Day: September 10, 2023

One of the most important trends in the post-Soviet space has been the sharp reduction in the relative size of non-titular nations in the newly independent countries. Yet, while Moscow’s opportunities to exploit these national minorities have declined as a result, the Russian authorities still make use of them. They present Moscow as the chief defender of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in these states, employing other ethnic minorities as leverage against the governments involved. In recent years, Moscow’s efforts in this regard have centered most prominently on the Karakalpaks of Uzbekistan and the Gagauz of Moldova (see EDM, June 9, 2020, May 9).

The Kremlin has also shown that it has not forgotten those groups it earlier exploited and reserves the right to turn its attention back to them when it feels necessary. Perhaps the most prominent example of this is the Talysh, a Persian-speaking group in Azerbaijan numbering several hundred thousand there and about the same number in adjoining sections of Iran. Three decades ago, some in Moscow supported this group; however, this minority appears to have been largely ignored in the Kremlin since that time. Even so, over the past several weeks, the Talysh have returned to the center of new tensions in Russia’s relationship with Azerbaijan.

The ostensible cause of this conflict was a memorial held on August 9 in the Urals city of Yekterinburg commemorating the 30^th anniversary of the formation of the Talysh-Mughan Autonomous Republic. This republic was a short-lived state formation within Azerbaijan that unsuccessfully pursued the creation of an autonomous region for the Talysh living there. That effort attracted relatively little popular support at the time and was suppressed within weeks by Baku. The ringleaders were arrested, sentenced to long prison sentences and, in some cases, ultimately expelled to the Netherlands where they later formed a Talysh independence party. But with rare exceptions over the past 30 years, the group has attracted little attention beyond Azerbaijan (see EDM, February 3, 2015; Kavkaz-uzel.eu; Nakanune.ru, August 28; Forum-msk.org, September 1).

That public neglect might have continued even with the Yekaterinburg meeting save for two key factors. First, tensions between Moscow and Baku are mounting over the future of Karabakh and other issues, which is prompting the Kremlin to employ various means to demonstrate its ability to cause trouble in the South Caucasus for anyone who challenges its authority (News.am, August 28). Second, the attendance of Igor Volodin, chair of the Yekaterinburg city council and a member of the United Russia party, at the Talysh memorial created quite a stir, as it seemed to signal that the event had Moscow’s approval.

These tensions and the appearance of a prominent albeit local Russian official prompted Baku to send a diplomat note to Moscow on August 16 protesting what the Azerbaijani government sees as official Russian support for the Talysh and thus opposition to Baku’s efforts to integrate its national minorities. The note was followed by a statement from Azerbaijan’s ambassador in Moscow denouncing Volodin’s appearance and articles in the Azerbaijani media criticizing Russian interference in Azerbaijan’s internal affairs (Ura.news, August 16; News.ru, August 27; Kavkaz-uzel.eu;Nakanune.ru, August 28).

Volodin may have appeared at the meeting entirely on his own initiative to gain support from members of the Talysh minority now living in his city who are voters there. This may very well have been the case, Moscow officials, on August 27, told the Azerbaijani embassy that Volodin would not remain chair of the city duma after the upcoming elections. They assert that he should have consulted with more senior officials before appearing at such a meeting. And the fact that he did not raises questions about his reliability and current position (Ura.news, August 31). These officials undoubtedly hope that they have “extinguished” the controversy, especially given that many more could lose their jobs if the Kremlin decides they, too, have violated official policy (News.ru; 66.ru, August 30).

However, there are compelling reasons to think that this is hardly the whole story. On the one hand, senior Russian politicians do not attend meetings of foreign opposition groups without either explicit direction from their higher-ups or because they believe that what they are doing is consistent with official policy. On the other hand, growing tensions between Moscow and Baku over the Armenian community in Karabakh and its future within Azerbaijan make the Volodin fiasco seem reminiscent of the Kremlin “playing the Talysh card.” After all, by reminding the Azerbaijani authorities that Moscow can cause trouble for Baku if it does not go along with Russia on negotiations with Yerevan, the Kremlin is clearly hopeful that the Azerbaijani government will decide that it is better not to challenge Russia directly lest it face something like a new Mughan movement.

And the potential for such a movement may be even greater now as Russia and Iran may now be on the same side of the issue. Tehran seems to want to rein in Baku and dispatch Talysh groups from within Iran to the southern part of Azerbaijan to cause trouble. Such a move would give the Azerbaijani government another ethnic issue to handle—something it does not need given the international attention to the closure of the Lachin corridor by which the ethnic Armenians in Karabakh had been receiving supplies from Yerevan.

Hence, a Talysh meeting in a Russian city far from the South Caucasus may be about more than it appears on the surface and have consequences far greater than many are inclined to think. At the very least, these possibilities will be on the mind of policymakers in Moscow and Tehran, on the one hand, and Baku and its allies, on the other. And that will remain true even if the diplomatic back-and-forth over the Yekaterinburg meeting quiets over the next several weeks.

A sniper of Ukraine’s 3rd Separate Assault Brigade takes a position during a reconnaissance mission near the eastern city of Bakhmut.

The final declaration of the Group of 20 (G20) major economies in India left Kyiv angry over its refusal to condemn Moscow for its aggression against Ukraine, as new fragments of projectiles appeared to have landed on NATO-member Romania’s territory on September 9.

“We are grateful to the partners who tried to include strong wording in the text,” Ukrainian Foreign Ministry spokesman Oleh Nikolenko posted on Facebook.

“However, in terms of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, [the] G20 has nothing to be proud of,” he wrote.

RFE/RL’s Live Briefing gives you all of the latest developments on Russia’s full-scale invasion, Kyiv’s counteroffensive, Western military aid, global reaction, and the plight of civilians. For all of RFE/RL’s coverage of the war in Ukraine, click here.

The final declaration revealed the sharp divisions over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with host India able to get attendees to agree to a final statement only after softening language on Moscow’s war on its neighbor.

The statement underlined the “human suffering and negative added impacts of the war in Ukraine,” but did not mention Russia’s invasion.

“All states must refrain from the threat or use of force to seek territorial acquisition against the territorial integrity and sovereignty or political independence of any state. The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible,” it said, referencing the UN Charter.

A senior EU diplomat told AP that the bloc had not given up any of its position and said the fact that Moscow had signed on to the agreement was important.

“The option we have is text or no text, and I think it is better [to have a] text. At least if they [the Russians] don’t implement, we know once more that we cannot rely on them,” the diplomat said.

Meanwhile, Kyiv said the toll of the wounded from a Russian missile strike on the Ukrainian city of Kryviy Rih rose to 74, as Ukrainian forces pressed their slow counteroffensive against Russian forces in southern and eastern regions.

Elsewhere, Romanian officials said they had found new drone fragments on the NATO member’s territory near the Ukrainian border for the second time this week. The Defense Ministry said they were “similar to those used by the Russian Army.”

President Klaus Iohannis said in a statement that the fragments indicated “an absolutely unacceptable violation of the sovereign airspace of Romania, a NATO ally, with real risks to the security of Romanian citizens in the area.”

Iohannis added that he had a phone call with NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg to inform him of the new finding and that he had received assurances of the alliance’s support.

Moscow did not comment on the report.

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Eighteen months into Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine is struggling to build momentum in the counteroffensive taking place over three fronts, with the primary push coming south of Orikhiv, in the southern Zaporizhzhya region.

While some Western allies have expressed frustration with the slow pace of the effort, now in its third month, Ukrainian troops have shown glimpses of success in breaching the Russian defensive lines.

Kyiv also claimed “partial success” in the east, near the obliterated Donetsk region city of Bakhmut, which Russia captured earlier this year.

And in Crimea, Russian-installed authorities in the city of Simferopol called a blaze at a military post a “domestic fire” and not the result of an attack by Ukrainian drones.

Full details of the blaze were not immediately available. Kyiv has not commented.

A main goal of Ukraine’s southern counteroffensive is to drive toward the peninsula and eventually retake the region, which was illegally annexed by Russia in 2014.

Kyiv estimates that Russia has deployed more than 420,000 soldiers in areas it controls in the east and south of Ukraine, deputy intelligence chief Vadym Skibitskiy said on September 9.

“The Russian Federation has concentrated more than 420,000 servicemen in our territories that are temporarily occupied, including Crimea,” Skibitskiy said at a conference in Kyiv. The figure “does not include the Russian National Guard and other special units that maintain occupation authorities on our territories.”

Ukraine is almost entirely dependent on Western military aid and equipment to wage its defense against the Russian invasion. Kyiv has repeatedly pressed the United States and other allies for more powerful weaponry, such as F-16 fighter jets, which could be put into service next year.

Kyiv has also sought supplies of long-range, U.S.-designed Army Tactical Missile Systems, which have a greater distance for striking at Russian targets.

The United States has been reluctant to send the weapons, but unnamed U.S. officials told ABC News that the systems, known as ATACMS, or “attack-ems,” were likely to be supplied in the end.

“They are coming,” one anonymous official told ABC News on September 8. A second official said the missiles were “on the table” and likely to be included in an upcoming weapons package.

Japan’s foreign minister arrived in Kyiv on September 9 in an unannounced visit aimed at showing support for Ukraine.

Yoshimasa Hayashi met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy and agreed to begin talks on potential security guarantees and to cooperate on reconstructing Ukraine’s economy, Japan’s Foreign Ministry said.

Japan has joined the West in supporting Ukraine and imposing sanctions on Russia. However, it does not allow the supply of weapons, under long-standing pacifist government policies.

It’s the first visit by a Japanese foreign minister to Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba in a joint news conference thanked Hayashi for his country’s support and that he wanted the foreign minister “and the entire Japanese people to know that the Ukrainian people remember and will never forget the humanitarian aid.”

With reporting by Reuters and AP