Day: October 21, 2023

Hamas, or the Islamic Resistance Movement, is a Palestinian Islamist military and sociopolitical movement that grew out of the Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni religious and political organization founded in Egypt in 1928 that has branches throughout the world.10 Hamas emerged in Gaza in the late 1980s, and established itself as an alternative to the secular Fatah movement in the 1990s by violently attacking Israeli targets after Fatah had entered into a peace process with Israel. Over time, Hamas has attacked or repressed Palestinian political and factional opponents.

After Israel withdrew military forces from Gaza in 2005, Hamas forcibly seized the territory from the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority (PA) in 2007. Hamas has both political and military components and exercises de facto government authority and manages service provision in Gaza. Hamas controls Gaza through its security forces and obtains resources from smuggling, informal “taxes,” and reported external assistance. According to the U.S. State Department, “Hamas has received funding, weapons, and training from Iran and raises funds in Persian Gulf countries. The group receives donations from some Palestinians and other expatriates as well as from its own charity organizations.”11 One media report has suggested that during this decade, Hamas has received some of its funding in cryptocurrency.12

Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’s leader for Gaza, came from Hamas’s military wing (see below). Aside from those living in Gaza and the West Bank, some Hamas leaders and personnel may live in Arab countries and Turkey. Hamas’s political bureau leader, Ismail Haniyeh, appears to be based in Doha, Qatar.

Hamas and other Gaza-based militants have engaged in occasional conflict with Israel since Hamas seized Gaza by force in 2007. During the major conflicts in 2008-2009, 2012, 2014, and 2021, Hamas and other militants launched rockets indiscriminately toward Israel, and Israeli military strikes largely decimated Gaza’s infrastructure.

Since 2007, Gaza has faced crisis-level economic and humanitarian conditions, partly owing to broad restrictions that Israel and Egypt—citing security concerns—have imposed on the transit of people and goods. Gazans face chronic economic difficulties and shortages of electricity and safe drinking water.13 Because Gaza does not have a self-sufficient economy, external assistance largely sustains humanitarian welfare. Egypt and Qatar helped mediate conflict and provided basic resources in the wake of the four past major conflicts, but Gaza has not experienced broader economic recovery or reconstruction.

Hamas’s military wing, the Izz al Din al Qassam Brigades,14 has killed hundreds of Israelis15 and more than two dozen U.S. citizens (including some dual U.S.-Israeli citizens)16 in attacks since 1993. As the Qassam Brigades developed from a small band of guerrillas into a more sophisticated organization with access to greater resources and territorial control, its methods of attack evolved from small-scale kidnappings and killings of Israeli military personnel to suicide bombings and rocket attacks against Israeli civilians. The planning, preparation, and implementation of the October 7, 2023, attacks in Israel apparently demonstrate a further evolution in the Qassam Brigades’ capabilities, including the use of drone munitions, personnel- capable gliders, and complex infantry operations featuring thousands of personnel attacking across Israeli-controlled lines along multiple axes.

Hamas’s ideology combines Palestinian nationalism with Islamic fundamentalism. Hamas’s founding charter committed the group to the destruction of Israel and the establishment of an Islamic state in all of historic Palestine.17 A 2017 document updated Hamas’s founding principles. It stated that Hamas sees its conflict as being with the “Zionist project,” rather than Jews in general, and expressed willingness to accept a Palestinian state within the 1949/50-1967 armistice lines if it results from “national consensus,” while rejecting Zionism completely and stating Hamas’s preference for the establishment of an Islamist Palestinian state from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea and from the southern Israeli city of Eilat to the Lebanese border.18 (For background on the history of Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian conflict, see Appendix B in CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.)

Having consolidated control over Gaza, and pursuing popular support through armed attacks on Israel, Hamas has appeared to seek to compete politically with other Palestinian movements or establish its indispensability to a future negotiated Israeli-Palestinian political arrangement. Hamas’s 2017 document states that the group remains open to democratic political competition with Palestinian rivals, but underscores goals incompatible with recent Arab-Israeli normalization diplomacy. Elections have not occurred in Gaza since 2007, and Hamas appears to maintain strict control over political activity in areas under its control. Human rights organizations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have documented Hamas human rights violations against Palestinian civilians and violence against Israelis.

Foreign terrorist organization designation and consequences19

The U.S. government designated Hamas as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) on October 8, 1997. (The Iran-backed Shia Islamist group Lebanese Hezbollah (or Hizballah) was designated as an FTO on the same date.) The State Department’s Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT) is responsible for identifying entities for designation as an FTO. Prior to doing so, the Department is obligated to demonstrate that the entity in question engages in “terrorist activity” or retains the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.20 When assessing entities for possible designation, the CT Bureau looks not only at the actual terrorist attacks that a group has carried out, but also at whether the group has engaged in planning and preparations for possible future acts of terrorism or retains the capability and intent to carry out such acts.

Entities placed on the FTO list are suspected of engaging in terrorism-related activities. By designating an entity as an FTO, the United States seeks to limit the group’s financial, property, and travel interests. Per Section 219 of the INA, as amended by Section 302 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132), the Secretary of State must demonstrate that the entity of concern has met the three criteria to allow the Department to designate it as an FTO. The suspected terrorist group must:

• be a foreign organization,
• engage in or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorism, and
• threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests of the United States.

In general, the designation of an entity, such as Hamas, as an FTO leads or may lead to the following consequences:

• It is unlawful for a person in the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to knowingly provide “material support or resources” to a designated FTO.
• Representatives and members of a designated FTO, if they are aliens, are inadmissible to, and in certain circumstances removable from, the United States.
• The Secretary of the Treasury may require U.S. financial institutions possessing or controlling any assets of a designated FTO to block all transactions involving those assets.
• May motivate efforts by the U.S. government and other nations to curb terrorism financing.
• May stigmatize and isolate the FTO outside of its established support base.
• May deter donations or contributions to and economic transactions with the FTO.
• May heighten public awareness and knowledge of the FTO and terrorist organizations more generally.
• May signal to other governments U.S. concern about designated organizations.

Hamas’s relationship with Iran

The Iranian government has supported Hamas for decades, going back nearly to the group’s inception.21 Iranian officials met with Hamas leaders and expressed public backing for the group and its goals beginning in the early 1990s, as Hamas sought to take up the mantle of Palestinian resistance to Israel against the backdrop of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)-Israel negotiations that culminated in the 1993 Oslo Accord.22 Hamas opened an external office in Iran in 1992.

It is less clear how much material support the Iranian government provided to Hamas in the first years of the relationship. In 1998, Hamas’s spiritual leader Ahmad Yassin (later killed in a 2004 Israeli strike) reportedly obtained from Iran a pledge of $15 million a month.23 Hamas leaders gave conflicting accounts of their ties with Iran throughout the 1990s, perhaps sensitive to Palestinian domestic criticisms of Hamas as being reliant on foreign sponsors.24

During the second Palestinian intifada (or uprising) of 2000-2005, Iran reportedly continued to provide support to Hamas, including via the Shia Islamist group Lebanese Hezbollah (also an FTO).25 Some have contrasted Iran’s relationship with Hezbollah (a “full Iranian proxy,” in the words of one observer) with its relationship with Hamas (“a pragmatic partner to Iran’s anti-Israel axis”).26

Since Hamas took over de facto control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, it has engaged in several rounds of conflict with Israel, with continued reported material and financial support, but uncertain direction, from Iran. Iranian aid has been especially important to Hamas in light of Israeli-Egyptian restrictions in place for Gaza since 2007 on the transit of people and goods, and with regard to Hamas’s arsenal of rockets, which have featured prominently in Hamas attacks against Israel for years. Iran initially smuggled rockets into Gaza by sea and via illicit tunnels under the Egyptian border. After Egypt began cracking down on those tunnels in 2013, and as ties between Iran and Sudan (a key arms transit point) began to deteriorate in 2014, Iran focused more on teaching Palestinian militants how to use Iranian systems and locally manufacture their own variants.27

Iran-Hamas relations deteriorated after the outbreak of violence in Syria in 2011, with Iran and Hezbollah backing the government of Bashar al Asad, and Hamas siding with the mostly Sunni opposition. In 2012, Hamas’s political leadership left Damascus for Qatar, where it has reportedly been based since then. In 2017, with Hamas more isolated regionally and with the Iran-backed Asad government ascendant, the two sides began to repair ties and have since appeared closely aligned. Hamas’s top political leader, Ismail Haniyeh, reportedly visited Tehran at least three times between 2019 and the October 7 attacks.28

The level of Iranian material support for Hamas has reportedly remained high in recent years. In a September 2020 publication, the State Department reported that “Iran historically provided up to $100 million annually in combined support to Palestinian terrorist groups, including Hamas, Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command.”29 Haniyeh reportedly said in a January 2022 interview that Iran was the “main funder” of a $70 million “plan of defense for Gaza” after 2009.30

Hamas attacks: Why and why now?

Hamas leaders have said that their planning and preparation for the October 2023 attacks took place over several years, suggesting that the group made a strategic decision to prepare itself to be able to carry out attacks and operations that might change the status quo and prevailing assumptions in the group’s long confrontation with Israel.31 The decision to launch the attacks in October 2023 may reflect various Hamas motivating factors, including:

• Disrupting Arab-Israeli normalization efforts – The October 7 attacks may have been intended to disrupt existing and potential future normalization agreements between Israel and Arab states, including U.S.-backed efforts to promote Saudi-Israeli normalization.
• Seeking to strengthen its domestic position – Hamas may have launched the attacks in a bid to bolster its domestic political position vis-à-vis the struggling Palestinian Authority (PA) and its president since 2005, Mahmoud Abbas. Difficult and deteriorating living conditions in Gaza may have increased local political pressure on Hamas, and Hamas leaders may have perceived political opportunity arising from a pattern of confrontations in 2022 and 2023 between Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank and in Jerusalem. A former senior U.S. official has speculated, “
• Capitalizing on Israeli domestic turmoil – Political tensions have risen in 2023 among Israelis, stemming from disputes over proposed judicial reform and other issues. Hamas and its allies may have perceived an opportunity to amplify discord among Israelis by launching the attacks and successfully targeting Israeli military and civilian targets.
• Using hostages for prisoner releases or other concessions – Hamas leaders have long highlighted the release of Palestinian prisoners held by Israel as a priority for the group, and may have launched the attacks to use hostages to obtain prisoner releases or other Israeli concessions.

Source: This article is a selection from a larger article, Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), published by Congressional Research Service (CRS)

Notes:

• 10 U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2021, released February 2023. 
• 11 Ibid.
• 12 Angus Berwick and Ian Talley, “Hamas Militants Behind Israel Attack Raised Millions in Crypto,” Wall Street Journal, October 10, 2023.
• 13 For information on the situation, see U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian territory (OCHA-oPt), Gaza Strip: Critical Humanitarian Indicators, https://www.ochaopt.org/page/gaza-strip-critical- humanitarian-indicators.
• 14 Izz al Din al Qassam was a Muslim Brotherhood member, preacher, and leader of an anti-Zionist and anti-colonialist resistance movement in historic Palestine during the British Mandate period. He was killed by British forces in 1935.
• 15 Figures sourced from Jewish Virtual Library website at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/TerrorAttacks.html and https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/comprehensive-listing-of-terrorism-victims-in-israel. In the aggregate, other Palestinian militant groups (such as Palestine Islamic Jihad, the Fatah-affiliated Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) also have killed scores, if not hundreds, of Israelis since 1993.
• 16 Figures sourced from Jewish Virtual Library website at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/usvictims.html.
• 17 For an English translation of the 1988 Hamas charter, see http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp.
• 18 “Hamas in 2017: The document in full,” Middle East Eye, May 1, 2017. This document, unlike the 1988 charter, does not identify Hamas with the Muslim Brotherhood.
• 19 Prepared by John Rollins, Specialist in Terrorism and National Security. For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10613, Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), by John W. Rollins.
• 20 As defined in Section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) (8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(3)(B)), or “terrorism,” as defined in Section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act (FRAA), Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (FRAA) (22 U.S.C. §2656f(d)(2)).
• 21 The Iranian government has backed terrorist groups since the early 1980s, focused initially on supporting the Shia
• Islamist group Hezbollah in Lebanon and pressuring Persian Gulf monarchies to cease their support for Iraq in its war against Iran. After the first Palestinian intifada (or uprising) broke out in 1987 (the same year Hamas was founded), Iran began to focus more on supporting Palestinian groups. See U.S. State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1986, January 1988 and Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1989, April 1990.
• 22 “Iran pledges to aid Hamas in fight for ‘free Palestine,’” Independent (London), November 17, 1992; Christopher Walker, “PLO fears rise of fundamentalists,” Times (London), December 18, 1992; “Iran tells Hamas it is firmly against PLO peace deal,” Reuters, November 30, 1993. For background on the Oslo Accord, see CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
• 23 Laura King, “Hamas leader gaining Arab support,” Associated Press, May 27, 1998.
• 24 See, for example, “Hamas leader Yasin interviewed on attacks on civilians, ties with Iran,” BBC Monitoring, October 16, 1999.
• 25 Aaron Mannes, “Iran binds Hizballah to Hamas,” Jerusalem Post, March 30, 2004.
• 26 Ido Levy, “How Iran fuels Hamas terrorism,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 1, 2021.
• 27 Fabian Hinz, “Iran transfers rockets to Palestinian groups,” Wilson Center, May 19, 2021; Adnan Abu Amer, “Report outlines how Iran smuggles arms to Hamas,” Al-Monitor, April 9, 2021.
• 28 Maren Koss, “Flexible resistance: How Hezbollah and Hamas are mending ties,” Carnegie Middle East Center, July 1, 2018. Haniyeh reportedly visited Tehran in June 2019, January 2020 (for Soleimani’s funeral), and August 2021 (for Raisi’s inauguration). Iran and Sudan announced the resumption of diplomatic relations on October 9, 2023.
• 29 U.S. State Department, Outlaw Regime: A Chronicle of Iran’s Destructive Activities, September 2020.
• 30 Mai Abu Hasaneen, “Hamas holds memorial tribute for Soleimani in Gaza,” Al-Monitor, January 7, 2022.
• 31 Hamas official Ali Baraka quoted in Samia Nakhoul and Laila Bassam, “Who is Mohammed Deif, the Hamas commander behind the attack on Israel?” Reuters, October 11, 2023.
• 32 Martin Indyk, “Why Hamas Attacked—and Why Israel Was Taken by Surprise,” Foreign Affairs, October 7, 2023.

Saudi Arabia was the world’s third-highest crude oil and condensate producer, the world’s top crude oil exporter, and OPEC’s top crude oil producer in 2022.¹

Saudi Arabia is a key member of OPEC+, and in October 2022, Saudi Arabia and other OPEC+ members agreed to crude oil production cuts intended to rebalance the global oil market, hedge against downside risks of decreased oil demand, and raise falling crude oil prices.² In May 2023, Saudi Arabia and several OPEC+ members further reduced crude oil production and extended cuts through 2024. Saudi Arabia voluntarily decreased oil production by an additional 1 million barrels per day (b/d) from July 2023 through December 2023, with possible extensions that depend on the status of the oil market.³

Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 supports extensive renewable energy and nonassociated natural gas development throughout the country and seeks to decrease oil- and associated natural gas-fired electricity generation in favor of renewable-sourced generation.⁴ Saudi Aramco expects Jafurah, the largest unconventional natural gas field in Saudi Arabia, to begin production in 2025, and the Saudi National Renewable Energy Program (NREP) expects renewable energy sources to account for 50% of generated electricity in Saudi Arabia by 2030.⁵

Petroleum and other liquids

Saudi Arabia produced 12.1 million b/d in total liquid fuels in 2022, up 12% from 10.8 million b/d in 2021.

Saudi Arabia produced 10.4 million b/d of crude oil in 2022, 14% higher than the 9.1 million b/d in 2021.⁶ This increase drives Saudi Arabia’s increased total liquid fuels production, reflecting a gradual reversal of OPEC+ production cuts from 2020.⁷

Saudi Arabia accounts for 43% (0.5 million b/d) of agreed on OPEC+ production cuts that began in May 2023 and extends through the end of 2024.⁸ Saudi Arabia will take an additional oil production cut of 1.0 million b/d from July through December 2023. We expect these oil production cuts to result in decreased crude oil production in Saudi Arabia for 2023 compared with 2022.⁹

Saudi Arabia produces five grades of crude oil: Arabian Heavy, Arabian Medium, Arabian Light, Arabian Extra Light, and Arabian Super Light. In general, the majority of Saudi Arabia’s crude oil is considered sour because its sulfur content is greater than 1%.¹⁰

Saudi Aramco plans to increase its maximum sustainable capacity for crude oil production by an estimated 1 million b/d, from Saudi Aramco’s reported capacity of 12 million b/d in 2022 to 13 million b/d by 2027. Large expansion projects for the Safaniya, Zuluf, Marjan, and Berri oil fields are scheduled to drive this increased capacity. All three are under construction or in engineering phases as of 2023.¹¹

Saudi Arabia held 15% of the world’s proved oil reserves and an estimated 21% of OPEC’s proved reserves in 2022.¹² Saudi Arabia’s reserves include Ghawar and Safaniya, the world’s largest onshore and offshore oil fields, respectively.¹³

Saudi Arabia consumed 3.6 million b/d in total liquid fuels in 2022, which was nearly 40% of Middle East consumption (9.9 million b/d). Saudi Arabia was estimated to be the largest per capita oil consumer in the world in 2022, not including major transshipment countries (such as the Netherlands and Singapore).¹⁴

Oil refining in Saudi Arabia occurs domestically and internationally through either wholly owned, joint, or affiliated refineries held by Saudi Aramco. Saudi Aramco reported that domestic production of refined oil products was 1.6 million b/d in 2020 (57% of Saudi Aramco’s global production). Saudi Aramco reported domestic refining capacity at 2.9 million b/d in 2020 (45% of the global capacity Saudi Aramco held) prior to the Jazan Refinery Complex opening in 2021. Jazan, located in southwest Saudi Arabia, increased domestic capacity by an additional 400,000 b/d in 2021, while throughput remained at 50%.¹⁵

Natural gas

Saudi Arabia meets natural gas consumption with domestic production and does not import natural gas. Natural gas production and consumption increased 2% from 4.0 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) in 2020 to 4.1 Tcf in 2021.¹⁶ Saudi Aramco expects domestic demand for natural gas to grow 3.7% per year from 2021 to 2030 because of increased demand for natural gas-fired power generation.¹⁷

Associated natural gas production in Saudi Arabia changes alongside increases or decreases in crude oil production, and it was 52% of Saudi Arabia’s total natural gas production in 2022.¹⁸ Saudi Arabia flared 66 billion cubic feet (Bcf) of associated natural gas in 2022 at an average intensity of 17 cubic feet per barrel (cf/b) of oil produced. The World Bank ranks Saudi Arabia as the 13th-largest natural gas flaring country for 2022, but the average intensity at which Saudi Arabia flared its natural gas was well below that of other top oil-producing countries.¹⁹

Nonassociated natural gas is a rising proportion of Saudi Arabia’s total natural gas production, increasing from 22% in 2012 to 48% in 2022. Increased production of nonassociated natural gas allows Saudi Arabia to meet domestic natural gas demand despite shifts in crude oil production that limit associated natural gas output. For example, the proportion of nonassociated natural gas peaked at 52% of Saudi Arabia’s total consumption in 2020 at a time when crude oil production declined significantly during the COVID-19 pandemic.²⁰

Jafurah, the largest unconventional natural gas field in Saudi Arabia, contains 200 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) in estimated reserves of natural gas.²¹Located east of Ghawar, Jafurah is currently under development and is scheduled to begin production of nonassociated natural gas in 2025 and provide 2.0 Bcf/d of natural gas by 2030.²²

Saudi Arabia seeks to begin exporting natural gas as part of Vision 2030.²³ According to a 2016 analysis of Vision 2030’s natural gas development plans, Jadwa Investments estimates that average year-over-year increases in production will need to exceed 6.6% between 2020 and 2029 for Saudi Arabia to viably export natural gas.²⁴

Electricity

Saudi Arabia generated an estimated 374 terawatthours (TWh) of electricity in 2022, up 2% from 367 TWh in 2021.²⁵ In 2022, Saudi Arabia generated 67% of its electricity from natural gas (up from 60% in 2021), 33% from oil (down from 40%), and less than 1% from renewables (the same as in 2021).²⁶

Increased electricity demand during the summer months in Saudi Arabia drove oil-fired power generation (crude oil and fuel oil) up 9% year over year, increasing from 1.0 million b/d in 2021 to 1.1 million b/d in 2022.²⁷ Oil-fired power generation supplements Saudi Arabia’s natural gas-fired power to help meet demand for electricity. Despite minimal offsets from increased capacity to generate electricity from renewables and nonassociated natural gas, the demand for oil-fired power generation increased following declines in crude oil production and associated natural gas production.²⁸

Doosan Enerbility and Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) are constructing the Jafurah Cogeneration Plant east of Riyadh, which is scheduled to come online in 2025.²⁹ The plant’s production capacity, 320 megawatts, will supply power to the Jafurah natural gas field, which will ultimately supply natural gas for domestic electric power generation, water desalination, and steel production throughout Saudi Arabia.³⁰

Water desalination accounted for 6% of electricity consumption in Saudi Arabia in 2020, and production of desalinated water in Saudi Arabia doubled from 1.1 billion cubic meters (Bcm) in 2010 to 2.2 Bcm in 2021.³¹ Saudi Arabia’s Saline Water Conversion Corporation (SWCC) is upgrading multiple desalination plants to reduce their energy consumption by 2024. New requirements for these plants call for less than 3 kilowatthours (kWh) per cubic meter of desalinated water, instead of the traditional 15 kWh. In total, the desalination plants receiving these upgrades account for 94% of Saudi Arabia’s desalinated water production.³²

Renewable energy sources made up less than 1% of electricity generation in Saudi Arabia from 2018 to 2022.³³ The Saudi National Renewable Energy Program (NREP) intends to increase this share to 50% by 2030 through several solar and wind projects.³⁴ Saudi Arabia’s General Authority for Statistics reported 13 NREP projects as underway in 2020, and the Saudi Power Procurement Company (SPPC) announced a series of new agreements for wind projects and solar projects through 2022 and 2023.³⁵ Additional updates for major projects include:

The Dumat Al Jandal wind farm began generating power in August 2021. It has the largest capacity of any wind farm in the Middle East, and it is the first wind farm in Saudi Arabia.³⁶

The Sakaka solar project started operations in June 2021; it is the first utility-scale solar power project in Saudi Arabia.³⁷

The Rabigh solar project in Makkah Province began operations in April 2023.³⁸

Saudi Arabia’s ACWA Power and Water and Electricity Holding Company signed agreements for Al-Shuaiba 2 in November 2022; it will have the largest capacity of any single-site solar power plant in the world.³⁹

Energy Trade

Saudi Arabia exported an estimated 7.3 million b/d of crude oil in 2022, up 13% from 6.5 million b/d in 2021 as a result of increased annual crude oil production. Saudi Arabia’s crude oil exports were 34% of all 2022 exports from OPEC members.⁴¹

According to customs data from Global Trade Tracker, countries in Asia were Saudi Arabia’s primary export market for crude oil and condensate. Countries in Asia received 79% of Saudi Arabia’s total annual exports in 2022, up from 72% in 2018 and subsequent years of steady year-over-year increases. China is Saudi Arabia’s top crude oil importer, accounting for 25% of 2022 exports, followed by Japan, South Korea, and India.⁴²

Saudi Arabia imported 257,000 b/d of fuel oil in the first half of 2023, up 51% year over year from 171,000 b/d in the first half of 2022, driven by increased imports from Russia. Imports of fuel oil from Russia initially increased during the summer of 2022 to meet demand for power generation in Saudi Arabia. Substantially higher imports began in February 2023 because of discounted prices for fuel oil from Russia.⁴³

Endnotes

1. U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Statistics (accessed June 2023); Energy Institute, Statistical Review of World Energy, 2023.
2. Maha El Dahan and Ahmad Ghaddar, Reuters, “Why are OPEC+ supply cuts failing to boost oil prices?,“ July 4, 2023; Alex Lawler, Reuters, “OPEC oil output falls on Saudi cut and Nigerian outage, Reuters survey finds,“ July 31, 2023.
3. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Today in Energy, “EIA forecasts crude oil prices will increase through 2024 as demand rises above supply,“ July 19, 2023; Maha El Dahan and Ahmed Elimam, Reuters, “Saudi Arabia extends 1 million barrel-per-day oil cut, may deepen it in future,“ August 3, 2023. Maha El Dahan and Yousef Saba, Reuters, “Saudi Arabia, Russia extend voluntary oil cuts to year-end, markets jump,“ September 5, 2023.
4. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Vision 2030 (accessed July 2023).
5. Saudi Aramco, “Jafurah: the jewel of our unconventional gas program,“ December 29, 2022; Saudi Aramco, Annual Report 2022, March 10, 2023; Thomas Everill, The Borgen Project, “Recent Developments for Renewable Energy in Saudi Arabia,“ January 7, 2023; International Trade Administration, “Saudi Arabia Renewable Energy,“ September 13, 2021; Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Vision 2030 (accessed July 2023).
6. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Short-Term Energy Outlook Data Browser (accessed August 2023);
7. U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Statistics (accessed July 2023); Saudi Aramco, Annual Report 2022, March 10, 2023.
8. Oil & Gas Journal, “OPEC+ surprises markets with voluntary cuts of 1.15 million b/d,“ April 3, 2023.
9. Conglin Xu, Oil & Gas Journal, “Saudi Arabia to further reduce output as OPEC+ sticks to 2023 production cut target,“ June 5, 2023; U.S. Energy Information Administration, Today in Energy, “EIA forecasts crude oil prices will increase through 2024 as demand rises above supply,“ July 19, 2023. Maha El Dahan and Yousef Saba, Reuters, “Saudi Arabia, Russia extend voluntary oil cuts to year-end, markets jump,“ September 5, 2023.
10. Saudi Aramco, Base Prospectus, June 7, 2021; U.S. Energy Information Administration, Today in Energy, “Changing quality mix is affecting crude oil price differentials and refining decisions,“ September 21, 2017.
11. Saudi Aramco, Annual Report 2022, March 10, 2023; Dhahran A. Bakr, Energy Intelligence, “Aramco Sets Out Project Plans for Next Three Years,“ February 3, 2023; Christopher E. Smith, Oil & Gas Journal, “Aramco advancing crude development projects to boost output by 1.5 million b/d,“ March 13, 2023; Alex Lawler, Reuters, “Explainer: How much extra oil can Saudi Arabia pump?“ July 18, 2022.
12. Oil & Gas Journal, Worldwide Look at Reserves and Production, December 5, 2022.
13. William Pentland, Forbes, “World’s Five Largest Offshore Oil Fields,“ September 7, 2013; Oil & Gas Middle East, “Revealed: 5 largest oilfields in the Middle East,“ April 3, 2023; Saudi Aramco, Products: Oil Production (accessed August 2023).
14. U.S. Energy Information Administration, Short-Term Energy Outlook, July 2023; U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Statistics (accessed July 2023).
15. Saudi Aramco, Base Prospectus, June 7, 2021; Oil & Gas Journal, Worldwide, US Refinery Survey-Capacities as of Jan. 1, 2023, Jan 30,2023, page 17; Jeslyn Lerh and Trixie Sher Li Yap, Reuters, “Saudi Aramco to ramp up Jizan fuel output, sources say,“ March 27, 2023; Jamie Ingram, Middle East Economic Survey, “Aramco CEO: Jazan Refinery Throughputs Hit 4000,000 B/D Capacity?,“ March 17, 2023.
16. U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Statistics (accessed July 2023).
17. Saudi Aramco, Base Prospectus, June 7, 2021.
18. Rystad Energy UCube (accessed June 2023).
19. World Bank, Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership (GGFR), Global Gas Flaring Tracker; Saudi Aramco, “Saudi Aramco Joins World Bank’s Initiative: Zero Routine Flaring by 2030,“ November 6, 2019.
20. Rystad Energy UCube (accessed June 2023).
21. Saudi Aramco, “Jafurah: the jewel of our unconventional gas program,“ December 29, 2022.
22. Saudi Aramco, Annual Report 2022, March 10, 2023.
23. Rania El Gamal, Reuters, “Saudi Aramco aims to become gas exporter with $150 billion investment drive,“ November 26, 2018; Rania El Gamal, Reuters, “Saudi Arabia aims to export 3 bln cubic feet/day of gas before 2030,“ February 26, 2019.
24. Fahad M. Alturki and Asad Kahn, Jadwa Investments, Natural Gas and the Vision 2030, October 2016.
25. U.S. Energy Information Administration, International Energy Statistics (accessed July 2023); Energy Institute, Statistical Review of World Energy, 2023.
26. Energy Institute, Statistical Review of World Energy, 2023.
27. Joint Organisations Data Initiative, JODI Oil World Database; Middle East Economic Survey, Weekly Energy, Economic & Geopolitical Outlook, “Middle East Oil Demand Set for Summer Surge,“ June 2, 2023, Vol. 66 No. 22.
28. Middle East Economic Survey, Weekly Energy, Economic & Geopolitical Outlook, “Middle East Oil Demand Set for Summer Surge,“ June 2, 2023, Vol. 66 No. 22.
29. Doosan Enerbility, “Doosan Enerbility Signs Contract for Jafurah Cogeneration Plant Project in Saudi Arabia,“ September 23, 2022.
30. Saudi Aramco, “Jafurah: the jewel of our unconventional gas program,“ December 29, 2022; Doosan Enerbility, “Doosan Enerbility Signs Contract for Jafurah Cogeneration Plant Project in Saudi Arabia,“ September 23, 2022.
31. Ayman A. Hashem and Ahmed A. Bakhsh, Energy Source, Part G: Economics, Planning, and Policy, “The cost analysis of electric power generation in Saudi Arabia,“ March 10, 2017, Vol. 12 No. 6, pages 591–596; Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzega and Elise Cassignol, Policy Center for the New South, The Geopolitics of Seawater Desalination, September 2022; Rinat Gainullin and Hala H. Koura, Arab News, “The rise and rise of water desalination in Saudi Arabia,“ September 11, 2022.
32. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Sustainable Development, Decarbonatization in desalination sector in KSA(accessed July 2023); Saline Water Conversion Corporation (SWCC), Decarbonization of the water sector, August 31, 2022; Achref Chibani, Arab Center Washington DC, “The Costs and Benefits of Water Desalination in the Gulf,“ April 12, 2023.
33. Energy Institute, Statistical Review of World Energy, 2023.
34. International Trade Administration, “Saudi Arabia Renewable Energy,“ September 13, 2021; Thomas Everill, The Borgen Project, “Recent Developments for Renewable Energy in Saudi Arabia,“ January 7, 2023.
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36. Al Jazeera, “Saudi Arabia’s first wind farm begins electricity production,“ August 8, 2021; Thomas Everill, The Borgen Project, “Recent Developments for Renewable Energy in Saudi Arabia,“ January 7, 2023.
37. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Energy, Ministry’s Projects (accessed August 2023).
38. AWCA Power, Projects, Sakaka PV IPP (accessed August 2023).
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40. Energy Institute, Statistical Review of World Energy, 2023.
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42. Global Trade Tracker, Analytics, Country Level Tradeflows (accessed July 2023).
43. Kpler (accessed August 2023); Jamie Ingram, Middle East Economic Survey, “Saudi Imports Record Russian Oil Amid Diesel Surge,“ April 14, 2023; Jeslyn Lerh, Reuters, “Saudi Arabia imports record Russian fuel oil in June as trade grows,“ July 12, 2023.

In order for nations to address their power deficits and maintain their influence, a significant shift away from unilateralism is imperative, and an even more significant shift toward forging strategic alliances will be required.

By Mohamed Cassimjee

The present global world order

‘Nothing is built on stone; all is built on sand, but we must build as if the sand were stone’, — Jorge Luis Borges, Argentine poet.

This quotation aptly describes the present global world order, which can best be characterised as a ‘Strategic Alliance Global Order’. This concept can help to make sense of present developments and the evolving international system, and in developing a strategic response.

The present world order, as it evolves, is as multifaceted as it is complex. Influence is diffused, with an emerging quadrilateral power rivalry in different configurations and alliances (US, EU, China, Russia). This does not exclude other possible rising rivals from organisations or other emerging powers (creating a two-tier system). The present world order has a definite non-hegemonic power dynamic. It is also marked by a schism between democracies and autocracies; there is a divide on adherence to an international rules-based system and a north/south historical dynamic.

The US’s National Intelligence Council in its Global Trends report for 2012 had already posited that: ‘The shift in national power … may be overshadowed by an even more fundamental shift in the nature of power. By 2030, no country — whether the US, China or any other large country — will be a hegemonic power’.¹

Its most recent report in 2019 reinforced this perspective, stating that: ‘No single state is likely to be positioned to dominate across all regions or domains, opening the door for a broader range of actors to advance their interests.’²

Defining the Strategic Alliance Global World Order

The ‘Strategic Alliance Global Order’ can be defined by the absence of absolute, dominant power by any individual country, and therefore the need, especially by major states, to counterbalance other aspirant states within the specific context of a non-hegemonic global environment. How this competition or cooperation plays out will become a critical issue.

As a result, countries start to scramble to restructure and build new alliances, as energy supplies, global value chains and national security interests are threatened. Principles are sometimes sacrificed at the altar of realpolitik, as a means of survival. Old allies become new enemies while old enemies become new allies. Military budgets grow and joint exercises are conducted with traditional partners but also with new potential allies, in anticipation of an increased military threat.

For countries to compensate for the deficit of power and to maintain influence, a drastic shift away from unilateralism is necessitated and an even more drastic move towards strategic alliances will be required. This pattern will become the new dominant approach in international relations, giving rise to strategic alliances. The focus on building and maintaining such alliances will become critical, not only for national and foreign policy interests, but also for the global balance of power. The ‘Strategic Alliance Global Order’³ is thus born and in motion.

The US, EU, Russia and China – the dominant players at present – will continue to expand their spheres of alliance by courting countries across the globe. Of special attention will be Latin America, Africa, Asia and the Pacific and in some cases parts of Europe. Major powers will also place emphasis on “traditional middle powers and emerging middle powers” that are able to exercise regional and global influence.⁴

In this regard, the Ukraine war has turbo-charged the ‘Strategic Alliance World Order,’ which had already begun at the end of the 20^th century, as the old-world order with its own characteristics started to erode. Joseph Borrell, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, alluded to this in March 2022 just after the Ukraine war started: ‘Crises tend to crystallise developments and this one has made it even clearer that we live in a world shaped by raw power politics, where everything is weaponised and where we face a fierce battle of narratives. All these trends were already happening before the Ukraine war; now they are accelerating’, he wrote.

Implications for diplomatic engagements

The central argument of this paper is that there is an important new development that goes beyond the traditional reasons for bilateral and international engagement that is infusing the international because of the ‘Strategic Alliance Global Order’. This new power dynamic calls for a different approach by both powerful and less powerful countries in their engagement with one another.

We are likely to see both moribund and new partnerships resurrected or mooted; summits will be hosted, and cooperative approaches advanced, as present non-hegemonic dominant countries as well as middle and emerging powers seek to build alliances based on common values and mutual benefits or driven by realpolitik. Countries will also use mechanisms such as soft power more, through an increase in financial aid, enhanced trade cooperation, investment initiatives, military and political cooperation. Because the focus will be on regions that hold the best opportunities for sharing common interests, the benefits of soft power could flow in that direction at the expense of others. Countries will also use extensive social media campaigns to highlight the benefits of their actions, whether actual or anticipated.

It is therefore critical that in such a diplomatic dance, major powers need to understand that it cannot be business as usual. Less powerful countries need to understand that this new power dynamic creates opportunities for a more even-handed way of engagement.

As perfectly described in an article in the Financial Times by Ivan Krastev on the influence of middle powers, ‘…they all share one fundamental feature: they are all determined to be at the table and not on the menu, since they all have the power and ambition to shape their regions’.⁵

Not adapting to this model, where the margin for error is exceedingly small and the stakes are high, is to risk threatening the very goal of winning over a potential partner and losing the balance of power in favour of other strong nations. In the case of less powerful countries, it may mean giving up on important gains. Bilateral, regional, mini lateral⁶ and multilateral negotiations in the pursuit of establishing and strengthening partnerships will therefore need to be for the mutual benefit of all parties.

International relations will have to focus on building strategic alliances, which can be activated via bilateral relations, regional groupings or minilateral configurations. In pursuit of building alliances, bilateral relations may be intensified through an increase in diplomatic engagements and the arrangement of structured mechanisms such as binational commissions and dialogue forums. Regional groupings will grow as countries seek security and relevance, and to exert their regional influence. Minilateralism as an alternative form of collective action will also become more prevalent in building alliances and solving disputes, beyond just military cooperation and include cooperation designed to assist with creating a forum to broadly advance regional interests.⁷

Therefore, it is not incomprehensible that while bilateral and multilateral diplomacy will continue to be used, minilateralism may become the main mechanism to resolve most of the world’s most pressing challenges (such as the Ukraine war) due to its more focused and less bureaucratic character. This prominence is also reflected in groupings like the G20, G7 and BRICS.⁸ Minilateralism will grow in importance, especially in areas where multilateralism has been unable to resolve problems.

The rise of alliances

The jostling for influence by major powers, in order to build alliances, has resulted in less dominant countries reflecting on how best to adapt their foreign policies. The concern is that to choose sides will mean the loss of opportunity to maintain control over foreign policy choices that would be in their national interests.

In regions such as Latin America and the Caribbean, where major powers have competed to bring countries into their sphere of influence in the past, many are seeking an alternative policy strategy to choosing sides. In their book Latin American Foreign Policies in the New World Order: The Active Non-Alignment Option, former Chilean Ambassador and Minister Jorge Heine and political scientists Carlos Fortin and Carlos Ominami argue that Latin America and the Caribbean must avoid being caught between China and the US.⁹

Academic Juan Tokatlian argues that ‘one can realize that the vast majority of Latin American countries are already searching for a more balanced foreign policy: a complex equilibrium in exceedingly difficult international circumstances. A diplomacy that seeks an equidistant position.’¹⁰

In a major foreign policy speech, British Foreign Secretary James Cleverly in referring to Britain’s future foreign policy strategy, alluded to the concepts that have been posited in the “Strategic Alliance Global Order”. He stated that: “[We] will make a long term and sustained effort to revive old friendships and build new ones, reaching far beyond our long-established alliances”.¹¹ For the UK in a post-Brexit era which is geopolitically fraught, and without belonging to the European Union as a powerful bloc, adapting, designing, and creating a “new” foreign relations paradigm will require an ever more strategic approach, which encapsulates the present power dynamics in international relations.

Arrangements that embrace both soft and hard power, such as the EU’s, will expand as emergent powers attempt to project influence through regional blocs. This view has been vindicated by data showing that support for leaving has dropped significantly in EU countries with 72% viewing the EU favourably compared to 26% who viewed it unfavourably, while countries in the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership who are not members are also clamouring to join.¹² In the UK, opinion polls show that support for Brexit is at 33% with 55% indicating that it was wrong to leave.¹³ The Ukraine war will further accelerate this trend as in times of global uncertainty being part of a bloc provides strength in numbers and structure. The EU will continue to grow in geopolitical importance after a challenging period when hope in the EU project was floundering. The approval of “A Strategic Compass” action plan by the EU to strengthen its security and defence policy by 2030 is an attempt to compensate for the absence of hard power.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in an address in Prague in August 2022 emphasised that the EU would invest in new partnerships – in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Political and economic diversification is, incidentally, also part of the answer to the question as to how we deal with the superpower China and the triad of ‘partner, competitor and rival’. Scholz added that the EU would also ‘make itself ’fit’ for future enlargement’.¹⁴ In this respect, the EU will continue to reorganise, overcoming the hesitancy of the objectives it set out, to strive to become an important European and global force, whose focus will turn increasingly to matters of geopolitics and the use of hard power.¹⁵

This development will be positive for regional powers like South Africa which form part of a select group of countries that have a strategic partnership with the EU. It will also be positive for Africa in the form of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership. A strong opportunity thus exists for South Africa and Africa to negotiate for better outcomes as important regional powers and continents are being lobbied intensely by blocs like the EU. The EU believes that it must continue to build solid alliances with partners in Africa ‘[i]n order to preserve its own economic and security interests in the face of increased geopolitical competition’.¹⁶

A new ‘European political community’ was also inaugurated at a meeting in October 2022 as an informal intergovernmental gathering of both EU and non-EU countries sharing common values. Its purpose is to foster cooperation on issues of common interest, revolving around peace and security, the economic situation, energy and climate and migration and mobility.¹⁷

The pursuit of alliance-building across the world is also reflected in the number of high-level diplomatic visits, the establishment of military alliances, the strengthening of economic linkages through endeavours such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative or the US/G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investments, as well the signing of bilateral and regional trade agreements. We can also observe a similar pattern in the Pacific Islands with the ‘Friends to All’ strategy that these islands are employing as a way of mitigating geostrategic competition.¹⁸ The recent overtures by China in this region, and the first-ever US-Pacific Island Country Summit on 29 September 2022, highlight this point.¹⁹

Countries use both formal and more informal regional trading blocs and groupings to expand their influence, such as the EU, or Eurasian Economic Union championed by Russia, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, (or RCEP) led by China. The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Transpacific Partnership, (or CPTPP) is also being prioritised as a similar organisation that can advance the interests of members who belong to a powerful trade bloc. In this regard it has also attracted the attention of countries outside the Asia-Pacific bloc like the UK which joined recently.²⁰

The initial TPP proposed by the US was intended to build partnerships with countries in the Pacific to counter China’s growing economic strength. The Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from the negotiations, however, did not stop the rest of the grouping from proceeding. Informal trade groups that are being utilised to build influence are the US-led initiative in the form of the Indo-Pacific Framework launched in 2022 and the Russian-led Eastern Economic Forum.

In vying for influence, China and Russia are likely to place greater importance on groupings such as the BRICS as a Southern counterbalance to the North. In 2022 a number of countries from the Global South indicated their interest in joining the BRICS and at the 2022 summit a decision was taken to consider the modalities and principles of such an expansion.²¹ At the August 2023 BRICS Summit in Johannesburg, six countries – Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – were invited to join the organisation from 1 January 2024. Over 40 countries had expressed some interest in joining BRICS, and over 20 formally applied. The creation of an alternative economic architecture will drive the expansion,²² as will the new and uncertain global order. There is a possibility that with no country claiming to be a singular superpower, China and Russia – the more powerful countries – could become more amenable to the interests of the group.

Formal military-based alliances like NATO are also drawing more candidates, with many countries in Europe opting to now join the security umbrella. In 2019, NATO was being criticised for being ‘brain dead’ by French President Emmanuel Macron, for lacking direction.²³ Now, in the wake of the war in Ukraine, even avowedly neutral countries such as Sweden and Finland that once would not have contemplated such a move applied to join. Finland joined in April 2023 and Sweden may join during the course of 2023. The Ukraine war has acted as a catalyst for a closer alliance between the US and Europe.

There will also be countries that are looking to build alliances across different blocs, so as to have wider influence. In this regard India now belongs to different alliances representing the global divide such as BRICS, East Asia Summit, the Asian Regional Forum, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, or SCO). In order to expand its influence in Asia, the US is also relying on minilateral groups such as the “Quad” grouping consisting of the US, Australia, India and Japan as well as the AUKUS, the trilateral security agreement between Australia, the UK and the United States.²⁴

Importantly, countries are also acting from a genuine need for mutual bilateral and international cooperation. They do indeed support each other on common global challenges. Cooperation has covered many areas, such as on pandemics, peace and security, climate change and the financial crisis among others. COVID-19 was an excellent example of the global community cooperating to act in the best interests of humanity, although more could have been done for developing and least developed countries to have both access to vaccines and to allow for relaxation of patent rules required for the productions and supply of vaccines.²⁵

Affluent countries also provide critical resources, supporting domestic priorities and providing development cooperation, for the upliftment of less prosperous states. Countries also strive to enhance trade and investment, while regional groupings provide a platform and mechanisms to deal with critical regional and global issues. This aspect of international relations cannot be underestimated, as it provides a framework for a more cooperative future world order.

Strategic planning as a foreign policy tool in the ‘Strategic Alliance Global Order’

In the 21st century, international relations are continuously shifting, making the execution of statecraft which ‘includes the construction of strategies for securing national and global interests as well as the execution of these strategies by diplomats’ more difficult to manage.²⁶ This also requires the application of statecraft that is able to deliver a strategy that provides for the best outcomes.

As a result of the complexity of the geopolitical environment, multi-goal strategic thinking must become more dominant. Countries that continue to focus on ‘one-track’ strategies and unilateral or unilinear statecraft are likely to fail.²⁷

By creating a paradigm based on identifying certain key developments around the ‘Strategic Alliance World Order,’ outlined above, policy makers and key strategists will be able to better anticipate and understand specific events, and then create a strategy to cope with multiple scenarios and the implications thereof.

An effective player on the international stage will therefore be cognisant of the fact, that in the present world order, the pursuit of national and global interests will have to be balanced with anticipating the fluid changes in the building of alliances, and how they impact on relations with different countries and groupings.

This will also require a high-level foreign policy strategic thinking, and the presence of highly qualified, trained, and professional diplomats practising the art of statecraft in a complicated and shifting and evolving international relations environment. Over 70 years ago, Morgenthau was arguing that ‘Diplomacy of high quality will bring the ends and means of foreign policy into harmony with available resources of national power. It will tap the hidden sources of national strength and transform them fully and securely into political realities.’²⁸

South Africa’s Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Dr Naledi Pandor, succinctly outlined what is required in the present global order in a statement made in the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) Strategic Plan 2020-2025:‘This requires a set of strategies that position the country to effectively engage in global politics, trade and development with the requisite capabilities to manage multi-layered relations within the global political and economic architecture’.²⁹

Strategic decisions taken based on foreign policy principles, should therefore be a careful process of considering actions and consequences, as opposed to a one-size-fits-all solution. The late former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said, ‘A lot of people think international relations is like a game of chess. But it is not a game of chess, where people sit quietly, thinking out their strategy, taking their time between moves. It is more like a game of billiards, with a bunch of balls clustered together’.³⁰

Statistician Nassim Taleb, in his essay, ‘The Black Swan: The Power of the Unpredictable’ describes a ‘black swan event’ as a certain unpredictable event that has a low probability of occurring and which, if it occurs, has far-reaching and exceptional consequences.³¹

The Ukraine war is such a ‘black swan’ moment that led to the UN General Assembly (which has only held 10 emergency sessions since 1950) to call such a session after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 because the UN Security Council had failed to exercise its primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security in line with the adoption of resolution 377A(V), widely known as ‘Uniting for Peace’.³² As a result of a black swan event, policy choices and consequences become much more complex and the need to undertake strategic planning becomes imperative. In a ‘Strategic Alliance Global Order,’ choices made will have to consider the implications for bilateral relations as alliances are built around common interests and threats.

A decision by individual nations on the Ukraine resolution of March 2022 would have meant a strategic assessment of the different options. In this respect nations would have needed to determine why they are opposing, abstaining or supporting the above-mentioned resolution. In doing so they would have had to consider the following:

Firstly, states will have considered what are the concomitant implications of each position taken for bilateral, regional, and global relations as well as the multilateral order in terms of the promotion of global peace and security.

Secondly, they will have considered the practical reality and how it will impact on developments on the ground in terms of the position taken. This would include considering whether an attempt at peace at that moment would have been possible considering the state of play between the parties, or would it need to be preceded by a war of attrition; or would peace attempts without substantial support in the widest possible terms mean military defeat and conceding of territory by one party?

Thirdly, nations will have needed to assess why they should abstain at such a moment of history where there had been a clear violation of national sovereignty of a member state and the principles of international law, falling into the category of jus cogens (compelling law)? What persuasive arguments and actions could be made for such an approach?

Fourthly, is an abstention vote to be considered by taking a position of political non-alignment or one of political alignment based on solidarity alliances and national interest? Many in the Global South have viewed the UNGA resolution as an initiative of the Global North against countries of the Global South and supported by countries with a colonial and anti-liberation past. This approach will not give precedence to the immediate legal arguments of the present conflict nor necessarily negate the moral one, as it is based on subjective reasoning.

The German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock in analysing the outcome of the vote, alluded to this fact by stating during an address to her ambassadors that; “While 141 countries condemned Russia’s invasion more than half of the global population did not vote with us… to understand why, when there is a choice between right and wrong, between victims and perpetrators, a country would simply abstain”.³³

On the other hand, Dr Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, India’s External Affairs Minister, said in a media interview at the GLOBESEC 2022 Bratislava Forum on 3 June 2022, that; ‘Europe has to grow out of the mindset that its problems are the world’s problems, but the world’s problems aren’t Europe’s problems.’³⁴

A good strategy will therefore highlight the myriad of options that should be considered, the reasons for accepting or rejecting them, how they should be applied and most importantly the geopolitical context within which these are being undertaken. In today’s digital world the effectiveness of the communication strategy also will need to be examined. This is based on the dictum of ‘influencing the space and informing the narrative’ which continues to be a vital part in any foreign policy position and strategy.

While it is imperative that conflicts or major events around the world should be examined fairly, it is still trite that not all conflicts and events are the same in terms of geopolitical implications. The guiding light should be the application of international rules and principles and actions that are not contra bonos mores (against good morals).

Countries’ actions are driven by national interests, collective global interests, international law and rules-based interests or process-driven interests (a different process or procedure could result in a better outcome), or a combination of these. Process-driven interests may sometimes be a form of obfuscation to make national interests more palatable in decision-making. In the context of international relations, countries need to ensure that they are on the right side of history or within the context of this analysis on the side of a rules- and law-based ‘Strategic Alliance Global Order’.

Way forward

At this historical juncture, with the ‘Strategic Alliance Global Order’ in motion, multiple alliances will need to be built. This is a consequence of the absence of absolute power and the need to compensate for the power deficit of powerful nations. In this regard, less powerful countries also have the opportunity of participating in such alliances from a position of strength. It is possible that the need for and the creation of multiple alliances may result in the gradual erosion of the silo mentality and gradually push the global community towards a greater spirit of cooperation with its concomitant benefits both nationally and internationally.

While not apparent on the surface, a secure global world order will become the raison d’etre for breaking down barriers between nations and groupings, as the negative impact of a present fractured world order becomes unsustainable.³⁵

A zeitenwende (an epochal tectonic shift moment for humanity), to borrow the German phrase from the speech made by the German Chancellor to the Bundestag on 27 February 2022, is taking hold. A positive outcome of these shifts is that the ‘Strategic Alliance Global Order’ may lead to the breakdown of barriers, as countries and the global community become even more dependent on each other and specifically on countries that play by the rules for the maintenance and preservation of security, economic prosperity and stability of the global order. While it may not be apparent as the world seems increasingly divided, one should not lose sight of a world that is committed to international cooperation. This was seen in the March 2022 vote for the UN resolution on the war in Ukraine which blurred the global divisions and did not fit into neat compartments. The vote patterns reflected an overwhelming support for an international rules-based system.³⁶

This approach, it should be stressed, does not negate both the historical as well as the unique developmental challenges of the world. Importantly, a focus of the global community should be on finding sustainable solutions that revolve around common values and are focus ed on our common humanity.

As a corollary of a future global order the following are the sine qua non for global harmony. namely, robust systems and structures that underpin global institutions, constitutionalism; independent judiciary; democracy, freedom, rule of law, human rights; international cooperation and solidarity; adherence to international law, economic inclusivity; respect for diversity; gender equality; environmentalism; a vociferous civil society and media and ‘moderation in global affairs’.³⁷

Conclusion

Reflecting on Gramsci’s ‘interregnum’ between the old which is dying and the new that has not been born yet, the state of flux in the international order may see countries forming opposing alliances that may lead to greater conflict and tension. But the opposite also holds true, that states may see that it is in their strategic interests to promote a more stable, cooperative and peaceful global order.

In fact, if states articulate their displeasure against countries that seek to create disorder by using various diplomatic mechanisms, this may serve as a strong deterrent. States may also remain ambivalent towards other states adapting to the prevailing currents.³⁸ The strategic alliance process is, therefore, not a static one.

The present ‘Strategic Alliance Global Order’ provides countries with a history of ‘acting as a bridge’ between different global configurations and groupings, an opportunity to promote alliances based on promoting and creating a better world. To achieve such an objective, countries should be seen to take a stand on upholding a rules-based system in a consistent manner and work together for the benefit of the global community.

In this respect South Africa provided a framework which was articulated by the former South African Foreign Minister, Alfred Nzo in 1994. He described how South Africa hoped to serve ‘as a bridge to bring together interests of the Industrialised World and the Non-Aligned World closer together.’³⁹

South Africa can therefore, together with other like-minded countries such as India or Brazil start to engage and continue its tradition of being a bridge in the 21^st century through alliance-building with other like-minded countries such as the Nordics, Canada, Japan, Germany or the UK (due to its history of being part of initiatives such as the Commonwealth). Such alliances can coalesce around issues of common and global interests. This approach does not exclude forming alliances with the major powers to promote a better world.

The Global South has a major responsibility to influence and shape the new world order by forming alliances with different parts of the global community to promote inclusivity and a rules-based international system. In this way new alliances will be configured that promote a ‘Strategic Alliance Global Order’ for positive change.

The views expressed in this publication/article are those of the author/s and do not necessarily reflect the views of the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA).

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Source: This article was published by South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA)