Day: October 18, 2023
By Jeremy Powell
One of the most eventful things to have happened recently was from an unexpected source. The State Department and the intelligence apparatus didn’t initiate any coups somewhere in the Third World, the Kremlin didn’t launch a blitzkrieg and capture Kiev, and a currency from the BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) hasn’t entered circulation yet. For the man who was once heralded as a savior for spearheading electric vehicle technology (even with bylines backing Barack Obama) and space exploration, Elon Musk has once again reaffirmed his status as the Beltway’s number one opponent in an extremely bold fashion, far outpacing his purchase of Twitter and the release of the Twitter Files. He denied a Ukrainian request to turn on Starlink and use it to help Kiev launch drone strikes on the Crimean city of Sevastopol.
The reaction was intense. Establishment media outlets screamed bloody treachery over the revelation that Musk singlehandedly thwarted a massive strike that could have been a game changer in Ukraine’s war with Russia, and the media dogpiled on Musk’s handling of X (formerly Twitter) for allowing “Russian propaganda.” Kiev was livid, declaring that Musk had been complicit in the deaths of innocent Ukrainian civilians. However, Musk stood by his decision. Given the importance of Ukraine (and its access to the Black Sea) to Russia as a geographical barrier preventing it from being encircled in continental Europe by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as well as the fact that NATO has already signaled that it will allow Ukraine to join once the war with Russia is over, Moscow has every strategic reason to prevent the recapturing of Crimea.
Aside from the media outrage, however, have been the cheers Musk has been receiving, which would have not been there if this incident had happened twenty years earlier. Many of the people who cheered for Musk aren’t predominantly tech geeks or social liberals; they’re from the American heartland, proud to wave the Stars and Stripes and be a good conservative patriot. Once upon a time, these people were unabashed in their defense of American foreign policy, declaring that it was America’s responsibility to democratize the world with bombs. However, the argument no longer captivates them; the recipients of these regime changes didn’t democratize as hoped. Iraq is under an authoritarian and corrupt state, while Afghanistan fell to the Taliban as ordinary Afghans became fed up with the corruption of American-backed Kabul and have demonstrated a preference for (a rough) peace. These conservative Americans are fed up with seeing their standard of living going away and genuinely well-intentioned relatives dying in failed wars that were for nothing; they want their money spent on issues that are more pressing.
Even better, many of them also want the government to step out altogether on certain matters. Vivek Ramaswamy and Ron DeSantis are adamant about getting rid of the Department of Education, returning education back to state policy. Robert F. Kennedy Jr. has earned much enthusiasm from libertarians for calling for a return to hard money by backing the dollar with bitcoin and gold, effectively constraining much of the Federal Reserve’s power. Donald Trump remains just as relevant as ever, with the ongoing indictments in Georgia making him look like the archenemy of the Beltway. Polarization is growing ever deeper—no longer between Left and Right but instead between the political elite and the dissidents. The talk of the town next year will be between Trump, Ramaswamy, Kennedy Jr., and maybe DeSantis, not Nikki Haley or Mike Pence.
Being completely realistic here, however, the chances of a much-needed downsize of government power—especially on matters well-engrained as the common ground of both the Left and Right of the Beltway—are a virtual impossibility. The political pundits and the Beltway aren’t giving up without a fight, and much of that only signals to voters how nervous the Beltway is. Even if one of these candidates wins the presidential election, the case of Trump’s many attempts to pull out of Afghanistan and how his staff routinely sabotagedhim is a grim reminder. One can argue that Trump should have appointed better employees, but under the weight of having your fate decided by people who could remove you from office by voting for impeachment, there’s not much you can do. Would Lindsey Graham and Mitch McConnell have not voted for impeachment if Trump had immediately followed suit with his promises to pull troops out of Afghanistan and normalize relations with Russia?
We’ve already seen states attempting to remove Trump from the ballot. One Proud Boys member has been sentenced to twenty-two years of imprisonment for the events of January 6th, even though he didn’t attend the riot. Musk is currently being sued by the Department of Justice for not hiring non–United States citizens, even though doing so would have violated international arms trafficking laws. Returning to the complicated relationship between Trump and establishment Senate Republicans, a unilateral change in foreign or domestic policy that goes outside the acceptable boundaries of interventionism, sound money, and the managerial state will not be accepted by the Beltway. They will only accept something that can benefit their ideals; in other words, they will twist and co-opt the opposition into backing the very same ideas that betray liberty.
Indeed, while the conservative movement is experiencing a change of mind, there are proposals that are heartily embraced by the Beltway or can be manipulated into servicing its plans. When Ramaswamy talks about his love for the Constitution, why Americans are dangerously ignorant about the purpose of the Constitution, and how he can rectify this ignorance by imposing a civics test that determines whether the test takers can vote, Ramaswamy should realize that—beyond the reaction from Leftists—the Beltway can determine how the Constitution is to be interpreted by the people, such as what constitutes free speech or sedition. With Republicans now backing “semiconductor independence,” what they mean is to throw more taxpayer money onto wasteful and inefficient economic projects, something Ramaswamy and the other candidates support. Kennedy Jr. wants a return of the fairness doctrine for traditional media to curb polarization, but who will do the enforcing? Like Ramaswamy’s civics test, the fairness doctrine will be enforced by the bureaucrats who have protection from establishment lawmakers.
Ultimately, and unfortunately, while there are major changes in policy orientation, the fundamental point that the government ought to do more remains and is reinforced by the idea that the government is run by incompetent people. Ramaswamy, Kennedy Jr., the rest of the candidates, and much of the general public view the government getting out of the way as part of the government doing something to rectify the problem—contrary to libertarian thinking that the government is the source of the problem.
For Kennedy Jr., restoring the gold standard is part of a broader plan to establish an alternative form of progressivism, where portions of the bureaucracy and government interference in the economy are exponentially expanded. For Ramaswamy, national independence takes greater precedence than individuality and freedom of exchange, which means international trade becomes more of a foreign policy issue than an economic one.
We’re only at the tip of the iceberg. We’re only approaching 2024, with 2028 and so on further in the future. It can’t be stressed enough how much the new populist movement has inherited from the Beltway Left on matters relating to the role of the government and the economy. The ideological positions of the “national conservatives”—or the “progressive right”—is a response to the supposed championing of laissez-faire economics even though these national conservatives have never accounted for the fact that the word “capitalism” has been so heavily distorted into legitimizing big government policies under Republican administrations (need I remind you of who called for a national lockdown and who started inflating the currency during covid?). With economic progressivism favored by the Beltway and much of the public living under the illusion that the US only needs to replace the incompetent people at the helm with competent people, America is still on the road to serfdom.
If anything, what Elon Musk was able to accomplish with Twitter (now X) did much to expose the Beltway’s activities, as well as Musk doing his bit to try and prevent a potential escalation of the war. Libertarians should raise a glass to him for not only fighting against government encroachment but demonstrating that the fight for liberty can be done more efficiently than betting on 2024.
About the author: Jeremy Powell is a blogger on Substack, His X (formerly Twitter) handle is @jpowell145.
Source: This article was published by the Mises Institute
By James Fite
Was Iran involved in the October 7 surprise attack on Israel by Hamas? Some say yes; others – including the Biden administration – say no. In truth, it may not matter anymore – if, indeed, it ever did. America has promised to back Israel, no matter what. Israel vowed to destroy Hamas.
And now Iran threatens war with Israel unless the invasion of Gaza is called off. The leaders of all three nations have made bold and absolute statements of intent, guarantees of action. But bold statements, easy as they are to utter, can come at a price. Unless someone backs off, we’re on the road to war.
Is Iran Calling Biden’s Bluff?
The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) stands ready at the border and could invade Gaza at any moment – and Iran has threatened a multi-front war should they do so. Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian reportedly told Tor Wennesland, the UN’s envoy to the Middle East, that while Iran doesn’t want the fight between Israel and Hamas to spread throughout the region, it would be forced to step in and defend Gaza if the IDF launches its ground assault.
It has been said that the surprise attack and the war thus far have cost more Jewish lives than any other single conflict since the Holocaust. It led Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to declare a total war on Hamas, vowing to not stop until the terrorist organization was destroyed entirely. It took several days, but President Biden and key officials from his administration offered America’s full support and promised to stand by Israel – even going so far as to warn other “state and non-state” actors not to get involved.
America has already sent shipments of weapons to Israel, but that isn’t all. An aircraft carrier strike group, led by the USS Gerald R. Ford, arrived off the coast of Israel last week, and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin announced Saturday that a second strike group, led by the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower was en route as well. The Air Force is sending A-10 Thunderbolt II jets to the region as well to “support the U.S.’ increased posture” in the area, according to a statement from US Central Command.
Still, Iran threatens to join the war against Israel – implying that Hezbollah in Lebanon would as well. Are they trying to call Biden’s bluff, or are they really okay with America joining the war?
If Iran hoped the US would stand down, it seems they’re going to be disappointed. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and Sen. Mitt Romney (R-UT) both spoke in Tel Aviv Sunday about the bipartisan support in the fight against Hamas. Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) explicitly warned Iran to stay out of the fight on Sunday. “Here’s my message,” he said. “If Hezbollah, which is a proxy of Iran, launches a massive attack on Israel, I would consider that a threat to the – to the state of Israel, existential in nature. I will introduce a resolution in the United States Senate to allow military action by the United States in conjunction with Israel to knock Iran out of the oil business. Iran, if you escalate this war, we’re coming for you.”
Surprised or Not, Iran Is Complicit
Many have questioned Iran’s involvement in the Saturday, October 7 attack. The Biden administration said last week that they didn’t see any “specific evidence that tells us they were wittingly involved in planning or involved in the resourcing and the training that went into this very complex set of attacks.” Maybe they weren’t – but then again, perhaps they were.
As Liberty Nation National Security Correspondent Dave Pattersonpointed out last week, Hamas doesn’t have the vast industrial weapons complex required to produce the thousands of rockets used in that one attack – never mind all the munitions fired into Israel before and after. How did the terrorist group acquire such ordinance? As Patterson explained, Iran has been providing Hamas with weapons, training, and other support for years.
Indeed, it’s no secret that Iran has supported both Hamas and Hezbollah all along – the nation is often called the world’s largest sponsor of terrorism for good reason. Even if that one attack did take Iran by surprise, that doesn’t mean they aren’t complicit.
Of course Iran doesn’t want Israel to wipe out Hamas. The ability to support attacks against an enemy through a pair of proxy groups that can shoulder the blame is a sweet gig for the Islamic Republic of Iran. The question is whether Foreign Minister Amir-Abdollahian’s words will be supported in action once the IDF assault begins in full force. The Biden administration has gone too far to back down now without looking feeble and weak – and with bipartisan support for a full defense of Israel in Congress, even that may not be an option.
No one wants to appear weak and wishy-washy when their allies are threatened – not Iran, and not the US. But Hamas kicked the hornet nest when it began this war, and Israel’s response is as natural as the hornet’s. Just how steep a price the US and Iran are willing to pay for their bold statements will undoubtedly be revealed when the bill comes due.
About the author: Editor-at-Large. James is our wordsmith extraordinaire, a legislation hound and lover of all things self-reliant and free. An author of politics and fiction (often one and the same) he homesteads in the Arkansas wilderness.
Source: This article was published by Liberty Nation
Since Vladimir Putin launched his expanded invasion of Ukraine last year and annexed more of the country into Russia—as he began to do in 2014 with the occupation of Crimea— relations between Kazakhstan and Russia have deteriorated (see EDM, September 9, 2021, and June 28, 2022).
An increasing number of Kazakhs are telling pollsters that they expect their country to be the next target of Russian aggression and that they assume that Moscow will exploit separatist attitudes within Kazakhstan if it does so. The number making such declarations is still relatively small, 15 percent in one survey this past summer, and both Kazakh officials and Kazakh commentators downplay the potential for such a development anytime soon. However, ever more Kazakh commentators are acknowledging that the potential for separatism based on a variety of groups is growing, backing Astana’s tough response against such a threat, and expressing concern that Moscow could get behind any one of them and threaten their country (Demos.kz, May 17; Novayagazeta.eu, July 13; Qmonitor.kz, October 6, 16).
There are three potential bases for separatism in Kazakhstan at the present time: the ethnic Russians in the north (often viewed as the only threat in this vein), other non-Kazakhs (who now form almost as large a share of the Kazakh population as ethnic Russians do), and sub-groups within the Kazakh nation, both tribal and regional (which are unhappy with the central government).
The separatist potential of the ethnic Russians in Kazakh has long been recognized. They formed a plurality of the population until the mid-1980s, but have now declined to approximately 15 percent, a development that has cut both ways as far as separatism is concerned. On the one hand, the ethnic Russians now represent a far smaller foundation for the development of such a movement. On the other hand, those who remain feel more threatened because of their increasingly marginal status. These remaining ethnic Russians may be more willing to listen to the siren song of Moscow about becoming part of Russia. This is especially the case as the increasingly dominant Kazakhs, who now number more than 70 percent of the population, sometimes behave in ways that the Russians find offensive. One example of this is the activity of the so-called “language patrols,” which demand that everyone in Kazakhstan speak Kazakh (Qmonitor.kz, October 11; see EDM, September 9, 2021).
Over the last several years, Astana has taken an increasingly hard line against any manifestation of Russian separatism. They have gone so far as charging a variety of ethnic Russian individuals with engaging in separatist activities, criminalizing the possession of Russian passports, and, most recently, promoting the idea that all residents of Kazakhstan should describe themselves as Kazakhs rather than as Kazakhstantsy.
Moving away from this historical distinction, rooted in Soviet conceptions of ethnicity and nationality, is an idea that Kazakh leaders themselves had promoted beginning in the 1970s, but one that offends many ethnic Russians and some ethnic Kazakhs because it challenges traditional ethnic identities (Qmonitor.kz, July 24). As a result, while Kazakhstan has suppressed some separatist activities among Russians, it undoubtedly has made others even more unhappy with the situation in the country. This could explode if the country becomes unstable, or if outside forces more actively support Russian separatism in Kazakhstan than they appear to be doing at present (Stanradar.com, August 3, 2022; Qmonitor.kz, October 16).
In addition to the Russians, however, Kazakhstan faces separatist challenges from two other directions. These could be exploited by Russia and thus become even more important than the Russian minority in this regard. The first comes from the increasingly numerous non-Russian minorities, some of whom have engaged in violent actions over the last several years, convinced they are the victims of discrimination and are not receiving their share of the national wealth.
As of 2022, the largest state minorities include Uzbeks (3.2 percent), Ukrainians (1.9 percent), Uyghurs (1.5 percent), Germans (1.1 percent), and Tatars (1.1 percent), alongside many less numerous groups (The Qazakstan Monitor, May 2). Some of these populations want ethnic statehood either as autonomies within Kazakhstan, which remains a unitary state, or even independence if the situation does not change (see EDM, February 11, 2020; Windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com, February 18, 2020).
But perhaps the most important of these sources of separatism now come from within the Kazakh nation (as traditionally defined) on the basis of regional, religious, or tribal identities. Ethnic Kazakhs in the west have challenged Astana repeatedly in what most dismiss as merely economic protests, but these demonstrations contain an important secessionist message, as do religious protests (Stanradar.com, August 3, 2022; Vpoanalytics.com, August 15, 2022; Windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com, February 22).
However, the most important of these intra-Kazakh divisions consists of a social formation not found in any other post-Soviet country. From time immemorial, Kazakhs have always been divided into three great tribal confederations known as zhus, with almost every ethnic Kazakh knowing whether he or she is a member of the Older, Lesser, or Middle zhus—and with major government jobs routinely handed out on the basis of those identities.
Many had expected that with modernization, the role of the zhus in Kazakh society would lessen, and there is some evidence of that (Turanpress.kz, June 23, 2022). However, a curious thing has happened instead, according to Russian analyst Vladimir Prokhavtilov. These divisions have become more important as Kazakhs move toward becoming the overwhelming majority of the population, and as more traditional ethnic Kazakhs have returned from abroad. In the past, Kazakhs of whatever zhus could be counted upon to unite against any perceived ethnic Russian threat given the size of that nationality in Kazakhstan. Now, they are increasingly turning on one another, given the declining significance of the Russian minority (Fondsk.ru, March 17). Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev is worried about that, not least because these divisions too could easily be exploited by Russia or another outside power (Akorda.kz, March 13). Due to this, he has taken the lead in promoting a civic identity for all, despite its counter-productive risks (Qmonitor.kz, July 24).
In contrast to most analysts in the West, Russian specialists in the region focus on these alternative sources of separatism in Kazakhstan. Moscow is clearly aware that these divisions pose just as much a threat to Astana as Tokayev fears. Such groups also know that these potential fissures can be exploited either directly or by false flag operations to threaten Astana and force it to revise its current foreign policy stance, which the Kremlin views as anti-Russian (Windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com, September 10, 2022). Indeed, one Moscow analyst has pointedly noted that Tokayev and his regime “should not be afraid of some mythical independent Northern Kazakhstan, but of the emergence of an independent emirate” or regional power elsewhere in what is now Kazakhstan (Vpoanalytics.com, August 15, 2022).
At the very least, Western analysts and governments must be similarly aware of these possibilities, as they work to help Kazakhstan break many of its ties with Russia, but in ways that will not end by breaking Kazakhstan.
This article was published by The Jamestown Foundation’s Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 20 Issue: 160
By Milica Stojanovic
Serbian Trade Minister Tomislav Momirovic and Chinese Commerce Minister Wang Wentao signed a free trade deal between the two countries at the third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, a Chinese economic and political gathering in Beijing on Tuesday.
Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic hailed the deal as “a big step forward for us”.
Vucic said that before Serbia becomes a European Union member state, “we have to live… and we have to think about our country, our children and our future”.
Vucic also hailed his meeting with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping.
“[We had] a very important, you can hardly have a more important bilateral meeting in the world than the one we had today with President Xi, an extremely friendly conversation on all important topics,” he told media in Beijing.
Vucic also said that he spoke informally to Russian leader Vladimir Putin, explaining that “we spoke briefly, very briefly, we did not have a bilateral meeting”, but gave no further details of what was said.
Serbia’s Ministry of Construction, Transport and Infrastructure announced that it signed three commercial contracts with Chinese companies related to infrastructure projects worth “almost four billion euros for about 300 kilometres of new roads”. The contracts include the purchase of five Chinese high-speed trains.
Various memorandums of understanding and agreements were also signed between Serbia and China, according to an official statement.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative has had a large impact in the Balkans already.
According to an analysis by BIRN, in 2021 there were at least 61 projects in various stages of completion in Serbia that had been or were being implemented by or in cooperation with Chinese entities over a period of a decade, worth at least 18.7 billion euros.
According to BIRN’s estimate, at the end of 2021, there were 135 projects worth at least 32 billion euros in the Balkan region that were linked to China in some way.
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban also met Chinese President Xi in Beijing at the economic forum.
The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a press release that Orban and Xi agreed that the two countries “should work for the completion and opening of the Budapest-Belgrade Railway on schedule, run the Central European Trade and Logistics Cooperation Zone well, increase the size of cross-border e-commerce, and expand cooperation in information technology and new energy industries”.
Orban also held a meeting with Putin, maintaining his ties to the Russian leader despite his war against Ukraine.
Putin’s press service said Orban told Putin that “Hungary has never wanted to stand against Russia; on the contrary, its goal has always been to build and expand the best mutual contacts. And we have managed to do so.”
Orban also said that because of the war and EU sanctions against Russia, “our relations and the very basis of what we built together has been severely damaged”. Hungary has opposed further sanctions on Russia.
Orban added that Budapest was “trying to save what is left” of bilateral contacts with Moscow.
By Manoj Joshi
Beijing is struggling hard to cope with the fallout of the latest crisis in West Asia. It has adopted a seemingly neutral stance, refusing to name Hamas in its condemnation of the violence there and reiterating its known positions on the need for a two-state solution on the Palestine issue. Its aim is to ensure that it maintains its traction with the Arab states of the region, who are once again focused on the Palestinian issue. It has called for a ceasefire and resumption of negotiations between the two sides and dispatched a special envoy to the region. Its strategy seems aimed at working steadily to translate its economic clout in the region into geopolitical clout in the medium term.
On 9 October, two days after the horrific Hamas attack, Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman, Mao Ning, said China had been “deeply saddened” by the civilian casualties and opposes and condemns acts that harm civilians. She did not refer to Hamas by name and went on to add that it was “essential to restart the peace talks, implement the two-state solution and settle the Palestine question fully and properly through political means.”
In recent years, China has emerged as a growing force in West Asia as the United States’ (US) interests have shifted to the Indo-Pacific. The region is the source of much of the oil that China needs, and it is the main trading partner to most of the countries in the region, even though the US remains the leading military and diplomatic power there. Beijing has good relations with all the principal states—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Israel, and Iran—and it views the region both as a key economic partner and an important geopolitical objective. A hallmark of its growing influence was the stir caused earlier this year when it brokered a peace deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
China has good trade and technology ties with Israel, but it knows that the Jewish state, once called the 51st state of the US, has a deep and unwavering relationship with the US. It was not surprising that the US rushed two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region to deter third-party intervention in the current Gaza war.
China learnt its lesson in the early 2000s, when the US put an end to the flourishing Israel-China defence technology relationship. One of the beneficiaries of this was India, which got the Phalcon airborne early warning system that the Israelis had developed for China. Thereafter, this relationship has played out in civilian technology areas and has considerable depth even now.
From the 1950s and 60s, China supported the notion of a Palestinian state as being part of a liberation movement. But after China recognised Israel in 1992, it cultivated good ties with both Israel and Palestine. In June, Xi Jinping had welcomed Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to Beijing for a state visit and offered to mediate on the Israel-Palestine issue. In the joint statement after the visit, Xi “stressed that the Palestinian question has remain unresolved for over half a century, causing great sufferings to the Palestinian people, and that justice must be done to Palestine as soon as possible.” He called for the convening of a “large scale, more authoritative and more influential international peace conference” to achieve this.
Thereafter, Xi had also invited Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to visit China and the Israeli PM had indicated that he would do so. But, so far, the visit has not materialised. The Gaza war had probably upended the plans, but they do indicate a Chinese thrust towards a larger, if not decisive, role in resolving the Israel-Palestine issue.
Therefore China is trying to portray itself as neutral power and as a peacemaker in the region. China’s Special Envoy on Middle East Affairs, Zhai Zhun, said in a statement last week that China would like to coordinate with Egypt to work out a peace agreement between the Israelis and Palestinians. He added that, “the fundamental solution lies in implementing the two-state solution.” This week, Zhai Zhun is expected to visit the region and take forward the Chinese plans.
But the growing conflict has compelled China to take a more forward stand in support of the Arabs. Last Saturday, Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, told his Saudi counterpart, Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, in a phone call that “Israel’s actions [the siege of Gaza] have gone beyond self defence and it should heed the call of the international community and the Secretary General of the United Nations to stop its collective punishment of the people of Gaza.”
Then, on Monday, in a meeting with Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, in Moscow, Wang called for a ceasefire. He said that the UN Security Council needed to act urgently and that major powers should play a major role. “It is imperative that a ceasefire be put in place; that the two sides be brought back to the negotiating table” to prevent a further humanitarian disaster.
China’s stepping in in the current war indicates its longer-term strategy for the region. Besides the Saudi-Iran détente, Beijing played a key role in bringing Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, and Iran into the BRICS grouping earlier this year. An analysis by the International Institute of Strategic Studies noted that this followed the entry of several Middle Eastern states into the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and is part of an effort by China “to translate its economic clout into regional political support for its global ambitions.”
There is little doubt that Beijing has accumulated considerable geopolitical clout in the region through its economic ties and its various projects that come under the collective rubric of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Note that three of its West Asian partners—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—are also military partners of the US. Each of them have their own reasons for building ties with China, something that Washington is watching warily.
As in the case of the Indo-Pacific, India plays a major role in the US counter-strategy. This has involved giving rise to a new geopolitical grouping, the I2U2, comprising India, Israel, the US and UAE; and a geoeconomic project, the India-Europe-Middle East Economic Corridor (IMEEC)—both are helmed by the US.
In the present crisis, Beijing is unlikely to be able to play any significant role immediately. But its goal seems to be to go through the motions, and play for the longer term. Given the complex West Asian situation, that is understandable. Even the US is finding the going difficult. China does have one advantage, which the US has noted—that it is the only player there that had the ability to influence Iran, which is a supporter of Hamas as well as the Hezbollah in Lebanon. This was also underscored by a call from the US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, to his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi last week where he reiterated the US support for Israel’s right of self-defence and called for China to help maintain stability in the region and discourage “other parties[read Iran] from entering the conflict”. In turn, Wang told Blinken that “without reconciliation between the Arab nation and the Israeli nation, there would be no peace in the Middle East.”
The Gaza war has upended the plate tectonics of West Asia. It is now threatening to do so for the world. The US and Europe are straining to maintain some control over the unfolding events, even as they grapple with a war in Ukraine. Meanwhile, the developments provide an element of relief for Russia and an opportunity for China. Whether Beijing can exploit it to its benefit remains to be seen.
About the author: Manoj Joshi is a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation
Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation