Azerbaijan announced that it had launched local counter-terrorism activities in the Karabakh economic region in response to the tragic deaths of two civilians and four police officers in incidents involving landmines, placed by Armenian armed forces
Day: September 22, 2023
Azerbaijan Envisages Amnesty for Karabakh Fighters Who Bid a Farewell to Arms U.S. News & World Report
By Alicia García Herrero and Alessia Amighini
At the G20 in New Delhi, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni announced Italy’s exit from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which the country had joined in March 2019. The long-expected decision by the current Italian government had recently been anticipated by a similar statement by Italy’s Foreign Minister, Antonio Tajani, during a visit to Beijing, although with some nuances that were also reflected in Meloni’s announcement, namely that of a ‘mutually beneficial’ partnership with China and the ‘strengthening’ of bilateral cooperation between the two countries. How such cooperation will take place has yet to be clarified from either the Chinese or the Italian side.
Italy’s official exit from the BRI should come as no surprise for two reasons. During Italy’s last election campaign in the summer of 2022, Meloni said that the country’s adherence to the BRI was a ‘mistake’. Last November, the Defence Minister, Guido Crosetto, said that the renewal of the agreement between the two countries, which was to expire in 2023, was ‘unlikely’. On 21 April 2023, Meloni, as new Italian Premier, confirmed that Italy intended to exit the BRI, but the process has taken many months, up to the G20 Summit that has just ended.
Italy was the only G7 member to move out of line with the Western front in that year, when it signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to join the BRI, and it remains the only one. It has made essentially no gains from its participation in the BRI. Economic integration between the two countries has not progressed significantly through either trade or investment. Italy’s exports to China have increased only slightly, from €14.5 billion to €18.5 billion at the end of 2022.
At the same time, Italy’s imports from China rose from €33.5 billion to €50.9 billion during the same period. Therefore, Italy now has a far larger bilateral trade deficit with China. One of the goals of the MoU was to rebalance an uneven trade relationship, yet nothing has changed after four years. As for investment, China’s foreign direct investment in Italy has plummeted from US$650 million in 2019 to barely US$20 million in 2020, with a slight increase in 2021 to US$33 million. While there has been a general slowdown in Chinese investment globally and in Europe, the drop with Italy has been far more. In fact, China’s investments in Europe has remained extremely concentrated in Germany, France and the Benelux countries, all of which are non-BRI members and the top targets in the EU for Chinese FDI.
The question underlying the announcement is what the consequences might be of such an unprecedented event, as no BRI partner country has never officially opted out before. Beyond isolated assertions that exiting means that ‘Italian companies and citizens who work with China would pay a heavy price if Rome pulls out of the programme’[1], the lessons from past experiences of deteriorating bilateral relationships between China and Western countries are not encouraging.
China’s retaliation against Lithuania[2] is a good example, as it is an EU member state, although economically small. Other cases that might be more relevant are China’s reprisals against Canada, which is also a G7 member like Italy. Finally, there are lessons to be drawn from its reaction with Australia, focused on halting imports. But China’s blockade of imports from Lithuania was even more dramatic since it included imports from Germany that contained from Lithuania.[3] All of these cases, though, had a highly political content: Taiwan in the case of Lithuania, the origin of the COVID pandemic in Australia’s and the arrest of the daughter of Huawei’s founder in Canada. The question is how the decision to leave BRI will be read politically by China’s leadership.
Against such a backdrop, Meloni has so far tried to limit the politicisation of her decision to leave BRI, leaving the door open to other types of agreement with Beijing but not under the BRI trademark. Meloni’s official visit to the US in late July probably helped support her firm stance on leaving. Some observers consider that leaving the BRI is a red line for Beijing, but Meloni’s announcement in Delhi does not seem to have prompted an outright negative reaction from China.
The key to understanding the ‘shifting’ red line regarding Italy’s exit from the BRI might be in Meloni’s announcement in Delhi of ‘future cooperation’ between the two countries. All in all, Meloni has two conflicting constraints. On the one hand, Italy is a founder member of NATO and has been one of the most critical voices against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which China is –at least indirectly– supporting. On the other hand, Meloni’s most powerful constituency is the business sector, which always prefers to look the other way when it comes to introducing geopolitical factors into their strategic business decisions, and generally uses its lobbying power to secure government support in any circumstances that may arise. As a result, Meloni has good reasons to have opted for a low-key exit while at the same time continuing business cooperation, both in Italy and in third countries. This should avoid any risk of retaliation, which is what the Italian business community is most concerned about these days.
China’s domestic situation also needs to be considered when pondering its government’s reaction to the Italian announcement. The increasingly worrying economic situation should, in principle, deter China from taking aggressive measures against Italy, although it must be borne in mind that China’s structural deceleration during the past few years has been accompanied by rising nationalism and a greater hostility to countries perceived to be opposing China.
Moving to the more general perceptions of both countries, the sentiment of the Italian media regarding China improved progressively in the aftermath of the COVID pandemic, although there has been a deterioration over the past couple of months (see Figure 1). The sentiment of the Chinese regarding Italy has not changed much, at least in the Chinese language media although to a somewhat greater extent in China’s English-language media (see Figure 2). This recent divergence may suggest that the Chinese-language media (ie, the media available in mainland China) do not want to over-emphasise Italy’s intention of leaving the BRI as it could risk reducing the country’s reputation. To the contrary, the Chinese English-language media could instead be purposefully showing the deteriorating sentiment regarding Italy in order to raise concerns amongst the Italian business community of the potential consequences of exiting the BRI.
All in all, Meloni’s handling of Italy’s exit from BRI is important for the rest of the world. She has chosen a multilateral setting, namely the G20 summit, but has clearly avoided confrontation by floating the idea of a renewed bilateral co-operation with China. How such a cooperation might shape up in the future will be carefully observed in other European capitals, especially Brussels and Washington DC. Beyond that, other members of the BRI, especially those disappointed with the gains obtained, if any, will be keeping an even closer watch on the aftermath of Meloni’s announcement.
[1] https://www.ft.com/content/15249b54-2459-4126-8fbf-780599cf30ad.
[2] Where China implemented economic sanctions following the opening in November 2021 of a ‘Taiwan Representative Office’ in Vilnius.
[3] https://www.ft.com/content/15119be1-3d57-4769-8f82-ff8cb36a668b.
About the authors:
- Alicia García Herrero was Senior Research Fellow at the Elcano Royal Institute. Chief Economist for Asia Pacific at NATIXIS, she also serves as Senior Fellow at the European think-tank Bruegel and as a non-resident research fellow at the Emerging Market Research Institute (Johnson Cornell University).
- Alessia Amighini is a non-resident fellow at Bruegel and Co-Head of Asia Centre and Senior Associate Research Fellow at ISPI. She is Associate Professor of Economics at the Department of Economic and Business Studies (DiSEI) at the University of Piemonte Orientale (Novara, Italy), and Adjunct Professor of International Economics at the Catholic University (Milan, Italy).
Source: This article was published by the Elcano Royal Institute
Governor Gavin Newsom wants to add a 28th Constitutional Amendment loaded with gun restrictions. The state legislature has the governor’s back. SJR-7 would “call a constitutional convention under Article V of the Constitution of the United States for the purpose of proposing a constitutional amendment relating to firearms,” but there’s more in the pipeline.
AB-28 would “impose an excise tax in the amount of 11 percent of the gross receipts from the retail sale in this state of a firearm, firearm precursor part, and ammunition.” AB-92 “would make it a misdemeanor for a person who is prohibited from possessing a firearm under the laws of this state to purchase, own, or possess body armor, as specified.”
AB-301 “would additionally authorize the court to consider evidence of acquisition of body armor when determining whether grounds for a gun violence restraining order exist.”AB-725 “would amend how a firearm is defined for purposes of these provisions to include the frame or receiver of the weapon, including both a completed frame or receiver, or a firearm precursor part.”
AB-1089 would “require anybody who uses a three-dimensional printer or CNC milling machine to manufacture a firearm to be a state-licensed manufacturer.” AB-1406 “would authorize the department to request a delay of the delivery of a firearm if additional research is required to determine a person’s eligibility.”
- AB-1483 “would delete the private party transaction exemption to the 30-day prohibition.”
- AB-1587 would “require a payment card network to make the merchant category code for firearms and ammunition businesses established by the International Organization for Standardization.
- SB-2 “would require the licensing authority to issue or renew a license if the applicant is not a disqualified person for the license and the applicant is at least 21 years of age.” The bill would also “remove the good character and good cause requirements from the issuance criteria.”
- SB-378 “would require a licensed firearms dealer, as specified, to accept for storage a firearm transferred by an individual to prevent it from being accessed or used during periods of crisis or heightened risk to the owner of the firearm or members of their household.”
- SB-452 “would remove from the definition of an unsafe handgun a semiautomatic pistol without a microstamping component,” and “would prohibit a licensed firearms dealer from selling, offering for sale, exchanging, giving, transferring, or delivering a semiautomatic pistol.” And so on, in addition to the highly restrictive gun laws already existing.
Gov. Newsom cites America’s “gun owning tradition.” Still, the Constitution upholds the “right” of the people to keep and bear arms. See Stephen Halbrook’s The Right to Bear Arms: A Constitutional Right of the People or a Privilege of the Ruling Class?
For what happens when the people with all the power have all the guns, see Halbrook’s Gun Control in the Third Reich: Disarming the Jews and “Enemies of the State” and Gun Control in Nazi-Occupied France: Tyranny and Resistance.
This article was published by The Beacon
By Daniel Lacalle
Oil prices are soaring, and, as always, we read in many articles that OPEC and Russia are to blame. However, if OPEC and its allies were almighty and the drivers of oil prices, why have Brent and West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude plummeted in 2022? OPEC only reacts to demand, but it is not a price-setter. It is a price-taker.
WTI is up 13% year-to-date, but it only started bouncing in May. WTI is only up 6% in the past year. At $90.7/barrel, it is still far away from the June 2022 high of $122/barrel and barely reaching the levels of November 2022.
What made oil prices plummet from their June ’22 highs? Rate hikes and monetary contraction sent the entire commodity complex down to pre-Ukraine invasion levels despite production cuts, geopolitical risk, and the Chinese re-opening. Commodity prices are driven by monetary factors, and the hawkish stance of global central banks accelerated the decline despite supply chain challenges and limits to production. Added to the decline in the money supply and rate hikes, the United States and non-OPEC production offset the negative impact of Russia and OPEC limits on some exports. Competition works. Finally, oil prices stumbled as Asian demand ended up being weaker than estimated, with global industrial production declining, particularly in developed economies.
The weakness in crude was a combination of monetary factors, increased United States supply, and weaker global demand. Those three factors have now reversed at the same time.
We cannot blame OPEC when prices rise and ignore them when prices fall.
The biggest challenge for the oil market in developed economies in the next five years is self-inflicted.
Governments and financial institutions all over the world declared war on investment in fossil fuels under the misguided view that supply and prices would not be affected. According to JP Morgan, there is a chronic underinvestment in the oil and gas complex that exceeds $600 billion per year. In 2022, with oil prices rising to the previously mentioned $122/barrel, companies all over the world continued to reduce investment in exploration and production. Development capital expenditure was kept to a bare minimum, and even some European oil and gas giants started selling their “net zero emissions” strategy, ignoring the global energy reality. Total oil and gas investment came below depreciation for the sixth year in a row, according to Goldman Sachs.
The energy transition cannot happen through ideological imposition. It requires technology and competition. Destroying the incentives to invest in oil and gas and imposing an ideological, not industrial, view of energy has made developed economies more dependent on fossil fuels.
When politicians decide, they willingly ignore economic calculations because they believe that the political world dictates prices, not supply and demand. Economic analysis has been abandoned, and the result is an exceedingly negative scenario.
Developed economies have destroyed all incentives to invest in diversification and security of supply of oil and gas driven by an ideological view of the world without having a feasible, abundant, and flexible alternative. Thus, when the United States administration imposes more restrictions on oil and gas investment and the European Union decides to reduce nuclear capacity and ban the development of domestic resources, all they have done is make their economies more dependent on foreign suppliers.
Western governments now demand that OPEC produce more while, at the same time, saying that their nations will not use fossil fuels in ten years. This is the imaginary deal that we, in the West, offer to oil and gas producing nations: “Dear oil and gas producers, you have to produce as much as we demand and sell it cheap, investing billions of dollars in development, but we will not use your product in ten years”. I imagine there is no rush to sign such a deal.
It is hard to believe that the global emerging market producers will be thrilled about the prospect of eliminating their energy exports only to import more “energy transition” engineering from developed nations.
According to OPEC sources, there could be a two-million barrel-per-day supply shock in the winter of 2023. Other analysts are more prudent but still see a market that is tight today and may be getting worse as the underinvestment toll becomes more apparent.
The entire bounce in oil prices since May is driven by the rushed decision of central banks to stop the monetary tightening before the inflation battle has ended and by the misguided decision to limit investments in domestic resources in the middle of a geopolitical battle without a clear alternative. Governments have created their own supply shock by placing ideological views in the energy industry. The alternatives are not evident yet; technology and availability have not been fully developed, but politicians have already decided when the transition must be completed.
Crude oil did not replace whale oil due to the decisions of environmentalists or politicians. Crude oil displaced other sources of energy because it was easier to store, produce, and transport. Crude oil and natural gas proved to be abundant, easy to manage, and economically efficient. This is the first time in human history that the energy transition has been decided by politicians without allowing technology, competition, or human ingenuity to come up with a better, more flexible, and more economical alternative. Renewables are great, but they are intermittent and volatile. We need to allow the world to produce alternatives when they can truly replace the current energy resources without destroying our lifestyle and economy.
We may blame OPEC for rising oil prices, but the fact is that they only react to weak demand and low prices. OPEC may increase production at its next meeting, but the reality is that the energy supply issues have been created by Western governments and may persist. Instead of allowing all sources of energy to compete and allocation of capital to generate the investments needed for security of supply and energy transition, what has happened is that we may have created an energy crisis by political design. The alternatives are not ready, and the domestic resources that could limit prices have been banned or severely limited.
The irony is that anyone who understands energy knows that there is no successful energy transition without natural gas and nuclear, and this requires incentives to invest in energy security. Governments will not back down, and they will prefer a decline in energy prices coming from a deep recession to an improvement coming from diversification and investment.
This may be yet another energy crisis created by political design. Unfortunately, instead of learning and changing, many developed nations’ policymakers will prefer to impose restrictions on consumers. Ultimately, the incorrect planning of this energy transition is not a question of energy sovereignty or climate change, but a way to control citizens. That is why many governments prefer to see soaring energy prices, because that will allow them to impose restrictions on consumers.
About the author: Daniel Lacalle, PhD, economist and fund manager, is the author of the bestselling books Freedom or Equality (2020), Escape from the Central Bank Trap (2017), The Energy World Is Flat (2015), and Life in the Financial Markets (2014). He is a professor of global economy at IE Business School in Madrid.
Source: This article was published by the Mises Institute
By Mirella Bilalagic and Dr Simone Bunse
The threat of acute food insecurity is once again growing after years of progress in bringing levels down. An estimated 258 million people experienced dangerous levels of food insecurity in 2022—more than double the number just three years earlier. The majority lived in countries afflicted by a combination of underdevelopment and armed conflict.
The largest populations experiencing crisis-level food insecurity or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or higher) lived in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (27.4 million), Ethiopia (23.6 million), Afghanistan (19.9 million), Nigeria (19.5 million) and Yemen (17.3 million). The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) warn that food security will likely deteriorate further in 2023 in 18 global hunger hotspots.
At the 2023 Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development, researchers, development practitioners, policymakers and civil society representatives explored the links between food security, peace and development—particularly in fragile and conflict-affect countries. This topical backgrounder is inspired by a number of sessions at the Forum, looking at drivers of food insecurity, current challenges to food security programmes, and ways to prevent conflict-related food insecurity or respond more effectively when it does happen.
Drivers of food insecurity
The global rise in food insecurity is linked to a combination of interconnected, often mutually reinforcing drivers. In its reporting on food crises, the Food Security Information Network (FSIN) identifies three main types of driver: economic shocks; conflict and insecurity; and weather extremes. Its annual statistics show how the interactions between these drivers, and their relative impacts, can vary over time.
According to FSIN’s 2023 Global Report on Food Crises, while conflict and insecurity remained the primary driver of acute food insecurity in terms of numbers of people affected, economic shocks were the dominant driver in more than half of 58 countries hit by food crises in 2022, including Afghanistan, South Sudan and Syria. These economic shocks included repercussions of the war in Ukraine and the Covid-19 pandemic, and related issues such as contractions in gross domestic product (GDP), inflation, unemployment and reduced exports increasing food prices.
Crucially, however, although FSIN identifies the primary driver of food insecurity in a given country, two or three such drivers are often present, reinforcing each other and eroding the country’s, or a population’s, resilience.
Challenges to effective food security programming
The worsening food security situation comes at a time when, particularly in conflict-affected countries, food security programming by external humanitarian and development actors faces several critical challenges. Three of these are discussed below: funding constraints; the weaponization of food; and the politicization of food aid.
International development actors and humanitarian agencies involved in food security programming are suffering serious shortfalls in funding. With soaring global food prices—driven by, among other factors, the war in Ukraine and its impact on food exports—this means they can distribute less food and have had to cut back the number of beneficiaries and locations they can service. Earlier this year, for example, WFP reported unprecedented funding shortfalls for its responses to food crises in Jordan, Pakistan, Tanzania and Yemen.
Even though total humanitarian assistance increased by 27 per cent in 2022, there remains a US$52.4 billion funding gap—the largest ever. It is becoming clear that, to be more effective, food security programming needs to go beyond humanitarian assistance alone and include climate adaptation, development, peacebuilding and conflict prevention. Peacebuilding, in particular, has often been neglected and is rarely an explicit objective of humanitarian programmes.
Responses are also being complicated by the ‘weaponization’ of food: the use of food as a weapon of war and political control. Examples abound, despite the UN Security Council’s adoption of Resolution 2417 in 2018 on the protection of civilians, which strongly condemns the use of starvation as a warfare tactic, along with the unlawful denial of humanitarian access.
The use of food to shape conflict dynamics has taken different forms in different contexts. For example, Boko Haram has reportedly been using access to food supplies as part of its recruitment strategy in north-eastern Nigeria. In Venezuela, the armed forces and various non-state armed groups operating food distribution programmes on behalf of the state have reportedly distributed supplies based on loyalty to the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela. In Somalia, research indicates that al-Shabab operates as a ‘proto-state’ in parts of the country, providing food and humanitarian relief in locations where government presence is limited or non-existent.
Finally, while humanitarian interventions by external actors should be depoliticized, according to humanitarian principles, and not made part of any political negotiations, in reality the main drivers of food security tend to interact with political interests. Humanitarian actors must often balance the urgency of delivering food (and other) assistance to suffering populations against the risk of unintentionally legitimizing gangs or other non-state actors who control the affected areas during interactions. It is nearly impossible to keep humanitarian food aid separate from local and national politics, and engagement with political actors, even illegitimate non-state actors, may well be unavoidable.
Responding to and preventing conflict-related food insecurity: Ways forward
Discussions at the 2023 Stockholm Forum focused on how to ensure that food security programmes provide food and effective access to it, meet people’s dietary needs and preferences, improve food stability, and are also conflict-sensitive, conflict-preventative and sustainable. Four suggestions that emerged are particularly noteworthy.
Integrated food security approaches with a greater focus on peace
Food security programmes in a conflict-affected area may both affect and be affected by conflict dynamics—positively or negatively. Paying special attention to promoting peace and preventing conflict is hence crucial in any food security programming. Particularly in contexts where food supply has been weaponized or politicized, any conflict-related repercussions should be carefully monitored in order to fulfil humanitarian principles as far as possible and limit potential adverse effects.
The humanitarian–development–peace (HDP) nexus approach is based on improving collaboration, coherence and complementarity between humanitarian, development and peacebuilding activities in the same geographic area. In many fragile contexts the approach not only offers increased possibilities to prevent conflict and improve the prospects for peace, but also carries great potential for synergy and cost-efficiency to stem current food insecurity trends. Indeed, a lack of coordination can undermine progress and even put communities in danger. In South Sudan, for instance, food aid has sometimes been diverted or looted by community self-defence groups or other armed groups, fuelling conflict rather than solving food insecurity.
When food security programmes incorporate such a nexus approach and are context-sensitive and designed to have long-term impact, they can provide a pathway out of fragility. To do this, they should not only emphasize immediate nutrition needs but also focus more prominently on issues of sustainability, cost-effectiveness and resilience. They should try to address local grievances, for example related to food or fertilizer price hikes, lack of economic opportunities for women and men, or the worsening impacts of climate change, which can all spark social unrest.
The implementation of such a nexus approach relies on creating or strengthening networks of complementary stakeholders and engaging different actors through collaboration and partnerships. Many humanitarian, development and peacebuilding actors are currently grappling with how to make such partnerships work.
Funding: Achieving more through accessible, flexible resources for locally grounded food security initiatives
There are no signs that funding shortfalls are going to go away. Thus, food security programming needs to become as cost-effective as possible. Integrated approaches are one way, especially in (hopefully) reducing future needs. Another way could be through improving funding mechanisms.
Such improvements should include more accessible and flexible funding, in conjunction with locally led resilience building and the empowerment of local actors. Local actors often have a deeper understanding than external actors of specific local food security challenges and conflict dynamics that impact humanitarian and development operations and programme implementation. However, they may lack the necessary resources and technical means to access funding to address food security issues.
A SIPRI study on food security financing in South Sudan found that donors lacked confidence in local organizations’ ability to manage international funds or control the risk of corruption. Empowering local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community organizations through capacity building and opportunities to access flexible funding may reduce donors’ risk perception and allow for more context-specific, responsive and adaptable programming. Under certain conditions, if food security programmes are led by local NGOs or community organizations this may also help to depoliticize food aid.
Gender sensitivity in food security initiatives
Food security interventions need to be not only conflict-sensitive but also gender-sensitive. For one thing, improving the quality of gender-disaggregated data is necessary if programmes are to achieve more effective outcomes and enhance their peacebuilding potential. Women play a key role in both food systems and conflict prevention. Women are crucial in food production and preparation. In many countries, agri-food systems are a more important livelihood source for women than for men. A recent FAO reportfinds that 66 per cent of women in sub-Saharan Africa and 71 per cent of women in southern Asia are employed in agri-food systems (compared to 60 per cent and 47 per cent of men, respectively).
Yet women often encounter challenges in obtaining resources and making autonomous decisions. In addition, their contributions are typically undervalued. This is despite the fact that strengthening women’s role in agri-food systems can, in many countries, increase food production and improve nutrition for a community. According to data from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, in 2020–21 only 4 per cent of total bilateral official development assistance (ODA) had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a principal objective.
As to conflict prevention, evidence suggests that women’s inclusion in peace negotiations, agreements and post-conflict reconstruction makes sustained peace more likely. A focus on gender equality can also help foster economic development, a key factor that can contribute to insulating communities from food-related conflict. Inclusive programming that promotes women’s empowerment and livelihoods can alleviate poverty and inequities, while at the same time strengthening social cohesion by reducing women’s marginalization and establishing a sense of shared purpose and prosperity between men and women.
Earlier action through synced and improved early warning
Early-warning systems are critical components of food security programming. They provide timely information about probable surges in acute food insecurity, which can be used to prepare for and possibly even prevent a crisis. There are at least five different food insecurity early-warning systems in operation, alongside multiple agricultural information systems and mixed information systems. The Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), for example, already provides early warning of acute food insecurity in much of Africa, Central America and Afghanistan, while WFP’s Vulnerability Analyses and Mapping (VAM) covers 80 countries. Mechanisms like the Hunger Map LIVE and the Consolidated Approach to Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI) serve to inform WFP’s planning, resource allocation and need for emergency interventions.
But to ensure earlier action is taken that can potentially prevent or mitigate food crises, improvements are needed both in early-warning systems and in how they interact with food security programming. For example, according to a study by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), some early warning systems do not adequately factor in structural vulnerabilities and market dynamics in international food systems. Current early-warning systems tend to give different results as to the severity of food insecurity, depending on their methods and coverage. This can lead to delayed and uncoordinated responses. In addition, national governments may not properly integrate early-warning systems into their food security programming, hindering prevention and responsiveness.
Greater collaboration among relevant international organizations (e.g. WFP, FAO and UN Environment), as well as support from the research community and consultation with policymakers, development agencies and local stakeholders, is required to better sync and improve early-warning systems for food insecurity. Furthermore, integrating such systems more systematically into policy and practice, and paying attention to both national and global food systems and economic interlinkages, could ensure that programmes become more proactive rather than reactive. This would allow for more timely actions that potentially save lives and resources.
Conclusion
The deepening global food crisis, driven by concurrent economic shocks, conflict and insecurity, and weather extremes that are being made more frequent and more intense by climate change, requires urgent action. Food security programming must become both more effective and more efficient. This means not only being more responsive but also having a longer-term, preventive focus. Food security interventions cannot be just about providing food; they need to be part of supporting peace and helping communities to become more resilient, secure and sustainable—and thus less vulnerable to food insecurity in the future.
Enhancing resilience to food insecurity was a thematic focus of the 2023 Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development. This topical backgrounder is inspired and informed by several sessions at the Forum, most notably ‘Food security for peace: Strengthening the evidence for transformative programming’ and ‘Disarming hunger: The role of peace within humanitarian–development–peace nexus approaches in addressing food crises’. The authors would like to thank the speakers and participants in all these sessions for their invaluable insights.
About the authors:
- Mirella Bilalagic is an intern in the SIPRI Food, Peace and Security Programme.
- Dr Simone Bunse is a Senior Researcher in the SIPRI Food, Peace and Security Programme.
Source: This article was published by SIPRI
By Harsh V. Pant
In international relations, strategic turnarounds are not uncommon, and are in fact embedded in the very tapestry of anarchical structural realities. Yet, even by those standards, the immediacy and scale of the volte-face in relations between the United States and Vietnam since the Cold War has been remarkable.
On September 10, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee, Nguyen Phu Trong, and the U.S. President, Joe Biden, met in Vietnam during Mr. Biden’s visit, marking a new phase in the bilateral relationship between the two countries. The standout from this meeting was the elevation of U.S.-Vietnam relations to a U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership from a U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership forged in 2013 between Vietnam President Truong Tan Sang and U.S. President Barack Obama.
A complex foreign policy legacy
Given the complex history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam during the Cold War, this elevation marks a significant step up. Vietnam’s strategic restraint notwithstanding, motivations for an upgrade in bilateral relationship have existed on either side, at least since 2013, if not before. Vietnam’s reservations about entering into a strategic partnership with the U.S. have both contemporary and historical relevance.
The geopolitics involving China’s growing belligerence in the Pacific theatre, felt most palpably in the waters surrounding Vietnam and the broader South China Sea, has proven to be a first order deterrent for Vietnam’s great power engagements. On the other hand, the historical legacy of Vietnam’s contested relations with the U.S. during the Vietnam War, an axile relationship with the communist states China and the Soviet Union, culminating in the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Soviet Union in 1978, had together imparted a direction diametrically opposite to U.S. interests. This complex foreign policy legacy is the reason why hitherto Vietnam has entered into a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ with only four nations: China, Russia, India and South Korea.
This year marks the 50th anniversary of the Paris Peace Accords signed in 1973 to end the Vietnam War. Much water has flown under the bridge, in that Vietnam’s relations with the U.S. have come a long way. Mr. Biden’s Indo-Pacific policy now counts Vietnam as among the U.S.’s ‘leading regional partners’ in the region. Vietnam is the 10th largest goods trading partner of the U.S. In 2020, the total value of trade in goods and services between the U.S. and Vietnam amounted to approximately $92.2 billion and exceeded $138 billion in 2022. In May 2022, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) was launched by the U.S., with Vietnam as a founding member along with 13 other countries to revive Washington’s economic dynamism in the Asia-Pacific.
Expanding ties
The Biden administration has depicted an unusual nimbleness in its strategic embrace of Vietnam. The visits by U.S. Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin and Vice President Kamala Harris to Vietnam in 2021, the meeting between Secretary Austin and Vietnamese Minister of National Defence of Vietnam General Phan Van Giang in Singapore in June 2022, and visits by U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken and Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen this year have culminated in Mr. Biden’s visit and augmenting of the bilateral relationship.
The U.S.-Vietnam relationship is now rapidly expanding its bilateral spectrum with an emphasis on enhancing political trust, strengthening science, technology, health and digital innovation cooperation, training of high-quality workforce, addressing climate change, and establishing a strong defence relationship in the backdrop of China’s increasing assertiveness. Addressing legacy issues underlines these cooperative efforts.
An assertive China
The war in Europe has thrown new challenges for Vietnam as its weapons import from Russia — its largest defence supplier — has been hit by West-led sanctions. These limitations in the face of Vietnam’s resolve to modernise its military, coupled with an ever-growing assertiveness from China, is also gradually nudging Vietnam in a new direction. China’s dramatic steps in 2014 to place oil rigs in Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone and subsequent assertive posturing have tested its avowed policy to stay clear of great power politics in the region. Undoubtedly, Washington senses an opportunity here and bolstering the defence and security relationship with Vietnam is a key piece of America’s grand strategy in the Indo-Pacific.
An important component of Mr. Biden’s visit was to start the process of friend-shoring supply chains in the semiconductor industry to Vietnam, even as it seeks to boost Hanoi’s chip manufacturing capabilities. As the two countries seek an expanded economic partnership by increasing investments in critical technologies, chips and Artificial Intelligence, there is space for linking such partnerships across the broader realms of the Indo-Pacific with like-minded partners. India’s initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) partnership with the U.S. along with the Quad’s Principles of critical and emerging technology could provide an overarching framework in the Indo-Pacific for a standardisation of technology in its design, development and use. A supply chain arch which extends from Vietnam to Europe via West Asia, and anchored by India with the newly-launched India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor during the recent G-20 meet in India could symbolise ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ in an apt way.
About the authors:
- Professor Harsh V. Pant is Vice President – Studies and Foreign Policy at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. He is a Professor of International Relations with King’s India Institute at King’s College London. He is also Director (Honorary) of Delhi School of Transnational Affairs at Delhi University.
- Vivek Mishra is a Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. His research interests include America in the Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific and Asia-Pacific regions, particularly the role of the US in security in South Asia, Indo-US defence relations, and the Indian defence sector.
Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation and originally appeared in The Hindu.