or another of social democrat, all bitterly hostile to a genuine Right, we need a dynamic, charismatic leader who has the ability to short-circuit the media elites, and to reach and rouse the masses directly. We need a leadership that can reach the masses and cut through the crippling and distorting hermeneutical fog spread by the media elites.
That’s what Milei did. A distinctive feature of the Argentine mainstream media are TV and radio shows with long and heated debates. A loophole existed in the system, and Milei began to be invited to these shows. Being a scholar of the Austrian school of economics and a wholehearted libertarian, Milei commented with propriety on all subjects and passionately defended freedom. Unlike the followers of the Hayekian strategy who treat the pernicious and criminal leftist ideas and their proponents—which cause so much harm and poverty to the people—with respect and politeness, Milei understood that we are at war and was frequently furious, cursing and shouting, reflecting all the resentment of the explored masses. (Thousands of hours of videos of Milei’s appearances on Argentine TV can be found on YouTube.)
Combining ardor and wisdom with a striking media personality, soon Milei was the economist with the most television time and became a national celebrity. In addition to being aligned with the right-wing discourse of fighting crime and defending traditional values, his libertarian speech—saying things like “tax is theft,” “politicians are parasites and we don’t need them for anything,” “the central bank is one of the biggest thieves in the history of humanity,” “your welfare is taken through a gun pointed to the head of others”—managed to directly reach the masses who woke up to the truth about the extortion they suffer from political profiteers.
During the Ron Paul revolutions of 2008 and 2012, Ron Paul was able to gain some attention from the mainstream media through his participation in the GOP presidential debates. He managed to open the eyes of multitudes of Americans to libertarian truths. However, Dr. Paul did not achieve national celebrity status, and the gates of mainstream media and the bipartisan political system soon closed to him, unlike what happened with Milei.
Milei began his political career by being elected congressman in 2021 and managed to make his presidential candidacy viable in 2023, winning the preelections in August. In the presidential debates, Argentina is seeing a libertarian imploding socialist myths, giving answers that a Walter Block would give.
For example, in the debate on October 1, when asked if wage differentials between men and women were the result of patriarchal discrimination, Milei responded that salary inequality disappears if the types of profession are taken into account and that if this disparity really existed, the exploitative capitalists who seek profits at all costs would hire only women, but this does not happen. The Rothbardian strategy of libertarian populismworked, as he said it would, and Argentina is about to have the world’s first anarchocapitalist president.
About the author: Fernando Fiori Chiocca is an anti-intellectual intellectual. From São Paulo, Brazil, he is the founder and editor of Rothbard Institute.
Source: This article was published by the Mises Institute
Like all sensitive people everywhere, I’ve been aware that a rift has opened up in the world — a dangerous tear in the very fabric of human decency, of fundamental morality, through which supposed justifications are loudly being made to excuse the killing, in the Gaza Strip, of children, of women, of the elderly and the ill, and of unarmed men “of military age” who have not engaged in any kind of military conflict at all.
It’s an age-old story, sadly. Throughout human history, men — it’s almost always only men — have slaughtered civilians in their quest, or their leaders’ quest for land, power and control. You could be forgiven for thinking that what drives most wars is actually an excuse to unleash these darkest impulses, and that everything else is secondary.
Gideon Levy’s ‘A Brief History of Killing Children’
It’s nearly two years since the great Israeli journalist Gideon Levy wrote an article for Haaretz, Israel’s oldest newspaper, entitled ‘A Brief History of Killing Children’, in which he chronicled the moral decline of the Israeli government from the 1990s to the time of writing through the ways in which Palestinian children have been treated.
“First we were ashamed, then we were shocked, and we even investigated”, Levy wrote. “Then we denied it and lied. After that we ignored and repressed it, yawned and lost interest. Now is the worst phase of all: We’ve started to extol the killers of children. That’s how far we’ve gone.”
Levy recalled the shock he felt in 1996, when a new-born baby, whose mother, Faiza Abu Dahuk, gave birth to him at an Israeli checkpoint, died after Israeli soldiers turned her away from three checkpoints. When she finally arrived at a hospital, after carrying him “all through a cold and rainy night”, he “was already dead.”
At the time, Levy noted, “The matter came up at a cabinet meeting. An officer was dismissed and a mini-storm ensued. This was in April 1996, during the year of hope and illusions.”
By 2000, however, and the time of the Second Intifada, the killing of 12-year old Mohammed al-Dura, who was shot by Israeli forces as he sought shelter with his father behind a concrete cylinder, marked the start of what Levy described as Israel’s “phase of denials and lies.” Although the Israel Defense Forces initially accepted responsibility for the killing, they then retracted their admission, claiming that “the whole episode was staged and that Mohammed al-Dura was not killed at all — or was murdered in cold blood by the Palestinians — to discredit and ‘delegitimize’ Israel”, as Levy’s fellow journalist Khaled Diab described it in 2013.
After that, as Levy described it, “20 years of indifference and complacence” began, as a result of which, as he further explained, “Soldiers and pilots have killed 2,171 children and teenagers, and not one of these cases shocked anyone here, or sparked a real investigation or led to a trial. More than 2,000 children in 20 years — 100 children, three classrooms a year.”
Crucially, he added that “all of them, down to the last, were found guilty of their own death”, because of the prevailing opinion in Israel that “they were terrorists and the soldiers or the police had no choice but to execute them.”
Levy’s 2021 article was prompted by what he called “the next phase” in this dehumanisation, in which Israel now “praises the killers of children; they are the new heroes.” He added, “This never happened before. They were Palestinians, terrorists, but still they were children.”
The specific example Levy focused on was that of 16-year old Omar Abu Sab, who “went out with a knife to stab a Border Police officer.” As he explained, “A video clip released by the police shows him approaching two officers from behind and attacking them. He was smaller and thinner than them, they could have stopped him, they didn’t have to shoot him, and they certainly didn’t have to kill him, like they needlessly killed children with knives before him and after him.”
Instead of being condemned or even criticised, however, the border guard who shot Omar Abu Sab to death at point-blank range was feted in the press, with the officer described as “The hero from the Old City”, who “took out a terrorist and prevented a major disaster” — and with no mention made of Omar Abu Sab’s age. As Levy concluded, “to turn the shooting of a 16-year-old with a knife into a big story is the crossing of a moral red line. It will encourage the needless killing of more children, if any such encouragement was needed.”
Children’s deaths amidst increasing violations of international humanitarian law
Gideon Levy’s analysis of Israel’s increasing dehumanisation of Palestinian children is significant, in part because it highlights Israel’s refusal to accept that, as stated in Article 6 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (which was agreed in 1989, and was ratified by Israel in 1991), States Parties “must recognize that every child has the inherent right to life”, and “shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and development of the child”, but also because, in the case of Omar Abu Sab and other children summarily executed by Israeli soldiers, it so flagrantly violates the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in May 2000, and which has also been ratified by Israel, in which Article 6.3 calls on States Parties to provide juveniles recruited into armed conflict with “all appropriate assistance for their physical and psychological recovery and their social reintegration.”
In addition, of course, Levy’s assessment also condemns Israel for its increasing contempt not just for the rights of children, but also for the entire apparatus of international humanitarian law, which, as the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) explains, “protects those who do not take part in the fighting, such as civilians and medical and religious military personnel”, who “are entitled to respect for their lives and for their physical and mental integrity”, who “also enjoy legal guarantees”, and who “must be protected and treated humanely in all circumstances, with no adverse distinction.”
This is hugely important, of course, because the 2,171 children and teenagers killed by Israel from 2000 to 2021 weren’t all shot at checkpoints; many were, instead, killed in the indiscriminate bombing raids on the Gaza Strip that have been taking place with alarming regularity ever since the 2.3 million inhabitants of that tiny densely populated area (roughly the size of east London) were first imprisoned in 2007, when Israel imposed a complete land, air and naval blockade of such severity that Human Rights Watch has accurately described the Gaza Strip as “an open air prison.”
Major assaults on the Gaza Strip took place in 2008-09, in 2012, in 2014 and again in 2021, with B’Tselem, the Jerusalem-based NGO, which documents human rights violations in the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories, compiling reports demonstrating that, from September 29, 2000 (the start of the Second Intifada) to December 26, 2008 (the start of Operation Cast Lead, the first of Israel’s major attacks on Gaza), 961 Palestinian children were killed, 345 children were killed in the 23 days of Operation Cast Lead, which lasted until January 18, 2009, and 877 more children were killed between January 19, 2009 and January 18, 2022.
This is a total of 2,183 Palestinian children killed, while over the same period 139 Israeli children were killed — a ratio of 15.7:1. UN figures from January 1, 2008 to September 19, 2023 provide further context, with 6,407 Palestinians in total killed throughout that period compared to 308 Israelis — a ratio of 20.8:1.
The death toll in Gaza is spiralling out of control
Now, however, with Israel having launched an incomparably savage attack on the Gaza Strip in retaliation for the brutal and unforgivable attacks during incursions into Israeli territory by Hamas militants on October 7, in which at least 1,400 Israelis were killed (attacks that have been rightly condemned as war crimes by international legal experts), the death toll in Gaza is spiralling out of control.
According to the latest reports, around 3,000 people have now been killed in the Gaza Strip in Israeli bombing raids over the last week and a half (almost half of the total from the long years of bloodshed from 2000 to last month), with at least 1,000 of those killed being children (again, nearly half of the total from 2000 to last month).
Moreover, a further 1,200 Palestinians, including 500 children, are unaccounted for, with many — if not most — buried beneath the rubble of Gaza’s devastated buildings, and, even more alarmingly, untold numbers of people will soon die of thirst, hunger, their wounds, pre-existing medical conditions and disease if Israel refuses to lift the “complete siege” of Gaza that was imposed on October 8, when defense minister Yoav Gallant stated, in stark and blood-curdlingly chilling terms, “There will be no electricity, no food, no fuel, everything is closed. We are fighting human animals and we will act accordingly.”
It may sound rather alarmist for me to suggest that the Israel government is well aware of the statistics over the last 22 years — and, specifically, the ratio of 20 Palestinian deaths to one Israeli death over that time — but I’m sure that some officials are aware of it, and are calculating accordingly that, at a minimum, 30,000 Palestinians in the Gaza Strip will be required to die to pay for Hamas’s attacks on October 7.
Behind closed doors, I’m sure that some Israeli officials have been discussing even more alarming proposals — very specifically, genocide — and I also note that, just a few days ago, the US journalist Seymour Hersh spoke to a “veteran Israeli spy” who told him that the big debate within the Israeli government was “whether to starve Hamas out or kill as many as 100,000” civilians.
Western leaders’ complicity in war crimes, and the urgent need for a humanitarian ceasefire
Disgracefully, as I noted in my article last week, My Shame at the West’s Uncritical Support for Israeli War Crimes in Gaza, Western leaders initially responded to the start of Israel’s unprecedented assault on Gaza — in which 6,000 bombs were dropped, almost as many as the US dropped on Afghanistan in an entire year — by unconditionally endorsing Israel’s “right to defend itself.”
Many, if not most have subsequently rowed back from this position — in many cases, I have no doubt, because human rights lawyers have pointed out to them that they may, as a result, be complicit in war crimes — but although the West’s position is now broadly in accord with President Biden’s statement on October 15, when he belatedly acknowledged that “[w]e must not lose sight of the fact that the overwhelming majority of Palestinians had nothing to do with Hamas’s appalling attacks, and are suffering as a result of them”, the humanitarian crisis will not be addressed through standing at a podium and finally saying the right thing.
While the West vacillates and pontificates — and, far too often, still defends Israel unconditionally — the Israeli government’s unrelenting blizzard of violations of international humanitarian law — of war crimes — continues as though they only apply to lesser beings.
As well as imposing the most extraordinarily violent and cruel collective punishment on the people of Gaza, via its indiscriminate bombing raids, and by withholding water, food and medical supplies (all of which are quite startling war crimes), the Israeli government has recently added ethnic cleansing to its growing list of violations, via the evacuation order for half of the population to move to the south of the Gaza Strip, with the apparent intention of persuading Egypt to open the Rafah Crossing so that they can be exiled to the Sinai Desert, never to return.
As Jan Egeland, the secretary-general of the Norwegian Refugee Council, told the Associated Press, this is “not an evacuation opportunity, it’s an order to relocate. Under humanitarian law, it’s called forcible transfer of populations, and it’s a war crime.”
What is needed now, clearly, is nothing short of an immediate ceasefire followed by the provision of urgent humanitarian relief and supplies to the Gaza Strip. Anything less means that those in positions of power around the world continue to be complicit in war crimes, and, as more Palestinian children die, will have these children’s blood on their hands.
By Timur Nersesov
We are currently living in the most multipolar and unstable period the world has seen since August 1914. It took two world wars to undo the consequences of the last period. The rules-based international order as we know it today is being challenged, and for the first time in the 80 years since the end of World War II, wars are being fought that take no notice and don’t bother with the pretense of that order. The events that began unfolding in the countries of Azerbaijan and Armenia in September 2020 were the first unvarnished challenge to the legitimacy of that world order, and the Western world has not answered that challenge.
While the history of the conflict goes back for centuries, its relevance for the West begins in 1994 following the collapse of the Soviet Union what is now known as the first Karabakh war ended in April 1994 with a negotiated ceasefire between the Azeris and the indigenous ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh. The ceasefire was followed by commitment from all parties to a mediated settlement under the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Mink Group. The terms of that ceasefire were to freeze the line of contact that would leave just under 20% of what was Soviet Azerbaijan’s territory under control of the local Armenians who were supported by the Republic of Armenia, pending a negotiated settlement on self-governance status, resettlement of refugees, and any exchange of territories.
From frozen conflict to ethnic cleansing
Within the OSCE framework, Azerbaijan and Armenia along with three mediators composed of the United States, France, and Russia, proceeded to conduct many rounds of negotiations over the next 27 years. The lack of substantive progress led the conflict to take on the ominous status of a “frozen conflict”, with occasional clashes along the line of contact. In September 2020 the situation changed. On September 27,2020 Azerbaijan launched a war to retake Karabakh in what became known as the 44-day war or the second Karabakh war.
Russia negotiated a ceasefire in November 2020, which was followed by nearly three years of clashes and blockades and an ineffective Russian peace-keeping mission. Azerbaijan justified the war as a resolution to the frozen conflict. It completed its conquest to take over Karabakh with a week-long campaign beginning on September 19 this year. At the conclusion of this crusade, Azerbaijan had established total control of the region of Karabakh and the expulsion of the entire Armenian population of 120,000 people.
The immediate consequence of the failure to respond to Azerbaijan’s rejection of its international commitments with the support ofTurkey, a NATO member, and Israel, a NATO partner, have been earth shattering. First, it is the complete eviction of all 120,000 remaining Armenians in the region that has been populated by ethnic Armenians for more than two millennia. Azerbaijan committed an ethnic cleansing within essentially one week. The speed of the events was such that the Western powers did not have time to issue reactions through their bureaucratic processes before the ethnic cleansing was complete.
Moreover, the very public support of a NATO state and NATO partner made any Western intervention a minefield. With Turkish troops directly involved and Israeli weapons on the front line, both of those states had the power to block most any coordinated effort from Western powers to react. For the first time, Western-aligned states were explicitly on the side of undermining an international conflict resolution process.
A terrible precedent for the future
The consequences of this profound failure to protect the rules-based international order will reverberate in generations to come. The September 2020 Azerbaijani military offensive against ethnic Armenians was executed summarily. Azerbaijan made no effort to seek international legitimation or had any concern that an international reaction would follow. The lack of Western response emboldened Russia to leverage the same pseudo-legalistic language used by Azerbaijan to legitimize its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
Russia did not drum up support for Armenians through the UN. It did not activate Russia’s own alliance structure under the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). This alliance of six post-Soviet states — Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan — formed in 2002 proved to be useless for Armenians. Russia did not even make a serious propaganda effort focused on the international community to identify a clear casus belli. In essence, Russia did not bother with a single step to legitimize its invasion. Even in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was done under the auspices of an intervention in a civil war, like the justification used by the United States for its engagement in Vietnam.
Every setback to the legitimacy of the institutions the West relies upon to provide peace and order increases danger. The biggest danger is that state actors start bypassing the international system to pursue their goals. Rules-based orders give us predictability. They create a sandbox, which limits the realm of the possible. If things cannot be confined within that sandbox, then we are increasing volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (VUCA). This VUCA world is dangerous in the age of nuclear weapons.
The rise of VUCA at a time globalized economies upon which billions depend for food, water, fuel and basic goods, such unpredictability is frightening. The ethnic cleansing of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh is a humanitarian disaster. The fact that it has gone completely unopposed is a terrible precedent. Azerbaijan’s decision to wage war to resolve the frozen conflict sets an example for others that it will be nearly impossible to walk back without a unified front from the West. This precedent will continually be used to embolden the use of violence to resolve conflict, without regard to international norms and will make the entire world worse off in the process.
[The views expressed in this article are the authors and do not represent the views of the US Government or any company.]
About the author: Timur R. Nersesov is a Lieutenant Colonel in the US Army Reserve with a total of 18 years in uniform. He is a veteran of the Iraq War and has spent over 13 years as a consultant to national security departments and agencies such as US Departments of Defense, State, and Homeland Security, and as a technology executive. Timur is also a member of the Truman National Security Project. He holds a MS in Analytics, a BA in Anthropology, and his current work centers on cloud technologies and Artificial Intelligence applications in defense and civil government.
Source: This article was published by Fair Observer
